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Europe is changing rapidly, which may also have a bearing on its criminal landscape. 
 is does not mean that all sorts of new crime are emerging: a large part of the crimes 
remains pro t-oriented and is committed by known modus operandi.  at is the old 
face of crime. Amidst the traditional landscape new faces of crime can be identi ed. 
 e internet is such a new face which emerges among others in the sex industry. 
 is is as old as the human race, with all the related abuses and exploitation. But the 
internet gives it also a new face because of its broad reach and related opportunities, 
negative as well as positive.  is volume provides other examples of this two-faced 
Janus head of crime. Old criminal trades, such as the illegal cigarette market, synthetic 
drugs and criminal exploitation of human labour, but also new criminal specialisations, 
new professional and industrial skills developed by ‘old’ ethnic minorities on various 
crime markets in central Europe. Meanwhile, the on-going illegal migrations continue 
to exert their in uence on the perception of crime: while the actual prevalence of most 
types of crime decreases, fear of crime continues to increase.  e  ow of migrants is 
unrelated to this outcome but it impacts nevertheless on the perception of crime.
 is volume of the 18th Cross-border Crime Colloquium, held in Bratislava in 
the spring of 2017, contains the peer-reviewed contributions of 22 European experts 
and up-and-coming researchers.  eir chapters cover a broad  eld of crime in which the 
double faced Janus head can be discerned: illegal migrants, criminal markets, corruption, 
money laundering and organised crime, highlighting many new aspects.
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Introduction: the multiple meaning of the  
Janus face in crime 
 
Petrus C. van Duyne 
 
 
 
 
The double face above the door 
 
“Panta rhei”, all flows, was one of the statements attributed to the pre-So-
cratic Greek philosopher Heraclitus. It looks like a platitude but following 
its tracks one may be surprised of the outcomes. Not because things change 
as such, but the ways they take place and how temporary they prove to be. 
Nothing has a final destination or an end-meaning as is symbolised by an 
ancient myth and expressed in the double sided Janus face. Why jumping 
from an old Greek philosopher to a respectable Roman god, probably with 
some Etruscan relatives? He was the god of “the beginning and end, open-
ing and closing”, which can be associated with the “all flows” principle of 
Heraclitus. With this meaning his face landed above the ianua or door, and 
by further association gave the opening month of the year his name. But 
why his double-faced appearance? This was the result of a punishment by 
the upper-god Jupiter because of Janus’ transgression of hiding a ‘refugee 
god’, namely Saturnus. The latter (married to his own sister) had eaten his 
own children to prevent being dethroned by them. This incurred the wrath 
of Jupiter which was extended to Janus who since then had two faces. De-
spite his crimes he was worshipped as an important god which of course 
disappeared with Christianity. However, the mysterious two-faced head 
did not disappear and was found in many places and newly interpreted. 
Dissected from its godly origin the image of two faces got the association 
of duplicity. The lemma of present dictionaries mention: a double dealing 
personality. Thus the Janus face, having a criminal origin, can also mean 
two stories from one source. But which one is true? Combined with ‘eve-
rything flows’ this Janus concept is a suitable metaphor for studying issues 
with multiple facets, uncertainty and ongoing change, such criminality. 
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 What is the Janus face of crime? That is a too broad question to answer 
because the Janus head can be found above every door through which 
crime or criminals pass, whether coming or going. If we want to detect a 
double meaning we must pass the door under his austere stone face to see 
what is on the other side because the metaphor is not necessarily universal. 
The other side may be empty: for crimes such as murder, assault, rape or 
theft it is unlikely to find ‘another face’ of crime, though a defence attorney 
will always try to suggest one. With other forms of crime a ‘second face’ 
would not be far-fetched. For example, one has ‘crimes for profit’ on one 
face but without a direct victim on the other side. Or, the ‘victim face’ does 
not look ‘unhappy’ at all, because of provided coveted illegal goods and 
services. With various economic crimes ‘abstract victims’ have to be 
dragged to the fore: ‘the state’, the ‘public fund’ or even more abstract ‘the 
community’ or the ‘general morality’. This vague or abstract face of crime 
is juxtaposed with the common consumers who are satisfied to have been 
served with: illegally crossing the borders, having a cheap cigarette or a 
joint or any other cheap illegal product having been made expensive or 
scarce by the authorities now parading as the primary victims of crime. 
They may rather be victims of own policy as may be argued about the 
global anti-drug policy (Bruun et al., 1975; Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; 
Paoli et al., 2009). Some criminal ‘services’ have no ‘happy face’ at the 
other side of the door: they may be a prelude to personal tragedy and vic-
timisation: e.g. human trafficking and sexual exploitation after the ‘smug-
gling service’ of a safe border crossing. 
 The Janus face of crime has also a temporal side: the ‘pantei rhei’ door 
to the future. The New Year starts with the first of Janus or January and so 
figuratively the ‘new year’ of crime. Is there ‘a criminal futurology’ help-
ing us to imagine the future Janus face? Some parameters are known: for 
example, a greying population with less crime, more migrants (for a better 
life or driven from hearth and home by war, prosecution or climate 
change), while the market of prohibited substances may prove to be as re-
silient as ever (UNODC, 2016). Nevertheless, there are important uncer-
tainties. There is the cyber dimension in the commission of property 
crimes, hate and sex crimes.  
 An uncertainty of a different order is the dual political factor in dealing 
with crime: the public imagery or fear of crime is an emotive face with an 
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enormous political potential. ‘Fear of crime’ is an uncertain, intangible re-
flection of the actual state of crime. With a usual ‘upwards bias’ –believing 
more than there is – fear of crime is like ‘soft wax’ in the hands of political 
manipulators for moulding a suitable political, rather populist face. To this 
end some concrete elements must be added. Today, in the industrialised 
world, it is the (Muslim) migration issue being grist to the mill of populists: 
kneading migration plus ‘crime in the mind’ into a fearsome face. It is a 
guaranteed winning ticket for which a politician does not even need real 
crime or migrants, as is demonstrated by the election results in the quiet 
orderly Slovenia, May 2918. The state of affairs in Hungary is also a good 
illustration for this psychological fear-of-crime-kneading: entrenched be-
hind its barbed wire and fences the Hungarian people display a xenophobia 
and a fear of a ‘Jewish conspiracy’ though with few (Muslim) strangers or 
sinister Jews around. The exception is the philanthropist Soros whose NGO 
left the country in April 2018. 
 Indeed, the strength of the Janus face metaphor does not consist of an 
unchangeable stone sculpture, but in the flexibility with which one of the 
sides can be shaped and kneaded. 
 
 
The alien Janus face 
 
Janus as the god of the entrance is a proper metaphor of the ‘alien’ trying 
to enter the European Union. However, instead of a mysterious god there 
is the European Commission guarding the entrance – to most citizens not 
a less mysterious being. Whether that is an improvement compared to a 
capricious ancient god remains to be seen. The EU is a rule based commu-
nity of states, though in its functioning it may be as capricious as any an-
cient god. Also, there is not just one door: there are as many as there are 
member states each with its national Janus face, albeit with EU regulations 
at the doorposts. Behind the ‘national door’ there may be a hall with new 
doors leading to new uncertainties: what face is there on the other side? 
 Of course, a rule based EU tries to avoid the accusation of being capri-
cious. Rules are intended to reduce uncertainty. How that is implemented 
is set out in the chapter on trafficking victimisation by Gwen Herkes. Vic-
timisation is not only an important existential event, it is also important as 
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a practical yardstick to manage the inflow of migrants and thus defend the 
European borders and security, however, with a ‘touch of humanity’. 
While the maintenance of security is one of the basic tasks of the EU and 
national authorities, there is also the harm dimension: the harm suffered by 
the migrant and the harm that may be done to the interests of the EU mem-
ber states. According to the author ‘harm’ is a Janus face of its own, but 
with lack of clarity on its back side. Which harm is recognised? That de-
pends considerably on who is harmed and how as that determines the allo-
cation of the important ‘victim label’: victims need protection. Thus ‘traf-
ficking’ implies an axiomatic victim status with all the protection measures 
it entails. Herkes gives an interesting exposé of the attributes of the ‘ideal 
victimhood’: young, female and thus vulnerable and exploited against their 
will. It helps to be trafficked by ‘organised crime’ which is important for 
the presentation of a threat dimension. Such a dimension also fits what 
Bouklis (2016) describes as the “victim industry” complex. If the victim-
of-trafficking situation applies, Directive 2004/81/EC obliges Member 
States to apply a variety of protective measures to the victim. Of course, 
one should not have contributed to one’s own victimisation: the crime and 
harm should have happened to the victim and one should not have ‘tempted 
fate’. Therefore economic migrants are not entitled to victim status: they 
may have been served willingly by human smugglers who provide a safe 
border crossing. However, the faces of trafficking and smuggling are 
blurred: smuggled persons can be victims of “ruthless criminal networks” 
or may land in such an exploitation situation (modern slavery) that it can 
be qualified as trafficking. Nevertheless, they are not the ‘ideal victims’ 
and the author notices that the harm that came to them easily slides into the 
background. The author pleads for more equality in treatment of both 
groups based on their own experience. 
 There is another side of the ideal victimhood: the criminal money mak-
ing opportunities under the cover of humanitarian emergency. This has 
been discussed by Giacomo Orsino and Anna Sergi concerning the endless 
flow of migrant to Italy and from there to Northwest Europe. Because of 
the harrowing situation funds in the inverse direction. However, emer-
gency funding and aid allocation are rarely connected to a transparent fi-
nancial management. Moreover, when such funds managed in a loose way 
land in traditional mafia territories such as Calabria, one does not need to 
be clairvoyant to see that the ‘ndrangheta soon takes advantage of these 
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opportunities. As a matter of fact they are already interwoven in the corrupt 
local public administration. The authors speak of a “concurrent predatory 
governance”: the local corrupt government and the mafia both dip into the 
pond of emergency funds. This local corrupt involvement was predictable 
but the mafia went beyond these territories: also emergency hotspots in 
Lampedusa and Rome were affected by mafia entrepreneurs where they 
met a similar and opportunistic greedy attitude. 
 We are not short of lofty recommendations while we witness a strong 
political tendency not to let migrants come even within sight of the EU 
gate: in June 2018 a recue ship was not allowed into the harbours of Italy 
and Malta, on the Balkan side Europe looks like a continental gated com-
munity. All to no avail: dreams of better life keep luring and there are per-
sistent rumours among migrants that behind some national doors migrants’ 
prospects are better than behind others: Germany and England are most 
often mentioned. But how to get there when behind each gate there is an-
other gate with again that ugly stone face of some god that no migrant un-
derstands. They look all grim, as they have always been to new comers. At 
the end of the 19th Century the protestant Americans looked suspiciously 
at the Catholic beer and wine drinking migrants from Italy and Poland 
(Krabbendam, 1995). Now the Poles and Italians look the same way at 
Muslim immigrants. Poland does not want to have any of them, while in 
Italy migrants from Africa and the Middle East simply are there: ship-
wrecked in front of the island of Lampedusa or Sicily. Anna Di Ronco and 
Anita Lavorgna describe in their chapter how they are looked upon by the 
local population. This is not an abstract matter, but something that is being 
sensed in daily life: foreign people in hangouts which may be located any-
where – in the parks, play grounds and around other public facilities, such 
as railway stations. Though this can cause some public nuisance, much of 
the doings of migrants is soon interpreted in criminal terms. For this a new 
term has been coined: ‘crimmigration’ referring to the associated percep-
tion of crime and migration. As from other research it appears that the me-
dia play a role creating and maintaining the association of crime and mi-
gration (Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2013), the authors analysed the 
two local newspapers in two Italian cities for the time span between 2008 
and 2017. To find out whether the way the migrant problem was presented 
was influenced political colour, they took a city run by a centre-left coali-
tion, Udine, and one by a centre-right coalition, Padova.  
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 Regarding the political colour of the two municipalities there were no 
distinctive differences in the mainly crimmigration-like publications of the 
‘migrant problem’: centre-left or right political colour displayed the same 
bias towards a negative reporting. In both cities asylum seekers as often 
seen as fake, ‘bogus’, spreading diseases and degrading the historic city 
centres: ‘disorderly and criminal’. The fact that a large part of those la-
belled in this way has fled from civil war and oppression gets less attention. 
Rather, fears are sensationalised by repeating the negative narrative frame 
of ‘threat, ‘siege’ or social and physical disorder or ‘degrado’. 
 The chapter by Miroslav Scheinost on the migrant issue in the Czech 
Republic does not only give a short and clear account of migration in and 
through the country in the past decades, its findings also show that public 
opinion, policy makers and media display different faces to migrants and 
what is perceived as a ‘risk of crime’. For example, the Ukrainians and the 
Vietnamese form a large part of the (illegal) migrant population. The 
Ukrainians were recruited for seasonal work and worked under (‘quasi-
serf’) conditions which together could be considered as ‘exploitative’ and 
therefore trafficking. The Vietnamese, instead of being victimised, are en-
gaged in various serious crime-enterprises, organising their businesses 
through their ethnic networks (This is described in a later chapter). Alto-
gether serious crimes by an ethnic organised crime groups that has a high 
conviction rate. Nevertheless, these crimes and the criminal ethnic groups 
hardly evoke the emotional reactions as is the case with the inflow of mi-
grants from African and the Middle East countries. The latter are publicly 
more associated with crime: migrants (roughly from Africa or Middle East) 
are seen as a public security threat, among others because they allegedly 
contribute to the increase of crime. However, in reality the crime rate in 
the Czech Republic is falling, as is the case in other European countries. 
However, perceptions prove to be ‘facts and figures resistant’. Despite 
these facts populist politicians still get away with this mis-representation 
and succeed with their anti-migrant stand in appealing to the electorate. 
 
 
The transnational face of organising crime 
 
With the classical Janus face we think of a bearded severe head hewn in 
stone. Is that not dusty? What about an updated Janus face above a ‘virtual 
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door’ that may just as well be the gateway of human traffickers for on- or 
offline sexual service? Why should potential participants – and among 
them victims – not enter or be lured by smart online advertisements on the 
virtual sex market? To answer this question Parisa Diba, Georgios A. An-
tonopoulos and Georgios Papanicolaou carried out an ethnographic re-
search project in addition to the extensive interviewing of experts in the 
field. For the ethnographic investigation the authors also entered a multi-
tude of websites – also the ‘Deep Web’. It is a really pioneering work with 
still many questions unanswered, and at the moment yielding the Janus 
face, partly shrouded in mist. Yes there are indications that criminal organ-
isers use the Internet and modern communication tools to recruit women 
from low income countries to the EU and the UK. Geographically widely 
spread advertisement campaigns, with the same spelling mistakes and 
same mobile numbers, raises the suspicion of a(n) organising individual(s) 
or a crime group. But do not jump to conclusions: there appears to be a lot 
of mist and the negative and positive faces are both present. The research-
ers describe ‘red-flag’ situations in which it is reasonable to suspect a plau-
sible new online trafficking intended for the old-fashioned sex exploitation 
– ‘offline’ in the escort firm, behind the windows or on the streets. But a 
smart sex worker can also use the Internet and the mobile telephone as 
liberating facilities, keeping pimps at bay, recruiting clients online and 
providing a choice between an online, virtual, or offline, physical sex ser-
vice (Bartlet, 2014). There is no hard evidence which mode of sex service 
will become dominant: the faces are changing all the time and not neces-
sarily towards more threats.  
 The door with the two faces is sometimes almost a real thing rather than 
a metaphor. This is certainly the case where migrants move to and fro 
through the ‘door’: some smuggled, other trafficked, and some migrants 
operating as seemingly legal entrepreneurs, but fraudulently cutting edges 
to remain competitive with their local semi-legal enterprises. That is case 
in the highly confusing situation of the Chinese migrant workers and the 
Chinese garment industry in the city of Prato, Italy. In his provocative 
chapter on transnational crime of Chinese origin in the EU Jurij Novak 
sheds light on this criminal landscape. First the author does away with a 
lot of myths around Chinese Triads and Chinese migration of whatever 
modality. After this tidying up, the author goes into the organisation of 
crime in the textile and garment industry in Prato. Amidst a large Chinese 
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minority of 30.000 to 40.0001, of which a substantial part remains illegal 
in the country, Chinese entrepreneurs have established a partly under-
ground garment industry. With an annual estimated profit of 2 billion Eu-
ros they serve any chic Italian brand (or forge them). To keep the produc-
tion costs low and the products competitive, all kinds of law breaking have 
been observed. By any legal qualification the labourers can be considered 
as exploited or in a state of modern slavery. Despite that, they have little 
victimisation awareness, industriously working in long shifts after which 
they return to their crowded dormitories. Their main concern is to transfer 
their savings home. Those who pull the strings lead complex production 
organisations as ‘bourgeois’ crime entrepreneurs, dwarfing old fashioned 
organised criminals. For the author these findings lead to the question: 
shouldn’t we investigate the more serious economic forms of organising 
crime? That is, not focus on the Chinese human smugglers, but the wealthy 
underground entrepreneur who presents the ‘decent’ entrepreneur’s face 
but exploits his fellow countrymen. 
 This is more than a pious wish, to which I would like to subscribe. Nev-
ertheless, we should not close our eyes to the extensive manufacturing cen-
tres and trading networks supplying Europe’s craving customers with a va-
riety of drugs. This is addressed by Miroslav Nozina who describes the 
emergence of a professional Vietnamese drug trading and industry sector 
after the 1990s. Due to its history in the socialist era the Vietnamese lived 
already in the Czech Republic since the end of the Vietnam War (1975). 
Most were sent by the Vietnamese government as labourers in the Soviet 
Bloc. Others, from South Vietnam, fled from the ‘liberation’ by the new 
North Vietnam authorities: many of them as the ‘boat-refugees’ heading to 
Australia, America and Europe. Together they form a diaspora of about 
three million Vietnamese.  
 After the dissolution of the socialist states the Vietnamese remained in 
countries such as Germany (East Berlin; von Lampe, 2005) and the Czech 
Republic (CR): so to say, they were already through the gate. In the first 
decade after the fall of ‘The Wall’ they kept themselves economically 
afloat by engaging in excise fraud, mainly concerning cigarettes. As Miro-
slav Nozina describes, after 2000, the Vietnamese in the CR switched to 
                                                 
1  All numbers  in this volume will be in normal European notation: a comma for 
the decimals and a full stop for the thousands. 
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another economic pattern: the professional and wholesale cannabis planta-
tion and after that the industrialised production of synthetic drugs: meth-
amphetamine. Both branches produce a volume that far exceeds the do-
mestic consumption which implies the exportation of surplus products 
through the criminal Vietnamese networks to surrounding countries. 
Though in diaspora the Vietnamese traders maintain ties to their home 
country and surrounding region. Not so much because of homesickness, 
but also because these open doors facilitate the importation of precursors 
as well as the re-export of finalised products. Geography helps the contin-
uation of cross-border business: the Vietnamese psychoactive products are 
of good quality and price, and Germany, Poland, Austria are good selling 
areas with virtual open gates behind which other Vietnamese networks can 
be relied upon.  
 There are more places where the Vietnamese are active in the under-
ground economy: Berlin, the place to be for the illegal cigarette retail trade. 
The development of this remarkable market described by Trang Ngyuen 
and Klaus von Lampe, illustrated the two faces of a persistent open illegal-
ity open on the orderly Berlin streets with a crystallised social and com-
mercial balance between the participants. The Vietnamese, residing as la-
bourers in the DDR, also found themselves laid off after the fall of The 
Wall, and virtually took over the existing Polish illegal cigarette market in 
Berlin. Overcoming an initial violent phase, the market settled. The authors 
observe a kind of in- and outflow of vendors: older vendors moving to licit 
jobs to be replaced by a new Vietnamese, fleeing their country for political 
or economic reasons. Though breaking the law, they are supposed to heed 
the informal market rules: pay for your vending place and your stock of 
cigarettes. And do not challenge law enforcement, being understaffed and 
more interested in wholesale smuggling and transport than in the open 
street market. Breaking the law is one face, keeping it orderly another. 
 
 
(Organising) crime; Janus respectable faces? 
 
Getting over the border, or through our guarded Janus faced door with pro-
hibited goods or human beings, whether or not intended for (s)exploitation, 
remains morally reprehensible. But that can also be considered as a result 
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of labelling of what is qualified as blameworthy. Of course, there are de-
grees of blameworthiness: smuggling can be a humanitarian act and safe 
lives; labelling abortion as evil seems at present to be a ‘prerogative’ of 
Catholic parties such as in Poland; and amidst the international discussion 
on the liberalisation of cannabis products one can find all sorts of labelling. 
This view may smack of a suspicious ‘moral relativism’ few dare to avow 
openly. Nevertheless, labelling a certain conduct as criminal is to a large 
degree a prerogative of the powerful: they can make exceptions to ‘crime 
labelling’ by excluding economic and financial misconduct or neutralising 
blameworthiness and focussing on lower-class criminality.  
 However, such dividing lines are not so easy, as Anna Markovska’s and 
Alexey Serdyuk’s chapter on the Ukrainian arms trade illustrates. Naturally, 
arms trade is never neutral: it is about violence and death as the final out-
come. But the state has the monopoly of violence and thereby life and 
death, and as such is in this matter the ultimate labeller (Ruggiero, 1996). 
However, what if the state trades with the tools of death, weapons. This 
yields a morally awkward situation. The face of the state should radiate 
morality, but its commercial face turns a blind eye towards trading the tools 
of death as a commodity. There we are right in the middle of the interna-
tional arms trade dilemma. Regarding Ukraine all ingredients for a ‘wrong’ 
story are present: a bitter inheritance of the Soviet Union, consisting of 
mal-governance; corruption and a huge stock of obsolete (nuclear) arms. 
Still needed are legal buyers who must have the ‘official right’ to buy arms 
internationally for which an end-user certificate is issued. There is no short-
age of such clients, obligatorily mentioned in the end user certificate (but 
forged as appeared in a few deals). Or otherwise at present, on a lower 
official level, there are ‘patriotic battalions’ fighting in the Donbas against 
Russia-armed insurgents. These Battalions are partly provided with arms 
from the grey market or otherwise by simple theft and embezzlement. Who 
are the law breakers in this market? That is unambiguously determined. It 
depends who does the labelling: in this domain it is the elite, in the gov-
ernment as well as the arms industry: they have the power to label what is 
‘criminal’ and must get the attention of law enforcement (Ruggiero, 2010). 
Thus, the elite enjoys a substantial extra income through fraud and embez-
zlement, virtually with impunity. After all, they have the power to deter-
mine which face of the arms trade is criminal or not. High-level arm trading 
will certainly not be labelled as such.  
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 Obviously such a manipulation of labelling by the elite is not restricted 
to the arms industry. It is also relevant for other fields such as economic 
and environmental crime, grand corruption and embezzlement. Naturally, 
such a manipulation is only required when something has gone wrong. If 
the profitable law breaking has succeeded, the first concern is safeguarding 
the loot. That is a risk, because if the loot is not cash it must be hidden 
within the financial system and can potentially be connected to a (suspi-
cious) beneficial owner. The latter has often no interest in becoming known 
for which he seeks the services of firms offering financial ‘secrecy prod-
ucts’, mostly available in traditional off-shore centres (Walter, 1989). 
However, as Matjaž Jager describes in his chapter on the Panama Papers 
and Paradise Leaks, this off-shore secrecy service provision is not perfectly 
safe. These leaks had worldwide repercussions, for the exposed persons 
and firms as well as the states that now has solid evidence to settle accounts 
with their tax dodgers. The author summarises the harm done to the public 
fund of almost all states: enormous tax evasion, fraud, money laundering 
etc. Despite the mainstream discussion on international unaccounted 
money flows, one may wonder whether states should be their ‘brother’s 
keeper’. Should a state that has no excise tax on wine lend support to a 
state that imposes very high taxes? Forcing ‘zero-tariff’ countries to com-
ply when it does not even know the relevant tax measures is at odds with 
the sovereignty in tax matters. Its implications should at least be investi-
gated. This also concerns the representation of the evil offshore centres, 
where tainted moneys are supposedly hoarded. That may be a partial myth: 
Van Duyne and Van Koningsveld (2017) found out that much of the hidden 
funds eventually ends in bank accounts of onshore countries of which the 
government complain about the ‘manifold harm of tax havens’. They rather 
look within their own (financial) gates with a big smiling Janus face. 
 What does the author remark about Slovenia? According to the author, 
Slovenia proves to be a neatly tidied-up country: after Finland the second 
best country in terms of the in terms of secrecy on the Tax Justice Network 
Financial Secrecy Index (2015). Furthermore it has a moderate profit tax 
rate (19%) and is certainly no ‘tax hell’ for which you need a ‘tax haven’ 
to mitigate the fiscal pain. The number of Slovenian legal and natural per-
sons that featured in the Panama Leak and Paradise Paper is moderate: 
about 80 beneficial owners of offshore corporations. Naturally, this caused 
some indignation to which the government responded by promising action 
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which it fulfilled by installing a strategic working group. Nevertheless, it 
is also smiling with two faces. Slovenia wants join the (EU) efforts to stem 
the flow of hidden wealth and the use of artificial tax arrangements. How-
ever, at the same time it continues the competition in the global law tax 
race for which it is better not to have the reputation of a ‘tax hell’. In this 
regard it stands out compared to countries which while beating the drum 
against tax evasion and money laundering remain silent of their own states 
(Delaware among them) or dependencies (Channel Islands) performing 
many offshore functions, though without naming it as such. As a matter of 
fact, if the statement that the offshore financial industry is little more than 
a global embezzlement support scheme, few states resist the temptation to 
receive the fiddlers’ loot, while presenting to the global moral community 
their virtuous face. 
 
Virtuous faces 
 
Naturally, the idea of the Janus face is intriguing because it suggests some-
thing hidden, a sinister ‘true face’. But the ‘condition humaine’ is usually 
neither sinister nor intriguing; it is just banal. The other face may be ex-
pressionless, empty. Many governmental ‘gates to virtue’, morally shining 
at the front may have such an empty face on the inside. Or, when that is 
politically required, some superficial cover is put onto it.  
 Fighting corruption and money laundering may be good examples of 
virtuousness with a rear side. Actually, there is a preference to combine 
them: fighting corruption through fighting money laundering. This is the 
line of policy making and implementation by the Financial Action Task 
Force on money laundering (FATF). Isn’t there another face? That may 
depend on the breadth of the scope. 
 The chapter by Petrus C. van Duyne, Jackie H. Harvey and Liliya Y. 
Gelemerova broadens the scope beyond corruption to include criminal 
breaches of integrity. Subsequently they analysed how the (FATF) dealt 
with this broadened scope. After all, when there is an exchange of (mone-
tary) favours against an illegal decision, then there are criminal proceeds 
to be laundered. Though that must sound like a simple truth, it took fifteen 
years for this to sink in. Then there was an outburst of activities in 2005 
followed by a number of ‘silent’ years till 2009/10 when an intensified 
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awareness campaign was launched. In terms of our metaphor, the empty 
face of policy making was from time to time plastered over with some stern 
features. But how solid is this plaster? 
 To that end the authors analysed the FATF documents, such as: the an-
nual reports, policy and guidance papers as well as the mutual country eval-
uations in two years in a sample of member states. They also made for each 
country a ‘reference count’ (of corruption subjects) and compared the out-
comes with the Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International 
(TI Index) and the compliance rate for integrity relevant recommendations. 
However, between these diverse measurements the authors could hardly 
find a correlation. As they put it: “nothing correlates with anything”. This 
implies that all efforts of the FATF have led to nothing measurable: the 
plaster appears to be skin deep.  
 That is a serious conclusion. It implies that awareness raising by means 
of (overfilled) seminars and issuing guidance reports, though lofty 
measures, remained without any discernible effect. Parallel to this we have 
the MERs in which corruption is increasingly (but with many variations) 
mentioned as important, while one of the initial the question how corrup-
tion damages the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems remained unanswered 
because of lack of reliable data. How serious should we take the stern face 
of the FATF when it does not address the question about the reliability of 
its output?  
 This is not the only unanswered question which passes silently under-
neath the Janus face. One of these unanswered but urgent questions con-
cerns the threat of money laundering and all that is conceptually connected 
to it. Michele Riccardi and Riccardi Milani discuss in their chapter the 
opacity of business ownership and the connected risk of money laundering. 
That is less straightforward as one would think. We begin by facing a con-
ceptual tangle in which one element, the consequences of the threat, re-
mains undetermined. This is not solved: neither by the authors, the FATF 
or the European Commission. Without being able to determine the conse-
quences of a laundering threat, except in vague general terms, the whole 
formula ends in mist. Nevertheless, all stakeholders continue to say “it is 
significant” with which the shortcoming is declared solved.  
 The authors, working in 2015-2017 in an international consortium led 
by Transcrime, tried to solve the deficit by working with empirical data 
from Italy, the UK and the Netherlands. It was a heroic and pioneering 
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attempt processing empirical data with a transparent methodology. Natu-
rally, such an innovative project raises a multitude of new questions, par-
ticularly about the database and the rough clustering of economic sectors, 
such as bars, restaurants, hotels or the entertainment and gambling indus-
try. In countries such as the Netherlands, strictly controlled licencing re-
vealed occasionally an inflow of unexplained investment. This happened 
with bars and restaurants, but these were usually small scale enterprises 
and the intended investment could rarely be interpreted as a manifestation 
of ‘organised crime’ penetration (Van Duyne and Van de Vorm, 2016). 
Where is the threat?  
 Nevertheless, the approach is worthwhile to be replicated and to be used 
as a sieve to select subjects for further refinement and deeper investigation. 
This applies particularly to the Beneficial Owner distance and the cross-
border complexity of corporations. In addition, to address such questions 
the methodology must be more refined while existing potential refuting 
data should be heeded. This applies to the economic sectors as well as the 
actors. As a matter of fact, there may be far fewer sophisticated offshore 
‘company illusionists’ than this research suggests (Van Duyne and De 
Zanger, 2014). For sophistication we will have look up, economically and 
socially, at the higher levels of economic and financial crimes and grand 
corruption. That encompasses ‘white collar crime’ or state crime as men-
tioned in the chapter of Anna Markovska and Alexey Serdyuk. 
 Is that a Janus face with a white collar? That looks anachronistic, but 
true. At the other side of Janus we enter a room of ‘mirror images’: busi-
ness pretensions, deceptive constructions, and in the end one or more dis-
appearing players in the fraud game. An example of this is provided in the 
chapter on VAT fraud, written by Tomáš Strémy, Natália Hangáčová and 
Martin Kotovský. We all know VAT fraud from our daily payments for 
goods and services, which we rarely notice because so much is ‘inclusive’. 
Of course, we notice it when the painter or handyman asks; “With or with-
out receipt?” And we know that ‘without’ is some 20% cheaper. That is 
basic, but the authors go above this: they provide an elaborate description 
of the way VAT fraud is organised. Or is it organised crime? The authors 
do not engage in this sterile dispute: what they analyse is the organisation 
of complex scams, for which the execution always requires the full appli-
cation of organised crime acts. But, in case of criminal investigation or 
prosecution, we do not find an ‘organised crime’ charge of participating in 
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a criminal organisation. It is remarkable to find a mention of organised 
crime in the introduction, but when it comes to the application of criminal 
law there are no examples: no grim Janus face in cases of VAT fraud 
schemes but again only a ‘white collar smile’?  
 That is confusing when compared with what Anna Maria Maugeri tell 
us about the way the Italian law maker and law enforcement agencies in-
tend to address ‘polluting’ the economy by infiltration whether by the Ma-
fia or other forms of organised crime In addition to bringing the perpetra-
tors to justice, the Italian legal system has a broad assortment of tools to 
tackle companies that are being infiltrated or are suspected of being instru-
mental to the Mafia or Mafia-type organisations. Companies can be con-
fiscated, lock stock and barrel in a criminal procedure or can be handled 
within the framework of civil or administrative procedings. The latter 
preventive measures are interesting: entrepreneurs who are too close to the 
Mafia or other organised criminals run the risk of losing their freedom of 
management because of being put under judicial surveillance. This is a 
twosided sword: it hits the Mafia economically and financially, while it 
‘cures’ the firm placed under judicial control. The author calls it a 
“therapeuthic manner of management”, allowing the continuation of the 
firm, thus inflicting no harm to staff and third parties. Compared to the 
criminal law measures of confiscation and forfeiture of measurement these 
measures are less invasive.  
 Though according to this exposé the Janus face may look benign at the 
other side, one should consider carefully what is behind that: a lower 
burden of proof to assume an organised crime threat. Lowering the burden 
of proof is justified in view of “the need to repress illegality and the need 
to safeguard the ‘social value’ of the enterprise”. Is that another step in the 
levelling of protecting dikes against the power of the state? Do we move 
into the direction of proven guilty unless the accused can prove his inno-
cence? Are the administrative law monitoring of licencing in the Nether-
lands or the ‘unexplained wealth’ observations and related court orders in 
the UK, Ireland (King, 2015) and Australia, similar steps in the direction 
of an “entire sanctioning system is rational and flexible”, which are euphe-
misms of more repression and power to the state? 2  
                                                 
2  https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201709_rusi_unexplained_wealth_orders 
 _keen_web.pdf 
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 Developments in the eastern member states of the democratic European 
Union reminds us to be careful in balancing rule of law interests and to put 
a clear warning sign under this Janus face: Beware of the Power of the 
State. 
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The Janus-faced victimisation in  
human smuggling and human trafficking 
Gwen Herkes1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 2015, the European Union was confronted with an enormous number of 
migrants who wanted to reach a safe destination within its borders. This 
‘refugee boom’ resulted in a flourishing environment for economic activi-
ties like human smuggling (HS) and human trafficking (HT) due to the 
higher demand for ‘migration services’, namely crossing borders and 
working once arrived at the destination. For months, the media reported on 
this topic with poignant footage on migrants arriving in boats in Greece 
and Italy being left to their fate by smugglers. Because of the increased 
public concern on these illegal and harmful activities, the phenomena of 
HS and HT turned once more into hot topics resulting in several new Eu-
ropean policy initiatives.  
 Due to the increased (cr)immigration (explained later), the difference 
between several migration and criminal law measures is blurred. This de-
velopment is also noticeable concerning HS and HT. The last decennia, the 
European Union claims their policy developments on migration, HS and 
HT to be established on human rights considerations for these victims. In 
this chapter, these claims of human rights are critically analysed with a 
focus on the used victim discourse and the underlying reasons for it. This 
analysis reveals within the EU policy documents on HS and HT a Janus-
faced victimisation and a double instrumentalisation of the victims. 
 
                                                 
1  Academic assistant and PhD student, Institute for International Research on 
Criminal Policy (IRCP), Department Criminology, Penal law and Social law, 
Ghent University and affiliated to the Centre of the Social Study of Migration 
and Refugees (CESSMIR). 
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Illegal migration: human smuggling or human  
trafficking? 
 
Since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ that started in 2015, there has been sig-
nificant media coverage on the topics of migration, human smuggling (HS) 
and human trafficking (HT). HS and HT are two types of irregular migra-
tion, which are regularly confused. This is not only a flaw of popular dis-
course since the two concepts are even often used interchangeably in sci-
entific literature (Aronowitz, 2001). Even though these phenomena often 
might concern victim populations with similar characteristics, it is im-
portant to distinguish them clearly from one another, especially because 
the distinction goes hand in hand with some important policy implications 
(Vermeulen, 2006). Several legal entities already created their definitions 
of HS and HT with the United Nations being the first to elaborate two pro-
tocols in the combat against HT (UN, 2000a) and HS (UN, 2000b) arising 
from the fight against transnational organised crime. The focus of this 
chapter, however, is on the later developed definition of HT and HS in the 
policy documents of the European Union.  
Human trafficking is defined as:  
“the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of 
persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those per-
sons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, 
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a posi-
tion of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or bene-
fits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another per-
son, for the purpose of exploitation” (art. 2 Directive 2011/36/EU).  
 
Human smuggling, on the other hand, is defined as:  
“Intentionally assisting of a person who is not a national of a Member 
State to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member State in breach 
of the laws of the State concerned on the entry or transit of aliens. Or 
intentionally assisting, for financial gain, a person who is not a national 
of a Member State to reside within the territory of a Member State in 
breach of the laws of the State concerned on the residence of aliens.” 
(art. 2 Council Directive 2002/90/EC). 
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The above-mentioned definitions distinguish HT from HS. Firstly, the def-
inition of HT does not include the requirement of border-crossing to estab-
lish the crime. This means that a person can be trafficked even within the 
borders of just one country. However, for HS, the illegal border-crossing 
is a constitutive element of the crime. Secondly, the most important condi-
tion to constitute the crime of HT is its intended exploitative nature. In case 
of HS the purpose of exploitation is not required, only the intention to 
‘help’ someone crossing a border. The definition moves even further away 
from this exploitative purpose since strictly speaking even the help from a 
humanitarian point of view (without any financial benefit) is included in it. 
 
 
Evolution of the EU policy on migration matters 
 
The creation of the policy on HS and HT cannot be discussed without con-
sidering the emergence and the development of the general migration pol-
icy in Europe. Migration is a phenomenon of all times but the debate sur-
rounding it has changed over time. Even though legal and illegal migration 
should not be lumped together, the policy initiatives on these topics have 
gone through a common evolution.  
 After the Second World War most western European countries consid-
ered migrants as extra manpower willing to work under very interesting 
and beneficial conditions that the employers could not meet in the internal 
market (Huysmans, 2006). At this time not much political attention was 
given to migration policy since most of the countries were favourable to-
wards migration to enhance their economic growth. Therefore, the regula-
tion of the legal status of these migrant workers, who were at the time only 
temporary residents, was not listed as a priority for many years. This also 
meant that the public opinion and political discussions on this subject was 
not as polarised as these days.  
 It was not until the late 1960s and 1970s that a turning point became 
apparent. Following a protectionist socio-economic view, the migration 
regulations in many of these Western European countries were strength-
ened after realising that these migrants were more interested in permanent 
residence rather than just being a temporary guest worker. Together with 
this development migration and migrants were more often linked to the 
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disturbance of the public order (Ugur, 1995). These initiatives were mainly 
national issues because the migration policy was at that time not yet a core 
issue in the development towards a European Union (Twomey and Korella, 
1995).  
 A first step towards a more protectionist common European region was 
taken with the creation of the Regulation 1612/68 of the Council, which 
made for the first time a distinction between the freedom of movement for 
nationals of a Member State and of third country nationals (Ugur, 1995).  
 Migration policy in Europe at that time was mostly based on socio-eco-
nomic concerns. However, all of this started to change from the 1980s on-
wards. This turnaround was based on the changed perception of migrants, 
especially because of the changed attitude regarding (bogus) asylum seek-
ers. The asylum procedure was increasingly considered as an alternative 
‘entrance procedure’ abused by economic migrants (who cannot be con-
sidered as legitimate refugees or asylum seekers) who want to obtain a right 
to stay and work in Europe. This change of attitude for many Western Eu-
ropean countries resulted in a more important role of the European institu-
tions in operationalising a common migration policy (Huysmans, 2006; 
Lavenex, 2001).  
 Furthermore, migration became an important topic in existing intergov-
ernmental initiatives such as the Trevi group, the ad hoc immigration group 
and Schengen. These initiatives ensured the gradual incorporation of mi-
gration and asylum policy in the structures of the European Union 
(Huysmans, 2000). However, it was noticeable that these groups used a 
mainly repressive approach with a focus on the prevention of migration 
and return policies. The main reason for this was the founding basis of 
some of these groups. For instance, the Trevi group was originally estab-
lished to combat cross border crime, resulting in a similar approach and 
logic within these intergovernmental initiatives regarding migration and 
asylum issues (Cholewinski, 2007). Moreover, Schengen systematically 
addressed migration and criminal policy topics by introducing common 
measures. A clear example of this is the Schengen Information System, 
which was developed for a more efficient support of external border con-
trol and law enforcement cooperation to help these institutions to preserve 
security within the Schengen member states. Both subjects (related to crim-
inal offences) and foreigners (third-country nationals) are recorded in this 
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large-scale information system as potential threats for the national security 
of these states (Cholewinski, 2007).  
 This trend continued when the European Union was created. The Treaty 
of Maastricht (1992) brought together the themes of migration and security 
under the third pillar on Justice and Home Affairs. Topics of migration and 
these of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters were from then 
on treated under the same regime of this third pillar. Only some years later 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was the policy on migration and asylum 
‘communautarised’ by transferring it to the first pillar (economic, social 
and environmental policies). For the first time, a clear distinction between 
asylum and migration matters and criminal matters was established. Even 
though this can be considered as an important development in the history 
of EU migration policy, this change was not motivated by the existing need 
to more clearly distinguish the politics on these topics. It was rather based 
on the lack of willingness and readiness of Member States to communau-
tarise the entire existing third pillar by further integrating and harmonising 
the criminal policy (Cholewinski, 2007; Huysmans, 2006).  
 It was in this transformed pillar structure that the first action plan to 
combat illegal migration and trafficking in human beings (2002) was in-
troduced. In a directive – at the time a first pillar instrument –the Member 
States were encouraged to install effective, proportionate and deterring 
sanctions for these crimes. However, the minimum standards concerning 
the nature and the length of the sentences were only introduced in an ac-
companying Framework Decision, an exclusive third pillar instrument 
(Vermeulen and De Bondt, 2015). The Lisbon Treaty (2007) then abol-
ished the pillar structure and opted for a common migration policy in which 
some important goals are introduced.  
 First, all Member States should approach and control immigration in a 
similar way. At the same time, a more repressive objective was introduced 
in which the prevention and fight against illegal migration became the most 
important focus together with the equal approach towards all third country 
nationals. Moreover, the rise of the European border and coast guard 
agency (FRONTEX) can be situated in this context. This agency was es-
tablished to contribute to these policy goals and enforce the prevention, 
enforcement and protection of the external borders of the EU. This agency 
continued to have a functional relationship with other organisations like 
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Europol, CEPOL2 and OLAF,3 which have all been strongly related to 
criminal matters (Vermeulen and De Bondt, 2015).  
 Within the European Union, the policy on migration and asylum was 
never far away from security topics, in which a repressive approach was 
often a priority. The combat against illegal migration therefore had always 
been an important issue in the European policy.  
 
 
A development towards ‘crimmigration’ 
 
Lately, an increased overlap can be observed between issues of criminal 
law and migration law. The contraction of these words introduces the term 
crimmigration. This stands for the trend of a de facto and de jure entangle-
ment of the criminal and migration law in which both fields mutually ben-
efit from each other (Vermeulen, 2007). This overlap is even more speci-
fied by the increased criminalisation of transgressions of migration law, 
which used to be handled with administrative measures rather than crimi-
nal ones. But it is also present when migratory measures are used as crim-
inal sanctions, for example, the extradition of legal migrants after commit-
ting a crime (Stumpf, 2012; Vermeulen, 2007). ‘Crimmigration’ might also 
be considered as the contraction of the words crime and migration, which 
rather focuses on the impact of migration on criminality and insecurity. In 
this chapter, crimmigration will be used in its traditional meaning as the 
entanglement of criminal and migration law.  
 The development towards crimmigration in the European Union has 
been enhanced in the last decennia, especially concerning the phenomena 
of HS an HT. Due to the ever-increasing safety issues, migrants are being 
regularly considered as a high-risk group in view of disruption of public 
order. This often results in a security-based approach to tackle this so-
called problem or even crisis (Parkin, 2013).  
 The European regulation concerning the criminalisation of HS was in-
troduced by the Directive 2002/90/EC and characterises this crimmigration 
evolution. The main objective of this criminalisation is to combat the ille-
gal migration, which is particularly a migration law issue (Stumpf, 2006). 
                                                 
2  European Union agency for law enforcement training. 
3  European anti-fraud office. 
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Furthermore, by systematically describing HT and HS as crimes under-
taken by organised criminal networks, there is an attribution of a threat 
dimension to the phenomena that results in the assumption of an enormous 
risk for our society, though perhaps incorrectly (Grewcock, 2003; 
Vermeulen et al., 2010). An even more pure form of crimmigration is the 
criminalisation of HS for humanitarian reasons. The Directive 2002/90/EC 
leaves the option open to be decided by the Member States whether or not 
to criminalise even these ‘smugglers’ who help people cross the EU bor-
ders in order to protect and help them and without any financial gain and 
therefore without any abuse or exploitation. The failure of the European 
Union to close this option, due to the pressure of some Member States, 
proves the extent of the crimmigration within the EU in which the criminal 
law is used to combat illegal migration sometimes even without the pres-
ence of any criminal intent.  
 In two more recent European policy initiatives, namely the European 
Agenda on Migration and the European Agenda on Security, this crimmi-
gration development is explicitly stated. The European Agenda on Security 
(2015), determines the European priorities in the battle against cross-bor-
der crime. The three determined priorities are terrorism, organised crime 
and cybercrime. HS and HT are included in the priority on combatting or-
ganised crime, argued to be major problems of the EU. 
 Once more is there an obvious connection between migration and secu-
rity since both agendas should be looked at together because of the rele-
vance of certain migration measures regarding to some security priorities. 
Furthermore, the collaboration of EU Member States and third countries in 
the fight against migrant smuggling also became a top priority for the next 
few years. HS and HT as migration issues are clearly treated as very im-
portant security issues and therefore included both in the European Agenda 
on Security (COM(2015)2185) and in the European Agenda on Migration 
(COM(2015)240).  
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Victim discourse in the EU policy on human smuggling and traf-
ficking 
 
Generally, a person who has migrated – a migrant – is not considered a 
victim especially since the increasing growth of migration into Europe. 
Furthermore, this view is often linked to the development of an intensified 
fear of crime in the resident population, frequently resulting rather in a 
criminal-image than a victim-image. This development resulted in a lack 
of compassion and disregard for migrants as potential victims (Collins, 
2007; Parkin, 2013). Only in case of extreme abuse and vulnerability to 
exploitation, might a migrant be considered a victim in public discourse 
(Agustín, 2003a).  
 The labelling of persons as victims is always the result of several rea-
sons and motivations of those who impose a label. At the same time, this 
label often consists of a predetermined meaning. Consequently, when a 
certain group of people are regularly characterised as non-victims, impost-
ers or even criminals, they are unlikely to be considered as typical victims. 
Often the actual experiences of these people are not taken into account and 
the label is therefore mainly build on the perceptions of these persons, or-
ganisations or political actors who possess the power to impose or withhold 
the label (Hoyle et al., 2011; Walklate, 2011).  
 By analysing the European legislative and policy framework on HS and 
HT there are reasons to assume that the label of victim is deliberately used 
when the negative treatment of the persons being smuggled or trafficked 
reaches a certain level of severity. In the absence of these conditions, it 
may be denied. There is also a dual approach in regard to the concept of 
the ideal victim that can be found in EU policy documents on HT and HS 
since migrants can be divided in two extremes that are only separated by a 
thin line of interpretation we will discuss in the next section.  
 
Victimisation as an objective fact or a constructed reality? 
 
The traditional image of victims usually results from standard concepts 
which are described in several theoretical frameworks on criminal victim-
isation.  
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 In the first criminological theories, victimhood was considered as an 
objective reality. When confronted with a crime, everyone is, therefore, 
able to recognise who the victims are. Hence the victimisation in itself is 
not questioned. For a very long time, this understanding of victims re-
mained the dominant perspective in the positivist victimological frame-
works. Most of the positivist authors however focused on obvious and vis-
ible victims of conventional crimes like violent crimes or theft (Davies et 
al., 2003). Besides, these static victim-conceptions often directed the at-
tention to the contribution of victims to their own victimisation. Concepts 
like ‘victim proneness’, ‘victim precipitation’ and ‘victim lifestyle’ were 
introduced in victimology and were given a prominent role in future victim 
research (Davies et al., 2003; Rock, 2011; Walklate, 1989). At the time, 
there was not much room for alternative appreciations of the concepts ‘vic-
tim’, ‘victimisation’ and ‘victimhood’. Questions regarding the process of 
becoming a victim were unnecessary because of the fixed image and the 
‘predetermined’ characteristics of victims. Either someone was a victim or 
not.  
 It was only later that the above-mentioned positivist tradition in victim-
ology was challenged. Holstein and Miller (1990) encouraged researchers 
to further establish the victimological understanding and to look for the 
interactional dynamics, which could cause a person to become a ‘victim’. 
This new way of thinking can only originate from a critical approach of the 
– at that time – existing static victimological concepts. Rather than simply 
studying those who are considered victims (and the reasons why they could 
possibly be blamed for their own victimisation), the understanding of the 
underlying process of victimisation became an important focus in victim-
ology (Burgess et al., 2013). Holstein and Miller (1990) introduced sym-
bolic interactionism as a suitable framework to criticise the objective and 
factual victim image.  
 Symbolic interactionists start from the principle that there are certain 
existing definitions of ‘concepts’, which are used and known by everyone, 
and are therefore linked to a common meaning (Blumer, 1969). By inter-
preting the victim-concept through this symbolic interactionist view, re-
searchers started to look at victimisation rather as a label than as a rigid 
objective truth (Miers, 1989; Rock, 2002). At that time, the labelling theory 
was already well known and developed in the field of criminology. Histor-
ically, this perspective, however, solely covered the labelling of offenders 
28 
 
and criminals. Only later was this framework also applied to victims and 
therefore providing a first step in acknowledging that there might be an 
important societal influence regarding the victimisation of people (Kenney, 
2002).  
 The labels ‘victim’ and ‘offender’ are created by important societal ac-
tors who use these words and create their meaning through, among others, 
policy documents. At the same time moral standards with respect to these 
labels are developed. Therefore, the accompanying connotations become 
widespread as a sort of public knowledge resulting in predetermined as-
sumptions regarding victims of crime (Lima De Perez and Vermeulen, 
2015).  
 These assumptions often lead to the creation of several conditions for 
people to ‘deserve’ the status of a victim. This image of a deserving victim 
results in a societal necessity to morally convince others to sympathise and 
pity them because of what they have experienced (Green, 2011; Wilson 
and O’Brien, 2016). Christie (1986) was the first to introduce the concept 
of the ideal victim and described this as a label in which “a person or a 
category of individuals who – when hit by crime – most readily are given 
the complete and legitimate status of being a victim” (Christie, 1986, p.18). 
To fit this image, victims have to be weak and respectable, and cannot be 
involved in their own victimisation. Ideally, the offender is considered as 
big and bad and not related to the victim. Therefore, the ideal victim fulfils 
a passive role and waits to be rescued from its terrible situation.  
 By introducing the ideal victim concept, Christie (1986) revealed the 
strong limitations of existing societal victim labels since the ideal victim is 
often used as a framework for interpreting victimisation. At the same time, 
the use of these labels does not stroke with victimhood realities. Persons 
who do not fit the strict conditions for being considered as an ideal victim 
will not be recognised as such even if the objective circumstances of their 
experiences do justify a victim identification. On the other hand, many la-
belled victims might not consider themselves victims (or might not want 
to be labelled as one) (Matsueda, 2014; Rock, 2002; Van Dijk, 2009; 
Spencer, 2015).  
 The discussion on these contradictions surrounding the concepts of vic-
tims and victimisation is relevant for many types of crime. However, in this 
field of crimes of HS and HT the specific use of these concepts is of im-
portance. By analysing the European policy documents concerning these 
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topics, we find out that the use of the (ideal) victim concept has significant 
underlying meaning.  
 
 
Human trafficking: consensus on ‘the ideal victim’ in 
order to instrumentalise 
 
On 5 April 2011, the European Parliament and the Council of the European 
Union adopted Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating traf-
ficking in human beings and protecting its victims. It replaced the Council 
Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA. The directive was needed to tackle 
the most recent developments concerning the phenomenon of trafficking 
in human beings. The Directive adopted a broader concept of what should 
be considered as HT than in the older 2002 Council Framework. Some ad-
ditional types of exploitation were included, therefore some variations of 
exploitation (e.g. forced begging) were from then on considered as actions 
resulting in HT. This directive “establishes minimum rules concerning the 
definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of trafficking in 
human beings” (art. 1 Directive 2011/36/EU). 
 The major objectives of the Directive 2011/36/EU are the prevention 
and prosecution of HT but at the same time the protection of victims’ 
rights. Throughout this instrument, the necessity for the protection of these 
people is never questioned. This protection is even applied to those who 
might risk to be prosecuted or punished for illegal migration while being 
trafficked (e.g. the illegal border crossing, the irregular residence in a 
Member State or the use of false documents). This objective is expressed 
through the encouragement of various initiatives of assistance and support 
before, during and for an appropriate time after criminal proceedings in 
order to create the possibility for victims to free themselves from their ex-
ploitative situation. Even when the victim is illegally residing in a Member 
State, the Directive introduces a right to a reflection period in which this 
person has the right to protection and assistance. The Directive also goes 
beyond the sole encouragement of assistance and even states that this help 
should be given every time when there are reasons for believing someone 
is a victim of trafficking even when this person is not willing to act as a 
witness in a criminal procedure against the trafficker (Note 18 Directive 
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2011/36/EU). By introducing this Note 18, the Directive places the interest 
and protection of the trafficked victim above the potential success of the 
criminal trial against the trafficker. It is important to notice that this addi-
tional provision does not have any binding obligation for the Member 
States.  
 Another important instrument in the combat against HT is the EU strat-
egy (COM(2012)286) towards the Eradication of Trafficking in Human 
Beings (2012-2016). This strategic document was introduced to support 
the Directive 2011/36/EU by establishing a priority list and implement 
measures against HT. It is remarkable that the identification of victims to 
offer help and assistance is considered top priority in this document. Sec-
ond on the list are the actions to prevent this type or crime; and third is the 
prosecution of the traffickers of human beings.  
 
Victimisation in case of human trafficking 
 
The victimisation of persons who are being trafficked is a well-discussed 
topic that is often interpreted in different ways. However, traditionally, the 
focus in HT is on the sexual exploitation of the trafficked person. In this 
case, the trafficked person meets the requirements to be considered as an 
ideal victim (Christie, 1986) with the characteristics of being very vulner-
able, weak and blameless in addition to being young and woman (Hoyle et 
al., 2011; Srikantiah, 2007; Wilson and O’Brien, 2016). This image is 
clearly present in the above-mentioned EU policy documents on HT in 
which the passivity of the victim is stressed and a ‘deserving’ and ideal 
victim is described.  
 There exists clear evidence of ‘labelling the victim’ of trafficked since 
the vulnerability of these victims becomes an immutable presumption 
while the capacity of an own decision-making process is totally dismissed. 
The consent of the victim to ‘participate’ in the act of human trafficking is 
considered irrelevant in case of the use of “threat[s] or [. . .] force or other 
forms of coercion, or abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability” (art. 2, 1 Directive 2011/36/EU). 
The definition of this position of vulnerability as a “situation in which the 
person concerned has no real or acceptable alternative but to submit to 
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the abuse involved” (art. 2, 2 Directive 2011/36/EU), results in the ac-
ceptance of an innocent victim image which – even though they might have 
consented to the act of HT – will almost never be blamed and therefore, 
considered a victim.  
 Therefore, the victimisation and vulnerability is determined as soon as 
these persons come in contact with these traffickers. Throughout the policy 
documents, the problematic vulnerability of the victims is prioritised and, 
therefore, the EU is given an explicit mandate to protect these victims as a 
‘patriarchal protector of the weak’ and combat the crime (Agustín, 2003b; 
Capous Desyllas, 2007). 
 Both the Directive 2011/36/EU and the EU strategy claim to start from 
a human rights perspective in which human trafficking is considered as a 
serious form of crime and a major infraction on the fundamental human 
rights (also forbidden by Article 5 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union). Therefore, the protection, the support and the help 
for these victims to escape their exploiting situation is considered as a 
moral duty. Besides these human rights arguments, the combat against HT 
is motivated by the moral outrage concerning the exploitation of these vic-
tims. HT is therefore also a crime often lumped together with other phe-
nomena like modern slavery and prostitution (Hoyle et al., 2011; Lima De 
Perez and Vermeulen, 2015; O’Connell-Davidson, 2010). The connection 
with slavery also helps to fit the consensus on the ideal victim label by 
openly focusing on a crime in which there is a bad perpetrator and an in-
nocent victim (Hoyle et al., 2011; Spencer, 2015). Moreover, the indissol-
uble link between forced prostitution and HT includes an extra dimension 
through which the anti-prostitution agenda was underhandedly introduced 
(Lima De Perez and Vermeulen, 2015; Persak and Vermeulen, 2014). Even 
though there is a focus on human rights regarding the topic of HT, a touch 
of security can be found within these policy initiatives by investing in the 
battle against criminal organisations.  
 However, an explicit form of instrumentalisation of the victim can be 
noticed in regard to these rights that are derived from being considered as 
a victim. As mentioned before, the assistance and help to victims of HT is 
recognised as a priority in the EU policy. By introducing the Directive 
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2004/81/EC that obliges Member States to grant residence permits, assis-
tance and protection to victims of HT4 who cooperate with the authorities, 
the European Union created an extra protective measure for victims who 
decided to escape their exploitative situation and cooperate with the au-
thorities in order to bring the offenders of trafficking to justice.  
 Even though this right to protection, assistance and a residence permit 
might be considered as a positive action, the instrumental background of 
this measure can be derived from article 14 of this Directive 2004/81/EC 
that further elaborates on the withdrawal conditions of the residence per-
mit. There are some expected terms for withdrawing the assistance and 
residence permit due to the renewal of the contact with the suspected traf-
ficker, the fraudulent motives of the victim, arguments of protection of na-
tional security and if the victim ceases to cooperate with the authorities. 
However also the mere decision of judicial authorities to stop the procedure 
is mentioned as a withdrawal condition, implying that these benefits can 
be withdrawn in case the public prosecutor decides not to prosecute even 
though the victim would have fully. Thus, this courtesy is only meaningful 
in cases of successful judicial procedures, which are scarce. This results in 
treating the victim as a mere instrument in the route towards a successful 
criminal procedure (O’Connell Davidson, 2006; Vermeulen et al., 2006). 
 
 
Human smuggling:  
dualism in the perspective on victims 
 
The two most important documents in the discussion on the European 
framework of HS are the Directive 2002/90/EC and the Framework Deci-
sion 2002/946/JHA, which together form the ‘facilitators’ package’. These 
two documents are still used as the foundation of the European HS policy, 
even though they date from 2002. This package was installed to better pro-
tect the European borders and prevent the illegal migration into the Euro-
pean Union. It should be noted that these documents focus mainly on the 
                                                 
4  The Directive 2004/81/EC includes the possibility for Member States to grant 
the same to smuggled persons, but this is not mandatory. However, the Action 
Plan against HS (2015) included the revision of this Directive in a more bind-
ing instrument for vulnerable migrants (mainly women and children).  
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facilitation of the illegal entry, transit or residence rather than the individ-
ual act of illegal migration. Therefore, this policy focuses on the smugglers 
rather than on the smuggled persons themselves.  
 As mentioned above, the only important component of HS is the actual 
intention to facilitate the act. Consequently, there is no need for financial 
exploitation or the abuse of the vulnerable position of a person to determine 
the crime of HS. There is only one possible exception to this rule in which 
the Directive allows for individual Member States to spare those who fa-
cilitate the illegal entering or transiting for humanitarian reasons only. 
Nevertheless, this is just a built-in possibility for Member States and there-
fore not an obligation. The Framework Decision expects Member States to 
punish HS infringements by creating measures that are “effective, propor-
tionate and dissuasive criminal penalties which may entail extradition” 
(art. 1, 1 Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA).  
 Three aggravating circumstances are considered in case of HS. Firstly, 
when the act was committed for the purpose of financial profit. Secondly, 
if it was facilitated by a network of criminal organisations. Thirdly, when 
the life of a person is endangered during the act of HS. In these cases, 
Member States are required to impose custodial sentences, of which the 
maximum cannot be less than eight years.  
 After the introduction of the European Agenda on Migration (COM 
(2015)240) and the European Agenda on Security (COM(2015)185), and 
of course also by the influx of refugees in 2015, the European Commission 
developed a five year action plan to combat the smuggling of migrants 
(COM(2015)285). The goal of this plan is to “fight against migrant smug-
gling [. . .] to prevent the exploitation of migrants by criminal networks 
and reduce incentives to irregular migration”. The exploitation that these 
vulnerable migrants experience during their trajectory to Europe is men-
tioned in the introduction of this document as the first and most important 
concern for developing this action plan. To achieve this, the plan wants to 
combat “ruthless criminal networks [. . . which . . .] organize the journeys 
of large numbers of migrants desperate to reach the EU. They make sub-
stantial gains while putting the migrants’ lives at risk” (p. 1 Action plan 
against HS). The tasks of police and law enforcement are prioritised to-
gether with a better knowledge and information sharing system. The action 
plan only mentions the smuggled persons themselves in the third action 
point. The goal of this action is twofold. On the one hand, it strives for 
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more assistance for the vulnerable migrants (women and children). Other-
wise, the need for improved preventive measures against illegal migration 
is stressed. This preventive part is mainly achieved by enhancing the EU 
return policy and therefore creating a deterring effect regarding consenting 
to the act of human smuggling “it has to be made clear to them that they 
will be returned swiftly to their home countries if they have no right to stay 
in the EU legally” (p. 7 Action plan against HS). 
 
Victimisation in case of human smuggling 
 
In contrast to HT where there is an unambiguous view regarding the vic-
tims of crime, the victim image of smuggled people is not as obvious. First 
of all, smuggled persons do not fit in the ideal victim framework since this 
type of victim willingly engages in a risky situation that may result in their 
own victimisation. HS is particularly an event in which there is an obvious 
mutual understanding (concerning the destination, the planned route and 
the price) before the crime can be carried out. The smuggled person uses 
its own agency to make these decisions and to negotiate the conditions of 
the agreement. This usually implies that the smuggled person consented to 
being smuggled under also dangerous circumstances (Brouwer and Kumin, 
2003; Tamura, 2010).  
 As mentioned above, the concept of ‘victim precipitation’ is well stud-
ied in the early years of victimology. However, many theories in victimol-
ogy based on this idea were strongly criticised because of its victim-blam-
ing reasoning (Green, 2011). Nevertheless, this reasoning was again rein-
stated in the Action plan against HS. The difference between the ‘guilty’ 
smuggled person and the innocent HT victim is described as follows “The 
difference between the two is that in the former, migrants willingly engage 
in the irregular migration process by paying for the services of a smuggler 
in order to cross an international border, while in the latter they are the 
victims, coerced into severe exploitation which may or may not be linked 
to the crossing of a border” (p. 2 Action plan against HS). Therefore, the 
smuggled persons are theoretically not considered as vulnerable and ‘de-
serving’ victims who should automatically be granted protection. This in-
nocence problem results in the exclusion of the smuggled person from the 
traditional victim image because of his own role in the decision making 
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process and because of its active contribution in becoming ‘victimised’. 
Barely any considerations regarding the need for assistance, support and 
protection of the victims – which were the fundamentals in HT – can be 
found in the action described in the policy regarding HS.  
 Nonetheless, the introduction of the EU Action plan against HS implies 
that it was developed to combat the ‘ruthless’ criminal smuggling networks 
because of the manifest exploitations of the smuggled people on their way 
to Europe. It is well-known that human smuggling creates a vulnerability 
which results in an increased risk to experience many different abuses 
(Koser, 2000; Vermeulen, 2001). The justification for the action plan is 
also based on these traumatic experiences, the abuse and the exploitation 
during the smuggling trajectories. This could create the impression that the 
policy on HS is mainly developed because of the concerns for human 
rights, which would imply a deserving victim image. However, this ap-
proach can be scrutinised since the victim label is clearly not used on smug-
gled persons. Firstly, the victimisation vocabulary used in regard to HT is 
nowhere to be found in the policy documents on HS. In addition, the pre-
sumed, or sometimes maybe even created, vulnerability is not applied on 
smuggled persons since they are often stereotyped as young adult males, 
who because of their gender and demonstrated agency, are no longer con-
sidered as vulnerable (Lima De Pérez, 2015a). This accepted vulnerability 
is merely present amongst the ‘more vulnerable migrants’ like women and 
children (Spencer, 2015). The human rights perspective, therefore, is rather 
used as a cover to undertake measures inspired by a protective attitude and 
safety concerns in which the European identity is the priority (Gallagher, 
2001).  
 These two contradicting objectives between the reality and perception 
result in a Janus-faced victim image in the cases of HS. The victim label 
and human rights concerns are so to speak used to justify the current anti-
smuggling policy even though it is based on alternative motives: preven-
tion of the phenomenon, but first and foremost the prosecution and punish-
ment of the offenders became the prioritised goals. This protective focus 
also results in a changing approach towards the smuggled persons in which 
they are often considered as illegally smuggled objects like weapons and 
drugs rather than as human beings. From this perspective, there is even a 
tendency towards criminalisation of the smuggled persons because of their 
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illegal residence within the EU borders, instead of a victimisation (Lima 
De Perez and Vermeulen, 2015).  
 
 
The importance of consent in regard to the labelling of 
victims of smuggling and trafficking 
 
Even though the concepts of HS and HT – regarding the abuses and the 
victims – are often used interchangeably and are considered as similar 
crimes in the media, there is an important difference between the labelling 
of persons who are being smuggled as opposed to trafficked in the EU pol-
icy documents and action plans. The numerous casualties, the abuse (while 
travelling), the inhuman treatments and the various types of exploitation 
happening in smuggling as well as in trafficking are firmly condemned. 
This would suggest a strong human rights-based motivation in the core of 
these initiatives. However, after further exploring the existing policy it is 
obvious that the more than thirty-year-old ideas of Nils Christie (1986) 
concerning the (non) ideal victim are making a come-back throughout the 
legislation and policy making on HT and HS (Srikantiah, 2007). Regarding 
both phenomena, the victim-label is used very differently resulting in an 
important distinction between the ‘smuggled person’ and the ‘trafficked 
victim’. 
 There is a categorical shift in discourse throughout the documents con-
cerning the compassion for smuggled persons. In the introduction of the 
action plan against HS and in the description of the reasons for its devel-
opment, there is a strong focus on the abuses and the violations of human 
rights. The documents focused on the horrors and on the large number of 
smuggled persons that died in the Mediterranean Sea. 
 
“Ruthless criminal networks . . . putting the migrants’ lives at risk”, 
“Scores of migrants drown at sea, suffocate in containers or perish in 
the deserts” . . . “The human rights of migrants are often gravely vio-
lated through abuse and exploitation” (p.1 Action plan against HS).  
 
Despite this outspoken moral outrage, this rather victimising discourse 
changes direction. The empathetic and victimising discourse is lost 
throughout the rest of the action plan where the people involved are just 
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appointed as ‘migrants’ and are blamed because of their willingness to pay 
smugglers to come to Europe.  
 In case of HT this consent to the act is not taken into account because 
of the exploiting and abusive nature of the crime. The consent of the traf-
ficked person is considered irrelevant in case of threat or use of force, co-
ercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, abuse of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve 
the consent. The introduction of the notion abuse of the ‘position of vul-
nerability’, and its broad interpretation resulted a situation in which almost 
all trafficked persons will be considered victims. However, this is not al-
ways in agreement with the own perceptions on victimisation of these la-
belled persons (Spencer, 2015; Lima De Pérez, 2015b).  
 On the other hand, this exclusion of the possibility to consent to the act 
was nowhere to be found regarding to HS. Nevertheless, it could be argued 
that also smuggled persons are often deceived and even given benefits in 
order to achieve their consent to be smuggled. Furthermore, HS is often a 
textbook case in which people are abused and find themselves in a position 
of vulnerability. The very existence of smuggling services is driven by a 
lack of legal migration opportunities and increasing border control activi-
ties, making alternative solutions impossible (Brouwer and Kumin, 2003).  
 These findings imply a double standard concerning the victimisation in 
policy concerning HT and HS. The focus in HS policy is not on the viola-
tion of human rights during the travel. Despite the slightly victim tainted 
discourse, it is clear that the underlying objectives of the policy are first 
and foremost the protection of the European safety and identity. This might 
all be summarised by the name of the ‘facilitators’ package’, namely pre-
venting the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit and residence in the 
EU. Therefore victimisation and vulnerability are both concepts which are 
socially constructed and serve political objectives (Green, 2011). The 
moral compassion present in the HT policy is absent in the protective ap-
proach towards HS which is primarily founded on the goals of European 
safety, protection and surveillance of the external borders. 
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Conclusion: dubious victim discourse 
 
The labelling framework introduces a victimological perspective through 
which a social interactionist reality can be critically analysed. It should be 
noticed that the victim label is used in a different manner regarding to the 
legislation and policy of HT and HS. This results in a false dichotomy be-
tween the ideal trafficking victim and the non-ideal smuggled person. For 
a person to fit the ideal victim image, he or she should passively endure all 
harm and exploitation while any own contribution to the crime is entirely 
dismissed (Christie, 1986). If a person does not respond to all of these con-
ditions, this results in the exclusion of the victim label. Consenting to the 
crime is one of these criteria for which different standards are used in case 
of HT and HS. The consent to HT is ignored due to the vulnerable position 
of these persons. However, consenting to HS results in the elimination of 
smuggled person as official victim. This polarisation does not even end 
with the distinction between an ideal and a non-ideal victim but is increas-
ingly linked with other opposite qualifications such as ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’, 
‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ migrants (Buckland, 2008; Stumpf, 2006). Thus, 
a fine line exists between victimisation and criminalisation when the per-
son does not fit the ‘ideal victim’ criteria (Spencer, 2015; Hoyle et al., 
2011; Munro, 2008; Sharma, 2003).  
 This artificial distinction based on an outdated victim image can be crit-
icised for several reasons. Firstly, the justification for these two extremes 
in victimising of people being smuggled or trafficked should be ques-
tioned. It goes without saying that victims of HT have to endure exploiting 
situations caused by and also causing their vulnerability. But also smug-
gled persons face this vulnerability and experience particular types of ex-
ploitation and abuse, which can result in exploitative dependencies 
(Andrees and Van der Linden, 2005; Buckland, 2008; Chapkis, 2003). Ac-
tually, HT victims often commence their road in not that different circum-
stances: as some economic migrants, asylum seekers and smuggled per-
sons (Gallagher, 2001). The explicit line between the innocent victims and 
the opportunist illegal migrant, used to further stipulate the right to protec-
tion, is not only a dangerous one but also makes no sense since many peo-
ple who are being trafficked are in essence also economic migrants 
(Chapkis, 2003). Starting from a dominant victim image is in this case not 
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only inept to grasp the complexity of victimisation in these phenomena, 
but will often lead to inappropriate and sometimes even harmful ap-
proaches in tackling human smuggling and trafficking (Buckland, 2008).  
 Secondly, besides the imposition of this label and the relating potential 
harmful consequences, it is necessary to investigate the legitimacy of this 
label. These uncanny distinctions in the legitimacy of the victimhood does 
not take into account the real experiences of a person, which then fails to 
engage with the complexities and flexibilities of these people (Spencer, 
2015; Hoyle et al., 2011). By imposing this victim label to a prior deter-
mined group of people it is possible to lose sight of the own victim percep-
tion of the labelled person (McDonald and Erez, 2007; Pemberton, 2016). 
Therefore, it is essential to include a person’s own reality into these con-
siderations to pursue a complete image of the migration experience. Vic-
timhood cannot be deemed an objective reality since this will never be the 
same experience for all victims (Christie, 1986). Van Liempt and Sersli 
(2013) argue for a reality check by comparing the used victimizing dis-
course and labels with the actual experiences of these migrants. It is espe-
cially important to recognise the relativity of the concept ‘victim’ because 
of the complexity of the experiences (Collins, 2007; Goodey, 2003; 
McDonald and Erez, 2007; Vervliet, 2013). 
 Thirdly, the instrumentalisation of the victims after their labelling is 
twofold. Firstly, victims are used to defend the current EU policy but im-
plicitly serve to support alternative policy motives. Secondly, this instru-
mentalisation is explicitly present when the protection, assistance or even 
residence permits for victims appears to depend on their role in the criminal 
procedure against traffickers or smugglers.  
 At the beginning of this chapter, I mentioned that the European policy 
on human smuggling and trafficking in human beings focuses on a human 
rights perspective both in their policy documents and in the popular media 
when arguing the approach to tackle these two phenomena. The increasing 
crimmigration evolution created an ideal environment to surreptitiously 
develop a political and strategic mechanism to protect the European secu-
rity and identity and at the same time hold on to this human rights-inspired 
narrative. The victim has an important role to play as a corner stone in this 
European policy. Therefore, is this application of the victim-label clearly 
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not free from value judgements and there is even an unambiguous instru-
mentalisation of the victim and the victimising discourse to benefit the pro-
tection of the European borders.  
 There is a remarkable crimmigration evolution in the European migra-
tion policy these days. As mentioned before, the policy initiatives on HT 
and HS are strongly framed in an approach to ‘protect the human rights’. 
But especially with HS this is a thin cover for the protection of ‘Fort Eu-
rope’ through a security based approach (Cholewinski, 2000; European 
Commission, 2013; Lima De Perez and Vermeulen, 2015; Mitsilegas, 
2012). This tendency was already present in the first initiatives but is even 
more relevant in the new action plans. Measures against migration, HS and 
even HT are consistently wrapped in a human rights cloak since this is 
easier to pitch (Berman, 2010). But the underlying objectives are detection 
and persecution the offenders and even criminalising the illegal migrants 
(Goodey, 2003). In addition to this crimmigration and alternative objec-
tives, its negative impact on the real human rights approach is essential. 
Many of the protectionist measures do not have a positive impact on the 
so-called victims. The strong anti-migration agenda and the strengthening 
and criminalisation of illegal migration does not contribute to the protec-
tion of these people. If it is harder to cross borders, this will mainly result 
in an increasing demand for smuggling services. Developing a more re-
strictive migration policy without including legal migration opportunities 
rather feeds the organised, irregular migration than stop it. It simultane-
ously increases the vulnerability of the smuggled persons (Brouwer and 
Kumin, 2003; Gallagher, 2006; Koser, 2000; Lima De Perez and 
Vermeulen, 2015; Munro, 2008). One step further, it is even disputable 
whether these developments towards a strict border protection are even in 
agreement with the existing right to apply for asylum hence the Refugee 
Convention (1951) (Gallagher, 2002).  
 The double instrumentalisation of the victims of HT and HS inspires to 
ponder on how a real human rights inspired policy should look like in re-
gard to the victims. Firstly, it is necessary to similarly approach all the vic-
tims based on their experiences of abuse or exploitation despite their role 
in or consent to establishing the crime. Furthermore, several protective and 
supportive measures should be introduced for all victims, not least to ena-
ble them to break contact with traffickers or smugglers without further in-
strumentally inspired strings attached (Agustín, 2002; Munro, 2008; 
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O'Neill, 2001). Additionally there is the need for a change in EU mentality 
whilst abandoning the unilateral focus on the traffickers and smugglers by 
also recognizing EU’s own role in the victimisation of migrants 
(Mitsilegas, 2012).  
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The emergency business 
Migrants reception, mafia interests and glocal 
governance: from Lampedusa to Rome 
 
Giacomo Orsini1 and Anna Sergi2 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The dangerousness of mafia power is linked to the possibility that the em-
ployment and exploitation of personal and social networks might grant a 
fast-track access to both legal and illegal markets. In other words, a suc-
cessful mafia presence in a territory leads to situations where corruptive 
pacts, malpractices and sleaze become a social norm so that for locals it 
becomes very difficult to qualify them as deviant or criminal. In this sce-
nario, the more rooted the mafia group is on a specific territory, in terms 
of cultural bond with the community together with the availability of social 
and personal networks, the deeper will be its capability to exercise local 
governance, thereby increasing the vulnerability of local institutions and 
licit sectors.  
 Particular events or particular conditions can increase the likelihood or 
the speed of success of mafia involvement in the public and private gov-
ernance of a given territory. Two examples can best illustrate this: first, the 
availability of (new/more) funding or diversified sources of capitals, such 
as new investment opportunities; second, emergency situations, such as 
natural disasters. When different or new sources of funding become avail-
able from public funding bodies, mafia groups – as predatory forces – use 
their networks to both participate in tenders and receive the funds while 
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masking their use afterwards. This has been studied both in relation to pub-
lic funds (Calderoni and Caneppele, 2009) and European Union’s funding 
(Sergi and South, 2016). This is especially true when it comes to situations 
of emergency, such as the aftermath of natural disasters, i.e. earthquakes 
or floods. In these cases, not only special funding is likely to become avail-
able, but also – and more importantly – controls over transparency and due 
diligence tend to be overruled by the necessity to speed up the recovery 
(Green, 2005). 
 Authorities have confirmed the involvement of organised crime/mafia-
type networks in the re-construction after the earthquake of 2009 in L’Aq-
uila, in the Central Italian region of Abruzzo (Sergi, 2017a). Anti-mafia 
investigations (for example Operation Lypas in 2011) related to the Calab-
rian mafia – the ‘ndrangheta – have shown how various clans had success-
fully obtained contracts and gained access and control to construction and 
development firms in the area. The contacts they used in the occasion of 
the earthquake had been previously secured for the cocaine trade as the 
clans were present in the area before the earthquake occurred. Moreover, 
as shown by Operation ‘Isola Felice’ – Happy Island – in 2015, due to 
ineffective regulation more and different clans are now involved in the re-
construction in the area. The poor quality of their construction works (for 
example, because of the use of less secure and cheaper materials) as well 
as the costs associated to their presence in the industry (judicial, adminis-
trative and economic) are all elements that can contribute, and have con-
tributed, to the poor environmental conditions of Central Italian regions.  
 In these scenarios, one fundamental aspect is the link between corrup-
tion and mafia groups. That corruption is an enabler and a systemic feature 
of the operations of many organised crime groups, especially when it 
comes to operations in the public and political sectors, is proved by the 
multiple cases recorded in the recent Italian history (Smith et al., 2016; 
Lavorgna and Sergi, 2014; CSD, 2010). However, the degree to which ma-
fia groups benefit from, and employ, corruption techniques requires a more 
refined discourse.  
 In dense mafia environments – territories where mafia clans are not just 
numerically more present and criminally active, but also socially and cul-
turally more embedded – it is not unusual to observe overlapping of roles 
and functions between criminal groups and ruling classes. In some cases, 
criminal groups and ruling classes share the same individuals in different 
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functions or use the same networks. Ties between different people are in-
deed multiple as people are linked through multiple roles (Boissevain, 
1974).  
 This is particularly true in small communities and in territories where 
local economy struggles. In Calabria, for example, the ruling class and ma-
fia groups “both consume resources without an intent to support innova-
tion or development and allow a careless accumulation of debts in the 
name of personal gains” (Sergi, 2015: 43). This is exacerbated in situations 
where there is an exceptional influx of capitals and/or a condition of emer-
gency, which imply more predatory techniques on the one hand, and lower 
legal controls on the other hand. In these cases, together with local admin-
istration corruption – which presupposes an exchange of favours, a pact – 
there is a situation, which can be defined as “concurrent predatory govern-
ance”. Both legal and illegal actors such as politicians, administrators and 
mafia groups, act within an informal grey area, where the more a territory 
is prone to dense mafia presence, the higher the risk of such a grey area to 
resist. Different factors contribute generating such vicious circle:  
1. The links between mafia clans and their community, from an economic 
but also social-cultural perspective; mafia power feeds on local 
relationships to exploit local opportunities, the stronger the former the 
more successful the latter.  
2. The socio-cultural sets of behaviour of mafia groups and individuals 
include the ability to establish instrumental friendships and to maintain 
or gain proximity with local politicians and/or public administrators 
and/or entrepreneurs to access key functions and key offices. The more 
effective and the tighter are the links with the territory and the local 
culture of reference, the stronger will be the ability to establish forms 
of concurrent governance of the territory thanks to these connections 
and proximity. 
3. Instrumental relationships and concurrent governance are particularly 
effective and can be used to foster new business ventures when, in 
situations of emergency, transparency regulations are partially or 
completely disregarded. 
 
As discussed, when public funding reaches territories with these character-
istics in response to an emergency, the risk of widespread corruption is 
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high. This is even more the case within the framework of a complex gov-
ernance system as the European one, where funds are allocated by distant 
authorities.  
 One case which is extremely relevant to show how emergencies and 
European governance combine to favour mafias’ access to public funding 
is the migration crisis which started in Italy already in the late 1990s (Apap 
and Carrera, 2003). Since Italy became part of the Schengen space of free 
movement of people, a series of migration emergencies started to unfold in 
a peripheral national territory: the Sicilian island of Lampedusa. As these 
crises became extremely visible both in Italy and Europe, the country 
turned into the main expense item for EU authorities in their attempt to 
manage migration at the border. This pushed officials located at different 
institutional levels – i.e. national, regional, local – to declare the emergency 
status with increasing frequency, as this officially allowed for a quicker 
and more efficient response to the various crises. 
 In order to show how the permanent migrant crisis in Italy and Europe 
works to enable mafia groups to illicitly access substantial public funding, 
we concentrate here on a primary case study and two corollary, but con-
nected to one another, ones. First, and most importantly, we look at the 
iconic borderland of Lampedusa. The case of this tiny Sicilian island is 
extremely emblematic to show how emergency became the new normal of 
migration management in Italy – and in Europe. An analysis of the events 
involving the local migrants’ and asylum seekers’ reception centre demon-
strates how emergencies attracted increasing EU funds to this otherwise 
isolated community. It also demonstrates how the emergency allowed for 
the expansion of a grey area which favoured corruption and, with it, the 
infiltration of mafias’ interests in the local governance of migration.  
Thus, we move northwards in Calabria, to concentrate further on the 
involvement of the Calabrian mafia in the management of the biggest re-
ception centre of Europe, in Crotone. This case confirms how the inflow 
of substantial public funding in a territory with dense mafia presence fa-
vours concurrent predatory governance practices. 
Finally, we briefly look at the Mafia Capitale case in Rome, which in-
volved a local criminal group that, according to prosecutors, organised it-
self as a mafia group. This latest case shows how the availability of EU 
and national funds distributed within a declared emergency, provide a set 
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of opportunities for criminal groups with the right institutional connections 
– up to the office of the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
 
Mafia groups and interests in the “migration crisis” 
 
As said, mafias are criminal networks that develop “social ties providing 
access to profitable criminal opportunities” (Kleemans and de Poot, 2008: 
75). They exhibit a certain set of socio-cultural behaviours, which are 
highly dependent and embedded in local cultures (Sergi and Lavorgna, 
2016). These socio-cultural conducts characterise the network, but also the 
way individuals in, or close to, the network exploit that “concurrent pred-
atory governance”.  
 Additionally, mafias are criminal networks that necessarily rely on dif-
ferent forms of interactions with other powers across society to reach their 
goals. As noticed by Mische (2003) all networks are constituted through 
communicative interactions that we can understand through immersions in 
local culture. 
 Interactions, links and ties among individuals in and out of a network 
create different types of relationships, which are more or less beneficial to 
the network’s success. Mafias are understandable under this conceptuali-
sation, even when their interests seem not to be local. The interests of dif-
ferent mafia clans and related networks in the management of the busi-
nesses and the money that surrounds the migration crisis in Italy provides 
an extremely significant case to study the interplay of this glocal dimension 
of the mafias’ businesses. 
 Recently the Direzione Investigativa Antimafia (Investigative Anti-
mafia Directorate, DIA) confirms that elements of crisis and emergency 
are key in the way mafia groups work. The DIA (2016: p. 64), presenting 
some of its findings on Sicilian Cosa Nostra, notices how the various clans 
“continue undisturbed in their short and long-term strategies, by exploiting 
emergency situations determined by the dysfunction of the overall system . 
. . at times creating the conditions of the emergency themselves”. This mo-
dus operandi, continues the DIA, “can be exported to the business of mi-
grants’ reception centres . . . which could be among the sectors where Cosa 
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Nostra manages to allocate and distribute public contracts through syner-
gies with white collar criminals”. 
Before moving to our analysis, however, we provide here a concise but 
comprehensive overview of the complex reception system that Italy has 
put into place since the 1990s. This brief description is indeed essential to 
understand the cases, which we will analyse afterwards. 
 
Migrant reception in Italy: a complex and multi-layered  
apparatus 
 
According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in 2016 there were 
about 181.436 sea arrivals in Italy. On 3 May 2017, the UNHCR counted 
37.142 arrivals.3 In the period between January and February 2017 the UN-
HCR has counted a 48% increase in numbers compared to sea arrivals in 
the same period last year (UNHCR, 2017: 1). Across the Southern Italian 
regions, which are placed closer to the external border of the EU, there are 
hotspot facilities that operate for the first identification of newcomers. 
These are located all in Sicily and Calabria. There, Italian and European 
officials monitor and assist procedures such as for instance the fingerprint-
ing of third country nationals rescued at sea. After the identification inside 
the hotspots is concluded, migrants and asylum seekers are taken to other 
centres depending on their legal statuses. As such, Italian law provide for 
a 3- tier reception system, composed of:  
1. first assistance facilities (so called CPSA) and hotspots;  
2. first-line reception facilities, including first reception centres (so-called 
CPA) and regional hubs; 
3. second-line reception facilities (so-called SPRAR centres, run by the 
National Association of Italian Municipalities).  
 
If no spaces are available in first-line or second-line reception centres, the 
law stipulates that persons be accommodated in temporary facilities, also 
known as extraordinary reception centres, or CAS. Moreover, reception 
centres are of three types: CDAs are first-line support centres; CARAs are 
reception centres for asylum seekers and CIEs are centres for identification 
                                                 
3  UNHRC Operational Portal – Refugee Situations – Mediterranean Portal [ac-
cessed 3 May 2017] 
  http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205. 
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and expulsion. By the end of February 2017, 174.469 asylum-seekers were 
accommodated in reception centres across Italy, 78% of whom were in 
temporary facilities (UNHCR, 2017: 1).  
Over the years, such relatively complex reception system has under-
gone several reforms: it received increasing Communitarian funding, but 
still experienced a chronic state of crisis or, emergency due to overcrowd-
ing, and a series of scandals. As we discuss next, national investigators 
found mafia and mafia-like organisations being highly involved in the 
management of some of the country’s biggest, and thus more lucrative, 
reception centres. In the following pages, we present three relatively dif-
ferent cases – e.g. in terms of type of mafia territories, size of corruption, 
the structure of the criminal organization, the involvement of institutional 
actors. These cases show how emergencies translate ‘on the ground’ into 
an expanding grey area which offers several opportunities for mafia groups 
to profit. According to our observations, this seems to be even more the 
case when emergencies are funded by distant authorities such as the EU 
Commission.  
 
1. Governing migration through emergency: Lampedusa as a(n) (is)land 
of illicit business opportunities 
 
With Italy joining the Schengen space allowing for free movement of peo-
ple in 1997, Lampedusa became part of the EU external border (DG Home 
Affairs, 2014; Friese, 2010). Migrants’ arrivals in Lampedusa begun al-
ready in the 1990s. Yet, until the Schengen agreement entered into force, 
the few Italian law enforcement officials present on the island would 
largely overlook arrivals (Cuttitta, 2014). What changed with the Schengen 
space for the free movement of people encompassing Lampedusa was that 
arrivals started to be managed differently, as securitisation replaced the 
previous laissez faire and improvised approach (Léonard, 2011; Van Hou-
tum and Pijper, 2007). A local activist described this shift: 
 
“Once authorities started to organize themselves to deal with the issue 
– for instance with the opening of the first detention centre at the airport 
– the strategy aimed at separating the phenomenon from locals. Author-
ities’ strategy was to hide all they could from the eyes of Lampedusans. 
As soon as migrants arrived on dry land, a bus took them to the centre 
and they disappeared from [the] islanders’ sight.” 
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With the introduction of the Immigration Act 40/1998 Italian legislators 
adjusted the national rules to the Schengen parameters (Finotelli and 
Sciortino, 2009). Now, unauthorised migrants had to be detained so that 
new facilities were built in Lampedusa (Tsianos and Karakayali, 2010). 
Initially, migrants only occasionally encountered Lampedusa and landed 
there during their journey to Italy. However, since several European sea-
border patrolling missions launched from and around the island (Giorgi 
and Pinkus, 2006), boat migrants started being detected and rescued many 
miles away from Lampedusa and were then also taken to the island. Thus, 
an expensive maritime border had been established around Lampedusa 
thanks to the use of navy and coastguard ships, helicopters and even 
drones. At the same time, the first migrants’ reception and detention facil-
ity was opened in Lampedusa in 1996. At the beginning, authorities opened 
a gated camp for the migrants’ temporary stay with a maximum capacity 
of almost 200 individuals, inside the area of Lampedusa’s airport 
(Monzini, 2008). After authorities and medical teams had checked each 
person, direct flights would transfer migrants to mainland Sicily within a 
few days (Gatti, 2005). 
 Nevertheless, in 2005, the centre went under the lens of national as well 
as European media attention, as the inhuman conditions of migrants’ de-
tention had raised objections by the European Parliament and continental 
media (Andrijasevic, 2010; Gatti, 2005). Following these scandals, the Ital-
ian authorities began planning the construction of a new migrant centre in 
the inner valley of Contrada Imbriacola, the building of which started in 
2007. This bigger facility, primarily used for medical checks and identifi-
cation, had a maximum capacity of almost 400, and up to more than 800 
people in case of ‘emergency’. Today, the centre of Contrada Imbriacola 
is the first hotspot ever established in Italy, and it is the only facility used 
to detain migrants on the island (Dines et al., 2015). 
 Overall, with the European external border placed on the island, public 
funding started arriving at an unprecedented speed on this territory of 26 
square kilometres and less than 6.000 registered residents (Orsini, 2015). 
With national and Communitarian institutions busy fortifying the border, 
public investments came from both Brussels and Rome (Andersson, 2016; 
Völkel, 2014; Andrijasevic, 2010). 
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 Concerning border control, public funding ends primarily in the hands 
of law enforcement agencies, the military, and a series of major corpora-
tions that develop surveillance technologies, which are used at sea (Bigo, 
2000). Yet, substantial Communitarian transfers reached Lampedusa also 
to establish and run the local migrants’ reception and detention centre. It is 
mainly there that a series of opportunities arose for mafia/illicit entrepre-
neurial networks to profit from the “borderisation” (Cuttitta, 2014) of Lam-
pedusa, as an almost permanent state of emergency was declared on the 
island. 
 In fact, the Italian government declared first the state of emergency for 
Lampedusa in 2006 (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2006). The official scope of such 
declaration was the necessity to deal with the many migrants’ boats left on 
the island. Presented as an environmental threat and, therefore, based on 
the law number 225 of 19924 designed to deal with natural disasters, the 
emergency status allowed the Civil Protection Department to circumvent 
the public tender procedure and assign directly to private companies the 
contracts for the disposal of the wrecks (Friese, 2012).  
 In the following years, several other emergencies were declared, 
providing other opportunities to reduce transparency and public scrutiny. 
Possibly the most noteworthy emergency took place in 2011 when, due to 
the revolution in Tunisia and the civil war in Libya, thousands started 
reaching the island. Since the beginning, Italian authorities did nothing to 
transfer people to mainland Sicily, and simultaneously refused to offer ac-
commodations to the newcomers. The island was soon packed with people 
forced to sleep in the open air. Soon, a humanitarian emergency exploded 
on the island and it was projected from there to the whole of Europe (Cam-
pesi, 2011). It is at this stage that the then Italian Ministry of Interior, 
Maroni, officially declared another emergency, demanding for extra Com-
munitarian efforts – mainly economic – to deal with the situation. Brussels 
did not wait too much, and soon Italian authorities received “25 million 
euros of emergency funding” to address the situation on the island 
(McMahon, 2012: 6).  
                                                 
4 Available on the website of the Italian Civil Protection Department: 
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/view_prov.wp?conten-
tId=LEG1602 (accessed 8 June 2017). 
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 It is in Lampedusa that emergency management was normalised with 
respect to the governance of migration in Italy. Since the tragedy of the 3rd 
of October of 2013, when almost 400 migrants lost their lives as their boat 
capsized at less than one nautical mile from the island, and throughout 
2014, 2015 and 2016, Italy received a series of other emergency transfers 
from Brussels to cope with a migrant emergency that, as we have seen, 
lasts on the island from about two decades (Cuttitta, 2014; Perkowski, 
2016). Overall, tens of millions of Euros of European taxpayers reached 
Rome, to be spent mainly in Lampedusa (European Parliament, 2016). Al-
located within relatively short periods of time, no open tender was pub-
lished, which allows for those with the right institutional connections to be 
selected. While only a few Lampedusan seem to have received any direct 
benefit from the inflow of money, the state of emergency is pivotal on the 
island to facilitate the spread of criminal practices carried out by local ad-
ministrators. This is what a local lawyer, and personal assistant of the 
mayor of Lampedusa in 2013, Paola, explained: 
 
“I collected several evidences of the institutional commitment to sus-
pend the rule of law in Lampedusa with the excuse of the border [. . .] 
Many of the members of the last municipal administration [. . .] com-
mitted serious irregularities during their mandate. [After years of pro-
tests from locals] the provincial authority nominated an inspector who 
had the power of resolving the local administration in case she detected 
any irregularity. [. . .] After [. . .] more than two years of investigation, 
the inspector finally published a report where she denounced the ad-
ministration’s numerous criminal offences – mainly related to corrup-
tion. However, she concluded her report with what [. . .] summarizes 
perfectly the relation between the border emergency and the rule of law 
on this island. [. . .] Reading from the original report5: ‘Given that the 
administration demonstrated the ability to maintain good relations and 
efficient cooperation with national and Communitarian authorities [...] 
during the serious emergency of 2011 [. . .] I nominate a superinten-
dent’. This meant that she recorded irregularities and yet, she decided 
not to take any legal actions against local administrators. [Instead, she] 
                                                 
5  A version of which is available here: 
 https://www.scribd.com/doc/82861656/Commissariamento-Comune-di-Lam-
pedusa-e-Linosa (accessed 8 June 2017). 
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nominated a superintendent [who is] an unclear and unspecified legal 
figure [in the Italian legal system. As she reported, the superintendent 
role was] ‘to remove the irregularities carried out by the administra-
tion.’ [. . .] Over the two months the superintendent spent in Lampedusa, 
he did not take any single action against the former administration.” 
  
The document mentioned by Paola confirms what most interviewees said 
they experienced daily. The emergency is used in Lampedusa to justify a 
system of connivance amongst national and local institutions. It creates a 
sort of stasis where no institutional actor felt safe enough to denounce the 
criminal activities of the other (Orsini, 2016). In fact, this proves to be an 
extremely fertile soil for mafia-type behaviours to flourish. 
Here, the case of the management of migrants’ and asylum seekers’ re-
ception and detention on the island is emblematic. Since 1996, a centre was 
opened in the local airport, and was run by the volunteers of the Italian Red 
Cross: migrants received first aid there and they were taken to mainland 
Sicily within few hours or days later. At the time, there were only limited 
financial transfers from Rome to Lampedusa. Nevertheless, a few years 
later, in 2002, as the terms of the contract to run the centre changed, at the 
national level the Misericordia – a Calabrian religious association /charity 
(under investigation by the Antimafia since the first half of 2017) replaced 
the Italian Red Cross. As noted by Cuttitta (2014: 103) this happened when 
volunteers became “employees, and the volume of funds paid by the Min-
istry of Interior was made dependent on both the number of detainees and 
the number of days spent by each of them in the centre. Since then [. . .] 
migrants would remain for longer periods on the island”. Clearly, a series 
of incentives was connected to longer detention of migrants, while provid-
ing them with the cheapest possible services (Martone, 2016). 
 Moreover, since the access to this facility was denied to journalists, ac-
tivists and political actors of all kinds, public funding was handled basi-
cally without public scrutiny. This situation lasted until 2005 and until, first 
of all, the denouncements of a delegation of the European Parliament 
which was allowed inside the centre. Second, the inhuman living condi-
tions in which migrants were kept were denounced to the public that same 
year, when an undercover journalist entered the centre as an undocumented 
migrant.  
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 Following the scandal, the facility was changed again into a reception 
centre where migrants remained only for a few hours before being trans-
ferred to mainland Sicily. Here, the Red Cross took back the internal man-
agement and the centre was opened to public scrutiny, as journalists, re-
searchers and politicians were finally allowed inside. After all, Lampedusa 
was to become a management model for the whole of Europe, and further 
funding became available within the Communitarian project ‘Praesidium’ 
(Cuttitta, 2014). With increased resources, in 2007 a new and bigger centre 
was finally opened in the island’s inner valley of Contrada Imbiriacola to 
substitute the one in the airport. 
 With the opening of the new centre, a public tender was released and a 
consortium of cooperatives – Lampedusa Accoglienza srl – offered the 
cheapest price and won over the bid made by the Misericordia. Neverthe-
less, as noted by Friese (2012: 73), the cooperatives constituting the con-
sortium “had already sealed the deal before the tender was released and 
thus had excluded other regional competitors. In addition, both coops 
[could count on] political affiliations and clientelist relations”. At the time 
the centre of Contrada Imbriacola was a CPSA, and migrants could be de-
tained for only a relatively limited periods of time, that was anyway ex-
ceeded through institutional mismanagement. 
 In October, 2014, another scandal involved the management of the cen-
tre, as the Italian public broadcaster Rai 2 screened a video showing the 
inhuman ways in which detained migrants were washed in the open air by 
the personnel of Lampedusa Accoglienza. Following national and interna-
tional protests, the consortium agreed with the then Ministry of Interior to 
consensually brake the deal. A new deal had now to be finalized, with na-
tional authorities opting for a negotiated procedure. Here a pool of few 
companies was directly selected by the Ministry to compete. According to 
the prefect of the Sicilian province of Agrigento – which includes Lampe-
dusa – due to exceptional migratory pressures on the island only little time 
was left for authorities to proceed with a tender, making it thus necessary 
to opt for a transparent but faster procedure (Camera dei Deputati, 2015). 
Surprisingly enough, despite the scandal of 2005, the Misericordia was 
among the selected competitors. Even more surprisingly, the Misericordia 
won the bid and today runs the management of the migrants’ centre of 
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Lampedusa. This, despite an even greater scandal concerning the Miseri-
cordia involvement in the management of the biggest migrants and asylum 
seekers’ reception centre of the whole Europe. 
 
2. The Misericordia case in Crotone, Calabria 
 
The migrant and asylum facility of Lampedusa is not the only reception 
centre managed by the Misericordia. Actually, the charity is one of the 
country’s main contractors for reception centres of this sort. For the pur-
poses of this work, here we focus also on the case of the Misericordia’s 
(mis)management of the biggest reception centres for refugees and asylum 
seekers of Europe, the CDA/C.A.R.A Sant’Anna of Crotone, in Calabria. 
It must be understood here that in Italy the allocation of funding to run 
migrants and asylum seekers reception facilities took place over various 
emergencies, which were declared by different national governments, in-
creasingly since the crisis of 2011 in Lampedusa (Vassallo Paleologo, 
2011; Marchetti, 2014). 
 The alleged involvement of the Arena mafia clan in the management of 
services for the Sant’Anna Centre and the Misericordia charity has led to 
67 arrests made by the Antimafia on the 15th May 2017.6 Charges include 
mafia association, embezzlement, and fraud. The Misericordia is officially 
under investigation by the Antimafia District prosecutors since the first 
half of 2017 and went under scrutiny by local and national media since 
2014 for suspicious connections between its governor and the local mafia 
family – the clan Arena. While the governor of the Misericordia disclosed 
threats from the ‘ndrangheta to a Parliamentary Inquiry in 2015 (Camera 
dei Deputati, 2015), an investigation into the charity’s activities had actu-
ally already started in 2013. The charity – which is one of the largest em-
ployers in the region (Stranges and Wolff, 2016) – also participates as 
shareholder to a social enterprise called Miser.Icr, which invests in social 
activities in the local communities such as a cinema and a sport centre. This 
means that the association seeks to reinforce ties within the local commu-
nity. As reported also by the national media (Pipitone, 2017), recently the 
Miser.Icr has invested in the local football club of the town, once directed 
                                                 
6   Fermo di Indiziato di Delitto, Proc. Pen. N. 4456/2013 RGNR mod. 21 DDA 
- Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catanzaro - Direzione Dis-
trettuale Antimafia. 
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by the son of the mafia boss in the Arena clan. Moreover, the same enter-
prise has also acquired shares of the local airport. These were all consid-
ered profiles of risk, red flags, for the Anti-mafia investigation. As declared 
in the arrest warrant7: 
 
“[The Arena clan] was close to various entrepreneurs who, in exchange 
for participation in the financial gains of the business run by affiliates, 
could count on the enrichment of their client portfolio, often through 
imposition of mono-oligopolies and through an activity of credit recov-
ery thanks to the force of intimidation of the clan – as they could be 
recognised as ‘friends’ entrepreneurs” 
 
Moreover, the clan “gained control over sub-contracts for the Misericor-
dia, among which the catering services, through catering enterprises man-
aged and owned by affiliates”.8 The local coordinator and founder (who is 
also a priest) and the Governor/President of the Misericordia have been 
arrested because of their “apical role of organisers” for the clan. As re-
ported in the arrest warrant, they “allowed for significant sums to enrich 
the clan’s wealth”9. This was done thanks to the support of those, also un-
der arrest, who managed the subcontracts for the Misericordia – such as 
the refectory services for the migrants’ centre in Crotone. Through a series 
of crimes, such as false invoicing and different types of fraud and the con-
stitution of a shell company, they were able to “save” some of the allocated 
money for the services to the clan’s benefit. The evidence of this case in 
the territory and in relation to the asylum seekers and migrants’ centre, 
portray a scenario of “concurrent predatory governance” or, as defined by 
the Antimafia prosecutors10, of “circular relationship between the protag-
onists of the commercial decisions of the CARA [the reception centre] and 
the local ‘ndrangheta families”.  
                                                 
7  Fermo di Indiziato di Delitto, Proc. Pen. N. 4456/2013 RGNR mod. 21 DDA 
- Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Catanzaro - Direzione Dis-
trettuale Antimafia, page 5. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Ibid, page 9. 
10  Ibid, page 1322. 
63 
 
 A dossier published on the website11 of the Misericordia in 2015 ac-
counts for the various expenses and the supporting legal materials for both 
the Misericordia and the Miser.Icr, openly in response to allegations of 
mafia infiltration since 2013. Aside from the fact that these allegations now 
turned into arrests, the proximity of the manager of the Misericordia to the 
former Italian Minister of Interior, now Minister of Foreign Affairs, had 
raised doubts when the Misericordia was allocated the contract for the re-
ception centre in Lampedusa for the second time, in 2015 (Tizian, 2017). 
Indeed, interceptions made public by Anti-mafia prosecutors in the arrest 
warrants of May, 2017 in Calabria, confirm that the destiny of the reception 
centres of Crotone and Lampedusa are tied together. The bond is to be 
found in the activities, the investments and the contracts of the Misericor-
dia whose President/Governor in Calabria (now arrested) was also Vice-
President of the charity at the national level between 2012-2015. This gives 
thus an insight of how concurrent predatory governance flourishes in times 
of emergency management, by efficiently operating within Europe’s com-
plex governance system where policies are implemented through a multi-
plicity of institutional levels: from the local to the regional, the national 
and the European. It is in fact thanks to the permanent emergency and 
within such complex net of criminal and institutional interconnections 
placed at different geographical levels, that the most infamous scandals 
related to the (mis)management of migration and asylum in Italy gener-
ated: that of Mafia Capitale. 
 
3. The Mafia Capitale case in Rome 
 
As reported in the arrest warrants issued by the Antimafia Prosecutors in 
Rome within the frame of the Operation “Mondo di Mezzo” in 2014, a 
local criminal network had invested heavily in the management of Rome’s 
many reception facilities. Convictions in first degree arrived in July, 2017. 
Indeed, as recorded in one of the many taps collected by the investigators, 
                                                 
11  Misericordia Isola Capo Rizzuto - Dossier sull’organizzazione dell’accogli-
enza dei migranti e sulla gestione dei Centri d’accoglienza affidati alla Miser-
icordia di Isola Capo Rizzuto – 
  http://www.misericordiaisola.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Dossier-2015-
pt2.pdf (accessed 12 May 2017). 
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the involved criminals had profited from the business of managing mi-
grants’ reception in the Italian capital, more than they had from drug trade. 
One of the intercepted talks between one of the alleged bosses of Mafia 
Capitale and one of the brokers for the Mancuso ‘ndrangheta clan sees the 
former revealing to the latter12: 
 
“This year we ended with 40 million, but all the money, all the gains 
we have made on the gypsies, on the emergency of reception centres 
and on the migrants, all the other sectors end up with zero [gains].” 
 
In the same investigation, one of the men in charge of the management of 
the network’s interests in the reception centres discussed his role in “mov-
ing” migrants assigned to one of the CARA centres (the “Mineo”, assigned 
2.000 places) towards other centres where his and the network’s interests 
lie, due to the emergency situation. He says to his finance advisor13:  
 
“In Rome [. . .] I can get centres, buildings that are available [. . .] thanks 
to my ongoing relationships at the Ministry I am able to direct the mi-
grants coming from the South [. . .] as they often go through the Mineo 
centre and then [. . .] from the Mineo they are sent around Italy [. . .] 
some in Rome [. . .] so if they have buildings that can be turned into 
reception centres quickly, in emergency cases, without tenders, these 
buildings are occupied and I sent them [. . .] work [. . .]” 
 
The participation of members of the Calabrian ‘ndrangheta clans in the 
Mafia Capitale network, in the management of the funding for reception 
centres seems clear (Sergi and Lavorgna, 2016). Yet, for the purposes of 
this paper it is also interesting to notice that this investigation confirmed 
how emergency calls for speediness of responses, and how informality of 
relationships feeds into corruptive pacts and facilitates a systemic violation 
of laws and regulations (Dalla Chiesa, 2015; Sergi, 2016). 
 Here, one could conclude that this is a matter of business opportunities, 
a matter of profit-making more than anything else. However, the most wor-
risome part of the involvement of the Mafia Capitale criminal network in 
                                                 
12 Operation Mondo Di Mezzo, Ordinanza di Custodia Cautelare, Procura di 
Roma, No. 30456/10 R.G.N.R. DDA. P.1170. 
13  Operation Mondo Di Mezzo, Ordinanza di Custodia Cautelare, Procura di 
Roma, No. 30456/10 R.G.N.R. DDA. P.1136. 
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the funding of reception centres happens when and if resources are allo-
cated within the framework of a declared emergency. This entails that there 
is no time to set public tenders so that companies are selected via direct 
call made by local and national institutional actors. Certainly, it does re-
quire (criminal) business acumen to capture and exploit the potential of 
this sector. Eventually, however, the network can successfully do all that 
thanks to its ties, to the political proximity and to the informality of con-
tacts with key stakeholders. These networks of relationships could easily 
and promptly be activated in moments of crisis of a sector.  
 The cases of the centres of Crotone and Lampedusa described before 
mirrors many of the conditions, which allowed the criminal organisation 
to cumulate enormous illicit profits in Rome. In our view, the three cases 
constitute a sort of continuity, confirming the centrality of these complex 
intertwining criminal networks, together with institutional connections. 
Emergencies happen to occur in a complex governance system where 
power and accountability are blurred across multiple and geographically 
distant layers.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusion   
 
More research is clearly needed to understand the relationships between 
different networks of power, mafia interests and state institutions when it 
comes to the business around migration mixed with the challenges of an 
EU border zone such as Lampedusa and, to a certain extent, the rest of 
Italy. From the materials assessed for this paper, we can, however, draw 
some preliminary conclusive remarks.  
 Our first argument is that in cases where following an emergency an 
influx of funds from distant and complex government structures takes 
place, the dynamics of mafia power are facilitated. There are of course dif-
ferences between the ways in which such power works in mafia territories, 
like Crotone, when compared to territorially farther places, like Lampe-
dusa. In the case of the Misericordia in Crotone, in fact, the high mafia 
density makes it possible to insert the destination of the (extra) funds dur-
ing the emergency. This happened thanks to a network of friendships, alli-
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ances and personal interests that are wanted, fostered and sustained by lo-
cal mafia clans, who have social standing, political power and money in 
the area. In the case of Lampedusa, where, at first sight, mafia clans are not 
bound to the territory directly, still mafia interests and behaviours are fa-
voured indirectly by a set of policies from above that are handled by insti-
tutions at high risk of infiltration from below. There are various manifes-
tations of concurrent predatory governance of funds and territories: the 
grey area of illegality and unethical behaviours where personal contacts 
overlap with criminal and with entrepreneurial ones.  
 As said, the more a territory is prone to dense mafia presence, the higher 
the risk of such a grey area emerging as a direct qualifier of mafias’ very 
existence. However, even in territories where mafia presence is not dense, 
forms of concurrent predatory governance can not only take the form of 
mafia behaviours but also attract mafia power from elsewhere. In the last 
case of Mafia Capitale in Rome, the mafia method – where a (criminal) 
group uses its reputation to intimidate and force into compliance and si-
lence others, for financial or other gains – can emerge easily in cases where 
emergencies lead to lack of transparency and ad hoc measures and inter-
ventions. Similarly, the more a mafia group holds a strong grip on a spe-
cific territory, the more its links to local politics and local entrepreneurs 
can represent a springboard to reach out to possibilities beyond the imme-
diate territory. In the case of the Misericordia, the grip on Crotone is the 
reason why the charity could access higher institutional levels: in Calabria 
first, then in the rest of Italy afterwards and especially in Rome. This grip 
could be observed in the various interests shared by mafia groups, entre-
preneurs and the charity. In times of emergency, again, the relaxation of 
policies of control, the direct assignment instead of tenders, personal con-
tacts overruling transparency vouchers, all contribute to the indirect acqui-
sition of privileges elsewhere.  
 The recognition of this influence, therefore, would require a deeper un-
derstanding of how different mafia behaviours manifest and intertwine 
with local administration also outside their territories of origin. The more 
mafia clans are bound to their community from different perspectives (eco-
nomic, political), the more we can assume mafia clans to feed on local re-
lationships and opportunities. The more mafia clans feed on local relation-
ship the more they are embedded in the socio-cultural contexts and main-
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tain instrumental friendships of at least proximity to the key roles and in-
stitutions in those contexts. If mafia’s grip on their territory through instru-
mental friendships is not just infiltration or corruption of administration, 
but rather a form of concurrent predatory governance then mafia power can 
extend to new business ventures in situations of emergency. The social and 
entrepreneurial landscape knows many grey zones in which everyone, ad-
ministrators included, benefits from illegality. The emergence can be used 
to discard transparency regulations partially or completely. This can hap-
pen both at home (Crotone), where local opportunism is condoned by an 
already non-integer local administration and elsewhere (Lampedusa), 
where actors whose predatory skills have already developed elsewhere 
meet local opportunism given by the time and the funds of crisis.  
 Finally, the lesson we can learn from Lampedusa especially, that Euro-
pean integration seems to favour these types of behaviours of mafia-par-
ticipated governance, because the EU’s central institutions are far from the 
local territory and therefore there is a lack of control. In addition, this dis-
tance leads to an improper and/or scarce knowledge of the local territory 
in terms of social and cultural peculiarities in which policies are imposed 
and implemented. 
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Illegal migration, crime and the public  
response in the Czech Republic 
 
Miroslav Scheinost1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Immigration, illegal migration, refugees – words that are being increas-
ingly used. These words single or together resonate in the feelings and 
minds of a not insignificant part of the public with others: suspicious and 
dangerous aliens, associated with conflict, crime, terrorism . . . etc. This 
mixture results among people in the rise of fear of foreigners in general 
and hostility towards immigrants in particular. 
 This chapter does not want to deny risks connected with a massive mi-
gration wave that became evident in Europe over the last years. The aim is 
to analyse the relationship between the phenomenon of migration, the in-
volvement of organised crime into it and the impact on public. This analy-
sis is based on the research project that was carried out in the Czech Re-
public from 2016 till 2017.  
 It is true that the Czech Republic has not been typical for the migration 
wave. It was not strongly afflicted in the past or at present by the main-
stream of migrants of later years. The horizon of this project is, therefore, 
limited by the experience of the CR. But still it is possible to study the 
forms of migration and its organisation, impact on the level of crime and – 
what is striking – the apparent difference between the factual state of mi-
gration and its reflection by public opinion. 
 This apparent disproportion between the factual state and the feelings 
and fears of public was over time again affirmed. During last two years the 
so-called migration wave even decreased in the CR but it did not lose the 
                                                 
1  The author is director of the Institute of Criminology and Social Prevention, 
Prague. 
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public interest and impact on the social and political processes and public 
life. 
 In the research project attention was paid to criminological aspects of 
this phenomenon, especially to the involvement of organised smuggling of 
migrants and in the same time to some social consequences in relation to 
the public opinion, attitudes toward migration and immigration and fear of 
crime. 
 Data sources included the quantitative data from the police statistics 
(Criminal Police, Alien Police), data from Czech Statistical Office, data 
produced by Centre of Public Opinion Research (CVVM) and the infor-
mation from reports on the security situation in the CR. Data were comple-
mented also by the information acquired by interviews with police officers 
and with NGO. In addition to that, the analysis of court files from cases 
prosecuted as organising migration, i.e. committed in an organised group 
was carried out.  
 As a part of the project the extent, forms and impact of the current mi-
gration wave was compared with the results of research that was carried 
out on illegal migration in the first half of 1990s, which was the period of 
Balkan wars and also the period when the migration from Asia countries 
to the Europe was quite strong.  
 
 
The population of the CR and the proportion of for-
eigners in general 
 
The number of people of foreign nationality living on the territory of the 
Czech Republic (CR) was under the socialist regime very small due to di-
verse reasons. The chance to accommodate to different nationalities, cul-
tures and ways of behaviour had not been too big due to this situation. 
 For many years the population of Czechoslovakia was largely com-
posed of Czechs and Slovaks: two nations that are very close in terms of 
culture, language, and so on. The only exception was a small number of 
Germans and Poles living in the Bohemian region, some Greek political 
refugees in the 1950s, and a certain number of Romani, who mostly came 
from Slovakia and partly from Hungary. Thus, the ethnic composition of 
the society was not very diverse, which was further reinforced for years by 
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the fact that the borders were closed during the period of the Cold War. 
Only foreign students and tourists entered this structure, but not in any sub-
stantial numbers. The first significant influx of a new ethnic minority oc-
curred in the 1980s with a wave of young Vietnamese coming to CR on 
the basis of a treaty between the Czechoslovak and North Vietnamese gov-
ernments. Their number was estimated to around 30.000. They created the 
fundament for the later migration of Vietnamese people to the Czech Re-
public in the 1990s (Nozina and Kraus 2009: 21–23). 
 Due to these developments, there had been little need to adapt to differ-
ent nationalities, cultures and ways of life. It was the so-called Velvet Rev-
olution (1989) and the subsequent transformation of society, politics and 
the economy that opened the borders to people coming in increasing num-
bers from different parts of Europe and beyond. 
 The number of foreigners either with permanent or long-term residence 
(over 90 days) began to grow rapidly especially in the second half of 1990s. 
Between 1994 and 1999, their number increased twofold: from roughly 
100.000 to about 200.000 of settled foreigners. Since 2008 the number of 
foreigners remained relatively stable, about 424.000 – 439.000 until 2014 
after which the influx increased.  
 In 2016, the number of foreigners living in the CR reached 493.000. Up 
until June 2017, this number reached 510.000 including 278.000 foreign 
citizens with a permanent stay and 232.000 with long-term stay. The pro-
portion of settled foreigners in the total number of the inhabitants of the 
CR (which is now about 10,5 millions) reached till June 2017 about 4,8%.2  
 Most of them are Ukrainians (112.000), Slovaks (109), Vietnamese (59) 
and citizens of Russian Federation (36). If we take into account people 
from Islamic states living legally in the CR their number are minimal – 
until June 2017 it was 1.228 people from Syria, 587 from Pakistan, 526 
people from Iraq, 508 from Iran and 455 from Afghanistan. 
 
                                                 
2  See Czech Statistical Office,  
 http://www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci.nsf/datove_udaje/ciz_pocet_cizincu#cr 
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Figure 1. 
Foreign nationalities in the CR over 10 thousands of people – 
comparison 2005 - 2016 
 
Source: Czech Statistical Office  
 
Table 1. 
Foreigners from Islamic states with long-term or permanent stay in 
the CR 
State 2005 2015 June 2017 
Afghanistan 359 419 455 
Iraq 269 496 526 
Iran 159 414 508 
Pakistan 243 543 587 
Syria 378 1.071 1.228 
Source: Czech Statistical Office  
 
Of course, these numbers do not include foreigners coming to the CR for 
a short stay nor the people that stay in the CR illegally. 
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Illegal migration 
 
Since 2008 the CR is a part of Schengen as well as all our neighbouring 
states. It means that the control of Schengen borders in the CR took place 
only at airports. Illegal stay or entering is usually determined by controls 
within the territory of the state. 
In this project, we used the following definitions:  
 illegal migration is the movement of people across the state border 
without valid documentation, i.e. permit to enter or to stay;  
 smuggling is the organisation of such illegal movement; from this point 
of view it is not substantial whether the goal of this movement is the 
stay or transit. 
 
Illegal crossing of the state border itself is under the Czech law not a crim-
inal offence: it is misdemeanour that is handled under the administrative 
law and could be sanctioned by deportation. Only the act of smuggling is 
a crime. 
 Until 2007, smugglers could be punished if this offence was committed 
in an organised group or for payment with a prison sentence of up to 3 
years. Since 2007, it is possible to impose a more severe penalty: as mem-
ber of an organised criminal group an imprisonment of up to five years can 
be imposed. If in addition to being a member of an organised criminal 
group and for payment the maximum prison term is eight years or even 
twelve years if the profits made are large.What is the situation?  
 
Figure 2. 
Illegal immigration in the Czech Republic 
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It is clear that the number of illegal migrants grew in 2015 but still 8,5 
thousands per year was really minimal, especially in comparison with the 
1990s (when in time of Balkan wars only on the territory of CR the number 
of captured migrants reached in 1993 43.000) and even in comparison with 
some other European countries. 
 The following Figure shows the number of migrants captured on the 
borders (airports) and on the territory during last three years. 
 
Figure 3. 
Migrants captured illegally border crossing and on the territory of 
the CR, 2014 - 2016
 
 
With regard to the nationality of people found being illegally present in the 
CR the non-EU citizens dominate. In 2016 the Ukrainians were the most 
frequent (1.552 people, i.e. 30,8 % of the total number of observed foreign-
ers, an increase of 328, i.e. +26,8% in comparison with the year 2015). To 
be precise: as for Ukrainians, they are mostly workers staying in the CR 
after the expiry date of their permission to stay and work. 
 The second most frequently registered people were citizens of Russian 
federation (402, i.e. 8%). On the third place were citizens of Kuwait (336, 
i.e. 6,7 %), but this group forms rather a matter of delayed spa guests who 
2014 2015 2016
illegal crosssing
borders 181 240 222
illegal stay 4631 8323 5039
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do not leave the CR in time. On the fourth position were Vietnamese peo-
ple (269, i.e. 5,3 %). On the fifth position were people from Afghanistan 
(155, i.e. 3,1 %). In contrast to previous nationalities, Afghan people are 
mostly discovered during their transit across the CR. 
 If we look at the people from Islamic countries transiting the CR ille-
gally during the year 2016, their number is really not very high (Afghani-
stan 155, Syria 153, Iraq 109, Pakistan 55, and Iran 35). 
 In 2015, 234 persons controlled for their ID appeared to possess forged 
or invalid travel documents (passports); in 2016, 271 persons were in pos-
session of false documents. Most often they were citizens from Ukraine 
(175 persons) and Moldova (41). 
 
 
Organised illegal migration 
 
In 2016, the police investigated 56 persons that were involved in smug-
gling of illegal migrants.3 That means a decrease of about 67% in compar-
ison with 2015. The smugglers were mostly Czech citizens (38), followed 
by Ukrainians (6).  
 Interviews with Czech experts were carried out (there were seven inter-
viewed experts from Security Information Service, Organised Crime Po-
lice Task Unit, Directorate of Alien Police, Section of Security Policy of 
the Ministry of Interior and one NGO). In addition, we analysed case files 
from eight cases that were prosecuted and sentenced as organised crime at 
respective courts in 2015 and 2016. What can be deduced from these qual-
itative data? In general, we can say that there is no prove of the presence 
of huge international smuggler nets on the Czech territory. 
 As mentioned, the Czech Police detected during last year 56 cases of 
organised illegal migration. Illegal migrants were transported across the 
CR mostly by cars, vans and lorries.  
 Now, in contrast to the 1990s, the Czech Republic was not situated on 
main routes of migration; the Czech route is rather a lateral route. Among 
transiting migrants detected in the CR Moslems coming via South-Western 
route are most frequent (coming via Turkey, Greece, Balkan countries and 
                                                 
3  Statistics of the Czech Police  
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Hungary). The organisers of smuggling are not found in the CR; they de-
velop their activity in countries along the road, especially in Turkey, 
Greece, Balkan countries and Hungary or even in the home countries of 
migrants and refugees. Their activity may begin – and was noticed – al-
ready in refugee’s camps in the Middle East. 
 Special Czech cells/groups for covering the part of the migratory route 
across the CR are not established (as it was in the 1990s). Organisers of 
migration and their helpers/assistants are usually compatriots of migrants. 
There is an important supporting role of family ties; migrants often rely 
upon their relatives already settled in target countries. 
 Czech citizens are hired usually only as drivers or as providers of forged 
documents. Czech drivers were found several times working for the organ-
isers: not only in the CR but they were discovered in other countries (e.g. 
Germany, Great Britain). 
 This migration wave offers for organisers very profitable business, be-
cause migrants usually pay for each part of the route and the total amount 
is estimated to be in tens of thousands Euros.  
 Migrants coming from Asian countries combine various ways of 
transport: by trains, buses and cars, but some parts of the way may be even 
perform on foot.  
 What is growing is the use of forged documents and misuse of requests 
for asylum. But those asking in the CR for asylum use these requests 
mostly in order to extend the stay in the CR before continuing to the target 
country. Basically, it was proved that the CR is not attractive target country 
for migrants and refugees. They want to move farther away to Germany or 
to other countries in the Western Europe following commonly their rela-
tives living there.  
 The identity of migrants has been often quite doubtful and cannot be 
verified; it is rather characteristic feature. Many of them received substitute 
documents during their peregrination but these documents were frequently 
lost or destroyed. NGO’s workers are of the opinion that the reason to de-
stroy or throw documents away is usually the fear of being identified, 
which may imply to be sent back.  
 These findings are basically in agreement with the reports of Europol. 
According to Europol, 90% of the migrants coming to the EU is facilitated, 
mostly by members of criminal networks. The key migratory routes are 
known and identified even if they are fluid and changing depending on the 
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external factors and measures of countries along the route. Very loosely 
connected networks of smugglers are stretched along the migratory routes. 
The communication among organisers consists rather in sharing contacts 
to other persons involved in the net. Instead of escorting migrants from the 
start-point to the target country, there is rather a transmission of connec-
tions (usually phone numbers) to migrants and they then contact smugglers 
who organise the particular part of the way. Migrants of course pay for 
these parts of the route. The organisers themselves do not usually accom-
pany the groups of migrants, but rather organise the transport by cars, vans 
etc. operated by drivers. Persons (mostly drivers) at the executive level are 
hired but do not know the identity of organisers (Joint Europol-Interpol 
Report 2016). 
 The routing of refugees and migrants from Islamic countries across the 
Central Europe goes commonly via Turkey, Greece, the Balkan states and 
via Hungary to Austria and Germany. For the minority of migrants who 
decide to travel across the CR this country is only transit section of their 
total journey. Migration movement from Northern Africa and from sub-
Saharan region has not afflicted Czech territory until now. 
 Another case is the migration from Ukraine to the CR that has been the 
largest for more than 15 years during which the CR has been the target 
country for Ukrainian migrants. Economic reasons, such as work are the 
most important, but also security reasons in the mother country is an im-
portant push-factor of Ukrainian migrants. For years the basic motivation 
for influx of Ukrainian people was to search and find the job in the CR and 
to be able to support (or simply to ensure) the livelihood of their families 
living in Ukraine. Within the last years, a new factor started to operate: the 
need to move from the areas of war conflict that also worsened the eco-
nomic conditions of living and the security situation. Being in this situation 
the Ukrainians sometimes stay the CR after the validity of their stay permit 
or try to come illegally. Of course, due to this they are more vulnerable and 
they are willing to accept quite disadvantageous condition of work and 
payment without the chance to complain. 
 The problem with regard to Ukrainians is that, apart from being some-
times badly paid by Czech employers, they often become the victims of 
their compatriots operating as unofficial employment agencies whose ser-
vices are compulsory or, to be more precise, foisted on the workers. These 
organising persons are called ‘clients’ and quite unscrupulously misuse the 
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disadvantageous situation of Ukrainian workers that do not want to risk 
any conflict either with ‘clients’ or with Czech administration especially 
being in the situation of an illegal or semi-legal stay. The term ‘client’ 
seems to be inappropriate because it is used normally in the sense near to 
‘customer’. But for Ukrainian people it is the traditional term. We may 
compare such a client to the ‘small entrepreneur’ who uses the cheap and 
temporary Ukrainian manpower. This ‘client’ organises the workers to a 
group, he organises the employment, negotiates with employers, hires 
workers to the employers, he collects their salaries and pays them some 
part of the salary, sometimes organises the transport from and to Ukraine. 
Client ensures for his workers protection against being robbed or racket-
eered from criminals (‘bandits’) and pays for it to organised criminal 
groups (it means that ‘clients’ are somewhere ‘in-between’ classical organ-
ised crime and ‘normal’ entrepreneurship). Clients also help to solve the 
problems of workers in relation to the Czech administration and regula-
tions. Their traditional position and reputation is based to a great extent on 
the mistrust of Ukrainian workers to official authorities, either Czech or 
Ukrainians. Some authors compare the relation between ‘clients’ and 
‘workers’ to some kind of ‘quasi-serf’ system (Černík, 2005; Nožina 
2003). 
 In fact these ‘clients’ take nearly total control of Ukrainian workers and 
take away a substantial portion of their salaries. Workers are pushed to buy 
goods from ‘clients’ etc. If we look for an example of parasitising on eco-
nomic migration, this form of ‘arrangement of job’ consisting in nearly 
total control, huge profit and misuse of difficult situation of workers (in 
collaboration with organised crime groups). 
 Numerous members of the Vietnamese minority may be characterised 
as ‘inconspicuous’. They have been in permanent and intensive contact 
with the majority population, above all as small merchants and shopkeep-
ers. In this economic function, they are more or less tolerated and conflicts 
between the majority and Vietnamese minority occur very rarely. Vietnam-
ese have been somewhat recognised for their diligence, despite their dif-
ferent culture, traditions and history.  
 Even their involvement in some forms of economic crime (tax and cus-
tom frauds, breaking of trademark regulation, counterfeiting of goods etc.) 
and despite this was commonly well-known, this did not significantly dam-
age their reputation. However, recently the attitude of Czech majority starts 
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to become more critical because some Vietnamese engage in drug crime, 
especially in cannabis growing, but they also got involved in the produc-
tion of synthetic drug (Czech specialty pervitin) in a quite large volume.  
 With regard to immigration cases of documents forgery within the Vi-
etnamese community have been discovered. All these criminal activities 
are quite well-organised by flexible organised groups (Report on security 
situation in the CR 2017; Nozina and Kraus 2009). Still the Vietnamese 
are not at all the target of hostility or a substantial negative attitude of the 
majority. 
 
 
Case studies  
 
Let us illustrate some typical ‘modus operandi’ of organised migration on 
concrete cases. 
 First there is the case of migrants from Middle East being captured on 
the territory of the Czech Republic. 
 Two drivers – Hungarian citizens – were detained at the Czech-German 
border. They transported 76 persons including 23 children under 18 from 
Budapest via Slovakia and Czech Republic to Germany in a small lorry 
(IVECO). This means that people were in the freight space in very cramped 
conditions and during the travel any breaks were made. According to the 
statement of drivers they did not know anything about the load in car. They 
borrowed the car from another person in Hungary and went to Germany to 
do some shopping. In fact they were hired in Hungary by not identified 
persons, probably of Pakistan nationality as drivers and transporters. It was 
not their first ‘trip’ to Germany. The refugees paid € 400 per person to the 
Pakistan organiser in Hungary for the transport from Hungary to Germany. 
They were contacted by this organiser in the refugee camp in Hungary. 
 They were mostly from Pakistan and Afghanistan and their prior route 
went across Iran, Turkey, Greece and Serbia to Hungary. They contacted 
individual smugglers separately for the particular stages of the route and 
paid them for this service. During the journey refugees travel most often 
by cars, but also on foot (in one case the way afoot from Afghanistan to 
Turkey took one month), by ship from Turkey to Greece, by different 
means (train, bus, car, foot) via Balkan countries to Hungary. The payment 
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for one ‘stage’ was about € 400 per person, but from Turkey to Greece 
some of them had to pay $1.000. In some cases they were ‘on their way’ 
for nearly one year. Most of them wanted to go to Germany because rela-
tives were living there already. Many of them did not have any personal 
documents despite the fact that on the way they were provided by ‘papers’ 
from local authorities. Sometimes they throw the documents away them-
selves or they were advised from organisers to destroy them. 
 The second case concerns the forgery of documents. The offenders were 
members of an organised group that comprised ten people of Vietnamese 
nationality. They arranged the Czech citizenship for children of Vietnam-
ese mothers with limited stay in the CR (as mothers of children with Czech 
citizenship they may ask for permanent stay). One way of solving this 
problem was to submit a declaration of paternity made by a Czech citizen 
who was paid for giving such a statement (e.g. a homeless Czech man 
signed such declaration for about ten thousands Czech crowns). Some 
other documents of a different purpose were simply forged. 
 The subject of the third case was a Ukrainian citizen that bought for 
1.300 Euros a modified Rumanian ID card where the photo was replaced. 
He worked in the CR without valid visa and work permission. That is why 
he wanted the ID card from EU country. 
 
 
Comparison with the situation in the nineties  
 
Comparing the migration that afflicted the Czech territory now with the 
situation in 1990s, the difference is obvious. The number of illegal mi-
grants in the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at that time was 
quite huge: in 1991, over 18.000 illegal migrants were recorded. In 1992, 
it 32.000 refugees were counted and in 1993, only on the territory of the 
Czech Republic 43.000. Of course, these concern only known cases. The 
real number must have been substantially higher. 
 The majority of these migrants originated from the Balkan states, espe-
cially from former Yugoslavia (70-80%) but within the total spectre there 
were people from more than 70 countries all over the world. 
 The CR was not the target country: it was a transit country, which it still 
is. The “modus operandi” of smuggling differed from the present: there 
were smaller groups of migrants smuggled mostly on foot via Slovakian 
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border. At the border they are waited for by Czech smugglers, loaded into 
cars, escorted and transported to the Czech western border. The transport 
was very carefully organised and secured. Near the western border were 
migrants accommodated for a couple of days and then at convenient time 
and circumstances transferred to Germany – by cars but more often on foot 
over a ‘green border’. 
 The groups of smugglers were relatively stable and composed usually 
from the Czech citizens. They covered only one part of migrants journey, 
i.e. that within the Czech territory. If there were higher links of the organ-
isation, these were not situated within the CR. The number of detained 
smugglers was higher than at present: about 1.500 people per year, mostly 
Czechs (drivers, pedestrian smugglers, accommodation providers). Figure 
4 provides a scheme of such a developed smuggler organisation of this 
time: 
Figure 4. 
Scheme of smuggler organisation 
supervisor
accommodation provider pedestrian smuggler driver
co-ordinator
head of the Czech cell
in the CR
contact person
liaison officer
supreme link
out of the CR
 
 
The payment by migrants reached hundreds or thousands of dollars or Ger-
man marks, and that only for the Czech part of route. As a supporting crim-
inal activity border police officers detected falsification of documents and 
sometimes corruption of fellow officers. 
 The comparison of the nature of organised crime now and in the 1990s 
indicates some apparent differences. At that time in the CR the number of 
illegal migrants was roughly ten times higher. Criminal organisations were 
involved in organising illegal migration and smuggling of people in those 
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days as well as at present. But the functions and roles within groups were 
clearly arranged and delineated. Groups were relatively stable as well as 
the connections between individual groups. Separate local groups of or-
ganised smugglers covered the Czech part of the route and these groups 
were attached to international networks. This affiliation to some interna-
tional organisation probably did not mean the direct subordination with re-
gard to the managing links of international organisations but the relation-
ship consisted in fulfilling the task of covering the separate part of the 
route, of course for a reward. The involvement of Czech perpetrators was 
higher and the number of prosecuted smugglers was also higher.  
 At present, according to Europol confirmed by findings of our research 
project, the organisation of smugglers is looser and flexible. Relatively sta-
bilised interconnected cells were not identified. The communication 
among organisers consists rather in sharing contacts and in transmitting 
them to migrants. Instead of personally escorting, migrants just provided 
by these contacts of new information. Of course, this way of organising is 
also enabled by the current level and possibilities of communication (mo-
bile phones, Internet, social nets). 
 This way of organisation seems to confirm the thesis about the gradual 
transformation of organised crime or at least its part from fixed and stabi-
lised structures to more loose and variable networks based on contacts 
among participants (maybe the term ‘participant’ is now more adequate 
than ‘member’). These variable networks are more adaptable and may flex-
ibly react on the situation and chances (or threats). 
 The substantial difference may be seen also in the fact that massive mi-
gration in 1990s took place without any significant attention paid by pub-
lic, media or politics. A reason for this may consists in the fact that any 
group or nationality of the then migrants was not labelled as risk for Euro-
pean security, culture and society, although among the migrants there were 
Muslims and civil wars warriors as well. Now migration (especially the 
immigration from Middle East and Northern and sub-Saharan Africa) is 
designated as substantial threat for the Europe. 
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Migration threat? 
 
It would not be wise to deny security risks that may stem from migration 
movement in particular now that the movement of people has risen to an 
unprecedented level. Moreover the security risks may be related not only 
to target states or territories but also to the transit and to the source coun-
tries as well. 
 It is not possible to analyse all potential risks from the point of view 
either political science or economy etc. From the point of view of crimi-
nology, which is of course only one of the possible angles, the impact of 
‘mishandled’ migration may occur: 
 in the rise of criminality of foreigners/immigrants, 
 in conflicts between majority and immigrants/minorities that may arise 
and increase, 
 the growth of so-called hate crimes that stems from hatred, in this matter 
caused by aversion against certain religions, cultures or nationalities. 
 
In compliance with so-called Audit of national security (Audit národní 
bezpečnosti, 2016) it is possible to consider the origin and growth of these 
problems basically as result of two mistakes, i.e. as a consequence of un-
controlled mass migration and as a consequence of unsuccessful integra-
tion of newcomers. The knowledge of countries much more experienced 
in migration matters than the Czech Republic points to the interpretation 
that it is often a matter of unsuccessful integration of the second or third 
generation of immigrants. 
 It is also necessary to take into account that criminal problems poten-
tially related to migration are incorporated into the broader context of so-
cial atmosphere and mood of the majority population. Migration is now a 
sensitive topic discussed in the public space with strong emotional content 
and with strong impact on the policy, not only the security policy but public 
policy in general. The election campaigns and elections themselves around 
the European future during last two years were significantly influenced by 
the migration and immigration topics. It was up to the political actors in 
what way these topics were presented to the voters using either a more 
realistic picture or a more demagogic one. The Czech Republic is not an 
exception. 
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 This is something like a circle. The phenomenon of migration can cause 
tensions and social or even criminal problems in the society. These prob-
lems begin to be a topic of public and political discussions. The manner of 
discussion and the manner of presentation of problems related to migration 
may help to solve the situation or on the contrary to worsen it and make 
the problems and conflict sharper. The latter modality may produce the 
destructive spiral heading towards collapse. 
 In any case the atmosphere in the society creates not only the general 
frame for conceptualising the problem but it is very powerful agent in the 
process of searching for solutions and adopting measures. 
 
 
Reaction of the public 
 
The impact of migration movement on the public opinion and attitudes to 
migrants and on fear of crime is significant. Again, it is incomparable with 
the situation in 1990s when the number of illegal migrants was substan-
tially higher but the reaction of public, politics and media was rather flat. 
Thus, let us have a look at the attitudes and fears of the Czech public. 
 With regard to criminality of foreigners surveys of public opinion 
shows the tendency of people to overestimate the proportion of foreigners 
in the number of crimes committed. In our research carried out in 2008 
respondents supposed this proportion to be about 20% in average (Zeman 
2011). In fact, only in 2016 did the share of foreigners in the number of 
committed crimes reach the highest level of 9,1% while their share in the 
number of prosecuted offenders was 8,1%. For years the range of this share 
was between 6 and 8%. It is also necessary to say that the total number of 
registered crimes has been decreasing during the last years. It means that 
the percentage of crimes committed by foreigners has been calculated from 
a lower baseline. 
 Most of convicted foreign offenders in 2017 were citizens of the Slovak 
Republic (33,9% of sentenced foreigners), by respectively Ukrainians 
(19,6%) and Vietnamese (6,9%). 
 The following table shows the development of the number of cleared 
crimes (it means successfully investigated, i.e. when the offender is 
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known) and within this total the number of these crimes committed by for-
eigners and their share in the total number in the period 2013 to 2015. Fur-
ther we may divide crimes committed by foreigners to two categories: 
crimes committed by foreigners from EU countries and crimes committed 
by citizens of so-called third countries (non-EU states).  
 
Table 2. 
The development of cleared crimes committed by foreigners  
2013-2015 by foreigners from EU and non-EU countries. 
 2013 2014 2015 
Total number of 
cleared crimes 
117.596 114.392 101.597 
Total number of cleared 
crimes by all foreigners 
7.470 7.385 7.264 
non-EU countries 2.857 2.849 2.717 
EU countries 4.613 4.536 4.547 
% of all foreigners in the 
total number of cleared 
crimes  
6,4% 6,5% 7,2% 
% of non-EU countries 
of the total of cleared 
crimes  
2,4% 2,5% 2,7% 
Source:www.policie.cz/clanek/statisticke-prehledy-kriminality-za-rok-
2014.aspx; http://www.ok.cz/iksp/docs/425.pdf;  
www.czso.cz/csu/cizinci/2-ciz_kriminalita 
 
This trend shows that the share of foreigners from non-EU countries is 
strictly speaking minimal at the level not exceeding 3%. 
 But the meaning of public is different from the statistics. The survey of 
public opinion towards foreigners made regularly in March each year by 
the Centre for Public Opinion Research (CVVM) showed that 67% of 
respondents designated foreigners as a reason of growth of crime; only 9% 
disagreed (the rest did not express any opinion). Table 3 shows that the 
tendency to attribute to foreigners the negative impact on the level of crime 
is long-run. This means that – except of relative stable share of foreigners 
in committed crimes and prosecuted offenders – the public does not take 
into account that the total number of registered crime has been decreasing 
for the past few years. There is not any growth of crime, therefore the 
opinion of public is totally incorrect. 
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Table 3. 
“Foreigners are the reason for the increase in crime” 
Year  2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Answers % % % % % % % % 
Agree 74 70 62 67 65 66 66 67 
Disagree 6 7 10 6 7 9 8 9 
Agree nor disagree 17 20 24 23 25 22 22 20 
Don’t know 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 
Total = 100% 1139 1306 1053 1059 1061 1069 1079 1045 
Source: CVVM 2017: https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/cz/tiskove-zpravy?limitstart=0 
 
This opinion about negative influence of foreigners on crime of course 
strengthens an already not very friendly attitude to potential settlement of 
foreigners in the CR. 
 In March 2017, 39% of respondents stated that in the CR there are too 
many foreigners; 50% thought that their number is adequate; and, only 2% 
were of the opinion that the number of foreigners is too small. 
 We may suppose that the fear associated in public opinion with the ‘mi-
gration wave’ and nourished by the media and some political presentations 
may be identified as the reason for these attitudes. 
 In 2012, the survey (made by CVVM) about how are people satisfied 
with the different areas of public life showed that 43% of respondents were 
quite satisfied with the state of immigration (44% dissatisfied); 17% were 
satisfied and 49% dissatisfied with the level of security (for comparison: 
with the state of unemployment there were 77% dissatisfied people). After 
that came the change: in 2015 fear of unemployment was expressed by 
only 9% respondents, but fear of migration by 31%, fear of the Muslim 
world 12%, and fear of crime 11%.  
 The results from 2016 showed that the matter of immigration was seen 
as very urgent by 93% of people, and as a matter of security by 89%. In 
May 2016, 61% of respondents stated that the CR should not accept refu-
gees at all, 34% only as long as they will be able to return home. Only 2% 
were of the opinion that refugees could be allowed to settle in the country. 
 In June 2015, 70% of the respondents were against the acceptation of 
refugees from Middle East and Northern Africa; in May 2016, this has in-
creased to 78%.  
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 With regard to the attitude to different nationalities in 2016, 75 % re-
spondents expressed that Arabic people are not sympathetic (CVVM: 
March 2016). 
 In December 2016, people were asked if they have fear of something 
and if so, of what. In the first place, they stated to be afraid of migration 
and refugees (31%); in the second place afraid of terrorism (22%). The 
Czech population is still strongly worried about migration and terrorism. 
These phenomena seem to be apparently closely interconnected in the col-
lective consciousness. As for the opinions on the possible security threat 
that stems from the ‘refugee wave’ the survey shows that people perceive 
refugees as a security threat, not only for the Czech Republic (75% of the 
respondents) but for the whole of Europe (89%) and even the whole world 
(80%). Nevertheless, the results show a moderate decrease of these fears 
in comparison with 2015 (CVVM, 2016). 
 Partly as a result, and reflective of the mood of people, new figures ap-
peared on the political scene that based their programme on slogans about 
the threat from Islam, about dangerous migrants presented in general as 
potential terrorists and on the necessity of adopting strict measures against 
them. The accompanying vocabulary of these figures is sometimes more 
aggressive than the usual political language but this way of wording is 
well-known in many countries. 
 Fortunately, these slogans and appeals have not led to more numerous 
violent deeds against immigrants or the Muslim community. In 2015, there 
were five criminal acts qualified by the police as motivated hate crimes 
against Muslims and 5 criminal acts motivated by hatred of Arabic people. 
In 2015, 175 criminal offences in a so-called extremist context were rec-
orded, which represents 0,07% from the total number of recorded crimes 
in the CR (Report on Extremism, 2016).  
 What seems to be clear is that the reaction of public in the CR does not 
correspond to the real state of migration and of involvement of organised 
crime; it reacts rather on the general threat presented as a global or even a 
danger to the civilisation. 
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Conclusions 
 
Migration movements towards the Europe Union that takes place in this 
decade seems to be extraordinary as seen by eyes of the majority of the 
Middle Europe population. Nevertheless, it is only the part of migration 
processes in the contemporary history and from a bird’s eye view not lim-
ited to Europe only. We have seen diverse explanations of this influx; some 
of these explanations were apparently constructed in order to gain political 
profit, e.g. explanation given by the Czech EU opponents (especially be-
fore elections) that blamed Germany and EU that their policy meant the 
decisive incentive of this influx regardless the catastrophic impact. 
 The influence of organised crime was also sometimes mentioned as a 
driver of this migration process. But despite the large extent of this migra-
tion wave and despite it has organised features it is not possible to simplify 
its causes to an organised crime explanation, however defined, as a deter-
mining factor of this massive mobility.  
 Our knowledge of the nature of organised crime allows us to conclude 
to a phenomenon with big economic and subsequently also politic power. 
There are examples of countries where organised crime amassed so much 
power that its leaders succeeded in influencing by various ways economic 
processes and public administration. But it also holds true that organised 
crime predominantly does not strive at taking over political power and pub-
lic administration directly but that its main effort is to exploit or consoli-
date opportunities, such as existing demand of (illegal) services and goods. 
Of course, these opportunities and demands can be deliberately created or 
stimulated. 
 Migration can be such a demand too, stimulating illegal travel services. 
But causes of migration including the illegal one are deep and manifold 
and do not only result from organised crime activities. Organised crime 
uses the migration processes and pressures for its profit. Namely, it organ-
ises transport provisions, including crossing the borders, forged documents 
and exploits the circumstances in which migrants cannot organise their 
journey themselves. In the countries of origin existing aspirations of people 
to leave to other countries may fanned by organised crime. Migration flows 
may be influences by activities of organised crime. But this influence can-
not be interchanged for a kind of management and control of migration as 
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a certain social process. It would ascribe to organised crime a greater power 
than it really possesses and attributes that do not fit to its nature. 
 Migration is a natural and permanent historical phenomenon, whether 
individually or on a large-scale. As was said, the causes of migration are 
deep and manifold. Of course, it implies that migration movements cannot 
be simply solved by some isolated administrative measures in target or 
transit countries. In this sense, we may compare organised crime to an 
overgrown parasite conduct that profits from the phenomenon caused by 
substantially broader reasons. 
 With regard to the CR: Criminality of foreigners does not represent such 
a serious problem as allegedly in some other European countries. At the 
same time, illegal migration had not led to serious problems. Foreigners 
currently do not count for a substantial security threat as well. The issue of 
terrorism is another matter: the risk of terrorist attack is not directly de-
pending on the number of foreigners on some territory.  
 Nevertheless, public opinion perceives foreigners as a substantial factor 
influencing the level of crime in the CR although this idea is counterfac-
tual. Crime committed by foreigners in the CR does not reach the level of 
an important security risk. Despite this, half the interviewed people con-
sidered foreigners as the threat for our lifestyle.  
 The concern of public in relation to foreigners and immigrants does not 
originate at this point from facts but is rather a reaction to the presented 
picture of migrants as a global security and civilisation threat. At the same 
time the media and public basically identify the migration in general with 
migration from Islamic states.  
 It would not be correct to deny that uncontrolled immigration, moreover 
illegal or transit migration (if being too high) may bring serious risk of 
potential destabilisation of social and security situation. But reactions cor-
responding with reality should be based on the evaluation of this reality, 
not on emotions and false pictures if it should not lead to even worse situ-
ation. Existing basic documents adopted in the CR (especially Audit of na-
tional security 2016, Strategy of migration policy 2015 and Concept of in-
tegration of foreigners 2016) may be considered to be realistic and ade-
quately reflecting the situation. But it seems that they are not sufficiently 
communicated and explained to public. Of course, the influence of official 
documents and concepts to the shaping of the public opinion is never so 
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strong as the influence exerted by the media and various populist manipu-
lators. 
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The role of the Internet in the process of 
trafficking humans in the UK 
 
Parisa Diba, Georgios A. Antonopoulos and Georgios Papanicolaou1 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to present an account of the role of the Internet 
and digital technologies in the processes of human trafficking in the United 
Kingdom. It addresses a country-specific empirical gap in the literature 
considering the role of digital technologies, a special field that is rapidly 
emerging and significantly extends the study of human trafficking, an issue 
that has attracted considerable policy and research interest in the past 
twenty years.  
 Human trafficking is not a new phenomenon (see Antonopoulos and 
Papanicolaou, 2018) but the global geopolitical changes of the post-Cold 
War era have exacerbated conditions conducive to clandestine population 
flows and the development of ‘transnational’ illegal enterprises associated 
with those flows. The increased awareness of the issue, and the recognition 
that it presents a major area of focus for the effort to address and suppress 
transnational organised crime, has resulted in a new global prohibition re-
gime against human trafficking and clandestine cross-border movements 
(Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006; Papanicolaou, 2011). A key moment in 
this development has been the introduction of a major international instru-
ment (supplementing the 2000 United Nations Convention against Trans-
national Organised Crime), namely the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. The Pro-
tocol defines trafficking in persons as “the recruitment, transportation, 
                                                 
1  Parisa Diba is researcher at Teesside University. Georgios A. Antonopoulos is 
Professor of Criminology at Teesside University. Georgios Papanicolaou is 
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transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or re-
ceiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having 
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (United Na-
tions, 2000). Exploitation in the sex and labour markets constitute the core 
criminal activity in human trafficking cases, however, several other types 
exist, such as domestic servitude, organ ‘harvesting’, forced begging, 
forced marriage and illegal adoption.  
 In the past decade or so, human trafficking may have arguably received 
a considerable boost due to the development, advancement and prolifera-
tion of digital technologies (Hughes, 2014; Latonero et al., 2011, 2012; 
Sarkar, 2015). According to a recent Europol report regarding the traffick-
ing in human beings in the European Union (EU), online interactions and 
encounters have been observed as facilitating  
 
“several aspects of human trafficking and exploitation: targeting of po-
tential victims; access to personal data; arrangement of logistics and 
transportation; recruitment through social media, chat forums and other 
websites; advertisement of victims; their exploitation and surveillance” 
(Europol, 2016a: 12; see also Europol, 2016b).  
 
This view sustains the opinion that the burgeoning of digital technologies2, 
and the Internet in particular, has engendered new and creative opportuni-
ties for individual and collectives of criminals. The expeditious dissemina-
tion and usage of the Internet and other digital technologies such as ‘smart’ 
phones, that is, mobile phones whose capabilities are akin to those of a 
handheld personal computer, have added a new dimension to the traffick-
ing of human beings. They have arguably created new ways and means of 
facilitation, as well as affecting various aspects of trafficking, including the 
recruitment, control and exploitation of victims (Sarkar, 2015).  
 At present, however, there is relatively limited scholarly work investi-
gating the role that digital technologies play in the processes of human 
                                                 
2  These technologies include software applications, or ‘Apps’ as they are popu-
larly referred to, which are programmes that run on smart phones and other 
mobile devices, such as tablets. Most popular are instant messaging and Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communication apps such as WhatsApp, Viber 
and Skype. 
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trafficking or the particular ways in which the Internet has been used to 
shape the criminal strategies of traffickers (see Di Nicola et al., 2013; La-
tonero et al., 2011, 2012). Researchers across several academic disciplines 
including Computer Science, Information Science, Sociology, Criminol-
ogy, and Law (Bach and Dohy, 2015) have begun to address this scarcity 
of empirical research and knowledge, employing various methodologies 
and theoretical frameworks to do so.  
 A study undertaken by Di Nicola et al. (2013) regarding the use of the 
Internet and social networking sites to explore possible occurrences of hu-
man trafficking and sexual exploitation in Italy, has provided some inter-
esting insights. The authors conducted an analysis of a sample of prostitu-
tion advertisements placed on the most popular adult sites in Italy, as well 
as of those placed on Twitter pages for five of the most important adult 
portals. Within these advertisements, the authors discovered a set of indi-
cators that could suggest the presence of human trafficking, and by exten-
sion, victims. These four indicators were (a) the nationality of the prosti-
tutes; (b) the listing of a young age; (c) professional images of the women 
in the advertisements; and (d) surface misspellings in the text of the adver-
tisement (Di Nicola et al., 2013: 222).  
 According to this research, if these four elements were present in an 
advertisement, they could strongly suggest that the featured woman in the 
advertisement was a victim of trafficking. Moreover, their research found 
that, out of 502 advertisements that were listed on the popular Italian adult 
websites, 61,4% of the women featured were non-Italian and described as 
being from areas such Eastern Europe, the Far East and South America, 
with 23,9% of these women demonstrating the four aforementioned indi-
cators in their advertisements. Additionally, 77,2% of the advertisements 
featuring these non-native women contained errors in reference to spelling, 
grammar and punctuation (Di Nicola et al., 2013: 224). The researchers 
note that this is a striking finding, as it may indicate either that these 
women have poor knowledge of the Italian language and are recent arrivals 
to Italy, or that these advertisements have been created and written by an 
exploiter or trafficker, who may also possess a limited grasp of Italian vo-
cabulary. Overall, Di Nicola et al.’s (2013) research provides a useful start-
ing point for the study of online sex trafficking.  
 Nevertheless, as Latonero et al. (2011) emphasise, identifying inci-
dences of human trafficking on the Internet is not a straightforward task, 
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and remains a challenge for researchers and law enforcement alike. On this 
point, Latonero et al. (2011) cite a Council of Europe report (Sykiotou, 
2007), in which researchers undertook an Internet search for potential traf-
ficking sites. The latter pointed out that a website can only be delineated 
as ‘suspect’ (p. 32), since there is no evidence that the women featured in 
such advertisements for sexual services are in fact victims of trafficking. 
 Our research takes up the preceding important considerations and issues 
in the UK context. In particular, we undertook an extensive examination of 
the role of the Internet and digital technologies in the facilitation of the 
recruitment, transportation and exploitation in both the UK sex and labour 
markets. The ensuing analysis of our findings explores and addresses the 
phenomenon along these lines. Before proceeding, however, we outline the 
methods and data used in our research. 
 
 
Methods and data 
 
As part of our exploratory analysis, a number of methods were used to 
collect data on the role of the Internet and digital technologies in the pro-
cesses of human trafficking in the UK. Firstly, 18 semi-structured inter-
views were undertaken with a range of key informants in the UK, includ-
ing:  
 3 representatives of non-governmental organisation (NGOs) namely 
Barnardo’s SECOS (Sexual Exploitation of Children on the Streets), 
ECPAT UK (Every Child Protected Against Trafficking UK) and Un-
seen; 
 9 law enforcement agents (LEAs) such as police officers, detectives op-
erating within the organised crime and cybercrime units in the country 
as well as a representative of the UKHTC (United Kingdom Human 
Trafficking Centre);  
 2 Kurdish human smugglers; and  
 4 experts on cyber-crime and/or human trafficking.  
 
All of these experts are based in UK universities, and 2 of them have con-
ducted research internationally.  
 Secondly, intelligence reports by the Metropolitan Police were used. 
These intelligence reports are essentially problem profiles on either human 
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trafficking in particular or ‘organised crime’ in general with the purpose to 
inform tactical tasking and coordinating groups within the police.  
 Thirdly, open sources on the topic have been used. These open sources 
include reports by academics, research institutes, the government (Home 
Office), national and international law enforcement agencies, and NGOs. 
Open sources include media sources and press releases from law enforce-
ment agencies. 
 Finally, we conducted a UK-based virtual ethnography to acquire pri-
mary data between November 2015 and February 2017. As a research 
method, virtual ethnography “transfers the ethnographic tradition of the 
researcher as an embodied research instrument to the social spaces of the 
internet” (Hine, 2008: 257). Transferring the traditional ethnographic 
methodology to the internet entails that virtual ethnographers immerse 
themselves in the online environment (a ‘virtual world’), observing and 
interacting using media relevant to that environment for an extended period 
of time (Turney, 2008).  
 As a starting point to the virtual ethnography, online searches were con-
ducted on Google to ascertain the most popular websites and online classi-
fied3 advertising sexual services in the UK, which were: ‘AdultWork.com’, 
‘Backpage.com/uk’ and ‘Vivastreet.co.uk’. In addition, we also accessed 
social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as online 
discussion sites on which users develop conversations by exchanging mes-
sages (web forums) relevant for our investigations. Part of the virtual eth-
nography was conducted on the ‘Deep Web’. This is a part of the world 
wide web that can only be accessed by means of special software or re-
quires special authorisation and whose contents are not visible to search 
engines. 
 In addition to the above sites, we examined the role of the Internet and 
digital technologies in facilitating human trafficking for labour recruitment 
and exploitation by investigating popular online classified and recruitment 
                                                 
3  ‘Classified advertising’ is a form of advertising, which is particularly common 
in newspapers, periodicals, and online outlets that may be sold, distributed or 
provided free of charge. Classified advertisements are significantly cheaper 
than display advertisements used by most businesses (Wells et al., 2006). In 
this chapter we use the term ‘online classifieds’ for online classified advertise-
ments. 
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websites that were advertising jobs and employment in the UK labour mar-
kets. Relatedly, we also inspected native online classified websites in coun-
tries where significant trafficking activities to the UK with the intention of 
labour exploitation has occurred, according to official accounts (NCA, 
2016). This was a viable way of trying to detect any suspect advertisements 
recruiting for jobs in the UK that had been listed on these sites. We used 
keywords for advertised jobs in these sectors that possess a high risk of 
exploitation, such as: ‘agriculture’, ‘construction’, ‘au-pair’ ‘nail techni-
cian’, ‘escort’, ‘masseuse’, ‘charity collection’, ‘waiter/waitress’, ‘cleaner’ 
and ‘dancer’. Such search terms we translated into various languages, and 
then we performed searches, either via a generic search engine such as 
Google, or by using the integrated search tools on different job sites (in-
search). Overall, approximately 400 relevant items were identified during 
the course of the research. 
 Further sources of useful information came from our analysis of content 
posted synchronously or asynchronously on web forums. In particular, we 
examined the free, independent and not-for-profit ‘www.ukpunting.com’ 
forum, which is the most popular paid sex review and discussion site in the 
UK. With approximately 104.000 registered members, this forum consti-
tutes a very large, dynamic and vibrant virtual community. Here, we took 
an unobtrusive, non-interactive approach. We did not actively contribute 
to the forum through posts to any discussions or ‘threads’, which are tex-
tual conversations that are arranged chronologically on the forum’s 
webpages. On these online discussions a member is able to read the state-
ments and questions posted by other members of the forum, then add their 
own articulations to the discussion, by way of interaction, if so inclined.  
 We concentrated our research on trying to find topics and discussions 
of potentially trafficked women, and we were also able to conduct in-
searches on the forum to this aim, using search terms such as ‘brothel’, 
‘gangs’, ‘pimps’, ‘profiles’, ‘trafficked’ and ‘trafficking’, and we selected 
threads with a high degree of relevance. We also made efforts to explore 
whether certain women we had identified as being possible victims of traf-
ficking were discussed or reviewed on the forum, usually by searching for 
their aliases. Such discussions did, in fact, occur and it emerged that they 
compellingly illustrated how cognizant the punters were of the modus op-
erandi of pimps and traffickers in online contexts. These users also ap-
peared to be aware of the process involved in the setup and presentation of 
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profiles on online advertisements and adult sex websites that may indicate 
that the advertised woman (or women) could be sexually exploited victims 
of trafficking.  
 Some researchers have made the point that the online context may make 
it difficult to collect trustworthy and representative empirical data. The is-
sues affecting the online research methods relate to authenticity, validity 
and reliability (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016). In particular, such concerns 
regard the assessment of the quality of information that has been acquired 
from web forums, given that they are communicative, unregulated, user-
created and active social arenas. This may have the consequence that the 
data collected may be inaccurate, and, whether intentionally or not, mis-
leading. Moreover, the data reliability is undeterminable. Nevertheless, 
Hall and Antonopoulos (2016) underscore that data collected from online 
web forums (as well as social media sites) can, in fact, produce rich empir-
ical evidence from groups and communities that are normally hard to reach, 
such as punters in this case. They can also provide substantial insights into 
the ‘everyday life’ of these individuals and social groups. While some in-
formation may be false and delusive, the data obtained online should not 
lead to a general disregard of their quality (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016). 
Compared to online, the accumulation of data through offline methods does 
not always produce consistently valid findings either. Face-to-face interac-
tions can function to inhibit one’s true feelings. In some cases, the latter 
are more likely to be revealed in an online realm, which offers more reas-
surances of anonymity. In short, the powerful influence of online commu-
nities, such as forums, on the decision-making processes and ideas of punt-
ers cannot be ignored or dismissed (see also Cauduro et al., 2009). Apart 
from that, the use of a particular data source must be determined by the 
content of the research question.  
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Findings 
 
1. Recruitment 
 
The recruitment of victims is an integral aspect of the human trafficking 
process. A plethora of websites, including social networking and mi-
croblogging services such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as online ad-
vertisements, dating and international marriage agency sites (see Jones, 
2011), have been documented as recruiting people into trafficking and ad-
vertising the sale of their services, for the purposes of sexual or labour ex-
ploitation (see Hughes, 2014; Latonero et al., 2011, 2012; Mendel and 
Sharapov, 2014; Sarkar, 2015; Sykiotou, 2007). To lure and recruit victims 
online, traffickers frequently place spurious, promising advertisements on 
employment, dating and marriage websites for jobs including: administra-
tion, cleaning, home help, child care, waitressing, hostessing, pole dancing, 
transportation, the collection and delivery of charity bags, agricultural 
farming and construction roles, educational courses or work in the tourism 
sector (see also Europol, 2014). Our online research revealed some distinct 
examples of suspected deceptive recruitment (n=32), in that we found ad-
vertisements of women selling sexual services on online classifieds that 
were written in very poor English, advertising women as working in sev-
eral areas of the UK, such as in Birmingham, Oxford, Newcastle and Lon-
don, under various aliases. In one instance, on performing a google search 
of the telephone number listed in the advertisements, we discovered that 
the same number was present on general employment sites in Lithuania, 
advertising and recruiting for jobs available in the UK. Such jobs listed 
were for charity collection and waitress work in the cities of Manchester 
and London for a high salary of £150-200 a day, in which accommodation 
and transportation to work were included. There was no mention of the 
company, organisation or the name of the person recruiting for work or the 
requirement of any qualifications, but rather the only other information 
available in the advertisement was the mobile phone number. 
 In another occurrence, we found that the mobile phone number con-
nected to a dubious advertisement on an online classified website for a 
woman selling sexual services in London, was also present in the employ-
ment section of an online Romanian newspaper for available work in the 
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UK. This particular listing was for ‘unskilled labour’, and mentioned that 
‘conversational English’ was desirable. Again, the name of the company 
or the person posting the advertisement was not disclosed, nor, more im-
portantly, was the specific job role.  
 In her extensive examination of the role of the Internet in the facilitation 
of the trafficking of human beings for labour exploitation in several EU 
Member States, such as the Czech Republic, Ireland, Romania and the UK, 
Muskat-Gorska (2014) identified the presence of ‘red flags’ that may indi-
cate that a posted job offer was untrustworthy, and could lead to an unwit-
ting candidate’s exploitation. Such common ‘red flags’ include: the prom-
ise of an unrealistically high salary for an unqualified job, the particular 
advert possessing only a general description of the job, no address of the 
company or organisation and the associated contact details of the adver-
tisement containing only a mobile phone number or a general e-mail ad-
dress for further enquiries. Our findings agree with these ‘red flags’, and 
we suspect that these adverts are spurious and act as a means to lure and 
traffic women to the UK for purposes of sexual and/or labour exploitation. 
The mobile phone numbers may belong to a trafficking group or network 
based in the UK, who post bogus advertisements on online classified ad-
vertising websites in their native countries and may also arrange the trans-
portation and travel of their targeted victims to the UK (Interview with 
LEA 1, 2, 3). 
 The production of sites that are used to recruit and lure victims for sex-
ual exploitation overseas possesses a distinctive consistency. It appears 
that websites are frequently created and organised by suspected traffickers 
in the countries of origin and in the languages of potential victims, with 
these sites then fostering others, which are built up to form national recruit-
ment networks. As such, the content collected through the first website is 
then used on a second one, the aim being to attract clients. Information on 
the sex workers or victims that have been recruited is then translated into 
English, as well as the languages of other sex markets where the traffickers 
aim to trade (Interview with NGO1).  
 We discovered the presence of a potential trafficking network operating 
between Bulgaria and Greece, recruiting for young women between the 
ages of 18-35 to work as escorts in the UK. To a lesser extent, advertise-
ments were also posted in English, recruiting for women of any nationality 
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and physical body shape to work in the Oxford area of the UK, predomi-
nantly on the adult jobs section of www.backpage.com/uk. Our analysis 
and translation into English of the content of the Bulgarian and Greek ad-
vertisements revealed that each of the listings, despite the differences in 
language, contained a very similar layout and written information, with the 
full text of one of the advertisements outlined below: 
 
Ad: Escort for England 
£200 – 500 tii (sic) a day 
attractive and sexy girls profesionaliski [sic] and not, at the age of 18 
to '35 to work in England. knowledge of English is an advantage but 
not essential. We are looking only serious girls who want to make a 
lot of money in a short time. for more information, please send current 
pictures and write to that email address mxxiq11xx@gmail.com 
City: Sofia, Bulgaria 
Tel: 004407596475xxx 
 
A google search of the e-mail address posted in the advertisement above 
revealed the presence of ten more advertisements placed on both Bulgarian 
and Greek online classified and adult sex websites. This is an indication 
that this e-mail address may be accessed and used by criminal groups or 
individuals based and operating in Bulgaria and Greece. The owners of the 
e-mail address respond to enquiries made by potential aspirants regarding 
the advertisements and may also organise travel and transportation from 
and between the two countries to the UK. Although all of the advertise-
ments are recruiting women for sex work in the UK as escorts, there is no 
disclosure of the recruiter, thus it is impossible to determine whether it is 
an agency, a company or an individual who posted the advertisement. 
Moreover, there is no description of the terms of the job role, nor the loca-
tion of the place of work, and neither is there mention of the daily working 
hours involved. In one of the other advertisements, we noted the offer of 
“free accommodation”, yet there was no reference to the location of resi-
dence or the type of dwelling, nor whether the accommodation was tied to 
the workplace.  
 According to a report published by the National Crime Agency, victims 
exploited for labour originating from Eastern European countries such as 
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania stated that they were offered ac-
commodation as well as transportation to the UK as part of an employment 
package (NCA, 2016).  
 We also noted that all advertisements of this nature emphasised that 
there was “no experience necessary” for the job, and although knowledge 
of the English language would be advantageous, it was not an essential 
factor. This would suggest that women recruited may be advertised as be-
ing new to the UK sex market and to working in the sex industry. Moreo-
ver, emphasis placed on their lack of experience as an escort to attract po-
tential customers or clients. Furthermore, a salient aspect of these adver-
tisements was the aim to recruit “serious women looking to make a lot of 
money in a short period of time”, with the promise of unrealistically high 
amounts of money – for an unqualified job and a basic grasp of English – 
to be earned each day, ranging from £200-500, acting as an effective form 
of enticement.  
 What is also remarkable about this assortment of Bulgarian and Greek 
advertisements (n=10) is that all of them exhibit all of the ‘red flags’ iden-
tified, as mentioned above, by Muskat-Gorska (2014). The distinctive 
name and assortment of phone numbers enabled us to perform a more con-
centrated investigation of the authenticity of these Bulgarian and Greek 
advertisements. We used Google to search for the e-mail address, as well 
as the first half of the e-mail address, and we discovered profiles of women 
on adult online classified websites in the UK including www.back-
page.com/uk, www.vivastreet.co.uk and www.punternet.com. We found 
that up to 10 sets of profiles for each particular woman featured the same 
written information and style of writing, which signifies that these sets of 
profiles have not been written by the women themselves. It would not be 
unreasonable to assume that these profiles may have been created, penned 
and posted on different online classified websites by the same criminal 
group or individuals who also manage the aforementioned advertisements 
for recruitment. All of the women in the profiles were advertised as work-
ing in Oxford under various mobile phone numbers, although each profile 
did also feature the same e-mail address as listed in the recruitment adver-
tisements as another means of contact.  
 A multitude of motivations may have influenced the decisions of these 
women to travel and perform sex work, by applying for escort jobs abroad. 
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Much of the literature pertaining to migration for the purposes of perform-
ing sex work has highlighted that such decisions to migrate are often mo-
tivated by a desire for personal advancement, following friends who are 
perceived as being ‘successful’ and wealthy abroad (see Agustín, 2005; 
Europol, 2016b). Other reasons include: supporting family members back 
in one’s country of origin; wanting to attain a degree of independence, 
seeking opportunities to travel and see the world (see Siegel, 2012, 2016). 
In addition, as a matter of fact many of the women were already working 
as prostitutes in their native countries. These women are recruited to so-
cialise and mingle in clubs, pubs, night-time economy (NTE) establish-
ments or in parties of the same ethnic groups (for example Romanian, Bul-
garian, Czech, Russian). The traffickers use social media sites such as Fa-
cebook and Twitter, as well as digital mobile phone apps, such as 
WhatsApp, to locate other women who could work in the sex industry. 
Once potential victims are discovered, they are brought to the pimp or traf-
ficker, who then introduces them to various sex industry venues throughout 
the country.  
 At this stage, the women are usually aware of the type of work they are 
going to be introduced in. Maljević (2005) and Petrunov (2014) note that 
there has been an evolution in the trafficker-victim relationship concerning 
recruitment and relocation over the years, where ‘soft’ methods are now 
most frequently used, rather than the coercion that was typical in the 1990s. 
In the majority of cases, the consent of the trafficked person is acquired, 
and the division of earnings is pre-negotiated, with most individuals having 
been informed about the purpose of the trip, and the type of work they will 
be undertaking when they have arrived to the destination country.  
 Obviously, the main factor in the recruitment is finances: the division 
of the revenues with coercion does not usually take place during the re-
cruitment process. One of our interviewed experts recounted a discussion 
that had taken place with a sex worker who had travelled from her native 
country of Moldova to work in the sex industry abroad, wherein the woman 
was receptive of potential risks regarding personal safety and working en-
vironment. Yet, such dangers were seen as tolerable, as her performing sex 
work was an investment that would lead to a better life in the future (Inter-
view with Expert 2, 3). 
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 As some scholars, such as Petrunov (2014), assert, one of the main rea-
sons for working in the sex industry is the relatively large amount of earn-
ings, compared with what these women would earn if they stayed in their 
home countries: more money in less time. However, the women’s agree-
ment to work in the sex industry for monetary gain does not mean that 
exploitation does not occur. In their research examining the recruitment 
and migration of women to Italy for sex work, Cauduro et al. (2009) argue 
that while the women understand that they will be working as prostitutes, 
they undergo sexual exploitation by their traffickers or pimps, and they do 
not exercise their will in an ‘autonomous manner’. Petrunov (2014) also 
appears to agree to some extent with this view: his research on over 117 
trafficking victims from the three largest ethnic groups in Bulgaria (Bul-
garians, Roma and Turks) found that a sizeable number of respondents re-
ported that they had experienced some coercion after they began working 
in the destination country. It is important to note, therefore, that whilst 
these recruited women may have applied to the advertisements listed on 
the Bulgarian and/or Greek websites with an awareness of what the work 
in the UK will entail, the possibility exists that these women may have 
underestimated the risks involved and they too, through coercion and 
threats, may be placed in exploitative situations by their pimps or traffick-
ers. 
 All of our interviewees discussed the “lover-boy” method, in which a 
recruiter or trafficker, either operating alone or as part of a larger group, 
feigns romantic interest in a girl or young woman. He then seduces her 
with promises of marriage and an auspicious future by travelling abroad 
from the country of origin. As the relationship develops further, the re-
cruiter or trafficker manipulates or coerces the victim into sexual exploita-
tion through prostitution. This is reportedly a common tactic in the recruit-
ment of victims to the UK: 
 
“Generally, you’ve got ‘loverboy’ situation, people falling in love, then 
“let’s go travelling, let’s go abroad” and then the other way was just the 
promise of a job, so an agent or someone in a village would come and 
offer work, playing on vulnerabilities of poverty, lack of education, et-
cetera, to try and offer people things that actually don’t really ever ex-
ist” (Interview with NGO 3). 
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In addition, direct contact is also initiated with victims in chat rooms or via 
social networking sites, where traffickers pose as friends or lovers to re-
cruit victims, often exchanging e-mails, messages, photographs and videos 
with their victims to build a relationship and gain their trust and confi-
dence. NGO 3 stated that in the grooming and recruitment of children for 
the purposes of sexual exploitation, instead of initial physical contact with 
the victim, the Internet has enabled manifestations similar to the ‘lover-
boy’ tactic to take place online, on a range of social media websites and 
digital applications. Another interesting point raised by NGO 3 concerns 
the usage of social media applications by traffickers to determine how 
close in proximity a potential victim is to them, in terms of a nearby town 
or city, or even within the same locality, thus enabling them to easily track, 
meet and build up a relationship to gain their targeted victim’s trust: 
 
“I think probably ID’ing [identifying] locations, so if someone [victim] 
is using Facebook and had their location on, it’s very easy for someone 
[trafficker] to start assessing whether or not they are local to them, so 
do they invite them for a coffee or do they invite them to meet them and 
their friends, so I think social media is used like that, something we’ve 
observed is that lots of people we’ve worked with aren’t particularly 
internet savvy, which means they don’t have security settings on cor-
rectly” (Interview with NGO 3). 
 
Many electronic devices such as mobile phones and tablets have, within 
their settings, built-in location services functions. The latter enable any 
third-party applications and websites to use information based on the user’s 
current location in order to provide numerous location-based services, such 
as finding nearby amenities that include parks and restaurants. On this 
point, if a user has enabled location services, knowingly or unknowingly 
on their device, then such action would allow social media applications, 
such as Facebook, and/or Twitter to gain access to and publicly display the 
user’s location to their ‘friends’. Such location data can be included in the 
user’s status updates, uploaded photographs and messages sent via Face-
book’s Messenger feature. Interestingly, this information may be visible to 
a much larger number of people, as the user’s privacy settings may extend 
the visibility of the user’s profile beyond their Facebook ‘friends’ – posts 
may even be set to be ‘public’, i.e. accessible to everyone. Consequently, 
the visibility of one’s location to others can have negative implications for 
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a targeted person, and possesses much benefit for a trafficker searching for 
women to recruit. The NGO representatives interviewed mentioned that 
many of the victims they had worked with were not shrewd in their use of 
the Internet, and were neglectful in checking their location services settings 
on their mobile phones. Thus, an aspect of victims of trafficking support 
work involves advising them on the importance of Internet safety, ensuring 
that they understood what kinds of data they were sharing and who could 
see it. Such advice could hopefully work as a preventative measure against 
the occurrence of re-trafficking.  
 
2. Transportation 
 
The Internet has been used for obtaining travel documentation in several 
types of transportation. In this regard, traffickers operate like any other in-
ternet users. Tickets are purchased online by traffickers often by using 
compromised credit card data (McAlister, 2015), in order to conceal their 
identities and thereby add another layer of anonymity and distance to their 
criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the use of stolen credit card infor-
mation beneficially ensures that neither the tickets nor the victims are able 
to be easily linked back to the traffickers. Various methods of conveyance 
are utilised in the trafficking of victims, such as travelling from the origin 
country by air direct to the UK via budget airlines, or transport by road 
through international bus, coach, minibus services (NCA, 2016), or by 
truck and private car, which has been noted as offering more flexibility 
than air or train (see Dimitrova, 2006).  
 It is salient to acknowledge that transportation to the destination is fre-
quently executed legally, as during the transportation phase, the victims 
move voluntarily and co-operate with the traffickers. In particular, for 
countries in Europe that are part of the EU, the principle of freedom of 
movement within them has granted a legal possibility for nationals of EU 
member states to enter and cross the border of transit and destination coun-
tries legally, with their own travel documents, which has resulted in diffi-
culties in prevention within the transportation stage. After the accession of 
a number of former Eastern Bloc countries to the EU, female nationals 
from Eastern Europe could freely and legally travel to the UK – among 
other countries – to study at university or work in various sectors of the 
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economy. These opportunities obliged traffickers to alter their approach 
since their potential victims were empowered to approach the authorities 
as the possibility of deportation was not present. This has been the case 
with the rise of the Internet and mobile phones, which gave more freedom 
to sex workers to work independently. At the same time, it also gave crim-
inals more opportunities for control of their sex workers by, for instance, 
allowing them to communicate directly with clients as well as giving them 
the capacity to regularly control the women (Interview with LEA 2, 3; Ex-
pert 1, 2, 3).  
 An ICT-related issue associated with the transportation part of the pro-
cess is forged documents. We identified much evidence of forged docu-
ments as a possible means of facilitating the transportation of trafficking 
victims to the UK, through conducting part of our virtual ethnography on 
the deep web. Using the Tor web-browser and search engines such as 
‘Grams’, ‘TorSearch’ and ‘TORCH’, in the same manner as we would with 
the surface web, we found a deluge of darknet markets, such as ‘Fake ID’, 
‘Forgery Store’, ‘Onion Identity Services’ and ‘Valhalla’, that were selling 
counterfeit travel documents. There are also markets that were advertising 
the sale of other identity papers, including drivers’ licenses, ID cards and 
birth certificates that were available for all nationalities.  
 Aside from being able to cross borders under legal pretences, such doc-
umentation is highly useful for acquiring bank accounts, applying for loans 
or being able to rent property, particularly after arrival in the destination 
country. Although such documents are also available to purchase on the 
surface web, the assurance of anonymity and the protection of the users’ 
identities, resulting in a lower risk of detection from law enforcement 
within the infrastructure of the dark web, has a high appeal to potential 
buyers and marketplace sellers who partake in illicit (or licit) web transac-
tions and/or communication exchanges. As one of our interviewed experts 
on cybercrime trenchantly asserted, in such online endeavours, there may 
be a broad range of criminal actors involved, ranging from those with ru-
dimentary experience of the Internet, to those who possess much techno-
logical adeptness, such as accessing the dark web to engage in illicit trade 
(Interview with Expert 1).  
 Traffickers buy forged documentation for themselves to accompany 
their recruited victims, as a way of obscuring their real identities when 
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travelling abroad (see LEA 4, 6, 7). We noted that, depending on the par-
ticular vendor, the means of payment for the purchase of such documenta-
tion was through traditional forms of currency such as the Euro, or via 
Bitcoin (Ƀ)4, a decentralised peer-to-peer payments network and a virtual 
currency that essentially functions as online cash (see Brito and Castillo, 
2013). Sellers on various DarkNet markets (in the Deep Web) claimed that 
many of the counterfeit documents on sale possessed very high levels of 
authenticity. Three stated that their documents had been “tested and work-
ing fine all around the world”. They thus enabled one to travel freely with-
out triggering suspicion, to pass standard cursory inspection procedures at 
post offices, and to use person-to-person payment transfer services in 
which money can be sent or received, such as MoneyGram and Western 
Union. Similarly, sellers of passports available for purchase stated that 
there were no issues with travelling and entering another country, as the 
passports could also, for extra money, be affixed with visa stamps as well 
as being registered within official government databases of the destination 
country to avert suspicion and discovery. Technological capabilities have 
enabled further counterfeiting to take place, because not only can better 
fakes be developed at reduced prices, but advancements in ICT links dis-
persed locations in global trade relations. This linkage makes the formation 
of networks of buyers and sellers and the exchange of money relatively 
straightforward. This has become especially discernible since the Internet 
and e-commerce by producers and consumers became widespread, with the 
Internet acting as a “time/space compressor, on the one hand connecting 
sellers with large numbers of consumers in dispersed locations and on the 
other offering the formation of transient relationships between 
(cyber)criminal entrepreneurs” (Hall and Antonopoulos, 2016: 23) (Inter-
view with Expert 1, 2, 3; Interview with LEA 3, 4, 5).  
 
 
                                                 
4  Since its inception in 2008, the usage of Bitcoin has grown to such an extent 
that it is now able to be used as a form of payment for the purchase of sexual 
services, as evidenced by one UK-based escort agency in the city of Birming-
ham, Passion VIP, accepting payments in bitcoin as an alternative and discreet 
payment method, in what has been termed as “the world’s first bitcoin brothel” 
(Blue, 2013).  
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3. Exploitation 
 
In 2016, the most common type of human trafficking recorded for both 
adult and child (minor) victims in the UK was trafficking for the purposes 
of labour exploitation (National Crime Agency, 2017). Labour traffickers 
operate across the UK and exploit workers in low-skilled areas of work 
such as car washes, cleaning services, nail bars, restaurants as well as sea-
sonal agricultural work. In addition, the wages of these victims, alongside 
any state benefits that have been fraudulently claimed in their names are 
frequently paid into bank accounts that are controlled and managed by traf-
fickers (National Crime Agency, 2016). In our interviews, representatives 
of both LEAs and NGOs brought up the issue of labour trafficking and 
exploitation as a common occurrence in these sectors of work and estab-
lishments (Interview with LEA 1, 2). In instances where children have been 
trafficked to the UK there appears to exist a striking degree of convergence 
and overlap within the types of exploitation that child victims have expe-
rienced (Interview with NGO 1, 2; LEA 1, 2, 3 etc.; Expert 1, 2, 3). 
 From the virtual ethnography, we identified a multitude of advertise-
ments recruiting for work in the UK, placed on numerous online classified 
advertisement websites and Facebook pages in numerous languages that 
were consistent with the red flags as outlined earlier, in an array of fields, 
such as construction, agriculture, health and beauty. We also found that the 
mobile phone number listed in the advertisements was, when searched for 
on google, connected to profiles of women in the UK that were selling 
sexual services, either on online classified websites or adult entertainment 
sites. However, the original advertisement made no mention of sex work 
and was in a completely different job sector.  
 It is important to state that, despite the widespread use of the Internet 
and digital technologies, not all victims of trafficking would have been re-
cruited and exploited through the use of these mediums. Informal ‘offline’ 
forms of recruitment, such as word-of-mouth, or through friends and rela-
tives remain still a very pervasive and efficient method of trafficking indi-
viduals into situations of exploitation. This type of recruitment is still ex-
tensive in rural areas or among particular communities, such as Roma or 
other ethnic minority communities with traffickers often going to the fam-
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ilies of victims directly (e.g. Interview with LEA 4). Such tactics were re-
portedly deployed by traffickers recruiting and transporting targeted vic-
tims to the UK for labour exploitation: 
 
“In our experience in Nigeria, you’ll have someone who befriends a 
family, offers the opportunity of education and employment abroad . . . 
so it could be a male person or someone not directly related to the crim-
inal organisation that is paid to befriend the family and offer these op-
portunities and then smuggle them into the UK for purposes of exploi-
tation . . .” (Interview with NGO 2).  
 
Moreover, Vietnamese minors have been frequently trafficked to the UK 
for purposes of labour exploitation to work on farms and coastlines to cul-
tivate plants and cockles. The traffickers are visiting impoverished families 
to recruit young victims, and exploiting sociocultural factors of family hon-
our and providing for one’s family through working in potential forms of 
debt-bondage (e.g. Interview with LEA 2). Discussing trafficking for pur-
poses of labour exploitation, one NGO asserted that this type of trafficking 
possessed a distinctly offline dimension, where it was most likely to be 
shrouded in secrecy, most probably due to the illegal status of some traf-
ficked victims (Interview with NGO 4). 
 The Internet has also augmented the nature of sex work from a predom-
inantly physical environment to an increasingly virtual landscape to such 
an extent that most prostitution is currently advertised and solicited online 
(see also Ibanez and Suthers, 2014; Finn and Stalans, 2016), in what has 
been referred to in the literature as “virtual red light districts” (Cauduro et 
al., 2009: 59; Ibanez and Suthers, 2014; Perer, 2012). Correspondingly, 
there has been a significant shift in human sex trafficking activity to the 
virtual sphere, with both the supply and demand side having benefitted, 
with trafficked victims often being advertised online. The majority of our 
findings gleaned from the virtual ethnography pertain to sex trafficking, in 
particular the exploitation of young women. 
 We noted that typically, each advertisement of a woman posted on the 
online classified and adult sex websites we were researching included: a 
title, the name or alias of the listed woman, a textual profile description 
which would often include information on the physical attributes of the 
woman, such as her height, weight and breast size, photographs of the fea-
tured woman, the location of the town or city she was based as working in, 
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and a mobile phone number for contact purposes. More infrequently, we 
also noted that advertisements contained videos of the advertised woman 
dancing or posing in a provocative manner, stated nationality and/or eth-
nicity of the woman, the woman’s age, and whether the woman was listed 
with another woman in the advertisement, for example as a ‘duo’, some-
times with corresponding photographs of the two to demonstrate this was 
the case, and the inclusion of an e-mail address as another means of con-
tact, alongside the mobile phone number. On this specific issue, it has been 
emphasised by researchers such as Konrad et al. (2016: 6) that great diffi-
culty lies in “discerning whether the [suspected] victim is in any capacity 
a willing participant rather than a victim of fraud, threat, or coercion 
through posted advertisements and personal encounters”, and remains to 
be an assignment that is fraught with complications. As we could not be 
entirely sure of whether the women featured in such advertisements and 
websites were actual victims of human trafficking, we were careful to use 
cautionary descriptions, such as ‘potential’, ‘possible’ or ‘suspected’ vic-
tims. Moreover, our findings demonstrate a wide assortment of nationali-
ties, including Hungarian, Czech, Spanish, Moldavian, Ukrainian, Brazil-
ian, Italian, Chinese, Japanese and Romanian women. However, it is im-
portant to note that even though these women are listed under these nation-
alities, in reality, this may not be a true representation. 
 Our study, and specifically the virtual ethnography, revealed that, dur-
ing exploitation, there are a number of patterns and themes that emerge. 
Predictably, the first theme is the very visibility of online sexual exploita-
tion as part of the trafficking process:  
 
“People are purchasing sexual services, and the Internet is a really easy 
place to use that, mobile phones. So you’re in a new city for work, you 
log onto your phone, download an app and say ‘oh yep, I can visit X, Y 
and Z’, so I think there is definitely technology being used to facilitate 
the supply and demand. Yes, for labour, because of the recruitment 
sites, but I think the sexual exploitation is more apparent, because there 
are actual pictures of women online that someone purchasing a service 
can make a decision on, so that’s using the technology” (Interview with 
NGO 3). 
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Our virtual ethnographic research in human trafficking and exploitation in 
the UK sex markets revealed the importance of the mobile phone number 
listed within advertisements on online classifieds, for three key reasons.  
 Firstly, the mobile phone number serves as the nexus between the vir-
tual and real-world physical environments, as it enables a prospective pur-
chaser of sex browsing online to connect to a potential seller of sex and 
plan an offline (and almost certainly sexual) encounter.  
 Secondly, we detected in advertisements that the listed mobile phone 
number, when searched for on google and also by using the search function 
available on various online classifieds sites, revealed the existence of sev-
eral more women (n=205) also advertised as selling sexual services, fre-
quently in various cities across the UK as well women also working in the 
same locality.  
 Thirdly, in numerous instances (n=100), a google search of the mobile 
phone number also demonstrated that the same woman had multiple other 
profiles on various online classified and sex sites, in which she was listed 
under numerous aliases, ages and, in her earlier profiles, as working and 
based in various cities in the UK.  
 As such, the mobile phone number listed in such advertisements can 
serve as an important indicator of potential human trafficking activity. The 
advertisement of more than one woman under one number, either within 
the same city or multiple cities, suggests a ‘shared management’ situation, 
in which the women do not work as independent escorts, and may be under 
the control of a trafficking gang or network or a pimp, who controls their 
profiles, are in charge of the mobile phone as well as subsequent bookings 
made. Likewise, a google search of the phone number of a sole woman 
advertised is also useful to discern whether the woman has been previously 
advertised in different locations in the UK, indicative of frequent move-
ment to various locations across the UK, which can signify that the woman 
may be a victim of trafficking (see also Interview with LEA 2). 
 Further highlighting the significance of mobile phone numbers in our 
virtual ethnography was our use of a digital app and corresponding website 
called ‘TrueCaller’ (www.truecaller.com), which allows mobile phone 
numbers to be searched for in a database of over two billion mobile phone 
numbers, to see the name of the person that the phone is registered to, as 
well as the location of the phone and the mobile phone carrier that the 
phone is connected to. Whereas our google search of the numbers listed in 
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advertisements revealed the presence of other advertisements of women 
who are listed under the same number, we were able use TrueCaller to 
search for the mobile phone numbers we had highlighted in our research 
as being linked to suspicious advertisements. We discovered that fre-
quently, the number was registered to a person that was not listed in the 
advertisements, and in many instances the name of the person was male 
(see Figure 1). This discrepancy between the name or names of the women 
in the advertisements where the number is listed as a point of contact, to 
the number being registered in the name of another, male person, strongly 
suggests that the person may be a trafficker or pimp who manages and 
controls the women, and may arrange bookings for them. Although we 
stress that using TrueCaller did not result in all of the highlighted numbers 
being registered in another person’s name, or even registered at all, we did 
find that many (n=20) of the numbers were listed under the Lycamobile 
phone operator, a large and popular ‘Pay-as-you-go’ network. The posses-
sion of ‘pay-as-you-go’ phones has been observed as being used by crimi-
nal networks such as traffickers and/or smugglers for operational and co-
ordination purposes, as well as to maintain constant contact with their vic-
tims to facilitate their exploitation. The advantage is that mobile phones 
are often prepaid, or ‘Pay-as-you-go’, so that they are unable to be con-
nected to a specific individual through a service contract (see also Ibanez 
and Gazan, 2016a; 2016b).  
 
Figure 1. 
List of women advertised under a sole mobile phone number  
registered in the name of another person.
  
Source: Authors’ research 
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Conclusions 
This study addresses an important gap in the scholarly research of the use 
of the internet and other digital technologies in the process of human traf-
ficking in the UK context. As we have seen, computer-related criminal ac-
tivities have been identified as the ‘new’ threat or the ‘new’ frontier by law 
enforcement, policy makers, the media and an increasingly large number of 
academics. Our findings nevertheless indicate that traffickers use the internet 
in a similar way to other, non-criminal, users. In reality the internet-facili-
tated human trafficking is largely based upon a set of established criminal acts, 
which have existed for centuries. McQuade (2011) would define these crimi-
nal activities as adaptive in the sense that they constitute technological varia-
tions of ordinary crimes. Human traffickers using ICTs “resemble many pro-
fessional criminals in their ‘adaptive pragmatic organisation’” (Shover et al., 
2003: 501), and continue to evolve while responding to ‘shifting terrains’ 
(Hobbs, 2001), new and frequently mutating technologies, and, very im-
portantly, the opportunities offered by constant (irregular) migratory flows. 
Within this context, our findings would support the view that the implica-
tions of digital technologies are pervasive. They apply to every phase of 
the trafficking process from recruitment to exploitation, and seem to offer 
to traffickers considerable possibilities for a renewal and diversification of 
the approaches and techniques they use in the process. Similarly to what 
other studies suggest about the situation in other contexts (e.g. Di Nicola 
et al., 2013), such technologies open up a virtual world which amplifies 
and expands the potential of human traffickers to lure victims into their 
trade, and, particularly in the exploitation phase, to attract and identify cli-
ents.  
 Firstly, the widespread use of digital technologies and of the related 
media can be thought to remove an important physical barrier in the re-
cruitment process, as both traffickers are able in the online context to reach 
a significantly larger pool of potential victims and, conversely, potential 
victims may become aware of the ‘opportunities’ offered by the former via 
the same avenue, independently of location. At the same time, the online 
context, particularly the use of social media, facilitates both the obfusca-
tion of the traffickers’ identities, and the manipulation of the nature and 
amount of information made available to the potential victims, since the 
latter interact with a website and not with a person in the first instance. 
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This would still be the case when interaction takes place on social media 
platforms. The online context significantly increases the possibility of de-
ception, and it can therefore be detrimental to the potential victims’ ability 
to evaluate the nature of the ‘opportunities’ and the risks involved, when 
they enter the process as decision makers. It is true that the online context 
can be taken to empower the potential victims, in the sense that the nature 
and amount of information available from suspicious websites or from 
their online interactions may alert them to possible risks. Clearly further 
research is needed to explore the exact dynamics of the interactive pro-
cesses, but on the basis of our findings we would suggest that the online 
context involves a position of advantage for the traffickers. 
 Secondly, this advantage can be seen more clearly in the transportation 
and exploitation phases of the trafficking process. Again, the online con-
text significantly expands the market place from which traffickers may 
procure the necessary means to sustain the process, from ID and travel doc-
uments to travel bookings, under conditions of enhanced anonymity. It is, 
however, in the exploitation phase that the online context clearly amplifies 
and diversifies the possibilities available to traffickers, since it offers not 
merely an additional layer of anonymity but also considerable flexibility in 
the operation of their business. The online context removes important bar-
riers in the process of targeting and attracting potential customers, and con-
siderably speeds up the entire process. Beyond the facilitation of the offline 
sexual transactions, the online context may also open up new possibilities 
for the exploitation of the victims entirely on the virtual environments that 
digital technologies enable. Importantly, as we have seen, this activity on 
the traffickers’ side is now linked with the online environments and com-
munities relating to sexual services and the sex market that, ultimately, or-
ganise the demand side of the trade. 
 An implication of our findings, which may be of particular importance 
in the UK context, is that a reappraisal of the prevalence of human traffick-
ing may be necessary. There is no doubt that the extent of public awareness 
and the prioritisation of these issues for both policy makers and law en-
forcement in the UK is significant (NCA 2016; 2017). Nevertheless, as 
regards trafficking for sexual exploitation more specifically, the virtualisa-
tion of sex markets may have the consequence that a great deal of illicit 
activity, exploitation and victimisation may remain undetected. While our 
virtual ethnography approach has produced a series of indicators that could 
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be used for the development of tools for the prevention, detection and sup-
pression of criminal activity, there is clearly a need for a larger scale re-
search effort targeting specifically these online sexual markets.  
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The role of Vietnamese criminal networks in 
drug crime: 
the Czech Republic case  
 
Miroslav Nozina1 
   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Particularly since 1975, when the war in Indochina ended and the com-
munists seized power in all of Vietnam, there has been a rise in the number 
of Vietnamese living abroad. Currently, approximately three million Viet-
namese live outside of Vietnam, spread across more than 100 countries 
(Mazyrin, 2004: 159). The majority of the Vietnamese migrants are look-
ing for an opportunity to improve their lives and ensure a better future for 
their children in the ‘new homeland’, or back at home in Vietnam. How-
ever, criminal activities connected to local Vietnamese diasporas have also 
been recorded in many countries (OCTA, 2011: 17, 19; Nožina and Kraus, 
2012: 11). 
 Vietnamese criminals have found it easy to cross state borders, creating 
networks and introducing new modi operandi of criminal activities to the 
host countries. As a result, Vietnamese crime has become a serious prob-
lem in Southeast Asia, Australia, the USA, Canada and the Russian Feder-
ation (Adamoli et al., 1998: 26, 88–90; Emmers, 2002: 6; Mazyrin, 2004: 
172–73; AOC Canada, 2003; AOC Australia, 1995).  
 In the EU we find a similar situation with Vietnamese and Chinese 
groups being the most active Asian criminal organisations (Siegel-Ro-
zenblit, 2011: 7; OCTA, 2011: 10, 16, 17, 21, 22; Bąkowski, 2013: 3). With 
                                                 
1  The author is a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations, Pra-
gue. The study is based mainly on the results of the research project Global 
Prohibition Regimes: Theoretical Refinement and Empirical Analysis (No. 13-
26485S; 2013–2016), which was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech 
Republic. 
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respect to Vietnamese organised crime groups in Western European coun-
tries, during the 1990s, their presence was mainly recorded in the United 
Kingdom and in France (Nožina and Kraus, 2012: 42–51; MPS, 2010; 
OGD, 1998). However, since 2008, growing activity by such groups has 
also been noted in Belgium and the Netherlands (Siegel-Rozenblit, 2011: 
9). As for the Central European countries, Vietnamese criminal activities 
have been frequently detected in Germany, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Slovakia and Hungary (Nožina and Kraus, 2012: 56-75).  
 Vietnamese criminal networks are engaged in a broad spectrum of crim-
inal activities, including human smuggling, economic crime, violent crime, 
usury, theft, human trafficking, prostitution, counterfeiting activities, traf-
ficking in weapons and trafficking in drugs. Of particular interest to EU 
security forces in recent years have been the Vietnamese organisations’ 
activities in the areas of managing the trade in illicit commodities, smug-
gling of people, large-scale cultivation of cannabis and money laundering 
(Siegel-Rozenblit, 2011: 7, 9-10). In November 2013, Europol issued a 
special report warning about the then recently increased activities of Viet-
namese organised crime groups in Europe (Europol, 2013). 
 In the Czech Republic, the local Vietnamese diaspora has existed since 
communist times and their numbers have steadily grown since the opening 
of the country after the democratic revolution in 1989. According to offi-
cial statistics, approximately 58.000 Vietnamese citizens and Czech citi-
zens of Vietnamese origin were legally living in the country in 2013 (Český 
statistický úřad, 2014). The number of illegal immigrants from Vietnam is 
difficult to ascertain, but estimates range from 5.000 to 10.000 (PCR-
OCDU, 2015). The Vietnamese community represents the third most nu-
merous immigrant community in the country. 
 Together with the new immigrants from Vietnam, new kinds of crime 
have appeared as well. Vietnamese crime-entrepreneurs have started to or-
ganise illegal markets and to develop strong criminal networks in the 
Czech Republic. Vietnamese criminal networks have become highly de-
veloped in terms of their structures and modi operandi and have deeply 
penetrated the society of the local Vietnamese diaspora. They have been 
‘traditionally’ engaged mainly in the smuggling of people and economic 
crime, such as the trade in goods with fake trademarks and the illegal pro-
duction of, and illegal trade in, commodities such as alcohol and cigarettes 
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in violations of customs and tax laws. These criminal revenues are man-
aged through various forms of money laundering, including illegal finan-
cial transactions. 
 Vietnamese drug-related crime has likewise seen a dramatic increase. 
Especially since mid-2007, the Czech security forces have been recording 
a growing engagement of Vietnamese criminals in the illegal production 
of cannabis. In addition, from 2010, there has been a dominant Vietnamese 
organised crime presence in the methamphetamine market. Vietnamese of-
fenders have come to dominate the production of the commodity in the 
Czech Republic and its growing exports from the Czech Republic. Accord-
ing to the Czech Police Drug Headquarters, Vietnamese drug crime cur-
rently represents the most dynamically developing phenomenon on the 
Czech drug scene (PCR-NADH, 2016a). 
 
 
The basic framework and methodology of the research 
 
The problem of Vietnamese crime has so far not been widely studied. 
While there exist numerous important studies on the problem of the Viet-
namese diaspora in the world, some of them dealing with the Czech Re-
public (see e.g.Viviani, 1984; Kibria, 1993; Coughlan, 1998; Dorais, 2000, 
2005; Rutledge, 2000; Gilles, 2004; Blanc, 2005; Thomas, 2005; Fritsche, 
1991; Bui, 2003; Wolf, 2007; Grzymala-Kazlowska, 2002; Halik and 
Nowicka, 2002; Iglicka, 2005;Vasilijev, 1989; Brouček, 2003; Martínková 
and Pechová, 2010), most of them discuss the economic, social and cultural 
aspects of Vietnamese migration and the diasporas’ life, with little atten-
tion being paid to the problem of Vietnamese criminality. Cross (1989), for 
example, focused on Vietnamese criminal networks, Okólski (1999) stud-
ied Vietnamese illegal migration, Zhou and Bankston (2006) analysed Vi-
etnamese delinquency as a general phenomenon, English (1995), Klein-
knecht (1996), and Du Phuoc Long and Richard (1997) studied Vietnamese 
criminal gangs, and Silverstone (2010) focused on the policing of Viet-
namese crime. In the sphere of drug crime, Silverstone and Savage (2010) 
studied the Vietnamese drug trade in the United Kingdom, and 
Schoenmakers et al. (2013) that in the Netherlands.  
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 In the Czech Republic, the problem of Vietnamese criminality was for-
merly studied in the broader context of the topic of international organised 
crime penetrating the Czech Republic’s territory after the democratic 
changes at the end of the 1980s (Macháček and Rumpl, 1997; Nožina, 
2000, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). An important subject was the trafficking of 
humans (Pechová, 2007). The drug trade as a special criminal activity was 
studied by Nožina (2010b). However, in general, there existed a consider-
able shortage of published information in this field. To address this prob-
lem, the Institute of International Relations (IIR) in Prague carried out a 
research project from 2007 to 2016 which looked into the criminal struc-
tures existing within the Czech Republic’s Vietnamese diaspora and their 
criminal activities, including the production of and trafficking in drugs as 
two criminal phenomena which are rapidly gaining in importance in the 
Vietnamese criminal underworld. In the course of the research, several re-
lated studies were published (see, e.g., Nožina and Kraus, 2009, 2012, 
2016; Nožina, 2010a, 2010b, 2013; Nožina and Vaněček, 2016). 
 The IIR researchers relied mainly on primary sources: unpublished re-
ports and documents, interviews with members of the security forces as 
well as with members of the Vietnamese community in the Czech Repub-
lic. Six field assistants of Vietnamese origin and fluent in both Czech and 
Vietnamese were engaged at various stages of the project. They helped 
collect relevant information and carried out a series of structured inter-
views with other members of the Vietnamese community. 
 The information obtained through the Vietnamese assistants contrib-
uted mainly to gaining a general understanding of the drug problem. More 
concrete information related to the structures of Vietnamese drug networks 
and the modi operandi of their criminal offences. Other data were collected 
through an analysis of security reports. These were provided by various 
police units. In addition, interviews with members of the Czech security 
forces were carried out, mainly the Národní protidrogová centrála Policie 
České republiky (National Drug Headquarters of the Police of the Czech 
Republic) and the Útvar pro odhalování organizovaného zločinu Policie 
České republiky (Organised Crime Detection Unit of the Police of the 
Czech Republic).2 
                                                 
2  In 2016 it was reorganised and renamed the Národní centrála proti organi-
zovanému zločinu (National Headquarters Against Organised Crime).  
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 The main limitation of these kinds of sources lies in the fact that much 
of the information was considered confidential as its publication could neg-
atively affect ongoing investigations. Because of this, the information that 
was obtained from police sources frequently described commonly known 
facts, pertained to already solved criminal cases (which ended with one or 
more individuals being convicted of a crime), or involved outdated or frag-
mented data.  
 Another problem was that virtually every interview had to be authorised 
by the responsible leadership of the security agencies. This made the re-
search process extremely inflexible and in many cases censorship led to a 
certain devaluation of the information source. The problem was partly 
overcome by the personal experience and contacts of one of the research 
team´s members, who has served as a police expert on Vietnamese organ-
ised crime in various police units in the Czech Republic over the course of 
16 years. Moreover, the data and information that came from his previous 
work became an important resource for further analysis. But in some cases, 
the use of data and information was restricted due to the fact that it had 
been obtained in the course of operative investigations and therefore clas-
sified as secret.  
 Another valuable source of information for the project were Vietnam-
ese informers cooperating with the Czech Police. These individuals pro-
vide the police with information from the Vietnamese criminal underworld 
and some of them were also willing to cooperate with the authors. The 
main problem with using such sources in the research, however, is their 
motivations for cooperating. These motivations range from a certain kind 
of patriotism and beliefs about the need to fight crime to a personal desire 
for revenge and attempts to abuse the Czech security forces for personal 
purposes or in order to obtain some form of benefit. The information was 
frequently tendentious because of these motivations. These individuals 
also often reported only vague hearsay or rumours that were commonly 
shared in the Vietnamese community. This kind of information has only 
limited value for an analysis.  
 Because of the different levels of quality of the sources, the collected 
field data were triangulated with information from other sources. The re-
search in the Czech Republic was complemented by materials from and 
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interviews with various experts mainly from Poland, Germany, and Slo-
vakia. 
 
 
Drugs as a deep-rooted problem in the Vietnamese  
diaspora  
 
In general, between 1990 and 2000, the illegal production of and traffick-
ing in drugs perpetrated by Vietnamese offenders did not attract the interest 
of the Czech security forces. It was considered to be a marginal problem 
and there was almost no information about the situation on the Vietnamese 
drug market and the numbers of Vietnamese addicts. However, in the fol-
lowing decade, the drug problem within the Vietnamese community in the 
Czech Republic appeared to rise dramatically, which prompted the IIR re-
searchers to look for explanations. The interviews with the members of the 
Vietnamese community, which were carried out mainly in the years 2007 
– 2009, revealed that, in fact, this was not a new phenomenon: drug delin-
quency was deeply rooted in the Vietnamese diaspora in the Czech Repub-
lic and the Czech authorities had simply failed to become aware of it. In 
the difficult and stressful living conditions in the Czech Republic of the 
1990s, many of the Vietnamese immigrants had turned to drugs. Sellers of 
goods in the street markets, workers, teenagers, members of the criminal 
underworld, prostitutes, and also businessmen were among the Vietnamese 
drug addicts. 
 There are several reasons why drug abuse and drug dealing have had a 
tendency to stay “hidden” inside the Vietnamese community. First of all, 
drugs are universally rejected and condemned in the Vietnamese commu-
nity and Vietnamese drug addicts and drug dealers have a tendency to hide 
their activities even from their fellow countrymen. Equally, community 
members are usually not interested in communicating their problems with 
the outside world due a traditional tendency to isolate themselves from the 
majority society and due to a desire not to present the Vietnamese commu-
nity in the Czech Republic in a bad light. For the very same reasons, Viet-
namese drug addicts usually are not inclined to seek help from Czech drug 
treatment centres. 
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 In the sphere of drug trafficking, especially in the 1990s, drug imports 
organised by Vietnamese traffickers were insignificant. Vietnamese deal-
ers usually bought drugs in gram quantities, for example, methampheta-
mine from Czech dealers or heroin from Kosovo Albanians, and then sell-
ing these within their community. This usually does not happen on the 
streets. Rather, drug distribution takes place inside the Vietnamese mar-
kets, in brothels, in karaoke bars, etc., and due to this strategy Vietnamese 
dealers are not ‘visible’ to the Police. 
 Another typical phenomenon is the existence of special places called 
‘šlehárny’ (literally ‘hit places’ or ‘flick places’) in the Czech drug under-
world. A Vietnamese drug addict usually comes to some flat or house 
which functions as a ‘šlehárna’, buys the drug, consumes it, and spends 
the maximum intoxication period there. For extra money, he can also sleep 
in the ‘šlehárna’, and receive food and drink, etc. So again, the Vietnamese 
addict remains hidden, is not visible on the street and does not attract the 
uncomfortable attention from the police. This practice of drug use is prob-
ably based on the Asian tradition of opium dens which operated in Indo-
china in colonial times and then was simply transferred to Europe in mod-
ern times. 
 In the years 2008 – 2009, when we focused on the problem of ‘šle-
hárny’, there were at least 15 places of this kind in Prague alone; and others 
existed in bigger cities like Ostrava and Brno, and in cities in Western Bo-
hemia close to Germany and Poland, such as Ostrov nad Ohří, Děčín, 
Česká Lípa, Karlovy Vary and Cheb (Nožina and Kraus, 2009: 90-91). 
 
 
The “industrialisation” of the Vietnamese drug trade  
 
The first networks that connected the Vietnamese drug underworld with 
the Czech drug underworld and the international drug underworld operat-
ing on the Czech territory during the 1990s became the basis for the sub-
sequent expansion of Vietnamese drug crime in the Czech environment 
and then across Central Europe. After 2000, the engagement of Vietnamese 
nationals in the production of, and trade in, drugs grew dramatically. This 
growth can probably be attributed to two main factors. 
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 First, the demand for imported cheap Asian goods on the Central Euro-
pean market gradually declined and Vietnamese businesses that were heav-
ily engaged in selling such goods, saw their profits dwindling. The “Era of 
Golden Rain”, as the profitable period of the 1990s is referred to in the in 
the Vietnamese business community in the Czech Republic, ended. How-
ever, the expectations of many Vietnamese immigrants who came to the 
country with the goal of improving their economic situation were still high. 
It led many of them, including the members of the criminal underworld, to 
seek out alternative avenues towards maximal profit in the shortest possi-
ble time regardless of their legality (Nožina, 2010a: 232). 
 A second factor that potentially played into the growth of Vietnamese 
crime in the Czech Republic was the fact that in the 1990s, the Vietnamese 
in Central Europe had been able to derive substantial profits from the un-
licensed sale of counterfeit products and high excise goods such as alco-
holic beverages and cigarettes. This kind of illicit trade was on a significant 
scale, for example, in Berlin, Germany, where an extensive illicit cigarette 
market developed (von Lampe, 1999; von Lampe, 2003); but it was wide-
spread in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as well (PCR-NDH, 
2010). Illegal drugs were the next ‘logical’ step in the expansion of the 
assortment of profitable illegal commodities, not least because drug traf-
ficking networks had already been established in the course of 1990s; and 
there was space for their further expansion. The sources of drugs and modi 
operandi of the Vietnamese drug networks were flexibly modified to fit 
the new situation (PCR-NDH, 2010; 2016b). 
 Going into the 2000s, Vietnamese dealers continued to buy a wide array 
of drugs from dealers of other ethnic backgrounds. For example, criminal 
networks operating on the so-called Balkan Route from Afghanistan re-
mained the main source of heroin for Vietnamese drug dealers in the Czech 
Republic, while only 10% of the Vietnamese heroin supplies were smug-
gled from Southeast Asia. Other sources of supply were drug traffickers 
coming from such countries as the Russian Federation, Armenia, Bulgaria 
(mostly Bulgarian Turks), and China. Likewise, supplies of cannabis and 
methamphetamine were acquired from other, mainly Czech sources.
 However, in parallel to the continuing older modi operandi, various 
criminal cases during the 2000s provided evidence that Vietnamese crimi-
nal networks increasingly became involved in the production end of the 
drug trade as well (PCR-NDH, 2010). It also became evident that unlike 
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their Czech counterparts, who produced drugs in small amounts and were 
usually not well organised, Vietnamese ‘industrialised’ their drug produc-
tion. They started to use large pieces of equipment that allowed to produce 
cannabis and methamphetamine on a much larger scale (PCR-NDH, 2012). 
 The rise of Vietnamese drug crime led the Czech police to launch a 
series of operations against Vietnamese traffickers in 2001 under the code-
name ‘Mau’. The situation seemed to improve during the period from 2003 
to 2005, but only temporarily. The Vietnamese drug dealers then adapted 
to the new situation, vamping up their security measures, expanding their 
activities and establishing new networks (Nožina and Kraus, 2012: 180–
181). It was the beginning of a new era of the Vietnamese involvement in 
drug trafficking that saw a dramatic rise in the production and distribution 
of drugs organised by Vietnamese drug networks. Today cannabis and 
methamphetamine are the main vehicles of the Vietnamese drug business 
in Central Europe. Vietnamese traffickers have skilfully exploited the de-
mand for these drugs on the one hand and the production and distribution 
gaps on the Central European drug market on the other hand. 
 
Cannabis cultivation and trafficking 
 
From 2007, the Czech security forces have been registering a strong in-
volvement of Vietnamese offenders in the illegal production of and trade 
in cannabis, especially in the outdoor, hydroponic cultivation of cannabis 
and its trafficking (Nožina and Kraus, 2016: 524). This practice coincides 
with the recent spread of hydroponic cultivation of cannabis in several 
other European countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
(Silverstone and Savage, 2010; Schoenmakers et al., 2013). 
 According to rumours from within the Vietnamese drug scene, the hy-
droponic technology of cannabis cultivation was imported to the Czech 
Republic from the Netherlands by a Vietnamese drug dealer nicknamed 
Binh Con, or “Little Binh” (PCR-OCDU, 2007) at a time when an organ-
ised marijuana market in the Czech Republic virtually did not exist. Re-
portedly, Little Binh was able to produce more marijuana at a much better 
quality than what was previously available. The locally produced non-hy-
droponic marijuana had a content of only 5 to 6% of the active ingredient 
THC (tetrahydrocannabinol). In comparison, in the case of marijuana pro-
134 
 
duced with the hydroponic method, the police detected THC levels of be-
tween 7 and 23%. Since then, the potency of cannabis has increased fur-
ther. In 2014, the Czech Police came across several perpetrators who by 
using special technology and processes of production managed to grow 
marijuana with record levels of THC of up to nearly 50%. This kind of 
cannabis is not a “soft drug”; at these high THC levels, it is already con-
sidered a ‘hard drug’ (PCR-NDH, 2014). 
 The Binh Con name became a trademark of the high quality marijuana 
distributed on the Czech drug market, and many Vietnamese traders in 
drugs followed his successful business strategy (PCR-OCDU, 2007). The 
number of detected cannabis plantations started to rise dramatically. While 
the police discovered only one Vietnamese hydroponic cannabis farm in 
2005, they came across eight Vietnamese cannabis farms in 2007, 55 in 
2008, 84 in 2009 and 145 in 2010 (PCR-NDH, 2011). 
 The modi operandi of the establishment and operation of the cannabis 
plantations are usually quite similar. They are mostly set up in one-family 
homes, agricultural farms, abandoned warehouses and factories. The tech-
nologies for hydroponic production of cannabis are imported mainly from 
the Netherlands, but also from Great Britain, China, and Canada. A partic-
ularly important source of technology for the cultivators are the so-called 
‘grow shops’, or shops selling plant cultivation technologies. In several 
cases, Vietnamese owners of companies selling these technologies were 
also involved in the illegal growing and follow-up distribution of cannabis 
(PCR-OCDU, 2007, 2008). 
 Once the necessary technology is obtained, the bosses hire “gardeners”: 
the workers who are to take care of the farms. Formerly, the people in this 
position were usually illegal immigrants, previously jobless people, etc. 
However, in recent years, there is a clear trend of professionalisation of 
“gardeners”. Today many of them have previous experience with the grow-
ing of cannabis from other European countries, such as the United King-
dom and the Scandinavian countries, and they are much better paid as well. 
Formerly, they received salaries of € 400 – 500 per month, but now it is € 
1500 – 2000. After their contracts expire, many of them cross over to other 
grow farms in the Czech Republic or leave the country to continue with the 
same kinds of jobs abroad – in Poland, Great Britain and other West Euro-
pean countries (PCR-NDH, 2016b; Frydrych, 2010: 15; Nožina and Kraus, 
2012: 187; Výroční zpráva, 2010: 9).  
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 The plantations vary in size from 600 to 5000 plants. In one case, in the 
course of the police operation CUKROVAR (“Sugar Mill”), which was 
carried out in the years 2012-2014, a record 12.000 cannabis plants were 
seized (PCR-NDH, 2016b; Kudláčková, 2014; Nožina and Vaněček, 2016: 
66).  
 The profits from cannabis cultivation are high. 1 kg. of dried cannabis 
costs approximately € 160 on the Czech drug market. In the cases of plan-
tations with 600-800 plants, the profits are around € 120.000, and usually, 
already the first three-month growing cycle covers all expenses for the 
plantation’s establishment and brings a significant profit to the investor. 
 A relatively new trend due to police pressure, is that investors have been 
abandoning the setting up of high capacity farms, and now prefer to run a 
number of smaller installations with a growing capacity of approximately 
300 to 500 plants each. These operations tend to be run as joint ventures. 
In this way, an individual investor lowers the risk for himself, and in case 
one plantation is detected, the investor loses only a fraction of his invest-
ment and profit. 
 Most of the cannabis in the CR is grown for the domestic market. How-
ever, perpetrators also engage in trafficking cannabis abroad in high vol-
umes, especially to neighbouring countries, such as the Slovak Republic, 
Poland, and Germany, but also to more distant destinations like Ukraine, 
Hungary, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries (PCR-NDH, 
2016b). 
 
Production of and trafficking in methamphetamine 
 
In 2013, for the first time, the Czech Police observed a decrease in traffick-
ing in cannabis organised by Vietnamese criminal networks (PCR-NDH, 
2016b; Nožina and Vaněček, 2016: 46). This decline was caused by a 
steady trend of the Vietnamese criminal groups moving away from the il-
legal cultivation of cannabis towards the illegal production of methamphet-
amine. The shift to the trafficking in methamphetamine can be ascribed to 
bigger and faster profits at a lower risk of detection. At the same time, this 
trend reflects the growing demand for stimulant drugs on the European 
drug market. Some inspiration for this may also be found in Southeast Asia, 
where the illicit production of and trade in methamphetamine has been dra-
matically rising in recent years (SMART, 2015).  
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 As mentioned before, trafficking in methamphetamine had existed in 
the Vietnamese community for years. The Vietnamese drug dealers were 
buying methamphetamine from Czech ‘cooks’ in small amounts to supply 
addicts in the Czech Vietnamese community. Approximately in around 
2000, they started to hire the Czech ‘cooks’ for the production of meth and 
to supply chemicals (mainly ephedrine) to them. Then they learned how to 
produce methamphetamine on their own. Their engagement in this activity 
quickly increased and from 2010, it has been Vietnamese organised crime 
dominating the production of methamphetamine in the CR and its exports 
from the CR to other countries (Výroční zpráva, 2012: 5)  
 Due to the former Czech patterns, the conversion of pseudoephedrine 
into methamphetamine through the use of iodine and red phosphorus, the 
so-called “Czech way”, has remained the prevailing manufacturing method 
of the Vietnamese producers. However, they started to produce metham-
phetamine in bigger labs, in bigger amounts and with a higher quality. In 
one lot, labs now produce dozens of kilograms of methamphetamine. For 
example, in the course of the police operation BAT in 2015, a group of 
thirteen suspects, eleven Vietnamese and two Czechs, was arrested. It was 
found that they were operating a laboratory producing 30 to 50 kg of meth-
amphetamine in one production cycle, which lasted about five days (PCR-
NDH, 2016b; Kudláčková, 2015). 
 A persistent trend in the production of methamphetamine has been the 
extraction of its precursor, pseudoephedrine, from prescription pharmaceu-
ticals, mainly Cirrus, but also Acatar, Sudafet, Solutan, Modafen, Nurofen, 
Stopgrip, Paralen Plus Grip, Paralen Plus, etc. Pharmaceuticals containing 
pseudoephedrine were sold freely over the counter in the Czech Republic 
until 2009, when their regulation was introduced. However, the local drug 
market did not experience any serious shortage of the methamphetamine 
precursors as a result, since pseudoephedrine pharmaceuticals continued to 
be sold without any limitations or checks in Poland, the Slovak Republic 
and Hungary, and the drug dealers started to import them from these coun-
tries.  
 It took six years, until 2015, before Poland introduced similar restrictive 
measures for pharmaceuticals containing pseudoephedrine. But again, the 
effect of these measures was limited. The drug traffickers started to smug-
gle Cirrus and other pseudoephedrine pharmaceuticals from other coun-
tries. Currently, the main road for the pharmaceutical smuggling leads 
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from Turkey, across the Balkans (namely Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Slovakia) and Poland to the Czech Republic. Especially Bulgarian traffick-
ers in drugs are active on this trafficking route, and they flexibly cooperate 
with Poles, Czechs, and Vietnamese. In Poland, the main centre of 
pseudoephedrine pharmaceutical dealing is the Wulka Kosovska Market in 
Warsaw (PCR-NDH, 2016b). 
 On the Czech drug market, there are various pseudoephedrine pharma-
ceuticals with different brand names which are not registered in the EU 
countries and are coming, for example, from Asia. The first cases of im-
ports of pseudoephedrine pharmaceuticals of this kind from Vietnam were 
registered in 2010, and such import has continued until now. In addition, 
at the end of 2016, the smuggling of the pseudoephedrine pharmaceutical 
CET-DER from India to the Czech Republic and Poland came to light. 
 The production of methamphetamine directly from the precursor ephed-
rine represents another rising trend. For example, drug gangs from the Bal-
kans supply ephedrine to Vietnamese producers. Another source which has 
been growing in importance is China, where there are numerous factories 
producing ephedrine. Attempts to produce ephedrine with the help of tech-
nologies imported from Asia were uncovered in the Czech Republic as 
well. 
 Similarly, hundreds of kilograms of chemical substances in the form of 
so-called pre-precursors are imported from Asia, mostly from China. Pre-
precursors are chemicals from which chemical substances necessary for 
the production of drugs are produced. They are not usually included on the 
lists of controlled substances, and their importation is legal. In the target 
countries, they are used for the preparation of precursors, the chemicals 
directly used for the production of illegal drugs. This process is safer and 
cheaper than the production of drugs from pharmaceuticals or from smug-
gled controlled substances.  
 Pre-precursors are imported wholesale in hundreds of kilograms. In the 
course of the international operation called Operation APAAN in 2013, 
which was carried out in cooperation with the police and customs services 
of the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland, and the Netherlands, 30 tons of 
the pre-precursor APAAN, which is used for the production of the meth-
amphetamine precursor BMK, were seized. The shipment was organised 
by a Vietnamese company based in the Czech Republic and it was directed 
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from China to the Czech Republic and then to the Netherlands and Bel-
gium. From this amount of APAAN, 24 tons of methamphetamine could 
have been produced (PCR-NDH, 2016b; Nožina and Vaněček, 2016: 45-
46). 
 In June 2017, a vast Vietnamese network of importers of precursors for 
methamphetamine production was broken up by the Czech police as part 
of the operation codenamed ‘KIWI’. The group actively cooperated with 
the official producers of chemicals and pharmaceuticals in several coun-
tries of Europe and Asia and was able to regularly supply at least 20 big 
methamphetamine laboratories, each of them able to produce, on average, 
60 kilograms of high quality methamphetamine per month. The chemicals 
for the labs were supplied in multi-ton shipments (Kudláčková, 2017). 
 In the sphere of methamphetamine production, the Czech police de-
tected a trend of a sophisticated shuffling of laboratories from one rented 
property to another. Perpetrators tend to use rented residential property or 
warehouses for cooking several batches before leaving the contaminated 
property. The “cooking” of methamphetamine in mobile laboratories hid-
den in cars was registered as well. To further eliminate the risk of detection, 
the perpetrators have moved some of their production abroad, mainly to 
Poland (PCR-NDH, 2016b). 
 A substantial part of the methamphetamine manufactured by Vietnam-
ese in the Czech Republic is bound for users in Germany, where the de-
mand for methamphetamine has been rising in recent years. The border 
trade in methamphetamine is highly developed at the Vietnamese market 
places located in close vicinity to the border, and is controlled by Vietnam-
ese and Western Balkan organised crime groups. The situation is especially 
serious at the market places situated near the former Czech–German cross-
ings in Rozvadov and Svatý Kříž.  
 Some other important destination countries are Austria, France, Nor-
way, and Sweden. There are also relatively recent cases of methampheta-
mine smuggling from the Czech Republic to Japan and Australia,  
 The production of and trafficking in methamphetamine are highly prof-
itable. The organised groups mentioned above manage to produce 1 kilo-
gram of methamphetamine at a cost of approximately € 6.300 and then sell 
the same amount at a wholesale price of approximately € 10.000 on the 
Czech drug market. Methamphetamine exported and sold in Germany is 
traded at four times that price, and when exported to the Scandinavian 
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countries is even eight times more expensive. In the cases of Japan and 
Australia, the price levels are 10 or 15 times higher (PCR NDH, 2016b; 
Nožina and Vaněček, 2016: 45-46). According to Police estimates, the Vi-
etnamese drug networks in the Czech Republic produce and traffic 10 to 
12 tons of methamphetamine a year, and the volume of detected metham-
phetamine has been reaching its historical maximum in the recent years 
(Výroční zpráva, 2016: 6). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Vietnamese networks are present on the drug markets in several European 
countries, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Ger-
many, Slovakia, and Poland, and their activities have been rising in recent 
years. 
 In the Czech Republic, after an initial period in the 1990s when the drug 
dealing organised by Vietnamese nationals was not very widespread and 
was focused mainly on the Vietnamese diaspora, the Vietnamese drug net-
works dramatically entered the drug business at a national and international 
scale in the 2000s. Around the beginning of the new millennium, they 
started to engage mainly in the production and trafficking of cannabis and 
methamphetamine. Both these activities organised by Vietnamese offend-
ers are highly industrialised and include operations of technically well-
equipped hydroponic “gardens”, which produce hundreds of kilograms of 
high quality cannabis.  
 In addition, methamphetamine laboratories organised by Vietnamese 
are able to produce substantially bigger amounts of the drug than ever be-
fore. Hundreds of kilograms of chemical substances necessary for the pro-
duction of methamphetamine are imported into the Czech Republic. 
 The illegal activities of the Vietnamese groups are highly conspiratorial 
and organised. Vietnamese criminal networks use a kind of ‘division of 
labour’ between different groups. They have contacts with other Vietnam-
ese criminal groups operating abroad and use complex drug courier net-
works. The frequent use of occasional criminals or unemployed Vietnam-
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ese workers as menial workers in illegal cannabis ‘farms’, as drug and pre-
cursor couriers, or as distributors of drugs is characteristic of these net-
works as well. 
 Drugs of Vietnamese provenance are popular among Czech users be-
cause of their good quality and low price. Vietnamese made high quality 
cannabis is especially in high demand. Of the methamphetamine manufac-
tured by Vietnamese in the Czech Republic, a substantial part is exported 
for consumption in Germany which has seen an increase in demand in re-
cent years. The border trade in drugs is highly developed at Vietnamese 
market places located in close vicinity to the border with Germany and 
Poland, and is controlled by Vietnamese and Western Balkan organised 
crime groupings. Vietnamese networks in the Czech Republic are also en-
gaged in exports of drugs to other European countries, and, on a lesser 
scale, to Asia and the Pacific region. They operate well-developed produc-
tion and distribution networks, which are able to respond very quickly to 
the high demand for drugs. They represent a dynamic phenomenon on the 
European drug market, which should not be overlooked. 
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On the persistence of an open illegal market 
Explaining the continued existence of  
street-vending of contraband cigarettes  
in Berlin since 1990 
 
Trang Nguyen and Klaus von Lampe1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Germany is known as a nation where people customarily wait for a green 
light before proceeding, even in the middle of the night at a deserted inter-
section. In such a law abiding culture, widespread and open law breaking 
appears unthinkable. Yet this is exactly what one encounters in the case of 
the illegal cigarette market in Berlin. Since 1990 the situation in Berlin is 
such that large volumes of illegal cigarettes are sold by vendors in public 
places, including entrances to metro stations and supermarkets, with the 
vendors being primarily, and in recent years exclusively of Vietnamese 
origin. 
 As has been described elsewhere (von Lampe 2002; 2005), the origins 
of the cigarette black market in Berlin can be traced back to early 1989, 
some months prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain. In January 1989 a reform-
minded Polish government loosened travel restrictions for its citizens 
which made it possible to travel to the then capitalist enclave of West Ber-
lin where, under Allied control, no visa requirements existed for citizens 
of Eastern European countries. This gave rise to an anarchic cross-border 
trade. A wide range of goods were acquired by Polish tourists in their home 
country and brought over to West Berlin - legally or illegally - in hopes of 
                                                 
1 Trang Nguyen is a journalist and independent researcher based in Berlin, Ger-
many. Klaus von Lampe is Professor at the Department of Law, Police Science, 
and Criminal Justice Administration of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, 
City University of New York.  
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selling these for a profit on the street or at make-shift open air markets. 
Informally imported goods included a wide range of products such as elec-
tronic appliances and tools, but also goods that were subject to high taxa-
tion in West Berlin, namely alcoholic beverages and cigarettes which could 
be bought cheaply for hard currency in Poland. For example, a few bottles 
of vodka purchased for $1,20 each at a branch of the “Pewex” valuta store 
chain could be sold in West Berlin for the equivalent of a monthly salary 
of a Polish school teacher (Hartung, 1989; Irek, 1998). 
 In June 1990, along with the introduction of the D-Mark as the official 
means of payment in East Germany ahead of German reunification in Oc-
tober 1990, the open market shifted and spread to East Berlin and other 
parts of the German Democratic Republic with cigarettes emerging as the 
main commodity. In West Berlin, meanwhile, rigid police intervention dra-
matically restricted the selling of illegal cigarettes. By 1991, the illicit sale 
of cigarettes had become an established part of the economy in the Eastern 
parts of unified Germany, supposedly accounting for up to one third of the 
cigarettes consumed by East Germans (Der Spiegel 26/1991). Within the 
same time span of a few months, Vietnamese living in East Germany had 
begun to massively replace Polish tourists and other Eastern Europeans in 
the open selling of illegal cigarettes. According to some estimates, Viet-
namese vendors soon held a share of about 80% of the illegal market 
(Gosztonyi, 1994). Importantly, there is no indication that the transition 
from mostly Polish to mostly Vietnamese vendors between 1990 and 1992 
was the result of displacement competition. Rather, it appears that mem-
bers of other national and ethnic groups quite gladly quit the field to let the 
Vietnamese take over the highly exposed part of retail selling while Polish 
market participants increasingly confined themselves to the roles of smug-
gler and wholesaler of contraband cigarettes (Gosztonyi, 1994; Irek, 1998). 
Likewise, there is no indication that the dominance of Vietnamese vendors 
has been challenged by anyone ever since. 
 In this chapter we seek to shed some light on how it is possible that this 
open, visible illegal market exists, and has continued to exist within the 
same basic parameters for more than a quarter of a Century. 
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Methodology 
 
In discussing the open market for illegal cigarettes in Berlin as it has 
formed in the early 1990s, we bring together various lines of research. First 
of all, we further pursue the research that was begun by the second author 
in 1999 and that has examined the illegal cigarette trade in Germany as a 
case study of organised crime, based primarily on data from open and law 
enforcement sources (von Lampe, 2002; 2003; 2005; 2015; von Lampe & 
Johansen, 2004). Second, we draw on preliminary findings from ethno-
graphic research the first author has been conducting in the Vietnamese 
community in Berlin since February 2015. This includes semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews with 9 retired vendors, 3 former wholesale 
dealers, 2 former smugglers of cigarettes as well as 2 academics, 2 business 
people, 3 journalists and 3 political activists with knowledge of the illegal 
cigarette trade and its embeddedness in the Vietnamese community in Ber-
lin. In addition, we adopted an observational approach to understanding the 
geography and mechanisms of the selling of illegal cigarettes in Berlin and 
report preliminary findings from the monitoring of behaviour of sellers and 
buyers in public places at various vending locations. Finally, the first au-
thor who is fluent in Vietnamese, analysed Vietnamese language social 
media posts pertaining to the illegal cigarette trade. 
 
 
The basic parameters of the open illegal cigarette 
market in Berlin 
 
Berlin is a centre, if not the centre, of the illegal cigarette trade in Germany. 
For example, surveys of discarded cigarette packs commissioned by the 
tobacco industry suggest that Berlin tends to have the highest shares of 
illegal cigarettes in the country. The most recent survey conducted in the 
first quarter of 2017 indicates that more than half of the cigarettes smoked 
in Berlin have not been legally purchased inside of Germany (Fig. 1). 
 The basic picture that has not changed since the early 1990s is that ille-
gal cigarettes are openly sold at various locations in the city, that this mar-
ket, with few exceptions, is confined to former East Berlin, and that the 
vendors originate from Vietnam (see Image 1). This is not just a perception 
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held by outside observers, i.e. law enforcement, the media and the general 
public. It is also a view shared within the Vietnamese community in Ger-
many. For example, one former illegal cigarette vendor notes: 
 
Only our people do this type of job. There are hundreds [of vending 
places]. There were a lot more in the past, everyone did this job, all my 
friends, all my co-workers. (Interview V1) 
 
 A political activist added: 
 
For some reasons, Vietnamese people are more suitable for the job than 
any other immigrant groups. They are willing to take over the riskiest 
roles in the market while the Eastern European partners are likely to 
play a less conspicuous role. (Interview, P1) 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Share of illegal cigarettes, discarded pack surveys 2005-2017 
(1st quarter) 
 
 
Source: Ipsos Gmbh, Hamburg/Deutscher Zigarettenverband (DZV) 
 
The vending places have in common that they are accessible by the general 
public and that they – in line with Eck’s (1995) General Model of the Ge-
ography of Illicit Retail Marketplaces – are located where a large number 
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of persons congregate or pass by in the course of day-to-day routine activ-
ities. We identified two types of places that are likely to attract illegal ven-
dors of cigarettes: 
 metro train stations belonging to Berlin’s two systems of mass trans-
portation, S-Bahn and U-Bahn, and  
 supermarkets and shopping malls. 
 
 
 
Image 1: Press photographs (cutout enlargements) from the early 1990s (1), mid-
1990s (2), late 2000s (3), and 2016 (4). Sources: Der Spiegel, der kriminalist, Ber-
liner Morgenpost, BZ Berlin (Olaf Selchow). 
 
Vendors may position themselves on parking lots adjacent to train stations 
or retail stores, directly by the entrances, or even inside train stations and, 
in one case, inside a shopping mall. Vending spots inside train stations are 
located at stairs or in tunnels leading to the platform. Interestingly, in some 
cases the vending spots are much closer to the platform than to the nearest 
exit which means that escape should be rather difficult in case of a raid by 
police or customs officers (see Image 2).  
 Another pattern we observed is that vending places often are near legit-
imate businesses operated by other Vietnamese, such as fruit stands, flower 
shops and restaurants. We also noticed that these stores sometimes provide 
logistical support for the selling of illegal cigarettes. For example, in one 
instance we observed that a vendor was able to get change from a fruit 
stand a few meters away when a buyer wanted to pay with what appeared 
to be a too-high denomination bill. In another case we witnessed how a 
vendor retrieved cigarettes stored behind the outside display of a Vietnam-
ese-run floral shop. The same person was on an exceptionally cold winter 
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day also able to find shelter from the cold every 15 minutes or so in a 
nearby Vietnamese restaurant without having to buy anything. Interview-
ees also stated that these Vietnamese operated businesses might serve as 
lookouts or help vendors with the safe-keeping of money. 
 
 
 
Image 2: Sale of illegal cigarettes by vendor (in circle, right) to customer (in circle, 
left) inside an S-Bahn station in East Berlin, November 2016 
 
The illegal cigarettes that are being sold in Berlin come primarily from 
Eastern Europe. This includes cigarettes that pass through Eastern Euro-
pean countries in transit and cigarettes that are legally or illegally produced 
in Eastern Europe. It is treated as common knowledge in the Vietnamese 
community that most illegal cigarettes come from Poland, as Polish sup-
pliers are widely considered the major suppliers of Vietnamese wholesal-
ers. However, several interviewees pointed out that in the early 1990s when 
Russian troops were still stationed in Germany, Vietnamese were able to 
obtain large amounts of contraband cigarettes from Russian military per-
sonnel. These business relations were reportedly facilitated by the fact that 
Russian was taught in Vietnamese schools during the Cold War. 
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 In contrast, East Asia has not been an important source of illegal ciga-
rettes marketed in Germany or, more specifically, in Berlin. This is some-
what surprising because cigarette black markets in other parts of Europe, 
namely the UK and Ireland, have been a major destination for counterfeit 
cigarettes from China. Germany in this respect is a transit country rather 
than a country of final destination (Transcrime, 2015; von Lampe, Kurt, 
Shen, & Antonopoulos, 2012). Remarkably, despite the social proximity 
to the illicit cigarette trade in Berlin, Vietnam does not seem to play a 
prominent role in the illegal supply chain either. Even though Vietnam has 
been ranked third among the main countries of provenance for tobacco 
products smuggled into the European Union behind China and the United 
Arabic Emirates (European Commission, 2013). In contrast, smuggling of 
cigarettes from Vietnam to Germany has only been rarely documented. For 
example, in January 2016, the German Customs Service announced the 
seizure of 10,5 million contraband cigarettes that had arrived at the port of 
Hamburg in a container from Hanoi (Zollfahndungsamt Hamburg, 2016). 
 The Vietnamese involvement, thus, is largely confined to the bottom of 
the market pyramid. One interviewee explains the position of the Vietnam-
ese in the illegal cigarette trade as follows: 
 
It’s a complicated picture. I talked to quite some Vietnamese sellers 
here, but they almost have no connection with the factories or the big 
bosses behind the supply. Vietnamese people in Germany are just at the 
lowest level in this business, working mostly as vendors and peddlers 
in the street. (Interview P1) 
 
 
Changes over time 
 
The continuity of the Vietnamese dominated illegal cigarette market in 
Berlin does not mean that it has been entirely resistant to change. In fact, 
over the years there have been some substantial variations in the prevalence 
and organisation of open selling of illegal cigarettes, in the gender of ven-
dors, and in the types of illicit cigarettes that have been available. 
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Figure 2. 
Official Counts/Estimates of Vending Places in Berlin, 1992-2015 
 
Source: analysis of various media reports 
 
Over the years, police and customs service have provided counts and esti-
mates of the total number of public vending spots for illegal cigarettes in 
Berlin. According to these figures, the open selling was most prevalent in 
the mid-1990s with some 1.200 vending locations and, following a massive 
crackdown in response to a series of homicides in connection with the il-
legal cigarette market (von Lampe, 2002), the number of vending places 
declined rapidly and since then has remained rather stable at around 250-
400 (Fig. 2). More recently there are indications that a further drop to about 
100 vending places has occurred. In fact, one of the journalists among the 
interviewees suggests that this marks a diminished importance of the open 
market compared to other illegal distribution channels: 
 
In recent years there are less and less Vietnamese vendors in the streets, 
but it seems that there are more tobacco factories set up in the East, even 
underground factories. I thus assume fake and contraband cigarettes are 
also distributed through other ways, not only being sold by Vietnamese 
vendors in the street. They probably have a more advanced distribution 
network to legalise those cigarettes in the western market. I observe 
there are around 100 Vietnamese cigarette spots around Berlin, each 
sells around 60-80 packs per day, so the whole of Berlin consumes 
6.000-8.000 packs per day which makes around 3.000.000 packs per 
year. This number is nothing compared to the real number of illegal 
cigarettes in the Berlin market, as well as to the production capacity of 
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tobacco factories (. . .) around 200.000 packs per day by a small-scale 
underground factory. (Interview J1) 
 
There are no data available on the relative importance of street vending for 
the distribution of illegal cigarettes in Berlin so that we are not in a position 
to verify the claim of a shift from street vending to other, more clandestine 
retail schemes. We are only able to comment specifically on the open ille-
gal market and how it has developed over time. 
 Apart from the number of vending locations, there have been changes 
in the way illegal cigarettes are sold in public. One change pertains to the 
number of individuals involved in a single vending operation. From vari-
ous sources, including investigative files, video footage and photos pub-
lished by the media over the past 27 years it appears that there had been a 
shift from individual vendors to vending in groups with a rather complex 
division of labour in the mid-1990s. These complex organisations may 
have involved more than a dozen individuals operating and cooperating at 
the same place and the same time, and included specialised roles for those 
doing the actual selling, those who retrieved cigarettes from remote hiding 
places, those who handled the cash proceeds, and those who served as look-
outs (von Lampe, 2003). Such organisational growth and sophistication 
was likely a response to increased law enforcement pressure (Gosztonyi, 
1994; von Lampe, 2003). Subsequently there appears to have been a trend 
back to individual vendors or smaller groups, consisting of designated ven-
dors and individuals who deliver new cigarettes and at the same time pick 
up cash proceeds from the vendors. We noticed that vendors typically wear 
earphones and they seem to continuously communicate via these earphones 
which may indicate that they are in communication with other members of 
a group that is involved in the selling operation. 
 The only exception to less complex and smaller organisations in recent 
years, interestingly, is provided by one of the few cases of selling illegal 
cigarettes in West Berlin, a gang operating at a train station where up to 
five members have been collaborating at the same time in a division of 
labour between sellers, lookouts, an individual delivering cigarettes and 
collecting money, and what appeared to be a manager giving orders. 
 Another significant development has been a decline in female partici-
pation. While in the beginning, female cigarette vendors were a common 
sight, today illegal cigarettes are almost exclusively sold by male vendors. 
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In fact, in the course of our observational research we were only able to 
identify one woman selling illegal cigarettes. In recent years, thus, the typ-
ical seller of illegal cigarettes has been a male Vietnamese who passively 
waits for customers at a fixed public location. There is now even some 
uniformity in attire which is an additional signal to passers-by that the per-
son is selling cigarettes. For example, we observed that many vendors wear 
the same kind of shoulder-strapped bag and hat (a baseball cap during 
warmer months and a woollen cap in winter). 
 
 
 
Image 3: A legal pack of Marlboro with tax stamp (1), and various counterfeit 
Marlboro packs sold by Vietnamese street vendors in Berlin (2, 3 & 4). 
 
Interestingly, there have been fundamental shifts in the types of cigarettes 
that have been available on the black market in Berlin. Throughout the 
1990s and into the 2000s, genuine brand cigarettes dominated the illegal 
market (von Lampe, 2002). Then, around 2004, so-called cheap whites (or 
illicit whites), namely ‘Jin Ling’, were the cigarettes that street vendors 
typically had available (Spiegel Online, 2009). These cigarettes are legally 
produced but they are primarily or exclusively produced for distribution on 
the black market (Candea, Campbell, Lavrov, & Shleynov, 2008; Ross, 
Vellios, Clegg Smith, Ferguson, & Cohen, 2016). However, in the past two 
years ‘Jin Lings’, once among the most popular cigarette brands in Ger-
many overall, seem to have disappeared from the market and have been 
replaced by other cheap whites and by counterfeit cigarettes, including 
counterfeit ‘Marlboro’ (Image 3), ‘L&M’ and ‘West’, but also, ironically, 
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fake ‘Jin Lings’ (Image 4). These counterfeit cigarettes are said to be pro-
duced in Europe rather than in China or other East Asian countries (KPMG, 
2017). 
 
 
 
Image 4: Cheap whites sold by Vietnamese street vendors in Berlin, including 
genuine (1) and fake (2) Jin Ling, MG (3), and Palace (4). 
 
 
The Vietnamese community in Germany 
 
There are two groups of Vietnamese that need to be distinguished when 
discussing the illegal cigarette market in Berlin.  
 The first group consists of former contract workers primarily from the 
northern parts of Vietnam. They came to East Germany during the 1980s 
and began to sell illegal cigarettes after they lost their jobs as a result of the 
collapse of the Soviet economic system following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall.  
 The second group comprises illegal immigrants mostly from the under-
developed centre of Vietnam who came to Germany only after German re-
unification and who from 1991 onwards have largely replaced former con-
tract workers in the illegal cigarette trade.  
 A third group of Vietnamese in Germany has not been linked to illegal 
cigarettes: refugees from South Vietnam, so-called boat people who es-
caped the Communist regime after the end of the Vietnam War and who 
settled in West Germany and West Berlin. In contrast to the former two 
groups, boat people were given the status of political asylum seekers and 
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were granted residence and work permits right away, and are generally 
considered to be well integrated into German society (Schaland & Schmiz, 
2017; Wolf, 2007). 
 
 
Vietnamese migration and the illegal cigarette trade 
 
The first Vietnamese who started selling illegal cigarettes joined the mar-
ket that had initially emerged in West Berlin in early 1989 and later spread 
to East Berlin and other parts of East Germany. It was fuelled by price 
differentials between stores in Eastern Europe that sold western brand cig-
arettes for hard currency and retail stores in Germany (von Lampe, 2002). 
The illegal cigarette trade offered quick profits in a situation where Viet-
namese contract workers saw themselves confronted with lay-offs and the 
loss of legal residence status once their East German labour contracts ex-
pired. As one interviewee explains: 
 
That was a hard time for us [contract workers]. Everyone was uncertain 
about their future, didn’t know when they would be deported back to 
Vietnam. So all tried to make money as much as possible, doing all jobs, 
including selling cigarettes and other illegal stuff. (Interview V2) 
 
Another former contract worker recalls how lucrative selling illegal ciga-
rettes was during that time: 
 
A pack went for 1,7-2,5 DM while it cost 4 DM in the tobacco store. 
An untaxed carton made 10 DM in profit and if someone sold 100 car-
tons per day, he would make 1000 DM, a huge amount compared to the 
life of Vietnamese people back home; that’s how Viet people started to 
join the team (Interview V3). 
 
 One interviewee also linked the involvement in selling illegal cigarettes 
to a “communist mentality”: 
 
The Vietnamese community in the West is a lot more integrated and not 
involved in illegal activities. But the Vietnamese workers in the East 
are communist people. They mostly came from the middle or northern 
Vietnam, under the communist regime, then moved to East Germany, 
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also under the communist system. After they lost their job, with diffi-
culties in integrating into the new system and social structure, they did 
not have many options to seek new income. They suffered social depri-
vation, language barrier, plus their ‘communist mentality’, you know 
what I am talking about, many of them started to follow and take over 
the job of Eastern European tourists selling contraband cigarettes in 
Germany. (Interview P1) 
 
Most of the former contract workers withdrew from the illegal cigarette 
business once they were able to establish a legal existence in Germany. 
This gradually became possible with a change in policy initiated in 1993 
that permitted legal employment in addition to legal entrepreneurial activ-
ity (Wolf, 2007). 
 
But of course most people just did this job for some time; then once we 
got work papers, we all tried to go back to legal jobs again like you see 
now, working in a restaurant or having a flower shop. (Interview V4) 
 
The cigarette black market today is described by various interviewees as 
characterised by a constant influx of newly arriving Vietnamese illegal mi-
grants who replace those leaving the market. They sell cigarettes to repay 
the debts owed to human smugglers, which according to various sources 
may amount to some 20.000 Euros that have to be repaid in cash as soon 
as they arrive in Germany. For example, one former contract worker and 
cigarette vendor remarks: 
 
The cigarette vendors you see now in the street they are the young gen-
eration coming from the centre provinces in Vietnam, especially from 
Nghe An, and Ha Tinh. They all came here illegally by paying lots of 
money to smugglers. (Interview V3) 
 
Another interviewee draws the same connection between illegal migration 
and the selling of illegal cigarettes: 
 
Basically, lots of Vietnamese people do this job as either in the past 
they lost their job after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989, or 
recently they came to Germany illegally by paying money to a company 
or a group who brings people to Europe. In order to have money to pay 
back their debt, many chose (or have to) sell contraband cigarettes. (In-
terview P1) 
 
162 
 
However, one needs to be cautious not to draw too close a link between 
human smuggling and the illegal cigarette trade. Not all illegal migrants 
come to Germany with the intention or under the obligation to sell illegal 
cigarettes. Discussions on Facebook groups and other social media plat-
forms show that some illegal immigrants from Vietnam are deeply disap-
pointed after arriving in Germany. They claim that smugglers did not pro-
vide the jobs they were promised and that they were left alone to fend for 
themselves. There is evidence that these illegal migrants are recruited into 
the cigarette business only after their arrival in Germany. Cigarette selling 
jobs are openly posted on the Internet, and in a few cases, migrants actively 
seek employment in the illegal cigarette market through online postings. 
 The mechanisms of illegal migration help explain why men now far 
outnumber female cigarette vendors. As one interviewee points out, both 
men and women come to Germany illegally. However, the avenues to legal 
residency are different by gender: 
 
Until now, there are still many people coming to Germany every year, 
like a thousand each year, both men and women, by different ways. 
Then men try to stay by selling cigarettes, and getting legal papers 
through fraudulent marriage. Women too, they look for someone to get 
married, or they get pregnant in order to stay. Half the people eventually 
find a way to stay legally after a few years. (Interview V5)  
 
Importantly, the respective costs are much higher for men than for women. 
Various interviewees uniformly stated that in order to gain legal residence 
status through, for example, fraudulent marriage, male migrants have to 
pay up to 40.000 Euros, whereas the costs for a female migrant entering 
into a bogus marriage, or gaining residence rights through a German citizen 
or permanent resident falsely acknowledging paternity, costs only between 
4.000 and 5.000 Euros. Accordingly, the pressures to enter the cigarette 
trade are much stronger for men than for women. 
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The Vietnamese experience of selling illegal cigarettes 
in Berlin 
 
Newly arriving illegal immigrants find it easy to get access to the selling 
of illegal cigarettes in Berlin. “Everyone who wants to participate” can do 
so as long as they “follow the rules” (Interview P1). “The rules” is a refer-
ence to the power structure that overarches the market. The open illegal 
cigarette market in Berlin is a regulated illegal market which means that 
‘property rights’ are recognised and enforced for specific vending loca-
tions. This governance system emerged out of an initial phase of predatory 
exploitation of cigarette sellers by way of robberies and pure extortion, and 
a phase of violent conflicts over territory between rivalling Vietnamese 
gangs. Eventually, gangs were able to establish exclusive control over ter-
ritory and to ‘tax’ vendors in exchange for protection against other gangs 
and predatory criminals (Gosztonyi, 1994; von Lampe, 2002). Today, the 
gangs are reportedly much less prominent, but the regulatory system they 
established remains in place. As one former cigarette vendor notes: 
 
Now there is not much competition and violence between the groups 
anymore. Things are settled and newcomers just need to obey the rules. 
As long as you pay money to those smugglers, you can come to Ger-
many. And of course, as long as you pay enough ‘tax’, you can sell 
cigarettes. (Interview V5) 
 
 Similarly, a former smuggler explains: 
 
Today, there are no obvious gangs anymore, but still, the market is well 
structured and territories are controlled by certain people. Someone 
who owns a spot could hire a guy to sell cigarettes. He can stay with 
him, eat with him and each month gets a certain amount like a thousand 
Euros to pay for the smuggling costs. Then later, once this guy has 
enough, could keep staying or buy the place or quit the business. (Inter-
view S1) 
 
Apart from making arrangements with existing groups and obtaining ciga-
rettes, the practical hurdles for selling cigarettes are relatively low. 
Namely, no extensive German language skills are required to successfully 
complete transactions with customers. During the research period 2015-
2017, there was a uniform price of 2,20 Euros per pack irrespective of 
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brand or type of cigarette (genuine or counterfeit). This leaves very little 
room for negotiations and much can be accomplished by sign language and 
a rudimentary vocabulary. In fact, the transactions we observed typically 
took only seconds and involved little to no verbal communication between 
seller and buyer. Customers apparently either know, or strongly expect that 
a Vietnamese individual positioned in a public place is an illicit cigarette 
vendor. This makes lengthy explorations into whether or not he or she 
might sell cigarettes redundant. Further, the display of the packs the vendor 
has on him or her makes elaborate explanations of the available merchan-
dise dispensable. This occurs either by vendors placing the packs in an 
open bag so that passers-by are able to see them, or by opening the bag 
with the packs when a customer approaches. 
 As far as the social context is concerned, cigarette vendors appear to be 
operating in a fairly non-hostile environment. In particular, there is no in-
dication that widespread xenophobic violence that in the early 1990s was 
directed against Vietnamese in East Germany, including Vietnamese street 
vendors (Panayi, 1994), is still prevalent today. Passers-by for the most 
part do not seem to attach any importance to the selling of illegal cigarettes 
even though it is highly visible and, arguably, common knowledge. During 
our observations we did not witness any expressions of disapproval, let 
alone signs of hostility. On the contrary, if there was any communication 
with vendors, it consisted of friendly greetings and what appeared to be 
amicable small-talk. The only threat illegal cigarette sellers face, therefore, 
comes from the authorities, namely the customs service and the police and 
also from the immigration service. However, the available resources of 
agencies at the city and federal level are limited. In the media, unnamed 
law enforcement officials are being cited who surmise that in the absence 
of violent acts reminiscent of the gang wars of the 1990s, the illegal ciga-
rettes are given low priority. The few customs and police officers desig-
nated to combat the cigarette vendors reportedly see themselves over-
whelmed by the problem (Hansen, 2012; Oldenburger and Pletl, 2014). In-
deed, we were only able to witness once that a cigarette vendor was ar-
rested. The arrest occurred towards the end of our two-year observation 
and was carried out by undercover police agents. 
 Even when arrests occur, the perceived risks are low. A Vietnamese 
store owner observing the mentioned arrest from across the street com-
mented: 
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No problem, they will free him soon, probably overnight, because po-
lice stations don’t have enough space to keep these kinds of criminals. 
(Interview B1) 
 
Another interviewee explains with reference to street vendors and whole-
sale dealers: 
 
Vietnamese cigarette dealers are not afraid of getting caught or being in 
jail, as they can get at maximum a few year sentence, but living condi-
tions in jail might be even better than back home in Vietnam where they 
come from. (Interview J2)  
 
In fact, it is widely known among the Vietnamese community that once 
being arrested, vendors just need to claim to have no passport or identity 
card, report a fake address and all what custom officers and police officers 
can do is to take the vendor’s finger prints and free him or her. 
 Another interviewee added that the street vendors are not the most ap-
propriate targets to begin with: 
 
Police know that if they [vendors] are caught, some others will take 
over the job, as the problem is not with the street vendors, but the pro-
viders and distributors from factories in Eastern Europe. You know that 
cigarettes pass through three or four different levels of distribution be-
fore getting to Vietnamese sellers here. (Interview J1) 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
There appears to be a combination of factors that help explain why this 
open market for illegal cigarettes continues to exist even after 30 years. 
First of all, there is obviously a continued demand for, and a continued 
supply of cheap illegal cigarettes. The central point, however, is that supply 
and demand can be effectively linked by Vietnamese street sellers. We hy-
pothesise that the decisive factor is that early on, Vietnamese vendors be-
came iconic for the selling of illegal cigarettes in Berlin. A Vietnamese 
looking individual standing close to a supermarket or metro station is a 
widely understood signal for the availability of illegal cigarettes. This has 
several implications: 
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1. It facilitates the initiation of illicit transactions. 
2. It makes the selling of illegal cigarettes independent from any particular 
location. Eck (1995) in his General Model of the Geography of Illicit 
Retail Marketplaces, has suggested that the effect of displacement of 
open illicit retail markets is limited because of high place attachment. 
However, from our observations it appears that wherever a Vietnamese 
vendor sets him- or herself up in a public location, a viable vending spot 
is created. This means that the Vietnamese cigarette market is highly 
adaptable to environmental change, for example crack-downs at partic-
ular vending places or changes in the flow of pedestrians. 
3. The third implication of the iconic nature of Vietnamese cigarette ven-
dors is that it establishes a threshold for members of other ethnic groups 
to enter the market, so that barriers to market entry exist for potential 
competitors. 
 
The established system of retail distribution of illegal cigarettes is not only 
effective but also sustainable. There is a continuous supply of vendors 
through illegal migration, and there are only relatively low perceived risks 
associated with market participation, certainly none that show a suffi-
ciently deterrent effect. In addition, the illegal cigarette trade is to a certain 
degree embedded in the Vietnamese community. For example, legitimate 
stores operated by Vietnamese may provide logistical support for the sell-
ing of illegal cigarettes, and social media forums popular among Vietnam-
ese migrants facilitate networking and the exchange of information relating 
to the illegal cigarette trade. 
 In other words, Vietnamese have created a viable, adaptable retail dis-
tribution system for illegal cigarettes in Berlin since the early 1990s. Apart 
from a brief period in the mid-1990s, when German police invested exten-
sive resources to crack down on Vietnamese cigarette vendors and Viet-
namese extortion gangs, the system has not been substantially threatened 
by law enforcement, by market forces, or by competing providers of illegal 
cigarettes. Without a comprehensive, targeted and sustained response by 
law enforcement, or a substantial change on the demand and/or supply side, 
the open illegal cigarette market in Berlin is likely to survive for many 
more years. 
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The normalisation of arms trafficking in times 
of conflict:  
the Ukrainian experience 
  
Anna Markovska and Alexey Serdyuk1 
 
“What did I do wrong? Nothing.  
     I behaved unethically, for ethical reasons.” 
           Adnan Hashoggi (1935-2017),  
   Saudi arms trader  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Writing about the trafficking of arms is more straightforward when one 
does not engage with the moral issue of the killing of one’s fellow human 
beings, which inevitably is the purpose of all lethal weapons. It is simpler 
to consider the issues of legality and illegality, and, the organisation of 
legal and illegal arms trading when abstracted from actual harm and suf-
fering. Nevertheless, reports of civilians trapped in conflict zones, such as 
in Eastern Ukraine, inevitably lead to the realisation of how morally wrong 
it is to trade in such arms. When asked who bears responsibility for the 
conflict and the consequent devastation in the region, one local resident 
replied: “Those who provide the weapons” (BBC, 2018). However, it is 
not known whether the same resident was asked what they might do when 
under attack while not themselves in possession of arms. One possible re-
sponse might be that one has to buy weaponry, clandestinely or otherwise. 
This was certainly the case during the break-up of Yugoslavia and the sub-
sequent imposition of an UN arms embargo, a move that stimulated clan-
destine arms trading rather than restraining it (Glenny, 2012). 
                                                 
1  Respectively, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Anglia Ruskin University, UK 
and Reader in Sociology, Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs, 
Ukraine. 
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 For many years after the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukrainian offi-
cials were engaged in selling weapons in conflict zones such as Nigeria 
(BBC, 2009), Sierra-Leone (Human Rights Watch, 2001) and ex-Soviet 
states. The reason for this trade is that at its independence in 1991, Ukraine 
inherited a huge stockpile of Soviet military-grade weaponry, in addition 
to the capacity for the production of new weapons. At this period, the in-
ternational demand for cheap if obsolete weapons had also risen (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999). While the Soviet Union had supplied weapons to 
further its strategic political ambitions, Ukrainian officials primarily en-
gaged in legal and illegal arms trading for commercial profit. 
 From an ethically neutral perspective, one can consider arms as merely 
another commodity, even a controversial lethal one. However, there re-
mains a fundamental moral dilemma related to the application of arms: 
namely intimidation and violence. This is stressed by Ruggiero (2010), 
who argues that in the 21st Century, wars should be considered as a form 
of state and corporate criminality. An opinion which reflects Sutherland’s 
(1939) original concepts of white collar and corporate crime. Taking this 
principle into account seems to address central criminological concerns re-
garding the issue of crimes committed by powerful elites. But it does not 
necessarily criminalise the arms trade as such. This general moral state-
ment has little explanatory power as it does not take into account legitimate 
national interests and related foreign policy decisions, in addition to com-
mercial and ‘personal’ issues. 
 In practice, the political, commercial and ‘personal’ aspects of the trade 
are often linked. When Ukraine increased its capacity to produce lethal 
weapons, it consequently also expanded the market for them. Most markets 
have a shadowy or criminal fringe surrounding the main field, and the arms 
market is no exception (Lijn, 2018). Categorisation of the trade is not easy 
as it depends on the nature of the customers. States as customers are usually 
not in need of secret, clandestinely supplied arms, unless they are operating 
under an arms embargo. More normally, the clandestine trade is with un-
official belligerents and of course with plain criminals. All are, however, 
customers for arms, ammunition and related equipment. The question as to 
how they are being supplied. This concerns our experience of the Post-
Soviet Ukraine’s dealing with customers abroad and at home.  
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 As mentioned above, at independence Ukraine had large redundant sup-
plies of arms witch were badly guarded, many eager customers (most re-
cently in the East of Ukraine) and endemic corruption amongst its officials: 
all being risk enhancing factors. Therefore, there were reasons of concern. 
Until 2014, this was mainly a dilemma for the international community, 
regarding the ‘undesirable’ locations in the world to which Ukrainian arms 
might be sold, sometimes with the help of other countries. For example, a 
2009 investigation by the House of Commons revealed that UK registered 
brokers had aided the Ukrainian State Service for Export Control in facili-
tating sales from ex-Soviet stockpiles to countries that were embargoed 
destinations for such exports. In 2014, however conflict broke out in 
Ukrainian territory, which made the issue of its arms trade and trafficking 
an urgent domestic affair.  
 Understanding the supply and the demand for legal and illegal wea-
ponry requires clarification of a number of aspects. The concept of war as 
being a state and corporate criminality may offer a rationale for the supply 
and demand for illegal weapons. However, that is only partial; in times of 
conflict, strong ‘personal’ patriotic attitudes might also be counted as a 
factor in facilitating the arms trade. Arsovska and Zabyelina (2014) studied 
the demand for weapons in post-conflict zones. Their findings suggest that 
cultural attitudes, socio-political complexities, and the range of ‘personal’ 
emotions that exist in conflict and post-conflict regions need to be consid-
ered. The authors identify three factors that can stimulate the demand for 
weapons.  
 Firstly, a “conflict mentality”: “Kosovars have learned from the Kosovo 
Liberation Army that you get international attention if you have a gun’ 
(Ibid., p. 413).  
 Secondly, the presence of “a good patriotic bandit”, for example, a 
criminal who turns from drug to arms trafficking when the country 
needs weapons (Ibid.); and  
 Thirdly, a gun culture with a positive image of gun ownership, as dis-
cussed in their example of “the concept of honour in traditional Alba-
nian culture” (Ibid., p. 416).  
 
These three cultural factors together constitute an important addition to the 
market based understanding of arms trafficking.  
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 This chapter aims to identify and critically analyse the nature of the 
arms trade in post-Soviet Ukraine, paying particular attention to post 2014 
developments. Specifically, we consider the following three levels of the 
arms trade in post 2014 Ukraine:  
1.  Upper level: the state and its negotiators;  
2.  Middle level: organised criminal and /or paramilitary formations;  
3.  Lower level: ordinary citizens.  
 
We develop our analysis under the framework suggested by Ruggiero 
(2010) considering the issue of arms trafficking primarily as a business, 
and discuss the upper level of trafficking in the light of its comprising busi-
ness opportunities and possible corporate or individual gain. We also ex-
plore the cultural factors identified by Arsovska and Zabyelina (2014) as 
conducive to the demand for legal and illegal weapons within the remain-
ing two levels, by acknowledging the importance of ‘conflict mentality’, 
‘gun culture’, and ‘patriotism’ (Ibid., p. 417).  
 Our chapter is based on secondary data analyses, including news and 
policy reports from April 2017-September 2018. We acknowledge signif-
icant limitations: (1) the politicised nature of the media representation of 
the conflict in the east of Ukraine and associated controversial discussion 
of military capacity in the light of ongoing military conflict; (2) difficulties 
in obtaining reliable statistics on the military capabilities of the Ukrainian 
private battalions in early 2014; (3) changes in police crime recording prac-
tices in pre-and post-2014 Ukraine. 
 
 
Corporate criminality and harm: the ‘respectable’ and 
‘shadow’ worlds of arms trafficking 
 
Any study of the arms trade reveals the flexibility of the concept of a 
‘threshold of legality’: The decision as to what is right or what is wrong in 
trade will always depend on its surrounding circumstances, and will thus 
involve the “discretional stretching of values” (Ruggiero, 1996, p. 5). In 
2015, the British government sold bombs, missiles and rockets worth £1 
billion to Saudi Arabia, arguably facilitating “a surge of airstrikes by a 
Saudi-led coalition on Houthi rebels in Yemen” (Bowcott, 2016). In De-
cember 2015 Amnesty International reported that “the UK Government is 
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breaking national, EU and international law and policy by supplying weap-
ons to Saudi Arabia in the context of its military intervention and bombing 
campaign in Yemen” (Amnesty International, 2015). Nevertheless, in July 
2017 Campaigners Against Arms Trade lost their case “calling for UK 
arms sales to Saudi Arabia to be stopped over humanitarian concerns” 
when the High Court ruled that such exports could continue (Ross, 2017). 
The issue of such arms sales is popularly considered as being morally 
wrong, even though it is profitable for the UK and otherwise legal. Lynch 
(quoted by Ross, 2017) maintains that “irrespective of this ruling, the UK 
and other governments should end their shameless arms supplies to Saudi 
Arabia. They may amount to lucrative trade deals, but the UK risks aiding 
and abetting these terrible crimes”. The issue of a “discretional stretching 
of values” is important where the responsibility for war is ascribed to cor-
porations and governments with differently stretched values. 
 Feinstein and Holden (2015) identify two ‘worlds’ of arms trade: a ‘re-
spectable’ world of legal state operations and a ‘shadow world’. The re-
spectable world consists of “state sanctioned government-to-government 
contracts”; a “formal and legitimate” world (p. 445). The ‘shadow world’ 
is categorised by grey and black markets (Ibid., p. 445). The grey markets 
are those dominated by legal traders operating on behalf of those with a 
secret political agenda, while the black markets are represented by deals 
that are per se illegal. However, both traders and clients can operate in 
respectable and shadow worlds simultaneously.  
 As already stated, Ruggiero (2010) categorises war as being corporate 
and state crime, arguing that “powerful actors . . . are able to impose their 
own definitions within the social sphere, and, while making them widely 
acceptable, are then capable of translating them into political concepts and 
sensibilities” (p.106). However, this is not necessarily an exclusive defini-
tion of for the state of war. Lijn (2018) reminds us that the labelling of what 
is legal or illegal is arguably the privilege of the state, even though, in some 
situations, and especially in times of conflict, “the binary choices of good 
versus bad are arbitrary, and often do not reflect the views of the popula-
tion” (p. 1-2). With regard to the arm trade, the state seems to have such a 
latitude to influence moral perception according to its interests. This also 
applies to the clients with whom they are trading. Lijn (2018) writes that 
in Kosovo “some criminals may have continued their criminal activities 
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within government . . . where addressing them is difficult as they are con-
sidered war heroes” (p. 2). Hence, depending on the contingency it is evi-
dent that trading partners could be labelled “freedom fighters”, “terrorists” 
or “organised criminals”.  
 At one stage or another in the evolution of a crisis they may be repre-
sented by the state of being its violent opposition. The recent history of 
Ulster and the break-up of Yugoslavia (1992-1996) provide near contem-
porary examples in which such labelling can be discerned (Lijn, 2018). In 
consequence, we see that though formal, rational explanations of the arms 
trade may be useful, they have limited depth and explanatory power. It is 
for this reason that we contend that Arsovska and Zabyelina’s (2014) ar-
gument is essential, namely that, specifically on the demand side, “the im-
pact of culturally-enriched and socially-embedded factors” should be taken 
into consideration. These authors show that patriotism, conflict mentality 
and gun culture play as important a role in the “demand for weapons in the 
Balkans and in the North Caucasus” as does any other factor (Zabyelina, 
2014, p. 417). 
  
 
The situation in Post-Soviet Ukraine:  
power without accountability 
 
Lack of strategic vision 
 
Ukraine is a ‘successor state’ with an extensive Soviet Union heritage; an 
ineffective public administration, and economically, an important arms 
production sector which once was ‘the backbone’ of the Soviet Union’s 
armament industry (Kiss, 2014). Johansson (2011) notes that after the col-
lapse of the USSR, Ukraine was left with the third largest army in the 
world. Consisting of: “five ground armies, one army corps, four air armies, 
one air defence army, one rocket army, the Black Sea fleet, 21 divisions 
(infantry, tank and artillery), three airborne brigades and many support 
units including over 780.000 troops)” (p. 206). Ukraine also had around 
two thousand nuclear warheads on its territory (Ibid.). According to some 
experts, this was enough to indicate a positive economic development for 
the country. 
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 Because of the geographical situation of Ukraine, ever since the First 
World War, “large quantities of military equipment and armaments were 
dumped in Ukraine” (Johansson, 2011, p. 206). In 2011, there were about 
184 munitions storage sites, and “approximately seven million small arms 
and light weapons” recorded as being situated in Ukraine (Ibid.). The irony 
of the situation was that despite these large quantities of weapons, the mil-
itary power of Ukraine was negligible.  
 Johansson (2011) discusses the difficult situation in the early 1990s 
when the public administration of Ukraine had no experience in governing, 
and specifically of managing the military sector. Only by the late 1990s 
did Ukrainian officials start to show any interest in the arms industry 
(ibid.). Kiss (2014) stated that in the early 1990s, Ukrainian officials failed 
to realign the military sector towards civil industrial production, leaving 
arms exportation as the only option available to the government. In the 
1990s, the impact of the European Union and NATO’s attempts at ‘disci-
plining’ the Ukraine were slight. Ukraine’s entry into the shadow arms 
market was therefore relatively easy (ibid.). This entailed that “the arms 
industry was used for revenue generation, but it was hardly restructured 
and very little of the income was reinvested in the sector” (Kiss, 2014).  
 In 1999 the Ukrainian government attempted to legitimise their conduct 
by employing “easy-to-forge documents to prove that its state-owned com-
panies had stayed within the law”, as for example “in selling to Burkina 
Faso weapons that ended up in the hands of the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) in violation of not one but two UN arms embargoes” (Hiltermann, 
2001). It was very convenient for the Ukrainian government to create a 
political and economic context for the deal (designed paperwork), and thus 
to avoid responding to the concerns of the UN concerns of the UN. In a 
case study of Ukrainian arm sales to Sierra Leone, Hiltermann (2001) states 
that 
 
“in March 1999, a Ukrainian-registered cargo plane delivered 68 tons 
of weapons and ammunition to Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina 
Faso, for on-shipment to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) via Li-
beria. In Ouagadougou, the plane landed in the airport’s VIP terminal. 
There the cargo was transferred for shipment by smaller aircraft to Li-
beria and, once in Liberia, the weapons were transported by land to the 
RUF inside Sierra Leone” (Ibid.). 
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In response to the allegation of arming the RUF in Sierra Leone in contra-
diction of the embargoes, the Ukrainian government insisted that its “state-
owned arms export companies had sold the weapons legally to the Burkina 
Ministry of Defence, which had duly issued an end-user certificate show-
ing the weapons were to stay in Burkina Faso” (Ibid.). As Ruggiero notes 
it seems that, when governments are involved in cross-border transactions 
the issues of legality can be adjusted according the needs of a particular 
group. 
 In early 2014 when the violent conflict in the East of Ukraine unfolded, 
the country was to pay a very heavy price for the absence of a strategic 
vision on and the lax regulation of its military sector. 
 
Regulation and (mis)management 
 
It is important to note the legal provisions regarding the status of weapon 
ownership in Ukraine. There are three main legal directives regarding their 
ownership, use, and their transfer of ownership:  
 Instruction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that regulates the legal 
purchase and use of weapons;  
 the Decree of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) that defines the right to 
own weapons; 
 the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers concerning circulation of weap-
ons.  
 
Legally, any citizen of Ukraine, who is deemed psychologically fit to do 
so by a doctor, and on provision of a letter confirming this from the doctor, 
can purchase a specified firearm for hunting. However, the absence of any 
legal provision to control the permitted use of such weapons is clearly ev-
ident. For example, Article 263 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine describes 
cases of the ownership, keeping, purchase and the sale of weapons, ammu-
nition and explosives without identifying any permit to do so: in fact there 
is no relevant law! The Verkhovna Rada registered a draft for such law at 
the end of 2104, but failed to consider and enact it. 
 The mismanagement of military resources in the independent Ukraine 
occurred at all levels: from that of relevant Ministries to that of underpaid 
local officials. In the 1990s anecdotal evidence emerged suggesting that 
soldiers were routinely engaged in selling weapons (or anything suitable 
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military hardware for sale) to augment their minimal incomes and feed 
their families. This situation was repeated in other industries that lacked 
sufficient regulation and accountability, thus offering opportunities for the 
abuse of unprotected state assets. Such included: corrupt tenders to state 
drug purchases (Markovska and Isaeva, 2007), a lack of transparency in 
bankruptcy procedures and the stealing of natural resources from the state 
for example, in the gas industry (Markovska and Van Duyne, 2018). In 
Ukraine “the public administration, particularly the civil service, judiciary, 
the prosecution and the police, are especially vulnerable to corruption. Re-
ports issued by the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and other 
bodies of the Council of Europe also highlight the extent of corruption in 
Ukraine and the lack of independence in the judiciary and police (customs 
service included)” (MONEYVAL, 2017 p.16; Kuzio, 2007).  
 
Post-Soviet Ukraine as an “ill-conceived exporter”2  
 
Alongside the normal ‘respectable world’ arms trade, systemic corruption 
within government and the abundance of old and cheap weaponry that are 
not properly registered have created a shadowy arms trading scenario in 
Ukraine. The recklessness of the government is illustrated in the earlier 
cited example of the trafficking of weapons to Sierra Leone. A further ex-
ample of this upper level corruption is the case of Leonid Minin (Feinstein 
and Holden, 2015; Johansson, 2011). Mr Minin was believed to be “a cen-
tral part in the trade in East European small arms in sub-Saharan Africa” 
(Traynor, 2001). Traynor describes Minin as “one of a new breed of east 
European racketeers, some of whom are well-connected KGB veterans, 
who thrive on keeping Africans killing one another” (Ibid.). Minin was 
arrested in Italy in 2000. Italian magistrates reported that “Minin had char-
tered an Antonov-124 transport aircraft in Moscow, had it flown to Kiev 
in Ukraine where it was loaded with 113 tons of Kalashnikovs, RPGs, and 
ammunition, and then directed it to Abidjan, the capital of Ivory Coast in 
west Africa” (Ibid.). The UN Conference on Small Arms Trafficking in 
2001 used this and similar examples to identify governmental irresponsi-
bility with regard to arms sales (Hiltermann, 2001). 
                                                 
2  Johansson, 2011. 
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 raynor (2001) argues that Ukraine’s government is not the only one do-
ing so. One intercepted cargo in the early 2000s contained machine guns 
that were Czech-made, and of which the logistics used the port in Bulgaria 
(Ibid.). The difference in the Ukrainian case is the origin of the weapons 
sold and the activity of the authorities there. As a result of budgetary cuts 
to the military sector, arms and military goods were sold “through the 
shadow economy which controlled a significant part of Ukrainian arms 
supplies abroad” (Ibid.). Ustinov (2017) calculates that only 20% of all 
arms deals were conducted officially, while “80% of arms export deals 
were in the hands of the ‘shadow structures’” (Ustinov, 2017). 
 A parliamentary inquiry ordered by the Ukrainian President Kuchma to 
investigate the shadow arms trade, reported that between 1992 and 1998 
Ukraine lost $32 billion of revenue to the ‘lost’ weapons trade, the result 
of an inadequate pricing regime and an absence of governmental control. 
Traynor (2001) states that “Ukraine’s military stocks were worth $89bn in 
1992 and that in the course of the following six years $32bn worth of arms, 
equipment, and military property were stolen, much of it resold” (Ibid.). 
 The ease with which falsified documents, can be obtained from 
Ukraine, may be considered as an indirect indication of government cor-
ruption and the involvement of state officials in the shadow arms trade. 
Nevertheless, no Ukrainian politician has ever been prosecuted for facili-
tating illegal deals in arms trafficking and this despite anonymous sources 
alleging the involvement of politicians at highest level (Johansson, 2001, 
p.210). More importantly, the parliamentary inquiry cited earlier has been 
the only effort of the government to ascertain the extent of the arms trade. 
Unfortunately, the inquiry was ended abruptly, and all its associated docu-
ments have disappeared (Pravda, 2002). Another instance of the ability of 
powerful actors to manipulate the political situation to create an environ-
ment suitable for their misconduct (Ruggiero, 2010). 
 There are various ways in which to contextualise the criminality of state 
officials in Ukraine. Van de Bunt (2010) employs Simmel’s notion of the 
‘secret society’ in order to understand how members of criminal networks 
are able to maintain secrecy in relation to their actions. “Secrets do not 
remain hidden because the people involved isolate themselves from the 
world, but rather because the actors, and their illicit activities, are socially 
embedded” (ibid., p. 441). In the case of Ukraine, the perpetrators of crime 
(from state officials to soldiers at military bases) are well embedded and 
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able to switch secretly from criminal to legal activity in the course of their 
daily practices with a very limited chance of being caught. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the National Risk Assessment (NRA) confirms that in 
Ukraine, “white collar crime has exceeded other more conventional pro-
ceeds-generating offences, such as drug trafficking” (MONEYVAL, 2017, 
p.16). In this set of white-collar crimes, the top five predicate offences that 
pose significant risks for Ukrainian society are: fictitious entrepreneurship, 
tax evasion, fraud, embezzlement, and the abuse of power (MONEYVAL, 
2017). In such an environment, a politically patronised judiciary makes it 
extremely difficult to successfully prosecute any identified offences. In-
deed, MONEYVAL (2017, p. 64-65) highlights the difficulty of analysing 
statistics on corruption and money laundering in Ukraine, stating that as of 
2016 no current or former state official or oligarch has been prosecuted on 
money laundering charges. A lack of successful prosecutions reinforces the 
notion of a secret, politico-judicial interdependency where an intertwining 
of interests often leads to lawlessness amongst business and political elites.  
  
 
Three levels of arms trading in post 2014 Ukraine: 
a state in conflict. 
 
In any country, discussions of issues of legality and criminality in relation 
to the arms trade will be challenging. Introducing these qualifications in 
the context of an armed conflict is bound to be even more difficult. This 
section presents an overview of the situation in Ukraine based on an anal-
ysis of the limited data available. Each level discussed requires a more in-
depth analysis than is possible within the scope if this chapter. 
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The Upper level of arms trading  
 
The upper level of shadow world arms trafficking in pre-conflict Ukraine 
can be characterised by the existence of front companies and forged docu-
ments to facilitate sales, as well as a lack of prosecution for law breaking 
at governmental level. The conflict in the east of the country has since 
changed the clientele of the shadow world arms trade but not its way of 
operating.  
 In 2017, Amnesty International highlighted the case of the supply of 
weapons worth $169 million to the Government of South Sudan by a 
Ukrainian company. The four parties identified in the deal were: Ukrin-
mash (Ukraine) as an exporter, S-Profit (UK) as a supplier; International 
Golden Group (UAE) as an importer and the Ministry of Defence & Vet-
eran Affairs (South Sudan) as customer (Amnesty International, 2017). In 
terms of legality, “the prospective exports to South Sudan . . . should have 
rung alarm bells for any licensing or governmental export officials as-
sessing the transfer” (Ibid.). In addition, there are a number of human rights 
violation issues that are associated with arms transfers to South Sudan. The 
deal’s facilitation involved the crossing of a number of borders and in-
volved a “London-based intermediary company; as well as a buyer (Inter-
national Golden Group) and exporter (Ukrinmash) all of whom had been 
previously cited by a UN Panel of Experts’ report on Libya as violating a 
UN arms embargo in 2011” (Ibid.).  
 Clearly, this was not solely a Ukrainian act. Amnesty International 
noted the “regulatory vacuum that makes the UK an appealing jurisdiction, 
and UK companies attractive legal vehicles, through which to route illicit 
arms deals and other illicit activity” (Ibid.). The potential for the Ukrainian 
government to engage in shadowy arms dealings is significantly enabled 
by administrative tools provided from abroad, such as the opportunities 
created by UK-registered ‘shell’ companies. 
 In 2016, Ukraine significantly improved its ranking on the Global Mil-
itarisation Index, moving from 23rd place in 2014 to 16th place in 2016 
(BICC, 2016). In 2016 the state-run military-industrial concern Ukrobo-
ronprom ranked 77th on the list of the Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute (SIPRI) top 100 arms-producing military services compa-
nies with “the sales index at the level of $1,06 billion” (SIPRI, 2017). From 
a purely economic point of view, such an unprecedented rise within the 
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military sector could be considered as significant progress, however, Hig-
gins (2018) reports that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) has 
identified defence embezzlement schemes run by the high level Ukrainian 
state officials starting from 2014, of which only one case has ended up in 
court. The media in Ukraine frequently discusses the embezzlement of 
state funds and the systemic utilisation of fake contracts issued by the au-
thorities to defraud the state budget and the defence sector. For example, 
there are reports on the use of fictitious companies to service military ve-
hicles on state contracts.  
 
In 2014-2015 the Ministry of Defence purchased services worth 5,3 m 
HRV3 from the Kiev Armoured plant. The plant has allegedly bought 
the required parts paying 5,3 m HRV to the account of a company that 
has nothing to do with military services. The Kiev military prosecutor 
investigated the case in 2015, followed by a further investigation car-
ried out in 2016 by the Chief Military Prosecutor. Investigators ques-
tioned the main suspects thought to be involved in the fictitious compa-
nies, however to date no one has been prosecuted (Antikor, 2017). Sim-
ilarly, in March 2018, the national Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine 
(NABU) investigated a case of the Lviv armour factory where the man-
aging director allegedly used invoices of fictitious companies to embez-
zle state property (NABU, 2018). 
 
There are also reports that the military factory ‘Kuznica na Rubalskom’ 
(85% of its shares belonging to a fund that is owned by the president of 
Ukraine), has been involved in the overcharging and embezzlement of 
state funds (Godzenko, 2018). In November 2017 NABU investigated 
the purchase of military equipment that initially was priced at 4,75 m 
HRV, however the completion documents on the purchase revealed that 
14,876 m HRV had been spent to purchase equipment units from the 
factory (Liga, 2017).  
 
Ruggiero (2010, p. 117) described such criminality of the powerful and 
their ability to revise the scope of legality to suit the situation as “estab-
lishing new norms and legislations”. In Ukraine, the above examples sug-
gest that in addition the practice of the embezzlement of state funds has 
been widespread amongst business and political elites.  
                                                 
3 Ukrainian Hryvnia. €1 ≈ 30 Hryvnia (June 2018 conversion). 
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The middle level of arms trading 
 
This level of arms trafficking is directly related to the events of the winter 
2013-2014 in Ukraine, when a number of private armies and battalions 
were established. Peaceful anti-government protest started in Kiev in No-
vember 2013, but on 20th February 2014 a number of protestors were killed. 
Katchanovski (2015) called this day “a tipping point in the conflict be-
tween the West and Russia over Ukraine. This mass killing of the protesters 
and the mass shooting of the police that preceded it led to the overthrow of 
the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych and gave a start to a 
civil war in Donbas in Eastern Ukraine, Russian military intervention in 
Crimea and Donbas, and an international conflict between the West and 
Russia over Ukraine” (p. 3).  
 In the spring of 2014 between 30 and 40 volunteer battalions were 
formed to assist the new Ukrainian government to reclaim its territory in 
the east from Russian backed separatists and to defend its major cities (Am-
nesty International, 2014). At the beginning of this conflict, after years of 
governmental neglect, the Ukrainian national army was unable to fight 
against the Russian-armed separatists on its own.  
 Most of the Ukrainian volunteer battalions were formed in the Spring 
of 2014 as a response to the conflict in the east and the Russian invasion in 
Crimea (Gladka, 2016). Popularly known as Dobrobatu- Dobrovolchi Ba-
tallionu in Ukrainian (shorten to “Dobrobatu”) (Gladka, 2016), volunteer-
ing battalions were established as independent military groups in the 
Spring of 2014. At the beginning of the conflict these were not accountable 
to the authorities in Kiev. Naturally, no state can accept a challenge to its 
‘monopoly’ of military autonomy. Accordingly, in the spring of 2014 the 
Ukrainian parliament voted to disarm the paramilitaries, and then intro-
duced legislation to bring the battalions under control of the Ministry of 
Defence, Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the National Guard (the National 
Guard was formed in the Spring of 2014 by the government). Since then, 
only two military organisations, the “Right Sector” and the “Volunteer 
Army of Ukraine” remain to a degree independent, but coordinate their 
activities with those directed by the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. 
 SIPRI (2015) reported that this conflict situation affected the Ukrainian 
arms trade in many different ways. “The parties to the armed conflict – the 
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Ukrainian Government and the separatist rebels in eastern Ukraine – 
fought a large-scale conventional war with large numbers of weapons, in-
cluding heavy weapons. Most of the weapons used by both sides were in 
the Ukrainian inventory before the crisis started” (Ibid.). A question arises 
as to how the independent formations acquired their weapons in the initial 
stage of their development. While there are many speculations concerning 
this in the media, majority opinions suggests that either they were stolen 
from the ex-Soviet warehouses or were purchased on the grey market. 
 Many of these battalions were funded by Ukraine’s richest oligarchs, 
raising questions as to the legitimacy of their actions and the ideologies 
driving those actions. The private battalion of the Ukrainian oligarch Mr 
Kolomoisky provides an interesting example. The Ukrainian media re-
ported that Kolomoisky established a special military unit “Dnipro-1”, 
consisting of about 2.000 soldiers, to take part in the fighting in the region 
of Mariupol and Ilovaisk. Wier (2015) states that an army of volunteers 
was assembled by Kolomoisky amounting to between 10.000 and 20.000 
soldiers. Hirst (2015) holds that these troops were successful in maintain-
ing security in the city of Dnipropetrovsk when it was under attack by sep-
aratists.  
More generally, Coynash (2014) notes that: “These battalions were 
formed when Ukraine’s army was still floundering against militants trained 
and heavily armed by Russia to fight the latter’s dirty war. The volunteers 
were risking their lives and many have been killed defending their country. 
What are you supposed to say? We hate your views, go home? Where, 
incidentally, do we draw the line as to ‘acceptable views’?” In the first 
stages of the conflict these armed private battalions operated as informal 
links to assist the government forces with the supplies, including food and 
weapons.    
There are a number of issues that the presence of these battalions raises:  
1. Ideology:  
About a year after Kolomoisky’s volunteer army was established it was 
allegedly employed to storm government buildings in protest at new regu-
lations that were damaging to Kolomoisky’s financial interests (Weir, 
2015).  
2. Criminality: 
Certain factions within the battalions were suspected of being organised 
and armed criminal formations taking advantage of the situation. Map 1 
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below shows how the proximity of conflict zones increases the availability 
of weapons and the use of weapons in criminal activities. The size of the 
red circle corresponds to the prevalence of recorded criminal offences in-
volving the use of firearms. Data from the Crimea are not available.  
 
Map 1: Criminal offences recorded with the use of firearms, 2016  
 
(Source: Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 2016)  
 
3. Gun culture 
In order to understand the activities of the private battalions and their de-
mand for weaponry we might make sense of a business model based on 
rational choice. However, it is also important to consider the socio-cultural 
context of the formation of these battalions. Arsovska and Zabyelina’s 
(2014) identification of socially embedded factors that drive the illicit de-
mand for weapons seem directly applicable here, namely: patriotism and 
conflict mentality. Many of those who joined battalions did so from a sen-
timent of patriotic duty in a time of severe political and social instability. 
The prospect of Russian aggression turned their peaceful patriotism to mil-
itancy. Weapons should, therefore, be purchased to defend the country, and 
the nature of these purchases, legal or illegal, seemed to be irrelevant to 
them. A resulting increase in gun culture, the third cultural factor discussed 
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by Arsovska and Zabyelina (2014) encouraged both legal and illegal trade 
in guns, and to a certain degree, stimulated the third (the lower) level of 
arms trafficking. It also provided a rationale where the acquisition of arms 
are seen as being in the service of a ‘good cause’. 
 While the above socio-cultural factors are likely to be categorised as 
‘individual’, there are also some structural factors conducive to the increas-
ing use of firearms in the commitment of criminal activities. The first such 
factor is the worsening economic situation in Ukraine. The Head of the 
Criminal Investigation Department Mr Knyazev directly linked the wors-
ening of living standards in Ukraine with the rise of recorded criminality 
(Bodnya, 2017). During 2016, 3.900 robberies were recorded in Ukraine 
and among them 196 robberies involved the use of the firearms (Knyazev, 
as discussed in Bodnya, 2017). Knyazev considers armed robberies to be a 
sign of the conflict society, where weapons become inexpensive and 
widely available. According to Knyazev, before the 2014 conflict, crimi-
nals used weapons to intimidate their victims, whereas now they use weap-
ons to kill.  
 The second socio-cultural factor is a growing market for illegal weap-
ons. Knyazev (2017) notes that from 1 April 2014 13.361 weapons were 
recorded as being stolen; there were 6.807 cases of the illegal sale of weap-
ons; and 1.352 weapons and 1.825 grenades were confiscated by the au-
thorities. When asked for a comparison with previous years, Knyazev 
(2017) noted that before 2014 grenades and explosives were not in circu-
lation and any comparison would therefore be irrelevant. Knyazev argued 
that because of the conflict the Ukrainian black market for weapons had 
become amongst the cheapest in Europe. Stupak (quoted in Gor, 2017) re-
calls that in 2010, intelligence regraded the sale 5 pistols and a Kalashni-
kov, as being a massive operation. In post 2014 Ukraine, “one can purchase 
a grenade launcher and have ammunition for change” (Stupak, quoted in 
Gor, 2017). The increased availability of firearms implies a higher likeli-
hood of their being used. According to Knyazev, there is a growing ten-
dency towards the use of firearms in murders. For example, in 2016 286 
murders were committed involving firearms and 41 committed with the 
use of explosive devices (Bodnya, 2017). The fact that Ukraine is engaged 
in military conflict in the East is considered by Knyazev as one of the main 
reason for the increase in such criminal use of weapons.  
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 The third socio-cultural factor is the absence of effective policing oper-
ations during 2014, the first year of the conflict. Figure 1 compares the use 
of weapons in recorded criminal activity. 
 
Figure 1:  
Recorded criminal offences with weapons used, 2013-2017  
(Office of the Prosecutors General of Ukraine, 2017) 
 
 
The year 2014 can be singled out for a dramatic increase in the criminal 
use of firearms and explosives in Ukraine. Statistics reveal an increase 
from 761 crimes committed in 2013 to 2.523 crimes in 2014. In 2015, this 
diminished to 1.526, and to 579 and 583, respectively, in the following 
years. The country was awash with weaponry (Bodnya, 2017). Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that virtually every local market had a trader in illegal 
weapons. Stolbovoi (2017) argues that the politicisation of the police and, 
specifically, the liquidation of the Organised Crime Bureau in 2015 led to 
significant problems in identifying criminal groups prepared to use fire-
arms. Corruption within the police may also partially explain why many 
ordinary, law abiding citizens began to see the trafficking of arms as being 
an acceptable way of making a living. In that one could always negotiate 
with a corrupt police officer to “turn a blind eye” to any transaction. 
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The lower level 
 
The third level is the lower level of the arms trade pyramid where the illegal 
arms trade becomes normalised during a time during a time of conflict. The 
Ukrainian political crisis of the 2014 brought significant economic diffi-
culties to the country: “Ukraine’s economy contracted sharply and GDP 
declined in 2015” (Prosperity Index, 2017). Between 2012 and 2015, the 
Prosperity Index recorded the biggest fall in Ukraine’s international rank-
ing in factors such as governance, security and democratic accountability. 
A sharp fall in popular confidence in the government was also recorded, 
“only 24% of people had confidence in the national government during the 
Yanukovych years – but this number has dropped to just 8% in 2016 fol-
lowing the political turmoil” (Ibid.). The Democratic Initiative Foundation 
(2015) reported the results of a survey conducted amongst the Ukrainian 
public, where only 9% of respondents said they trusted the legal system. 
The survey concluded that the majority of the Ukrainian population (94%) 
believe that legal corruption is widespread, with 80,5% of population be-
lieving that the judiciary is under political control. 
 
The Personal Freedom Index has also registered a decline with regard 
to Ukraine:“it has fallen 17 ranks from 76th to 93rd over the past dec-
ade. Civil liberties have decreased and little to no progress has been 
made to improve the freedom of the press” (Prosperity Index, 2017).  
 
An economic rationale to this increased level of arms trafficking seems 
obvious considering Ukraine’s rampant inflation: a rapid decrease in in-
come levels and growing rate of unemployment. Because of the political 
situation, those engaged in the illegal arms trade can justify their illegal 
actions by adopting a “conflict mentality” (Arsovska and Zabyelina, 2014). 
Living in a state of constant fear and financial insecurity has the potential 
to reduce the moral threshold of what is regarded as being acceptable and 
legal to many. The ability to engage in “informal negotiation” with the po-
lice can provide a further encouragement to engage in the internal trade in 
weaponry. 
  A rapid scan of selected national Ukrainian newspapers in April-June 
2017 produced the following items: 
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April:  
A Georgian citizen is arrested in Odessa for providing a postal service 
for trafficked arms; a former volunteer is arrested in Kiev for engage-
ment in the production and sale of illegal firearms; arms sales from the 
military camp in the city of Nikolaev are reported; two Ukrainian sol-
diers are arrested on suspicion of arms trading from the military base in 
Kherson;  
May:  
In Odessa 5 people were arrested on suspicion of trafficking arms orig-
inating from the Ukrainian side of the conflict zone; a hidden warehouse 
of arms is discovered at a meat factory in Lugansk; a man is arrested in 
Kharkiv for involvement in arms trafficking (providing storage facili-
ties for arms in the city of Kharkiv); in Poltava a man is arrested for 
involvement in the sale of arms trafficked from the conflict zone;  
June:  
 In Kharkiv customs officials are implicated in in arms trafficking. 
 
Such “normalised” illegal arms trafficking can be divided into two catego-
ries: civilian or military, both can operate individually or as a part of an 
organised group. On the individual level we identified cases in which for 
example, in May 2017, uniformed patrol officers in the city of Kharkiv 
stopped and searched a Ukrainian national. During the search, they found 
that the man was carrying two explosive devices in his bag. When asked 
why, the man said that he was going fishing (illegally) (Korespondent, 
2017).  
 On aggregate level, the following statistics are instructive. During the 
first 9 months of 2017 police seized 7.110 weapons from illegal circulation. 
This is 39% more than in the same period in 2016 (Avakov, 2017). 1.604 
explosive devises were also seized. This level is less ideological, and crim-
inality is generally more visible to the authorities than is the “militarised” 
version and is, thus, easier for the police to deal with.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter elucidates the different levels of arms trafficking in Ukraine 
in order to raise the old, but here very relevant, concern of traditional crim-
inology: how do we label what is legal or illegal and with what implica-
tions? As Ruggiero (2010) argued, the attitudes to arms trade presents a 
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convincing indication of how the powerful in a society determines what is 
moral and what is immoral, what is legal and what is illegal. This chapter 
supports Ruggiero’s (2010) contention that the powerful can reshape legal 
and political conditions to suit their business of arms production and trad-
ing during times of conflict. When officials engage in what might be re-
garded as illegal or immoral conduct, they can often provide documenta-
tion that will offer them the legal framework within which to operate and 
thereby the protection against criminalisation. Indeed, without such a pro-
tection, when for example an old man is caught moving weapons in the 
boot of his car, he is at the mercy of officials who can apply different labels 
to him such as ‘arms trafficker’ or ‘terrorist’. 
 The conflict in eastern Ukraine has created a significant national de-
mand for weaponry. To meet this demand, the Ukrainian authorities have 
increased their weapon production capacity. However, it was not the coun-
try’s income position that benefited. With the endemic culture of corrup-
tion this increased production of weaponry enabled a political elite to use 
military factories as a means to embezzle state funds and launder money. 
A comparative situation had been experienced within the gas industry 
(Markovska and Van Duyne, 2018). As indicated, this upper or political 
level of criminality in arms trafficking has existed and flourished in 
Ukraine ever since the collapse of the USSR as evidenced in Amnesty In-
ternational’s reports and targeted investigations conducted by the British 
House of Commons. This was intensified by the war of secession in the 
east.  
 On a lower criminal level, it also had effect. Official statistics point to 
an increase in the number of firearms related offences committed by crim-
inal groups in Ukraine. The associated use of firearms by para-military 
groups is the subject for further studies that will depend on the developing 
political situation in the region. The level of arms trafficking amongst the 
Ukrainian population reveals situational response of ordinary citizens, who 
participate in the illegal arms trade to supplement their meagre incomes. It 
is this level of criminality that is mostly reported in the media and recorded 
in the official police statistics. 
 Understanding the different levels of and underlying factors determin-
ing the arms trade is of particular importance when proposing future peace-
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keeping initiatives for Ukraine. Each level would require a different ap-
proach to minimise the threat posed by the easy availability of lethal weap-
ons.  
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Panama papers, Paradise documents  
and the Slovene state 
in the global competitiveness race  
 
Matjaž Jager1 
 
  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I present a brief overview of the Slovenia’s stance on tax 
evasion through tax havens in particular after the Panama papers and Par-
adise documents leaks. After pointing out the manifold harm of tax havens, 
I show some of the counter efforts of the Slovenian tax administration and 
asses their effectiveness. Following that, I debate possible options a state 
has in defending itself against the off-shore tax evasion. Finally, I speculate 
on Slovenia’s future position on the matter. How active will it be in both 
its unilateral and multilateral efforts against tax havens? Is the political will 
present and what kind of policy may we expect?  
 
 
A preliminary question: the manifold harm of tax ha-
vens  
 
According to Richard Murphy in his recent account of the tax havens world 
– Dirty Secrets: How Tax Havens Destroy the Economy – the term ‘tax 
haven’ has always been problematic. In his brief technical definition, Mur-
phy states that it “generally describes a place whose tax system provides 
an advantage to a person who is not resident in that place” (Murphy, 2017: 
                                                 
1  Senior researcher and Director of the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Ljubljana and Professor of criminology at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
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54).2 Or, one could describe it, again, loosely, in a following way: “A tax 
haven provides facilities that enable people or entities to escape (and fre-
quently undermine) the laws, rules and regulations of jurisdictions else-
where, using secrecy as a prime tool. Those rules include tax, but also crim-
inal laws, disclosure rules (transparency), financial regulation, inheritance 
rules, and more” (Tax Justice Network, 2017). Such loose definitions cre-
ate serious problems for empirically estimating almost all aspects of the 
tax haven finances and consequently, the scale of the problem cannot be 
systematically assessed. In addition, the monetary flows are dynamic eas-
ily switching accounts between off and on shore countries. As pointed out 
recently by van Duyne and Koningsveld (2017): “While it cannot be denied 
that the volume of offshore wealth is large, the present databases lack the 
precision to determine the total size, let alone to identify within that hypo-
thetical total the subset attributable to identifiable types of law breaking, 
whether of criminal offences or tax crime.” Even though nebulous from an 
empirical point of view offshore financial centres offer concrete services: 
they record as their own transactions that have in fact real economic sub-
stance or impact elsewhere. Second, they provide as much secrecy as pos-
sible to those who make use of these provisions in order to pay zero or very 
little taxes with no questions asked (Cf. Murphy, 2017: p. 58)). These ser-
vices are marketed openly by its providers and “enablers” (Middleton and 
Levi, 2015) as “tax, risk and wealth planning” and the like.3 
 As is now almost universally agreed, the direct and indirect costs of tax 
havens are huge and manifold (e.g. Murphy, 2017; Shaxson, 2016; Zuc-
man, 2015; Palan et al., 2010). The loss of tax revenue is an obvious but 
                                                 
2  For a short recent historical development of tax havens see, e.g., Murphy 54-
57; for the case of Cayman Islands in particular e.g., Young (2013: p. 98-102).   
3  A typical online ad would look like this one advertising Belize:  
 “Offshore companies are the key elements for successful tax planning, risk 
planning and wealth planning. Certain jurisdictions like, for example, Belize 
incorporate so called International Business Companies. These companies are 
either subject to greatly reduced tax rates or are even fully tax exempt. Most 
of these countries also have reduced accounting and auditing requirements, 
which results in far less paperwork to be dealt with. An ideal structure means 
you have absolutely no administrative tasks to take care of during the year, no 
reporting at the end of the year and no taxes due at any time. All that applies is 
a low flat fee to remain in good standing with the registrar.” (Offshore Com-
pany Quick Corp., 2017) 
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by far not the only harm; tax havens have other equally or even more harm-
ful effects. Murphy, for example, describes in great detail how tax havens 
purposely:  
1. undermine the rule of law and the general level of trust in a society;  
2. de facto ignore or even enable crime by supplying (corporate) secrecy 
as their major product;  
3. undermine the democratic process;  
4. widen the rising gap between the rich and the poor and strengthen the 
perception of the ‘unaccountable elite’;  
5. fuel the so called ‘tax competition’, or ‘tax wars.’ 
 
Stripped of all sophistry, these tax wars are simply a “deliberate attempt by 
one state to deprive another state the resources that are its rightful property” 
(Murphy, 2017: 43).  
 Despite the clear and simple general aim of tax havens, the procedural 
details of tax dodging techniques via tax havens can appear complicated to 
most of us. The wider audience and many politicians consider it a technical 
matter reserved for the experts. This in turn creates an open space for po-
tential opinion manipulations and spins about the true nature of tax havens. 
One of the effects is that vested interests many times succeed in keeping 
the tax haven issue as far as possible from the public and academic eye.  
 However, recently experts have spoken openly about the true nature of 
tax havens. In May 2016, in light of the Panama papers, more than three 
hundred prominent economists wrote an open letter and described it in a 
straight forward way:  
 
“. . . The existence of tax havens does not add to overall global wealth 
or well-being; they serve no useful economic purpose . . . . As the Pan-
ama Papers and other recent exposés have revealed, the secrecy pro-
vided by tax havens fuels corruption and undermines countries’ ability 
to collect their fair share of taxes. While all countries are hit by tax 
dodging, poor countries are proportionately the biggest losers, missing 
out on at least $170bn of taxes annually as a result. As economists, we 
have very different views on the desirable levels of taxation, be they 
direct or indirect, personal or corporate. But we agreed that territories 
allowing assets to be hidden in shell companies or which encourage 
profits to be booked by companies that do no business there, are dis-
torting the working of the global economy. By hiding illicit activities 
200 
 
and allowing rich individuals and multinational corporations to operate 
by different rules, they also threaten the rule of law that is a vital ingre-
dient for economic success . . .” (Oxfam, 2016).4 
 
If tax havens – or ‘secrecy jurisdictions’ – are now rightfully diagnosed as 
socially and economically harmful and need to be addressed politically as 
a global regulatory problem, the question remains whether they are at this 
point against the law? Many defenders of tax havens stress the legality of 
these arrangements within the tax haven jurisdictions.  
 However, there is more than one legal issue here; that is why slogans 
defending tax havens as ‘perfectly legal’ (“They are perhaps not moral but 
perfectly legal”) are misleading. From the perspective of states that lose 
their taxes the question of legality or illegality looks completely different.  
 Clearly not all business transactions with tax havens are illegal from the 
source country point of view. But because of the high level of secrecy and 
opacity they provide, tax havens attract illegal businesses interested in hid-
ing and laundering money. Side by side with this group, we will find legit-
imate businesses that use tax havens as their “booking location” primarily 
for tax purposes. Normally, the transaction is taxed where its real economic 
substance or impact took place. But the tax evading transactions never have 
any real economic impact offshore, because the real economic impact takes 
place onshore. Because of that, it is clearly “. . . very hard for anyone using 
tax haven to be tax compliant.” (Murphy, 2017: p. 59); the main legal prob-
lem of the source country is the non-reporting by the beneficial owner in 
the jurisdiction where he has legal obligations. And of course, there are 
many concrete cases where the division between being formally on the 
right or wrong side of the law is not at all clear and is ultimately decided 
retroactively either by the court, or, as the well-publicised cases like Apple 
v. EU show, by an out of court settlement.  
 Apart from “booking location services”, guaranteeing secrecy and re-
fusing to cooperate with other states is at the heart of tax haven services. It 
makes them an ideal partner in crime. Crimes that offshore centres facili-
tate are: money laundering with or without private and public sector cor-
ruption including financing political parties and bribing politicians with 
                                                 
4  Among the signatories are Angus Deaton, the 2016 Nobel Prize-winner for 
Economics, Thomas Piketty, Jeffrey Sachs, director of Columbia University’s 
Earth Institute and Olivier Blanchard, former IMF chief economist, etc. (Ibid.). 
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deposits in off-shore bank accounts, illegal arms trafficking, terrorism fi-
nancing and in general illegal trade of all kinds of commodities, humans 
included.  
 Indeed tax havens are a refugium for the tax dodging legitimate busi-
nesses, the hard core criminal organisations and those in between; we could 
call them organised crime businesses. A good example would be Enron, 
who just before its bankruptcy had 881 (sic) subsidiaries in tax havens: 692 
in Cayman Islands, 119 in the Turks and Caicos, 43 in Mauritius and 8 in 
Bermuda (Cf. Shaxson, 2016). Corporate tax departments became im-
portant profit centres, in case of Enron with revenue targets, employing 
hundreds of individuals (Cf. Zucman 2015: p. 110; Braithwaite 2005: 
p.197). Roberto Saviano observes: “Tax havens are where criminal capi-
talism and legal capitalism meet side by side.” They both “seek the same 
services and enjoy the same benefits” (2017). The criminal underworld 
uses the very same mechanisms and legal vehicles as the upperworld: shell 
companies and banks, numerous subsidiaries, trusts and foundations 
(Shaxson, 2016: p. 27). 
 It is thus necessary to address the problem of tax havens while discuss-
ing the varieties of cross border crime (Cf. Van Duyne and Van Kon-
ingsveld, 2017). The impunity that tax havens offer cannot but fuel and 
facilitate all sorts of crime (cf. Deneault, 2007: p. 260) apart from tax dodg-
ing which itself contains a criminal dimension of its own.  
 
 
Tax dodging (via tax havens) as a criminal offence 
 
Tax law as well as definitions of what is or is not an administrative or 
criminal tax offence vary substantially between states. The situation gets 
even more complicated in cases when two or more different tax jurisdic-
tions are involved. Corporate activities and ownership structures may be 
spread over many (secrecy) jurisdictions as a result of an attempt to create 
the so called ‘secrecy space’ in which to hide (Cf. Murphy, 2017: p. 24). 
Consequently, it is difficult to distinguish in advance between acts remain-
ing within the letter and spirit of the law and illegally cheating on taxes.  
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 An established traditional distinction is between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. Tax avoidance, with or without the use of tax havens is in princi-
ple legal. On the other hand, tax evasion is illegal and a kind of fraud as it: 
“involves acts intended to misrepresent or to conceal facts in an effort to 
escape lawful tax liability” (Cf. Workman, 1982: p. 677). 
 In Slovenia, for example, illegal tax evasion can amount to an adminis-
trative offence in cases of less serious evasion. More serious tax evasion is 
a separate criminal offence (art. 249 of Criminal Code – KZ-1C “Tax Eva-
sion”) punishable with imprisonment of not less than three months and not 
more than three years. However, it qualifies as a criminal offence only if 
the sum of liabilities evaded exceeds 50.000 euros. Both natural and legal 
persons are liable. In defining the elements of crime of tax evasion the in-
crimination refers back to the provisions of the relevant tax law.  
 In theory, we therefore have two clear demarcation lines. The first one 
is between legal tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion. Once the illegality 
is established the second demarcation line is the one between an adminis-
trative tax offence and a criminal offence. In cases of illegal tax evasion, a 
criminal offence may contain the very same elements as the administrative 
tax offence; the only difference is that the sum of liabilities is above the 
50.000 Euros threshold (so called objective condition of punishment).  
 The problem in real life however, is not so much the latter but the for-
mer demarcation line between avoidance and evasion (Koprivec and Bajec, 
2017). The perpetually innovative and creative “tax, risk and wealth plan-
ners” are most of the time ahead of tax authorities. In disputed concrete 
cases, the legality or illegality is determined retrospectively by the tax ad-
ministration and/or by the final decision of the court, and sometimes less 
clearly in respect to the legal/illegal divide, by out of court settlement. 
 
 
Tax havens and Slovenian efforts 
 
How does Slovenia stand on taxes and providing secrecy and how does it 
tackle tax evasion via tax havens? First, as things look now, Slovenia is not 
a tax haven; it does not offer a tax-free (corporate) environment nor is it a 
very secretive jurisdiction. On the Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy 
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Index that appeared in 2015 it occupies a position number 88, with a se-
crecy score of 34. This is the second best position within the EU just after 
Finland as far as the extent of secrecy is concerned (Tax Justice Network, 
2015).5 On the other hand, the corporate income tax rate in Slovenia is 
among the lowest in the euro zone – in 2016 it was 17% (declining from 
the high of 25% in 1995), while the personal income tax is comparatively 
high and rises to 50% percent for the highest bracket; the rate ranges from 
16% to 50%.  
 In contrast to all other western countries, Slovenia has just raised the 
corporate tax in 2017 by two percent points to 19 percent, while at the same 
time making some reductions in individual income tax rates. According to 
the Ministry of Finance, increasing corporate income tax will not hurt Slo-
venia’s competitiveness, as it still remains among the lowest in Europe 
even after the increase to 19%. (Cf. Reuters, 2016).  
 Therefore, Slovenia currently maintains its corporate income tax at 
comparatively low levels and in turn relies more on the personal income 
tax and the value-added tax (VAT). However, this in fact means that Slo-
venian government levies higher taxes on its population; VAT in particular 
disproportionally affects poorer citizens.  
 Despite the comparatively low corporate tax some wealthier Slovenian 
tax payers find the idea of tax dodging in tax havens attractive. The prob-
lem is not at all a novelty for the Slovenian tax administration (Finančna 
uprava Republike Slovenije – FURS).6 According to its own report it con-
tinuously deals with this issue and has been successful to some degree in 
identifying and recovering taxes evaded through tax havens. From 2011, a 
special Project Tax Havens is underway and FURS publishes regular re-
ports on its results. The report shows the number of “focused controls” of 
natural and legal persons that FURS launched in each year together with 
the amount of tax in million euros that they established to be missing. 
These data are presented in Table 1 below:  
 
                                                 
5  The index ranks jurisdictions from exceptionally secretive (91-100) to 
moderately secretive (31-40). 
6  A recent discovery in the archives of the former ‘one party’ controlled secret 
service (SDV – UDBA) made clear that even in the time of socialist Yugosla-
via many big Slovene firms and banks owned subsidiaries in tax havens, many 
of them allegedly controlled by SDV (Pezdir, 2017).  
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Table 1. 
Project Tax havens - official data of the Slovene tax administration 
(Source: FURS, 2017: 4) 
Project tax 
havens 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Number  
of focused 
controls 
- 22 185 341 168 142 106 43 
Taxes 
evaded in 
million €  
- 6,1 3 3,5 12,3 2,4 2,8 6 
 
The table shows that the number of focused controls was rising through the 
years 2010 to 2012 followed by what looks like a steady decline from 2013 
to 2016, which in itself may or may not reflect any underlying shifts in the 
amount of tax evasion through tax havens. We also see that the officially 
established total amount of evaded tax is ranging from 2,4 to 12,3 million 
euros per year and totals 36,1 million euros in six years from 2010 to 2016.  
 In addition, in 2016, FURS published online anonymised details of its 
decisions in order to increase the visibility and transparency of its efforts 
against tax evasion using tax havens (Cf. Boštic, 2017b). In March 2017, 
FURS also published typical examples: a kind of typology of the ways tax 
avoidance using tax havens typically takes place (FURS, 2017: 5-7).7 
 The activities of FURS reflect only the cases of which they somehow 
get the information. The real extent of illegal tax evasion through tax ha-
vens remains an open question. In these circumstances, whistle-blowers 
are good news to FURS. Without their help, the secret untaxed wealth re-
mains “an unknown unknown”; without their help FURS is left searching 
for a needle in a haystack which is extremely costly with a uncertain final 
result. 
 We see that FURS started its focused activities already in 2011, before 
the recent political impetus provided by the Panama papers and Paradise 
documents. Despite the presented figures, the success of these activities is 
                                                 
7  Apart from tax evasion, secrecy jurisdictions may also play a role in bank-
ruptcy fraud. Officially, bankrupted debtors avoid effectively paying taxes and 
debts by hiding wealth in tax havens. Secrecy jurisdictions do not respond to 
the official demands to disclose the beneficial owners and therefore such ‘vir-
tually’ bankrupt debtors effectively get away with it (Cf., Boštic, 2017a, see 
also, e.g. Zgaga, 2015).  
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impossible to asses due to the unknown untaxed wealth. However, in com-
parison to the total amount of taxes collected for the state budget by FURS, 
for example 8,7 billion euros in 2017, the average 5,1 million euros per 
year so far identified by this kind of focused controls represents a very tiny 
share of the whole taxable wealth.  
 
 
Slovenians in Panama and Paradise papers  
 
As we know, the Panama papers consist of more than 10 million leaked 
financial documents created by a Panama law firm Mossack Fonseca. The 
documents leaked to the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung by an 
anonymous whistle-blower deal with more than two hundred thousand off-
shore entities. According to the media many of them were employed ex-
clusively as shell corporations used to facilitate tax evasion and eventual 
other illegal or criminal activities (ICIJ, 2016).  
 Worldwide the discoveries led to many official and internal8 investiga-
tions and accompanying intense media coverage primarily of cases that in-
volved politicians and other public figures. Among them was a small num-
ber of Slovenian beneficial owners. It turned out that a Ljubljana based 
consulting firm owned by a Slovene citizen acted as a main intermediary 
to Mossack Fonseca. Through this channel, it has registered companies for 
74 Slovenian natural persons – beneficial owners. As reported by Anuška 
Delić from Delo, the consulting firm opened 17 companies through Mos-
sack Fonseca: one at the British Virgin Islands and 16 in Anguilla, where 
there are virtually no taxes, and no agreements with other countries on dou-
ble taxation exist (Delić, 2016a). Apart from this number, the daily Delo 
decided not to reveal all beneficial owners that surfaced, but only those 
cases that in their view fit the criterion of being in the ‘public interest’.  
 Among the most notable publicly disclosed beneficial owners were: the 
so called ‘king of steroids’ (a person on the US Drug enforcement fugitives 
list (Cf. Delić, 2016b)); a couple of sportsmen; one drug administration 
                                                 
8  For problematic aspects of internal investigation of suspected white collar 
crimes triggered by Panama papers in the largest Scandinavian bank Nordea 
and in particular its Luxembourg branch, see Gottschalk (2016).  
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inspector; a public notary; an honorary consul, but no Slovenian nor for-
eign politicians. The content in most cases corresponded with a common 
tax haven rationale: off-shore registered companies of these beneficial 
owners were not doing business themselves – they owned shares in other 
companies. In case of selling these shares, no capital gain tax would ever 
be declared in Slovenia as the beneficial owners and the whole scheme 
would remain secret to Slovene tax authorities.  
 The government responded to the media provoked public indignation 
and promised action. The Prime Minister Cerar appointed a strategic work-
ing group to prepare additional measures for tackling the abuse through tax 
havens more effectively. Further, the Police produced two criminal charges 
so far, while the Specialised State Prosecutor’s office was conducting one 
ongoing criminal investigations (Delić, 2017). 
 Interestingly, the Slovene Chamber of tax advisers welcomed the dis-
coveries and stressed the need to strengthen the regulation and licensing 
requirements for tax advisers, among other to prevent such aggressive tax 
consultancy. They pointed out that the consulting firm that acted as an in-
termediary to Mossack Fonseca was not a member of the Chamber (Delo, 
2017) implying as it appears that their members would do no such things. 
 The more recent Paradise papers leak put light on the “top end of the 
world of offshore finance” (BBC News, 2017). This leak is composed of 
documents from two firms that provide offshore legal services: Appleby 
law firm based in Bermuda and Asiaciti Trust based in Singapore and co-
vers nineteen secrecy jurisdictions. So far the leak has brought up only six 
additional Slovenes as beneficial owners of tax haven based corporations. 
Thus Paradise papers, coming after Panama papers discovery, did not bring 
about a substantial change in the assessment of the scope of the problem, 
nor in the Slovene government’s position on the matter.  
 Do the 74 beneficial owners in the Panama papers and the 6 in the Par-
adise documents look like a modest catch? Yes, indeed. Very probably, the 
numbers will be even lower after cases are scrutinized by FURS. The me-
dia suggested a partial explanation; based on their other research and 
sources the Slovenes prefer European jurisdictions, mostly Lichtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus9 and Malta. In a separate research conducted by Delo 
                                                 
9  For example, media reported of a successful Slovene IT firm that developed 
first in Slovenia but then at some point moved its seat to Cyprus. In 2017, it 
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76 Slovenian beneficial owners (70 natural and 6 legal persons) surfaced 
out of the Maltese business register (Cf., Gole, 2017; Delić, 2017). In ad-
dition, the media recently also pointed out the nearby Bosnia and Herze-
govina (and its Republika Srbska in particular) as good hiding places 
(Mihajlović, 2018). 
 On the level of political parties, the reactions to these discoveries were 
mixed. Even though all of them denounced illegal tax evasion, only one of 
them in opposition demanded of the government to be more pro-active in 
the fight against tax havens. It also demanded a more ambitious reaction of 
the state and suggested and prepared an extensive action plan by itself. The 
government refused these demands as “not needed”. It only agreed to reg-
ularly report on its anti-tax havens activities to the Parliament and to com-
pose a list of state owned firms dealing with tax havens, presumably as a 
message to them that they are being watched (Cf., Združena levica 2016, 
2017).  
 Before we address the possible future stance of Slovenia on tax dodging 
via tax havens let us briefly point out options that states have at their dis-
posal.  
 
 
What can a harmed state do? 
 
Sovereign states caught up in a ring with free riding tax havens/secrecy 
jurisdictions have four options: they can decide to become a tax haven 
themselves and compete on the other side; they can enact more aggressive 
defence measures; they can actively join multilateral efforts against tax ha-
vens and finally, and they can do a combination of all or some of these 
things. 
 
Switching sides: becoming a tax haven  
 
In theory a state can switch sides. Although the supply of secrecy jurisdic-
tions is already abundant, some states may consider this option seriously, 
                                                 
was sold for almost a billion euros, while the Slovene tax administration re-
mained apparently empty handed. (Cf. Derčar, 2017; Dnevnik, 2016; cf. also 
Koprivec and Bajec, 2017: p. 25-30).  
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even though the best time to do this is probably over. This option needs to 
solve the riddle of how to raise sufficient revenues and eventually flourish 
and at the same time manage all international and other problems that the 
new status will bring about. The transition to a tax haven may not come 
overnight and in a pompous way, indeed many long established and 
younger tax havens never openly admit that they are what they are. How-
ever, the market for tax haven’s services is competitive and some would-
be paradis fiscaux have failed to succeed for this or that reason (Cf. Palan 
et al., 2010: 29-30). A smart and even less transparent version of this op-
tion is to create an ‘inner’ tax haven(s). These are states, autonomous re-
gions or jurisdictions within a (federal) state that function as tax havens or 
‘offshore jurisdictions’ within a “normal state”. Many times cited exam-
ples of such ‘inner tax havens’ are Delaware, Nevada and some other states 
in the USA (Ibid.). One can also become a de facto tax haven by leaving 
the law on the books intact and start granting numerous secrete favourable 
advance tax rulings to individual corporations or individuals functioning 
as tax avoidance scheme as was revealed by, for example the Luxembourg 
leaks in 2014 (Cf. ICIJ, 2014). 
 Therefore, in theory deciding to become a tax haven is an analytically 
interesting policy option with various sub-options and would demand a 
much broader analysis that we can undertake here. The second, much more 
prevalent option is to fight back. 
  
States acting in a proactive self-defence  
 
The prime problem of tax administrations of the world is information 
asymmetry. The simplest but optimistic solution to tax the hidden wealth 
would be to get the tax haven assist you in obtaining the information 
needed. Most of the time tax havens will refuse to cooperate even if a bla-
tant violation of another jurisdiction’s laws is involved (Cf., Workman, 
1982: 686, 679). The essence of tax havens is defending its secrecy for 
which they have very good economic reasons.  
 Strong states such as, for example, USA, France and Germany, may 
sometimes unilaterally press tax havens by threatening with sanctions or 
by rewarding leaks. Sometimes they succeed.  
 Germany in particular provides a recent example of how this is done. It 
has a long history of trying to resolve tax ‘problems’ with the neighbouring 
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tax havens like Switzerland and Liechtenstein and tries to exert pressure 
unilaterally and share its successes with other states. For example in a re-
cent well reported case German officials paid whistle-blowers millions of 
Euro for 11 CDs with data on the beneficial owners of secret Swiss bank 
accounts since 2010. This led some 120.000 German citizens to self-report 
their Swiss accounts and to an alleged 18 million recovery of unpaid taxes 
(Reuters 2012). In 2016 the media reported that the German state involved 
in this case – North Rhine-Westphalia – has passed stolen CDs to twenty 
seven other countries (SWIswissinfo.ch, 2016).  
 However, Switzerland, from its point of view considers buying data sto-
len from Swiss banks a violation of Swiss banking laws and a crime of 
economic espionage. Thus it launched a counter attack by trying to secure 
evidence against the German tax investigators with the help of the Swiss 
intelligence service. The operation ended when a Swiss spy was arrested 
on criminal charges in a Frankfurt hotel in April 2017. He was suspected 
of having spied inside North Rhine-Westphalia Finance Ministry since 
2012. His targets were the German tax investigators that carried out the 
operation of buying stolen data. The Swiss spy was sentenced to a sus-
pended sentence of one year and ten months together with € 25.000 fine. 
(Cf., BBC Europe, 2017).  
 
Joining multilateral efforts  
 
Apart from acting on their own as we have seen in the example of Ger-
many, the victimized states may close ranks. Indeed one of the leading re-
searchers of tax havens, Gabriel Zucman, suggests that the only way to 
reach a decisive global breakthrough is by means of extreme political pres-
sure. He suggests the coalition of states should impose harsh enough pen-
alties – customs duties, financial embargo, excluding tax havens from in-
ternational organisations and even excluding the tax havens members of 
the EU from the EU! (Zucman, 2015, 2016). 
 At the moment the multilateral efforts against tax havens are led by the 
IMF and the OECD with its BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) ini-
tiative and in particular by the EU with, among other, its External Strategy 
for Effective Taxation (EU Commission, 2016). 
 Indeed, in light of the Panama papers affair the EU Commission became 
more active. In January 2016, it presented its Anti-Tax Avoidance Package 
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focused on corporate taxation and in particular on aggressive tax planning 
within the EU (EU Commission, 2016). Among other, the obligatory ex-
change of information on ‘tax rulings’ is in place since January 2017. The 
Commission also promised to prepare a whistle-blower protection di-
rective, to launch again its Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in-
itiative and to produce the official list of tax havens – the announcement 
that triggered a wider media attention – by the end of 2017. The specula-
tions as to who might appear on the first ever EU list of ‘non-cooperative 
tax jurisdictions’ were widespread. Once the list was published in Decem-
ber 2017 it turned out that it does not cover EU member states, which did 
surprise many observers. (Cf. Damijan, 2017b). The Commission ex-
plained that it uses different tools against unfair and non-transparent taxa-
tion within the EU and that is why the EU member states do not appear on 
the list that is supposed to be the instrument of the ‘external strategy’ only. 
To many that looked like an excuse.  
 Without going into the many details of the present initiatives the ques-
tion remains whether the EU is a big enough global player that it can sub-
stantially reduce the ‘threat’ of tax havens? The other question is whether 
the member states can truly unite in light of the divergent political interests 
that they have on the matter. Some of the member states may have a vested 
interest in status quo. This has implications for the effectiveness of the new 
measures, which can be continually undermined, if not directly, by built-
in deliberate loopholes. Is thus the concern and indignation on the EU level 
genuine or mostly rhetorical? The ongoing challenge to build a common 
political will is far from resolved.  
 
 
Is the global solution rapidly underway? What is Slo-
venia’s stance?  
 
Obviously, states defending themselves alone or in small groups will not 
succeed in tackling the fast moving off-shore targets. In particular as the 
main strings are allegedly pulled by the main political and financial centres 
onshore. In the aftermath of Panama papers a former Harvard professor of 
economics Jeffrey Sachs pointed out the systemic onshore embeddedness 
of the problem:  
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“Tax havens do not just happen. The British Virgin Islands did not be-
come a tax and secrecy haven through its own efforts. These havens are 
the deliberate choice of major governments, especially the United King-
dom and the United States, in partnership with major financial, account-
ing, and legal institutions that move the money.  
The abuses are not only shocking, but staring us directly in the face. We 
didn’t need the Panama Papers to know that global tax corruption 
through the havens is rampant, but we can say that this abusive global 
system needs to be brought to a rapid end.” (Sachs cited in Oxfam, 
2016). 
 
Two years after the Panama papers the tax havens have not been brought 
to a rapid end. Obviously, we are still at the beginning of some kind of 
effective global reaction. In addition, as we saw, many aspects of the phe-
nomenon are not known and many questions remain unanswered. Apart 
from the lacking political will the main obstacles appear to be bank se-
crecy, no economic or other incentive on the side of tax havens to start to 
cooperate in good faith and the unwillingness on the side of the banks to 
tackle money laundering very seriously because of the fear of losing clients 
(Cf., Zucman, 2016: viii-ix). 
 But the Panama papers and the Paradise documents did move public 
opinion and created the rare momentum. This situation in turn built pres-
sure that in some places resulted in a political will to address the problem. 
But how long will that last?  
 If the political will is essential, the history of regulating international 
finance and indeed, tax havens so far, does not leave us very optimistic. 
Until very recently the dominant paradigms in this area were well known 
contrary slogans: deregulation and further reduction of the role of the state. 
Today, at least in theory, the voices against this paradigm are stronger, but 
the practice has not witnessed the decisive shift. Previous attempts to enact 
more effective worldwide regulation of finance do not fuel optimism. The 
reforms introduced after the Savings and Loans scandal in the late eighties 
and early nineties in the USA and the regulatory reforms in the aftermath 
of the 2008 financial crises were modest, to say the least (Cf. Dorn, 2010, 
2015; Jager, 2015, Štiblar, 2016). 
 Is, bearing in mind such a track record, an effective global solution of 
the tax haven problem realistic? Slavoj Žižek, for example, thinks it is not 
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and describes Pikkety (2014, 2015) and other tax haven fighters as “utopi-
ans”:  
 
“I think he’s utopian because he simply says that the mode of produc-
tion has to remain the same; . . . my claim is that if you imagine a world 
organisation where the measure proposed by Piketty can effectively be 
enacted, then the problems are already solved. Then already you have a 
total political reorganisation, you have a global power which effectively 
can control capital, we already won.” (Žižek, 2014) 
 
On the other side, Picketty, Zucman, Murphy, the NGO Oxfam and others 
(the ‘utopians’ in Žižek’s view), while acknowledging that we are still at 
the beginning, remain optimistic about achieving global, multilateral solu-
tion. They believe tax paradises can be fought to the final victory. The rest 
of us are in no better position than to wait and see.  
 The Slovenian government is of course not particularly interested in 
such theoretical frame of discussion. States, in particular smaller ones, nav-
igate their self-interest pragmatically and will continue to do that in the 
future.  
 To begin with, we predict that Slovenia will not consider becoming a 
tax haven as an option. On the contrary, it will continue its unilateral de-
fensive efforts (FURS) and may even start acting more aggressively in a 
proactive self-defence. At present, it is impossible to assess the success of 
these efforts as the size of wrongly untaxed wealth is simply not known. 
As remarked before, in comparison to the total tax collected in Slovenia 
per year the size of FURS’s catch (Project Tax havens) is tiny. It looks like 
neither Panama nor Paradise leaks will contribute in any substantial way 
to change this impression. It remains to be see how the situation will evolve 
in the future.  
 In the end we predict that Slovenia will continue to participate actively 
in various multilateral defensive initiatives, in particular within the EU 
where so far it has been among the more proactive members.  
 Bearing in mind the position of the majority of political parties and 
based on what we have seen so far, it can be said that Slovenia will, like 
most other countries, continue to ride two horses at the same time. On the 
one hand, it will be among those member states that actively support the 
EU and other multilateral defensive mechanisms against tax haven gener-
ated erosion of its tax bases. On the other hand, while waiting for the global 
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systemic solution of the tax haven problem to happen (either by the way 
suggested by Žižek or by the way suggested by the ‘utopians’), it will very 
probably actively take part in the global competitiveness race where 
providing a tax friendly (corporate) environment continues to be one of the 
main issues.  
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The crusade for purity 
Corruption and laundering 
 
Petrus C. van Duyne, Jackie H. Harvey and Liliya Y. Gelemerova1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: corruption and integrity offences 
 
 
Corruption emerges and re-emerges over time in multiple variations as it 
touches many sides of society. Therefore, how corruption is addressed 
within a country usually depends on perception, the emotion it evokes, its 
scale, politics and the affluence of its population. These determinants are 
interconnected. It is commonly believed that corruption occurs in impov-
erished regions and that corruption makes poor nations poorer. However, 
corruption in affluent regions may be overlooked as it is felt less acutely. 
Perception can cause bias and value judgements. For instance, if a politi-
cian in a society seen as democratic and affluent, passes plum jobs to kin-
folk. This would not necessarily be described as corruption despite the ap-
parent nepotism. If this occurs in an emerging market or a developing 
country, then it will most certainly be viewed as a manifestation of en-
grained corruption and invoke condemnation. 
 Likewise, prejudice can lead to a distorted perception of corruption 
prevalence. For example, geographically there is a north-south and an east-
west prejudice. Northern countries (protestant) would typically be seen as 
less corrupt than southern ones (catholic). Or, ‘the east’ would be more 
corrupt than ‘the west’ (in view of the roundness of the globe a strange 
                                                 
1  The authors are respectively: visiting and emeritus Professor at Northumbria 
University and Utrecht University; Professor of Financial Management at 
Northumbria University; and Honorary Senior Lecturer at the University of 
Manchester. 
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saying). Then we have the dichotomy of developed and developing coun-
tries with accompanying prejudices. 
 All this illustrates that we are dealing with a ‘hot subject’: the reproach 
of being biased or condescending to a group of countries is easily made. A 
researcher’s task is to steer clear of such value judgments and treat corrup-
tion as a similar form of ‘rational law breaking’: profit-seeking abuse of 
office or position.  
 Is that the essence of corruption? No, the formulation seems too broad. 
Selling sexual services where such are prohibited is not considered corrup-
tion (despite ideological objections). However, paying a brothel’s bouncer 
for access in breach of entry restrictions may be corruption: you buy a de-
cision against the rules. This case contains all elements of corruption which 
can be defined as: 
 
An improbity in decision-making or decay in the decision-making pro-
cess in which a decision-maker (in private or public service) consents 
to deviate from the criterion which should rule his decision making, in 
exchange for a reward, the promise or expectation of it (Van Duyne, 
2001, p. 75).  
 
This formal definition centres on decision making: the decision maker has 
power to provide or withhold something which, in a criminal interaction, 
becomes a tradable asset. Surprisingly, the OECD, the Council of Europe 
and the UN Conventions do not formally define ‘corruption’, although it is 
generally loosely described as misuse of public office for private profit or 
gain). Instead, a set of corruption offences is listed.2  
 In most literature the conceptual circle is even wider. The definition of 
Transparency International (TI) is “misuse of public power for private ben-
efit”. This definition is elegant in its simplicity, but it does not delineate 
sharply enough: it encompasses (grand) embezzlement and other forms of 
illegal or unethical enrichment.3 While embezzlement is seen as a form of 
                                                 
2  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Inter-
national Business Transactions; United Nations Convention against Corrup-
tion (2005); Council of Europe Convention on Corruption. These are discussed 
later in the chapter. 
3  Although we recognise that complex embezzlement typically involves more 
than one individual. 
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corruption, it is different from corruption as described above: it does not 
necessarily involve the illegal exchange of interests in a decision making 
process with other parties. In addition, abuse of office can also occur in the 
private sector and for purposes other than ‘private benefit’. For example, 
nepotistic appointments of relatives or allowing inappropriate advantages 
to a friend (cronyism). Within the whole circle of integrity breaches we 
have the abuse of office, which by its nature requires a formal relationship 
to an employing entity. Not all abuse involves corrupt conduct. Neither 
should abuse of office always result in direct financial profits. For example, 
office space may be misused after office hours for secret parties or as a 
personal studio. Within that circle of abuse of office we find the ‘hard core’ 
corruption as a sub-set in decision making situations. 
 One often finds the terms abuse, corruption, fraud and deceit used in 
changing conjunctions or as a word string in a sentence or text. This may 
be handy but remains imprecise. For ease of reference we will cluster these 
criminal manifestations under the concept of ‘integrity offences’.  
 
 
Integrity offences and laundering 
 
As follows from the previous section, including integrity broadens the 
scope substantially. Therefore we will focus on acquisitive manifestations 
of integrity breaches with a major impact on society. This is also an am-
biguous demarcation: what is major impact? In the literature this is often 
referred to as ‘grand corruption’, though that is often technically grand em-
bezzlement. That does not help us: the term ‘grand’ is also an open concept 
determined by the economic context of a country. Against the background 
of (international) scandals (e.g. Brazil, Peru, South Africa, Spain) that pro-
foundly affected the countries involved, we will focus on income of a vol-
ume that needs management and laundering,4 although we recognise that, 
cumulatively, petty corruption offences can also be of significant impact 
on the economy and public trust of a country: e.g. parole or traffic police, 
health care workers (Van Duyne and Stocco, 2012). However, proceeds 
                                                 
4  For the purpose of this chapter we define money laundering as “falsely claim-
ing a legitimate source for an illegally acquired advantage” (Van Duyne, 
2003, p. 69). 
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from petty offences enter the financial system through ‘percolation’ (as 
daily expenses) and remain typically ‘under the radar’. Our interest con-
cerns proceeds from corrupt conduct exceeding the average household ex-
penses and are in need of separate laundering (Van Duyne, 2003).  
 Large-scale integrity offences are likely to attract law enforcement at-
tention. Confidential data leaks can provide leads of inquiry. But more im-
portantly, criminal assets management (CAM/laundering) is expected to 
draw the attention of the ‘gatekeepers’ of the financial system’s integrity. 
These are entities required by the law to report financial transactions they 
consider unusual or suspicious. Within the international anti-money laun-
dering regime such suspicious transaction reports (STRs)5 are submitted to 
national Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). These ‘gatekeepers’ range 
from relationship managers and compliance officers in banks, to notaries 
and art and antique dealers. Through their reporting criminal revenues from 
integrity offences come onto the radar of regulators and law enforcement 
agencies. 
 Within the framework of the global anti-laundering regime, this CAM 
also comes in an aggregated form onto the radar of the Financial Action 
Task Force on money laundering (FATF), the international anti-laundering 
standards setter through ‘recommendations’ for the global financial system 
and designated professions and businesses. The FATF issues ‘typologies’ 
and evaluates how countries comply with its 40 Recommendations.6 
 Tackling the management of the proceeds of integrity offences is also 
within the remit of the FATF. Given the significance of the FATF, it is 
important to know its position regarding the proceeds of integrity offences. 
Therefore, in this chapter we will investigate how the FATF deals with 
integrity offences, their prevalence and impact.  
                                                 
5  In the US and the UK these are called ‘suspicious activity reports’ (SARs), 
whereas STRs refer to reports of transactions above $10.000 (in the US) or 
market abuse (in the UK). However, the FATF and most other countries use 
the denotation STR, which we adopt in this chapter. 
6  The first list of Recommendations was issued in 1990, followed by revisions 
in 1996, 2001, 2003 and most recently in 2012. The 2001 revision (in response 
to the terrorist 11th September attacks in the US) extended the FATF mandate 
to include Counter Terrorism. As a consequence, Special Recommendations 
directed at financing of terrorism were added to the list of 40 Recommenda-
tions (first eight, a year later the ninth). The 2012 version of the Recommen-
dations reincorporates the additional special Recommendations to revert to a 
list of 40. 
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Methodology 
 
Sources 
 
For our enquiry we made a search through documents the FATF published 
on its website: 
 Annual reports from the inception of the FATF to date; 
 Mutual Evaluation Reports of countries which had undergone a fourth 
round evaluation; 
 President’s summary of the outcomes from the experts’ meeting on cor-
ruption: 2011-2016; 
 Conference comment by Davis Lewis, May 2016; 
 Typologies on the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, 2011; 
 Plenary reports; 
 Support papers such as ‘Reference guide and information note on the 
use of Recommendations in the fight against corruption’ (October 
2012); best practices papers and practical hand-outs on ‘specific risk 
factors in the laundering of the proceeds of corruption, both issued in 
2012. 
 
In addition, we will make use of open sources where cases of integrity of-
fences are discussed or revealed, as well as publications of relevant NGOs 
and professional journals.  
 
Content analysis: the mutual evaluation reports 
 
One of the most commonly used techniques for evaluating reports is that 
of content analysis as it provides a way in which (a) the perceived im-
portance of an issue can be determined and (b) changes in that perception 
can more readily be identified (Krippendorff,1980). The method can be 
applied quantitatively (for example counting words, sentences paragraphs) 
or qualitatively (isolation of key themes and analysis of the sentence struc-
ture and meaning). Irrespective of approach, the value in content analysis 
is not what is counted but how the researcher sets out the conditions, under 
which the search took place (Riffe et al., 2014; Lacey, et al., 2015) in a 
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way that is systematic and replicable (Riffe et al., 2014; Lacey, et al., 2015; 
Powell,1997; Krippendorff, 1980). Quantitative approaches employed in-
clude simple word counting (see for example: Campbell, 2003, 2004); sen-
tence counting (see for example: Deegan et al., 2000); and, page propor-
tioning (see for example: Unerman, 2000).  
 Examples of both quantitative and qualitative methods have been fol-
lowed within the field of corruption. Andersson (2010) carried out a qual-
itative content analysis through ‘claims-making’ of three anti-corruption 
reports authored by the World Bank7 More recently, Czibik et al. (2016) 
employed word-based quantitative analysis (employing corruption or pre-
selected related terms such as bribery, backhanders or kickbacks) to ana-
lyse coverage of corruption within news media in Hungary.  
 
Approach followed 
 
The aim of this part of the study was to consider the degree of attention 
paid to ‘corruption’ within a sample of Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs) 
conducted by teams of assessors (deemed to be experts) of the FATF. The 
MERs are important as they describe a country from the perspective of its 
compliance with the Recommendations. However, that is a specific filter, 
not intended to describe the world ‘as it is’ but the state of compliance with 
FATF’s recommendations. The result is a judgment by six to eight asses-
sors of a varying degree of objectivity, with corruption not necessarily 
mentioned as an item. Thus, while MERs are important sources, we must 
interpret them cautiously.  
 As remarked, we analysed a selection of the outcomes of two evaluation 
rounds: the third and the fourth. The reason for this choice is that in this 
way we have two measurements and can control for the difference in as-
signment and FATF methodology. In a developed approach from the third 
round, the fourth round is carried out from the angle of risk and threat as-
sessment, which is broader than corruption: corruption is considered as a 
money laundering risk in the first place.8  
                                                 
7  ‘Claims-making’ originates in the sociology of social problems and relates to 
normative conditions that ought not to exist and about which something needs 
to be done (Nichols, 1997; Harvey and Ashton, 2015). 
8  In undertaking this analysis, we acknowledge that the underlying methods em-
ployed in the two rounds are different. However, although corruption had come 
225 
 
 We applied a quantitative content analysis as an approximation of how 
serious and important corruption was judged: as a risk to society and as a 
predicate to laundering. This resulted in a count of ‘corruption mentions’. 
Such a count has a caveat as it is not a fully external yardstick: it also re-
flects the opinion of the assessors. Therefore, we also compared it with an 
‘independent’ measure of corruption: the Transparency International Cor-
ruptions Perception Index for the years of the MERs.  
 The analysis was restricted solely to consideration of occurrence of the 
words ‘corruption’ and ‘bribery’. Consistent with the recommendation of 
Krippendorff (1980), we have identified sentences as our preferred unit. 
This was to account for the fact that the word ‘corruption’ appears multiple 
times in non-contextualised places such as headings etc., within the MERs.  
 Each report was searched using the ‘advanced find’ functionality within 
PDF documents. This enabled the context of the word to be assessed to 
ensure its relevance in terms of content so that sum-up sentences, word 
strings etc. could be identified. The documents of the other sources were 
also ‘combed’ for the occurrence of ‘corruption’, ‘bribery’, ‘abuse of of-
fice’ and ‘integrity’. This stock taking served as a reconnaissance of the 
spread of attention for integrity subjects related to laundering.  
 
 
Findings 
 
a. From first notice to enhanced awareness 
 
It would be counterfactual to say that awareness of corruption ‘emerged’ 
at some point of time after which it developed and unfolded into a global 
policy. We rather assume that some level of awareness of corruption has 
always been present. The corrupt rule of the president Mobutu (president 
of Zaire, 1965-1997) and Marcus (president of the Philippines, 1965-1986) 
needed no special awareness raising for their abuse of office, grand cor-
ruption and embezzlement.9 Their misconduct was condoned to ensure an 
                                                 
more to the fore within the risk-based approach of the fourth round, we main-
tain that it ought properly to have featured within the third round as a contrib-
utor to money laundering activity. 
9  Cite reference: Howard W. French, Mobutu Sese Seko, 66, Long time Dictator 
of Zaire, 8 September 1997, The New York Times. 
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anti-Soviet stance in the Cold War.10 However, in recent years, donor coun-
tries providing aid have become increasingly concerned about misappro-
priation of funds.11  
 Apart from a growing state of awareness, there were earlier clear signs 
that corruption in international trading relations had to be addressed. As a 
result of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission investigations in 
the mid-1970s it appeared that more than 400 US companies admitted hav-
ing furthered their business by paying bribes or providing favours of about 
$ 300 million to foreign governments and relationships. A famous case was 
the Lockheed scandal involving the Prince of the Netherlands. This was 
one of the cases that led to the passing of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 1977 (Gelemerova et al., 2018). It took more than ten years for a series 
of international events to unfold: in 1989, the year of birth of the FATF, 
the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) es-
tablished a working group to survey how national legislations address in-
ternational corruption. An EU Convention against corruption was drawn 
up in 1991.12 In 1994 the OECD Ministerial Council adopted the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention.13 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe adopted in 1996 the Programme of Action against Corruption, 
which was followed in 1999 by the Criminal Law Convention.14 The UN 
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) came later: adopted in 2003 and 
by October 2017 it was signed by 183 parties. Chapter V of UNCAC also 
                                                 
 https://partners.nytimes.com/library/world/090897obit-mobutu.html 
10  Howard W. French, Mobutu Sese Seko, 66, Longtime Dictator of Zaire, 8 
September 1997, The New York Times, https://partners.nytimes.com/li-
brary/world/090897obit-mobutu.html 
11  See for example ‘UK suspends aid to Uganda as concern grows over misuse 
of funds’. The Guardian 16 November 2012, available at 
  www.theguardian.com/global-development/2012/nov/16/uk-suspends-aid-
uganda-misuse Accessed 7 February 2018. 
12  Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 (2) (c) of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European 
Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union. 
 Official Journal C 195 , 25/06/1997 P. 0002 – 0011. 
13  Officially: Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions. The Convention came into force in 1999. 
Revised in 2009. 
14  Gelemerova (2010) discusses FCPA’s history and international anti-corruption 
legislation. 
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introduced international asset recovery and was considered a major break-
through.  
 Where there is so much confluence of political tributaries against cor-
ruption and given that the proceeds of (grand) corruption have to be laun-
dered, it is obvious that it should come within the remit of the FATF. The 
FATF is dependent on the G-7 (later G-20) which has an overlap with the 
OECD. Given this dependence, unsurprisingly, in general the FATF stayed 
also on this item in line with the dominant political community: the OECD, 
the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the EU and the USA.  
 The first mention of corruption as a laundering issue occurred in 
1994/95, a year after the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was signed: “In 
addition, there remains a significant threat of corruption, by criminals, of 
banks and their staff” (FATF-Annual Report (AR) 1994/95, p. 16). The 
mention stands alone and is not connected to corruption as a predicate of-
fence but as an operational threat to the integrity of banks.  
 In the following year corruption was mentioned four times, of which 
two concerned the threat of corrupt Eastern European banks (Russian in 
particular). Two mentions occurred as an aside in a summing-up sentence 
together with other categories of crime. One mention was contained within 
a statement about a specific Member State: “[and] other crimes as predi-
cate offences within the ambit of its money laundering statute” (FATF-AR, 
1995-96, p. 43). Another aside was for the future, in particular concerning 
the extension of the predicate offences beyond drug trafficking.  
 In similar fashion, we find in the FATF-AR 1996-97 that of the eight 
references to corruption, seven occurred in the usual summing-up sen-
tences of serious predicate offences. The eighth mention concerned the at-
tendance of the FATF at the 21st Conference of the European Ministers of 
Justice on corruption and organised crime. Clearly, the FATF kept pace 
with the political developments within the corruption portfolio.  
 In the subsequent annual reports, the references to corruption lacked 
depth and were few and far between. We find them in the FATF-AR 1997-
98: in the copied speech of IMF President Camdessus and in the summa-
rised Mutual Evaluations and description of the situation in Southeast Asia, 
Mexico, and the Black Sea region. Frequently, ‘corruption’ within MERs 
occurs in the summary statements pointing at the risk of drug trafficking, 
organised crime, fraud, tax evasion, corruption, human trafficking etc. Of 
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course, the order in this summing-up varied, but they were all serious of-
fences generating proceeds for laundering. Separate mentions concerned 
the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Commission Expert Group 
meeting in March 1999 and an International Anti-Corruption Conference 
in October 1999 in Durban (South Africa) during which the FATF Presi-
dent gave a presentation. 
 In 2003 the FATF issued its first mandatory requirements covering Po-
litically Exposed Person(s) (PEPs), their family members and close asso-
ciates. Given this significant event, it is perhaps surprising that in the 2002-
2003 AR, corruption was mentioned only two times and in the two follow-
ing years not at all. How big a problem is corruption when it can be ne-
glected or mainly mentioned by default? Can it sink into oblivion after its 
first surfacing?  
 Eventually the FATF and its President rescued this issue from oblivion. 
In the FATF-AR 2005-06, we read in the foreword of the President that 
“the devastating effects of money laundering linked with corruption” have 
to be examined. Thus, in 2005-06, the FATF initiated a cooperation with 
the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) to shed light on the 
symbiotic relationship between laundering and corruption. The report ob-
served “a critical need to (i) develop a greater understanding of how cor-
ruption damages the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems, and (ii) develop 
appropriate strategies to deal with the issue.” (p.7). At the joint FATF-
APG Plenary meeting in Singapore in June 2005, the two organisations 
decided to explore the issue and, among others, the ways in which corrup-
tion can undermine AML policy. 
 The Project Group expanded its membership soon in order to obtain 
broad international support. There were few who did not participate. We 
find, of course, the UN, IMF, World Bank, OECD, GRECO15 and the 
FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs).16 After the “successful” Plenary 
another followed in February 2006, with ESAAMLG, and a joint Typolo-
gies meeting with GAFISUD17 hosted by South Africa. More than 400 del-
egates from 44 jurisdictions discussed how to build an AML infrastructure. 
                                                 
15  The Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption. 
16  FATF Style Regional Bodies are regional stand-alone organisations which 
adopted the principles, standards and organisational structure of the FATF. 
17  ESAAMLG stands for Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering 
Group; GAFISUD if the South-American FATF Style Regional Body. 
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Corruption related money laundering was discussed, but to the extent it 
may undermine the AML-regime: laundering the proceeds of corruption 
was not the subject of any meaningful discussion. 
 After all these efforts, conferences and Plenaries, nothing happened. 
We find no mention of corruption in 2006-7; one mention in passing in 
2007-8; 2008-9 again none; but three in 2009-10 of which the most im-
portant was:  
 
“Also in response to the call by G20 leaders, the FATF has committed 
to publishing information to raise awareness on how AML/CFT 
measures may be leveraged to combat corruption and the FATF’s on-
going work to strengthen standards in this area” (FATF AR – 2009-
2010, p. 14).  
 
Corruption was also mentioned as one of the issues of the Working Group 
on Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering, but no context was pro-
vided. 
 What happened next after this serious call for awareness raising? The 
FATF started to move. In its following FATF-AR 2010-2011 the FATF 
President Luis Urrutia Corrral repeated the call of the G20 leaders that 
urged for higher priority to be given to the fight against corruption. The 
FATF had responded to this call with what one may consider as an ‘en-
hanced awareness’ which resulted in a significant output. The FATF pro-
duced six documents between 2011 and 2014: 
 Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption (July 2011); 
 Specific Risk Factors in Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption. Assis-
tance to Reporting Institutions (June 2012); 
 Reference Guide and Information Note on the use of the FATF Recom-
mendations to support the fight against Corruption (October 2012); 
 FATF Guidance: Politically Exposed Persons (Recommendations 12 
and 22) (June 2013); 
 Best Practices Paper: the use of the FATF Recommendations to combat 
Corruption (October 2013); 
 FATF Guidance: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership (October 
2014). 
 
In addition to this output, the FATF held five expert meetings from October 
2012 onwards, which were followed by an elaborate summary by the Pres-
ident of the FATF (or the Chairman of the meeting). Surveying this output 
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one may say that the FATF devoted much energy to the laundering aspects 
of proceeds of corruption.  
 The report Laundering of the proceeds of corruption is the most com-
prehensive and thorough. It is based on a study of 32 cases from 1965 to 
2008 involving 15 Presidents, three Prime Ministers (and/or wives or chil-
dren), ministers, governors and high-level civil servants. As is usual in 
such cases, the amount of money involved could only be roughly esti-
mated. According to Annex I of the report, the estimated damage or illegal 
earnings ranged from $ 1,8 million to $ 10.000 million. With this figure 
one must take into account that the abuse of office lasted throughout the 
rule of a President (or PM): that implies for decades. Philippines’ former 
president, Ferdinand Marcos, remained 21 years in office (1965-1986) and 
is estimated to have embezzled $10 billion; Pinochet remained in office for 
31 years (1973-2004) and allegedly embezzled ‘only’ $ 27 million. Sani 
Abacha (and sons) was in office from 1993 to 1998 and is suspected to 
have embezzled $3–5 billion.18 Although these cases were presented under 
the umbrella concept ‘corruption’, most references concern embezzlement: 
mentioned 18 times, while 12 cases refer to bribery. In eight cases a com-
bination of abuse of office was mentioned: embezzlement combined with 
bribery, extortion or ‘self-dealing’.19 
 “Lessons learned” from this study is that the AML-regime did not work, 
at least not in these cases of “grand corruption”. Many banks did not rec-
ognise the PEP, or if they did, they “failed to understand the source of the 
wealth” (p. 29), or they “fully understood that the money that was passing 
through PEP’s account was money from the national treasury” (p. 31). 
And for the FIUs, LEAs or supervising institutions? The project team con-
cluded that it “did not find any instance discovering corruption and pro-
actively alerting the affected country” (p. 32).  
                                                 
18  Of which in 2017 Switzerland returned $ 432 million. www.strait-
stimes.com/world/africa/switzerland-to-return-432-million- stolen-by-Nige-
rian-dictator 
19  “Self-dealing occurs when a PEP has a financial interest in an entity which 
does business with the state. The PEP is able to use his official position to 
ensure that the state does business with the entity, thereby enriching the PEP.” 
Ibid, p. 17. 
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 One important question addressed five years earlier by the then FATF 
president, however, remained untouched. That was: “a critical need to de-
velop a greater understanding of how corruption damages the effectiveness 
of AML/CFT systems”. Apparently this critical need was neither shared by 
the organisers nor by hundreds of attendants at the ‘expert meetings’.  
 Referring to the findings of the first report of 2011, the FATF issued 
guidance reports in which the PEP concept received much attention, to-
gether with the use of legal persons, geographical and industry sector spe-
cial risks. The guidance report “Specific Risk Factors” pointed at the need 
for financial institutions “to understand risks outside the context of identi-
fying and understanding and monitoring PEPs” (p. 4). To that end it pro-
vided a synopsis of geographic and product-, service- and transaction-risk 
factors. It also gave an overview of the many corruption indices that the 
financial institutions can consult to assess the risk attached to a customer. 
 By frequently referring to the applicable Recommendations, such as 
concerning (enhanced) Due Diligence (R.10; 22); PEP (R.12); or beneficial 
ownership of legal persons and legal arrangements (R.24, 25), the docu-
ments served as a proper ‘paper training session’. Naturally, they were also 
of use during the numerous experts meetings. As such, these publications, 
collecting existing knowledge, should have an awareness enhancing func-
tion to fight corruption and related laundering. Did that correlate with other 
output, such as the mutual evaluation reports or the corruption assessments 
such as gauged by perception indices?  
 
b. The Mutual Evaluation Reports: TI indices and corruption 
references 
 
It is reasonable to assume that with so much training, expert meetings and 
awareness raising something measurable should occur in the ‘real’ world 
of corruption. For example, if it is becoming increasingly difficult to con-
vert the proceeds of corruption into usable assets, something observable 
must have happened in the evaluated countries. Unfortunately, though this 
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should be the case, we only have indirect measurement sticks: e.g. the var-
ious integrity indices compiled by Transparency International (TI) and oth-
ers.20  
 These indices have obvious shortcomings. Firstly, there is their subjec-
tivity, due to relying on perception rather than evidence (Hough, 201621). 
Second, there is cross-contamination – FATF evaluation teams reference 
the TI index in their assessment, whilst the MERs form part of the data 
used by TI in arriving at their judgement. 
 As the TI Corruption Perception Index is widely used, we adopt this 
yardstick as an approximation of corruption in the public administration. 
In so doing, we are aware of the caveats and the lack of precision and sta-
tistical chance variation: e.g. a few points higher or lower between two 
measurement years does not necessarily mean a corresponding higher or 
lower extent of corruption.  
 We will give first a short description of the TI corruption yardstick, after 
which we will apply it to a sample of countries that have undergone a third 
and fourth mutual evaluation. We will inspect the MERs for the prevalence 
of corruption references: how often is corruption mentioned in a full sen-
tence? The assumption is that MERs of countries with a negative (low) TI 
index will have a higher frequency of references to corruption. We will 
then compare the fourth round compliance ratings on Recommendations 
linked to corruption with the TI indices of these countries.  
 
b.1. The TI corruption perception index 
 
TI traces its formation back to 1993. They operate internationally through 
national chapters and are proud of their independence. The details of data 
                                                 
20  Transparency International provides details on other measures (all maintained 
by TI) on its website page ‘measuring corruption’ 
  (http://www.transparency.org.uk/corruption/measuring-corrup-
tion/#.WiFDLVVl8qM). Accessed 21 December 2017. 
21  Washington Post ‘Here’s this year’s (flawed) Corruption Perception Index. 
Those flaws are useful’. By Dan Hough, 27 January 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/27/how-
do-you-measure-corruption-transparency-international-does-its-best-and-
thats-useful/?utm_term=.8f5019595df5. 
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used and on how the composite index is constructed is set out on their web-
site (see Corruption Perceptions Index 2016: Full Source Description22 and 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2016: Technical Methodology Note23).  
 The individual country score provides an indicator of corruption per-
ception within the public sector of a country on a standardised basis. The 
most recent 2016 survey scored 176 countries on a scale of 0 (highly cor-
rupt) to 100 (very clean).24 The countries are then ranked according to score 
from least to most corrupt. Of these countries, 121 or two thirds score be-
low the mid-point and the overall average score of 43,2, applying a general 
interpretation, indicates that wide areas of the world are very risky places 
to conduct business! 
 
b.2. Looking for correlations 
 
The fourth round is still in process; therefore, the findings are temporary. 
At the time of data collection (2016/17) 26 countries had been evaluated: 
See Table 1. Of these countries, we tallied the references to corruption in 
the third and last round to search for changes between these MERs. The 
distance in time between evaluations ranged from six to twelve years.  
 The differences between the TI-Indices of the two evaluation years 
ranged between one and nine points. Some countries ‘lost’ whilst others 
gained a few points. Of the 26 countries: 13 countries received lower rat-
ings, ten a better rating and for three, no data were available. The biggest 
changes concerned the ratings of Australia, Singapore and Spain: 8-9 
points negative. These are countries with a generally high TI score, well 
above the overall average score of 43,2. In contrast, most countries with a 
lower score than this general average ‘improved’ with a better rating in the 
year of the fourth evaluation round. The countries with an imporoved score 
were Serbia (from 35 to 42) and Sri Lanka (from 31 to 37). Two countries 
scored lower: Guatemala (from 32 to 28) and Uganda (from 28 to 25).  
 It is difficult to attribute these differences to potential causes, as these 
will be mixed with normal statistical variations. There are no background 
data to allow attributing these outcomes to the FATF-connected activities 
                                                 
22  Available at: CPI_2016_SourceDescriptionDocument_EN%20(2).pdf. 
23  Available at: CPI_2016_TechnicalMethodologyNote_EN%20(1).pdf. 
24  This paper was written before TI’s 2017 survey was published in February 
2018. 
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or national ML-policies. With the time difference between six and twelve 
years these ratings look rather stable. One should also take into account, as 
remarked before, that the TI ratings concern mainly perceptions of corrup-
tion, which are logically a derivative of underlying reality, but still remain 
subjective. Therefore, we took the midpoint between the two years and 
rank-ordered the countries according to this weighed TI score. The average 
score was 43,2 with Hungary above and Tunisia just below this dividing 
line. 
 How do these perception ratings compare with the corruption references 
in the two MERs rounds and with the compliance ratings for those recom-
mendations which, according to the FATF, are most relevant? We took the 
following Recommendations from the FATF Recommendations 2012 (up-
dated 2017): 
R. 10: Customer Due Diligence of financial institutions; 
R. 12: PEP; 
R. 22: DNFBPs (designated businesses and professions) Customer Due 
Diligence; 
R. 24: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons; 
R. 25: Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal arrangements. 
 
The rating for the level of compliance were full compliance (C), Largely 
Compliance (LP); Partial Compliance (PC) and No Compliance, which we 
converted into: 
 C  = 4 
 LP  = 3 
 PC  = 2 
 NC  = 1. 
 
We added these compliance ratings to a total as an ordinal scale index of 
the level of compliance to these five corruption relevant Recommenda-
tions. The results of this data collection, (a) the TI ratings, (b) corruption 
mentions and (c) the ratings on the five recommendations, are presented in 
Table 1.  
 
  
235 
 
Table 1. 
Country TI scores and corruption mentions in two  
Mutual Evaluation Rounds & 5 corruption linked Recommendations 
Country 
Mid-
point 
TI 
3rd 
Round 
men-
tions 
corr. 
4th 
round 
men-
tions 
corr. 
R10 
Due 
Dili-
gence 
R12 
PEP 
R22 
Due 
Dil. 
DNFB
P 
R24 
Ben. 
Own. 
Legal 
Pers. 
R25 
Ben. 
Own. 
Legal 
arr. 
Sum 
Com
pli-
ance 
Sweden 90 2 9 3 3 3 2 2 13 
Switzerland 88,5 34 33 2 3 2 3 3 13 
Singapore 88 46 80 4 4 2 2 2 14 
Norway 87,5 5 21 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Canada 84,5 11 37 3 1 1 2 1 8 
Australia 83,5 4 37 2 3 1 2 1 9 
Austria 77 4 15 3 2 2 2 2 11 
Belgium 75,5 24 7 3 2 3 3 3 15 
Spain 64 22 32 3 4 3 3 3 16 
Malaysia 50,5 70 90 4 3 3 2 2 14 
Italy 48 2 96 3 3 3 3 3 15 
Hungary 47,5 7 40 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Tunisia 41,5 5 93 2 2 2 2 1 11 
Serbia 38,5 37 73 2 2 2 3 2 12 
Jamaica 37,5 28 55 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Trinidad-Tob. 34,5 33 41 3 4 3 2 2 14 
Sri Lanka 34 11 62 1 1 1 1 1 5 
Guatemala 30 47 34 3 3 2 3 3 14 
Armenia 28,5 19 36 3 2 3 3 3 14 
Honduras 27,5 12 52 3 3 3 1 3 14 
Uganda 26,5 44 43 2 1 2 1 1 7 
Bangladesh 25 14 130 3 3 3 2 2 13 
Zimbabwe 21,5 59 41 2 2 2 1 1 8 
Fiji 0 31 56 2 2 1 2 2 9 
Samoa 45 17 15 2 2 2 2 2 10 
Vanuatu 31 5 23 2 3 2 1 1 9 
 53,3 593 1251       
 
We observe that the corruption mentions in the MERs have more than dou-
bled from the third to the fourth round. The group of countries with TI 
ratings above the average show an increase in corruption mentions, with 
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two exceptions: Belgium, which went from 24 to 7 mentions, and Switzer-
land, which remained practically the same. The group of countries below 
the TI average also had more corruption mentions, but with more excep-
tions: Guatemala, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Samoa containing fewer refer-
ences in the fourth round. 
 The most plausible explanation for this increase is the intensified atten-
tion to corruption due to the publications and FATF’s annual expert meet-
ings. However, its effects are whimsical with large jumps, as is the case 
with Italy and Bangladesh, and the substantial lower number of references 
to corruption in the MERs of Guatemala and Zimbabwe, both nevertheless 
perceived as very corrupt.  
 As a matter of fact: nothing correlates with anything. If we take the TI 
as the best available external measure of the level of corruption, we have 
an interpretation problem concerning the corruption references as well as 
the compliance ratings. Both corrupt and non-corrupt countries can have a 
reasonable or even good compliance with the FATF recommendations. 
 Thus, if these recommendations are intended to contribute to the fight 
against corruption, it cannot be concluded that their compliance has an ex-
ternal effect. The only effect that can be observed is a certain level of 
‘FATF satisfaction’. But that is an ‘internal effect’. 
 
b.3. Above the midpoint: the non-corrupt and less corrupt countries 
 
Not only the TI score and compliance, but also the word count (see Table 
1) should be interpreted cautiously. It is an indication, on an ordinal scale, 
of what assessors think worth mentioning than a precise scoring of the 
prevalence of corruption in the assessed country. Many ‘instances’ just oc-
cur in a summing-up sentence in which routinely three or four predicate 
crimes are mentioned as ‘serious problems’. Often corruption is one of 
them. Many instances are repetitions in conclusions and summaries. 
 Bribery was hardly mentioned as a problem in the third round. In line 
with the higher number of corruption references in the fourth round, brib-
ery was mentioned somewhat more, though it never reached double fig-
ures. In twelve MERs it was not even mentioned. This may be due to an 
‘absorption’ of bribery into the broader concept of corruption. Bribery may 
also be associated with ‘petty corruption’ with less need of laundering.  
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 Corruption as a social and economic problem usually does not manifest 
itself as a short-term phenomenon which emerges and disappears again. It 
is rather characterised by its long-term persistence. So one would expect 
that manifestations of corruption, for example, in real estate, would be 
mentioned in the MERs in both rounds: not only as a generally ongoing 
law enforcement issue, but mentioned by its specific form or economic 
sector. However, this did not appear to be the case in a systematic way. 
 When we first look at the countries above the midpoint 41,5 TI in our 
table, we observe only a few common denominators, between the two 
rounds and between the countries. Shared observations or concerns were 
expressed in the MERs of countries which saw corruption coming from 
abroad: the proceeds of corruption entering the country. In this manner, 
Australia, Austria, Singapore and Switzerland were identified as having 
received the proceeds of corruption from other countries. Either the pro-
ceeds were just transiting the country or were deposited requiring efforts 
to determine whether there was a PEP involved. For example, in its MER, 
Switzerland was mentioned in both rounds as the final destination of the 
proceeds of mega bribes or embezzlement by foreign heads of state or of 
the streams of slush money from the Brazilian Petrobas corruption affair. 
The same applies to Singapore, which in both rounds was mentioned as a 
kind of financial reception point of capital flight (not necessarily criminal) 
and grand corruption. There was no indication that this inflow of dirty 
money implied corruption at the receiving side or what this ‘receiving’ im-
plies: a simple transfer from a foreign bank account or cash deposit.  
 When we look at the countries with a lower TI ranking in this group – 
Belgium, Spain, Malaysia, Italy and Hungary – we also observe much di-
versity, across years and between countries.  
 Belgium had the lowest number of mentions of corruption in the fourth 
round (7), all referring to compliance procedures, but nothing about actual 
corruption, despite on-going corruption scandals.25 In the preceding third 
round it contained 24 references, but also here nothing factual about cor-
rupt acts and related laundering itself. There were mainly complaints about 
the lack of resources for the implementation of counter measures.  
                                                 
25  Volkskrant 24 July 2017. In particular, the Parti Socialiste in the Walloon prov-
inces has a history of corruption, cronyism and clientelism.  
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 The way in which corruption was presented differed for the MER of 
Italy. In the third round we see only two mentions, in the fourth round we 
find 96 mentions. It seems this is mainly caused by the adoption of corrup-
tion within a kind of crime ‘trinity’ of the three most important forms of 
predicate offences with money laundering relevance. These are: (1) tax and 
excise evasion (75% of total proceeds of crime); (2) drug trafficking and 
loansharking (15%) and (3) as remaining an ‘impure’ composite category 
of: corruption and bribery, fraud, theft and other profitable crimes (10%). 
There is no mentioning of the proportion of laundering within each offence 
type. This does not look like a very exact or serious approach: the important 
category of corruption is just submerged into an undifferentiated ‘left-over 
bag’. Nevertheless, this composite crimes category emerges in most tables 
(Italy is one of the countries with more statistics) increasing the mention 
frequency of corruption. That does not help our understanding. Further-
more, the tables are difficult to compare and we have reasons to suspect 
that the underlying data is not the same. Also, the assessors were obviously 
mainly (but not systematically, see table 11 within the report) interested in 
laundering and narrowed the database(s) to cases (suspects) with corrup-
tion-plus-laundering charges. Of course, laundering is inherent to receiving 
bribes, but does this approach lead to a responsible assessment of the seri-
ousness of corruption?  
 We attempted to get some clarity on this matter and compared the Ital-
ian assessment with that of Hungary as their weighed TI score differed only 
by 0,5 points. As measure of comparison, we took the number of convic-
tions for corruption in both countries. Unfortunately we were handicapped 
by the fact that in the Hungarian MER-fourth round, in contrast to the pre-
vious round, there is no breakdown of predicate offences. Telling for the 
FATF, no explanation why such important information has been dropped. 
So we are forced to compare the Italian fourth round time series of corrup-
tion convictions with the Hungarian third round.  
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Table 2. 
Frequencies of corruption related convictions: 
Italy (2011-2014) and Hungary (2006-2009) 
Hungary Italy 
Year Convictions Year Convictions 
2006 431 2011 597 
2007 369 2012 619 
2008 302 2014 558 
2009 230   
 
How can these findings be interpreted? In Italy (60 million inhabitants) 
corruption is presented as one of the three major proceeds-generating 
crimes (as we have seen: figures not separated). Nevertheless, the corrup-
tion conviction rates are modest, possibly even going down. Hungary is a 
much smaller country (10 million inhabitants), has almost the same TI in-
dex but a lower conviction prevalence. Maybe the Hungarian figures 
should be corrected for relative population size. In rounded figures, the 
Hungarian figures would then be multiplied by six, if such a linear extrap-
olation were allowed. It should be noted that in the fourth round MER in 
its National Risk Assessment Hungary rated its problem of corruption as a 
‘medium risk’. After a possible correction for population size such miti-
gating qualification might sound odd. At any rate, the number of convic-
tions have gone down in the time span 2006-2009, after which the series 
ends. Whether the trend continues towards an even lower prevalence can-
not be determined, but with a linear extrapolation it should have reached a 
zero level by now. With a TI of 47,5 that sounds only credible in an ‘illib-
eral democracy’.26 And Italy? If we accept this extrapolation, its corruption 
problem should at most be rated as ‘medium risk’, an assessment unlikely 
to be taken for granted outside the FATF.  
 There are two more countries of interest: Spain and Malaysia. Spain is 
of interest because of omissions in both MERs. Irrespective of its reasona-
ble good TI status (64), Spain has known various protracted corruption 
scandals in the real estate and banking sectors, which occurred during the 
                                                 
26  The ‘usual’ small bribe taker seems to have been replaced by the ‘usual’ grand 
oligarch. See “Victor Orbán’s oligarchs: a new elite emerges in Hungary. 
Prime minister has cultivated a group of friendly businessmen in what critics 
call crony capitalism” by N. Buckley and A. Byrne. The Financial Times, 21 
December 2017. Accessed 24 December 2017. 
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third as well as the fourth evaluation round but remained mostly unmen-
tioned. Thus corruption, nepotism and clientelism was a known local phe-
nomenon in both sectors. Illegal real estate development along the Medi-
terranean coast (particularly Marbella and Alicante) with 102 reported 
cases of corruption and more than 60 arrests was known internationally but 
went unnoticed in the third MER.27 Only in the fourth round MER there 
was a euphemistic mention of “some corruption cases, often involving 
town planning and real estate development” (p. 30). This led, among oth-
ers, to extend the PEP requirement to mayors and councillors of towns of 
more than 50.000 inhabitants (p. 169). Neither mention was made of the 
numerous cases of top-level political corruption, the involvement of banks 
or the many Spaniards facing trial for corruption: 1500 suspects between 
July 2015 and end 2016.28 
 The Malaysian MERs are also of interest when it comes to shedding 
light on corruption in the country. The MER-third round mentions the po-
litically expressed aim of the National Vision Policy (2001-2010) to attain 
“developed nation status” by 2020 (p. 16). That would imply fighting cor-
ruption as a national priority, good governance and business ethics. The 
government established a Malaysian Anti-Corruption Academy and an 
Anti-Corruption Agency with over 1.000 (!) staff (p. 40). This army han-
dled 62 investigations: period and outcome not clear from the reports. 
From 2002 to 2006 ACA received 123 STRs from the FIU. More figures 
on corruption are not available, although quantitative transparency is one 
of the priorities one would expect of a National Vision Policy. In the fourth 
round MER the 90 corruption references concern a lot of repeat sentences 
and organisation structures, intentions and summing-up sentences, but few 
facts. The few statistics mentioned concerned corruption cases combined 
with laundering: 139 investigations, 6 prosecutions and 2 convictions from 
2009-2013. Statistics of single corruption cases (without a laundering 
charge) are not provided even though the Malaysian ACC has a page on its 
website with monthly corruption arrests, trials and case description, with 
photos and names of the suspects for the sake of deterrence. By way of 
                                                 
27  Greenpeace España, 4 July 2006.  
 www.greenpeace.org/espana/es/news/2010/November/greenpeace-presenta-
su-nuevo/ www.telegraph.co.uk, Accessed 27 October 2017.  
28  www.politico.eu/.../spain-corruption-pp-rajoy-never-endin Accessed 27 Octo-
ber 2017. 
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example, five high value cases and one big case with a former senior po-
litical leader involved, also in illegal logging, were mentioned. In Septem-
ber 2015, at the time the MER was published, the grand corruption and 
abuse of office allegations concerning the ruling UMNO and Prime Min-
ister Najib Razak came to the open.29 This sheds doubt on the reliability 
and validity of this aspect of the MER. 
 
b.4. Below the midpoint: countries of concern 
 
How are the countries with a TI score lower than the midpoint described 
in their third and fourth MER? Looking at Table 1, the differences are con-
siderable. Tunisia refers to corruption only five times in its third round 
MER but this jumped to 93 in the fourth round MER. A country with the 
highest number of corruption references is Bangladesh: 14 and 130 in re-
spectively 2009 and 2016, while its TI index hardly improved: from 24 to 
26.  
 What happened to these countries? As we cannot discuss them all; we 
have to make a selection, beginning with the case of Tunisia with the high-
est TI score in this group. According to the third round MER, Tunisia is a 
country with mainly petty corruption. But, “Officials, broadly speaking, 
and in particular police officers, judges, and district attorneys, are subject 
to clear ethical obligations”. Members of the judiciary are threatened with 
“harsher penalties” for law breaking. Furthermore, “Tunisia has estab-
lished a system of clear principles and regulations in the area of transpar-
ency and good governance, based on international good practices and the 
European models.” With such a highly appraised ethical and transparent 
system, it is not surprising that the number of corruption cases is low: 143 
cases in 2003-2004 and 111 in 2004-2005.  
 What made the fourth round MER Tunisia so different? That was the 
‘Arab spring’ revolt of 2011, which took the lid from an apparently closed 
authoritarian society of kleptocrats. In contrast to the previous nice words 
                                                 
29  Prime Minister Najib Razak was accused of misappropriation of nearly $700 
million from the state owned investment firm (1MDB) to his private account. 
The case is still pending (also in the US), with wife and son (also mentioned 
in the Panama Papers) as lavish spenders. Jenkins, Nash. “Malaysian PM Najib 
‘Spent Millions’ on Luxury Goods: Report”. Accessed 9 September 2016. 
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about moral standards, the rule of the dethroned president, Ben Ali, to-
gether with his extended family and clan of followers, now stood accused 
of grand corruption. Interestingly that state of corruption did not penetrate 
the previous MER, reviewed and accepted by the FATF-in-Plenary.  
 For the new government this caused a hunt for the stolen or laundered 
assets: by 2013 $ 825 million was recovered. Therefore, the adulation in 
the third MER with the “clear ethical obligations”, “transparency and good 
governance” disappeared to be replaced by references to the required anti-
laundering actions against Ben Ali’s allegedly corrupt legacy. According 
to the fourth MER, one facet of that legacy is the cash-based parallel econ-
omy and bureaucracy. The MER also points at a shortage of trained judges 
(p.14) and insufficient freezing and confiscation orders (p.17). How effec-
tive the cleansing sweep is cannot be deduced from the text: the fourth 
MER provides only crude statistics of predicate offences, among them cor-
ruption cases (and suspects): 566 cases from 2011 to 2014, with most cases 
in the last two years (159 and 266) (Table 7, p.47). In addition, since 2011, 
1.368 cases concerning corruption have been opened, of which 669 in-
volved the former president and his family. 
 The fourth MER of Tunisia remains silent about the difference with the 
earlier (2006) MER. We can only speculate about the cause of this differ-
ence. What have the assessors missed or omitted in the third MER?  
 The second country with a large ‘jump’ of corruption mentions is 
Sri Lanka: from 11 to 62 mentions in respectively the third (2006) and the 
fourth round (2015). During that time span the TI index went up from 31 
to 37. Consequently one would expect more corruption references in the 
third round MER while the reverse was the case: the third round contained 
hardly any relevant references. It referred 10 times to the “Commission to 
Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption” and the UN Anti-Cor-
ruption convention. It only noted in passing that this Commission investi-
gated 30 cases of corruption annually with a conviction rate of 50%. There 
were no statistics. We do not even find the usual ritual formulation that 
‘corruption is endemic’. Indeed, a poor report, despite the seriousness of 
the corruption situation, according to TI. 
 The fourth MER of Sri Lanka appears to correspond to the improved 
state of integrity in Sri Lanka. However, the assessors view the authorities’ 
corruption approach almost exclusively from an anti-laundering angle: cor-
ruption is primarily seen as a laundering risk with hardly attention paid to 
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broader aspects.30 Sri Lanka is not reproached for its state of corruption but 
because of “a lack of corruption-related ML investigations, prosecutions 
and convictions” (p.3). A plain ‘ML risk-first’ standpoint. This manifests 
itself in the way the efforts of the Law Enforcement Agencies are pre-
sented: “there were 7.706 reported cases of bribery and corruption be-
tween 2008 and 2013. Of those, 336 were prosecuted, with only one lead-
ing to an ML investigation” (p. 26). No reference was made to the outcome 
of the investigations and prosecutions of corruption. Another matter of 
concern was that the Anti-Corruption Commission pursued mainly cases 
of petty corruption (p. 29): the ‘easy pickings’.  
 As a whole, the country did not have an overarching strategy with a 
focus on corruption and related laundering, complemented with a corre-
sponding confiscation policy. Despite the increase of corruption refer-
ences, the MER of Sri Lanka has a low information value: it appears that 
placing a focus on money laundering alone has resulted in other relevant 
information being ignored. This narrowing of focus affects the reliability 
and validity of the report. 
 Bangladesh has in both years the highest corruption references, more 
than Zimbabwe, which appears on the TI scale three points lower than 
Bangladesh. Corruption is deemed endemic in all state-owned enterprises. 
The banks are mentioned in particular for their role in corruption-related 
money laundering. In both MERs it was emphasised that corruption im-
peded the effectiveness of the AML-regime (§ 60 and § 73). In both MERs 
corruption is a national priority but still, corrupt business goes on unabated 
and without proper (statistical) monitoring. Very euphemistically, the third 
MER judged the compliance of the statistics Recommendation as “partial”, 
but added that “Statistics provided by Bangladesh authorities on investiga-
tions, prosecutions and convictions were not consolidated and could not 
always be reconciled against specific statutes or timeframes”. In other 
words, they were neither reliable nor valid: in fact useless. The fourth MER 
observed little improvement (except for the statistics of the Bangladesh 
                                                 
30  As noted previously, in 2006 the FATF Plenary jointly with the ESAAMLG 
and GAFISUD, at a meeting in South Africa, discussed how corruption can 
undermine AML. It seems, the subject was not consistently considered across 
all MERs. 
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FIU) and rated it with a kindly “partial-compliant”. That means that there 
are no statistic instruments to determine whether corruption related 
STRs/SARS, investigations, prosecutions and convictions increase or de-
crease. 
 New in the Bangladesh fourth MER is the “unexplained wealth” inves-
tigation, which proved to be of little help, however. Between 2011 and 
2015, the Anti-Corruption Commission seized about $ 13 million but, in 
the end, only one million was confiscated (p. 48). The MER speaks of an 
“overreliance on unexplained wealth actions” which has the drawback of 
alerting those potentially accused. It seems that culprits have little to worry 
about: we find that of the 214 ML charges between 2009 and 2015, four 
led to a conviction. Whether these are corruption-related is unknown. The 
wording in both MERs does not allow an optimistic expectation about cor-
ruption convictions, certainly not against the background of the chronically 
understaffed and under-resourced judiciary. 
 The same applies roughly to the other countries, below the average TI 
mark. It is true that the mentioning of corruption has increased substan-
tially which may have contributed to more awareness of corruption as a 
predicate offence. Otherwise, little seems to have changed structurally. 
Most jurisdictions established an Anti-Corruption Commission or Agency, 
which was no guarantee of more intensified action against corruption as 
well as laundering of its proceeds. The general observation is that the anti-
corruption bodies are under-resourced or that no or little activity can be 
observed (Armenia, Uganda). Though not stated explicitly, we might be 
justified in suspecting a lack of enthusiasm: Zimbabwe did not appoint a 
Commissioner to the ACC for three years; the Guatemala Commission 
“could have been more rigorous”; the prosecution of two ministers in Hon-
duras was mentioned, but without additional insight into the corruption 
prosecutions; Fiji has a 35-member Commission with wide powers, but 
limited resources and little output. One may wonder how their days are 
spent. 
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Conclusion: corruption and the FATF 
 
We have seen that corruption entered public consciousness with the Lock-
heed scandal but it has taken time to gain prominence. After the confluence 
of various tributaries from the US, the UN, the IMF and after the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention was signed, the FATF was bound to take over 
the theme, as mentioned in its 1994-95 annual report. This was not the 
money from corruption as such but the potential corruptive influence on 
banking staff. The idea that the bribes themselves are proceeds covered by 
the laundering concept still had to sink in. Otherwise, for the following 
years the ‘mentioning’ babbled on from aside to aside. One could always 
say: “It has the attention”, but without sense of urgency. 
 In 2005 this situation changed: the President of the FATF put the cor-
ruption issue firmly on the agenda with two specific subjects: the under-
mining of the AML regime by corruption and counter strategies. This re-
sulted in an outburst of activities in terms of a project group, broad inter-
national participation in meetings of up to 400 attendants: the Monty Py-
thon’s Flying Circus set in motion (Van Duyne et al., 2016). But there was 
limited attention to bribery as a source of proceeds and no answer to the 
question whether corruption was undermining the AML-regime.  
 After these ‘exhausting’ events the FATF became silent for a couple of 
years, until 2010, when the tocsin was sounded anew, again by the FATF 
President. This was followed by an intensified awareness campaign and a 
number of published studies and guides (2010-2013). Did this awareness 
raising had any effect? Though strict causal relationships are difficult to 
determine, it is plausible that the increased frequency of corruption men-
tions can be attributed to this awareness raising.  
 Otherwise the MERs data of 26 countries, both above and below the 
average corruption score, do not show a coherent picture, which is best 
summarised by “nothing correlates with anything”. Thus we have the find-
ing that on the five corruption relevant Recommendations four countries 
with perceived little corruption, according to the TI index, have a lower 
compliance rate than five perceived ‘corrupt’ states. From the perspective 
of fighting corruption by (among others) a strict compliance regime, this is 
an awkward finding: it points at the ineffectiveness of the AML-regime as 
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far as corruption is concerned. To use a qualification the FATF reserves 
for non-compliant states, this can be termed a ‘strategic deficiency’. 
 One aspect of the MERs is of serious concern: its reliability. As demon-
strated in the section on our findings, we had to conclude repeatedly that 
various statements in the MERs could not be substantiated. In the first 
place there are the statistics which are almost invariably below proper pro-
fessional standards, if available at all. While reliable statistics are the back-
bone of any evaluation, mal-performance can be observed from one MER-
round to the following one. Despite reproaches and encouragements we 
observe little progress in this matter. We also observed omissions of im-
portant corruption cases reported broadly in the open sources, but not men-
tioned in the MERs.  
 The difference between the third round and fourth round of Tunisia 
raises the question how these MERs could have been accepted in the first 
place. The first MER, because it proved to be blind to reality, and the sec-
ond one, because it omitted a proper comparison with the preceding one. 
This leads to the worrying question: how reliable are the MERs? The point 
is not only the observed omissions and mistakes but the fact that these can 
go unnoticed for years.31 How reliable is the ‘FATF brand’?  
 Meanwhile, amidst all this focus on corruption one question, posed five 
years earlier, remained virtually untouched: “develop a greater under-
standing of how corruption damages the effectiveness of AML/CFT sys-
tems”. While we observed that compared to the third round the mentions 
of corruption has increased significantly in the fourth round MERs, not-
withstanding we found only two examples that the assessors addressed this 
question: in the MERs of Bangladesh and Armenia. In the Bangladesh 
MERs concern was expressed that corruption lowered the effectiveness of 
the AM-regime. For Armenia “no indication was found by the evaluation 
team that corruption had any impact on the effective functioning of the 
AML/CFT system” (MER-Armenia 2015, p. 22). No explanation is given 
how the perceived pervasive corruption in the country leaves the AML sys-
tem unaffected. Naturally, given the limited sample of mutual evaluation, 
our observation is temporary: the fourth round is not over yet.  
                                                 
31  Both mutual evaluations were carried out by the World Bank and adopted by 
the Plenary of the Plenary of the MENAFATF (Middle East and North Africa 
Financial Action Task Force). 
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 Returning to our questions regarding the way corruption was treated as 
a political issue and an acquisitive offence, we conclude that it has a clear 
place in the fourth mutual evaluation round. However, we also conclude 
that the way it is otherwise dealt with is little coherent and mostly shallow. 
Some on-going or recent high-level corruption scandals and their im-
portance for the AML-regime were not reported. Laundering of suspected 
proceeds from grand corruption in the real estate sector of New York and 
London widely covered in the media,32 were barely mentioned. Politically 
too sensitive, even for the FATF? 
 There is also little attention for the broader abuse of office of which 
corruption is an element. This may be due to the circumstance that corrup-
tion is mainly addressed from the perspective of laundering and the em-
phasis laid on the ‘laundering-first’ requirement which narrows the vision. 
Despite the claim that fighting laundering is also fighting corruption, which 
is not substantiated, a broader approach outside the narrow confines of the 
FATF is required. 
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Opacity of business ownership and  
the risk of money laundering 
 
Michele Riccardi and Riccardo Milani1 
 
 
 
 
Risk based approach and risk assessment 
 
In the past twenty years, the risk based approach has become a central 
concept of the global money laundering (ML) discourse. The basic princi-
ple is simple: anti-money laundering (AML) measures should be weighted 
according to the risk of a given transaction, product or individual: higher 
risks require enhanced measures, lower risks allow simplified interven-
tions. In other words, AML resources (e.g. the budget of a bank’s AML 
department, or the officers of a FIU) should be allocated according to the 
identified risk: more resources where the risk of money laundering is 
higher. Consequently, the activity of measuring ML risk – which in the 
literature is referred to as risk assessment (see for example FATF, 2013) – 
is of pivotal importance because it influences how and where the State and 
the private sector move their money and human resources committed to the 
fight against money laundering.   
 The risk based approach is so central that the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) (in the last 2012 update) draped around it the first of its Rec-
ommendations. In line with the FATF, this approach has also been en-
dorsed through the EU AML regulatory regime. In particular, the 4th AML 
Directive (EU Directive 2015/849), and the forthcoming 5th AML Di-
rective, require money laundering risks to be assessed at three levels: (a) at 
the supranational level (Directive 2015/849, art. 6); (b) at the national level 
(art. 7); and, (c) by each obliged entity, i.e. each business sector which, by 
                                                 
1  Both authors are researchers at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore – 
Transcrime, Milan. 
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law, should conduct AML due diligence on the customers (Articles 8 and 
10-24). 
 The result of the exercise at supranational level is the EU Money Laun-
dering Supra-National Risk Assessment (SNRA), published by the Euro-
pean Commission in 2017, aimed at identifying the areas of ML (and ter-
rorist financing – TF) risks affecting the whole EU internal market by crim-
inal cross-border activities (European Commission, 2015).  
 Following the FATF and EU requirements, in recent years, a large num-
ber of countries carried out risk assessments at the national level (usually 
referred to as national risk assessments – NRA): for example, the United 
States, Japan, Switzerland (all in 2015), Canada (in 2016), and, in Europe, 
Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and, still on-going, the Netherlands (for 
a review of NRAs see Veen and Ferwerda, 2016; Savona and Riccardi, 
2017). Even more numerous are the risk assessment models adopted by 
banks, financial institutions and other obliged entities, although they are 
often concealed in ‘black boxes’ which are harder to access than banking 
safe-deposit boxes. 
 
 
What is the risk of money laundering? And how it can 
be measured? 
 
Despite the increasing number of money laundering risk assessment exer-
cises, there are still concerns about the effectiveness of this approach. Are 
governments and private businesses (such as banks or real estate agencies) 
able to identify and target ML risk? And if so, are they willing to do so? 
More generally, how can risk be defined? And measured?. 
 First, the FATF (in line with the broad literature on risk management) 
defines ML risk as the combination of two elements: 1) the likelihood that 
a ML event occurs (to be intended as statistical probability, although the 
FATF omits to provide a precise definition); 2) the impact (consequences, 
in the FATF taxonomy) that the occurrence of the ML event will exert. In 
turn, the likelihood that an event occurs is determined, according to FATF, 
by two main factors: threats and vulnerabilities (FATF, 2013, p. 7). A 
threat (T) may be defined as any “person or group of people, object or ac-
tivity with the potential to cause harm to, for example, the state, society, 
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the economy, etc.” (FATF, 2013, p. 7). Threats are all the people or activ-
ities that produce illicit proceeds and/or that may need to launder money. 
For example, drug trafficking groups that have accumulated dirty proceeds 
to be laundered. A vulnerability (V) is any circumstance or factor which 
attracts, facilitates or allows threats to happen (Dawe, 2013). For example, 
making high-value purchases in cash which could facilitate the injection of 
dirty proceeds into the legitimate economy. Eventually, the risk of money 
laundering (in the FATF conceptualisation) is a function of threats, vulner-
abilities and consequences. Therefore, assessing ML risk means identify-
ing and ‘measuring’ each of these three factors, and then of joining them 
together.  
 However, in the first place, most risk assessments carried out to date 
focus on threats and vulnerabilities only, and discard consequences. Even 
the EU supranational evaluation does not take into account the impact of 
ML: “it is regarded as constantly significant and will therefore not be as-
sessed” (European Commission, 2015, p. 7). In other words: we call them 
risk assessments but in fact they are assessments of the likelihood of money 
laundering. 
 Second, despite being under the same FATF umbrella, there is no har-
monisation among all the risk assessments produced to date (Savona and 
Riccardi, 2017, p. 24). Each country or entity seems to follow its own 
methodology. Most of them adopt a qualitative approach based more often 
on experts’ opinions rather than hard data. It has already been pointed out 
that expert based methodologies are questionable (Veen and Ferwerda, 
2016). To achieve their personal purpose, interviewees may overestimate 
ML risk (e.g. to gain more resources) or underestimate it (e.g. to get a 
medal from the prime minister for the good job done) and in any case it is 
hard to believe that their knowledge is objective, being influenced by their 
background, experience and field of work. On top of that, it should be noted 
that the ‘methodologies’ adopted by most existing reports are not transpar-
ent (Ferwerda and Reuter, 2017), in the sense that they are not sufficiently 
described in the reports or in any annex. The best example in this sense 
seems to be the UK ML NRA 2015, which comes up with some risk scores 
for different business sectors but there is detail on how they have been de-
rived (see Hopkins and Shelton, 2017 for a critical review).  
 The lack of transparency, of harmonisation and the qualitative nature of 
most risk assessments makes it difficult to compare, aggregate, or replicate 
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them over time nor to review them critically. At the end, their whole valid-
ity can be questioned: are they really useful and to whom? The impression 
is that, often, these exercises are performed only to respond to local or 
global AML compliance requirements. In particular, countries may con-
duct ML risk assessment only for satisfying the FATF (and gain some extra 
points at MERs – Mutual Evaluation Rounds). Similarly, banks and other 
obliged entities perform them for satisfying national AML regulatory au-
thorities. Is this a further confirmation that the AML regime has produced 
only a mountain of compliance with weak effectiveness (Harvey, 2011; 
Levi, 2014)? Are these evaluations based on a RBA – risk-based approach 
– or on a TBA – tick-the-box approach? 
 
 
A composite indicator of money laundering risk 
 
The research project IARM 
 
In order to address these gaps, in 2015-2017 an international consortium 
led by Transcrime – the Joint research centre on transnational crime of the 
Università Cattolica of Milan – carried out the research project IARM.2 
The project aimed at developing a methodology to assess the risk of money 
laundering based on hard data that could be replicated over time and in 
different countries and settings. In particular, it developed a composite in-
dicator which could provide a synthetic measure of ML risk at (i) regional 
level and (ii) at business sector level. The methodology was tested in three 
countries (Italy - (Riccardi, Milani, and Camerini, 2017) -, the Netherlands 
- (Ferwerda and Kleemans, 2017) - and the United Kingdom - (Hopkins 
                                                 
2  Project IARM - Identifying and Assessing the Risk of Money Laundering in 
Europe (www.transcrime.it/iarm) was co-funded by the European Commis-
sion, DG Home Affairs. The international consortium included Transcrime – 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (as coordinator), the University of Leices-
ter (UK), VU Amsterdam (the Netherlands), and, as associate partners, the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (Italy), the Italian FIU, the Ministry of Fi-
nance (the Netherlands), the Ministry of Security and Justice (the Netherlands), 
the National Police Chiefs Council (UK) and the external support of Home 
Office (UK). Bureau van Dijk supported the project as data provider. 
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and Shelton, 2017) and eventually four composite indicators were devel-
oped: the first measured the ML risk across the Italian 110 provinces; the 
second across 77 business sectors of the Italian economy (NACE divi-
sions3); the third across 83 business sectors of the Dutch economy (NACE 
divisions), and the last one across the 43 UK police areas.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The four indicators follow the same methodological approach. The idea is 
that the overall ML risk of a certain geographic area, or business sector, is 
a function of the level of the risk factors present in that area or sector (Sa-
vona and Riccardi, 2017, pp. 29–30). For doing so, IARM adopts the FATF 
conceptual framework that considers ML risk as a function of threats, vul-
nerabilities and consequences. In line with other works (see above), IARM 
focuses on threats and vulnerabilities only. In other words, it assesses the 
likelihood, rather than the actual risk of money laundering.  
 The IARM methodological approach can be better illustrated in 7 steps 
which follow the OECD guidelines for the construction of composite indi-
cators (OECD and Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commis-
sion, 2008) and previous works aimed at producing indicators of organised 
crime (van Dijk, 2007; Dugato, De Simoni, and Savona, 2014; Calderoni, 
2011). As set out in Savona and Riccardi (2017, p. 30), the steps are: 
1. Risk factors identification: in each country, at each level (area or busi-
ness sector), ML risk factors are identified on the basis of literature re-
view and then validated with experts’ interviews; 
2. Risk factors operationalisation: each risk factor is operationalised in 
one or more proxy variables so as it can be measured; 
                                                 
3  NACE Rev.2 is the statistical classification of economic activities in the Euro-
pean community, adopted in 2007. NACE uses different hierarchical levels. 
Level 1 (or 1-digit) identifies 21 sections by alphabetical letters (A to U); Level 
2 (or 2-digits) identifies 88 divisions by two-digit numerical codes (01 to 99) 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Statisti-
cal_classification_of_economic_activities_in_the_European_Commu-
nity_(NACE).  
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3. Data collection and normalisation: for each variable data are collected 
from a variety of sources, organised in a dataset, treated with imputation 
of missing values and, where necessary, normalised; 
4. Data exploration and correlation analysis: descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis are produced among the identified variables; 
5. Principal component analysis: variables are aggregated using principal 
component analysis (PCA) which allow identification of (and deter-
mine the relative weight of) the different dimensions (or components) 
of ML risk; 
6. Aggregation and composite indicator construction: for each component 
extracted from the PCA, values are generated for each area or sector in 
each of the three countries, and then aggregated and combined in a com-
posite indicator of ML risk after appropriate weighting and normalisa-
tion; 
7. Sensitivity analysis and validation: the composite indicator is validated 
through sensitivity analysis to determine how it changes depending on 
parameters’ variations (e.g. in weighting, normalisation techniques, 
PCA rotation, etc.). Also, the indicator is compared to alternative 
measures of ML – e.g. the number of suspicious transaction reports 
(STRs) issued by banks across areas or sectors. 
 
 
Findings 
 
ML risk across Italian provinces 
 
To better illustrate the IARM methodological approach, this section de-
scribes the development of the composite indicator of ML risk across the 
110 Italian provinces. More details can be found in the IARM report (Sa-
vona and Riccardi, 2017, pp. 29-33).  
 First, ML risk factors are identified with respect to Italian territories. 
Figure 1 below shows the risk factors grouped by the threats and vulnera-
bilities categories and, for each of them, the proxy variables used.  
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Figure 1. 
Risk factors of ML across Italian provinces 
 
Source: Riccardi, Milani and Camerini, 2017, p. 47 
 
In Italy, at territory level, we identified as risk factors of money laundering: 
on the threats side, organised crime (Calderoni, 2011; Transcrime, 2013) 
and illicit markets (Calderoni, 2014; Calderoni, Favarin, Garofalo, and 
Sarno, 2014; Giommoni, 2014; Mancuso, 2014) as ML threats; on the vul-
nerabilities side, cash-intensity (Ardizzi, Petraglia, Piacenza, and Turati, 
2014; Riccardi and Levi, 2018), opacity of business ownership (Cassetta, 
Pauselli, Rizzica, and Tonello, 2014; Riccardi and Savona, 2013), the high 
volume of money remittances (Clemente, 2016) and the presence of transit 
hubs (Soudijn and Reuter, 2016). In addition we included two proxies for 
underground economy (as defined in EUROSTAT, 2015):4 tax gap (Ar-
gentiero, Chiarini, and Marzano, 2015) and irregular labour (ISTAT, 
                                                 
4  Eurostat draws a clear distinction between illegal economy and underground 
economy. Both are part of the non-observed economy (or not registered), but 
the former comprises productive activities that are deliberately not registered 
because they involve criminal activities and markets, whereas the latter com-
prises activities that, although legal, are not registered to avoid taxation and 
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2017), which could play a role both as threat (because of the illicit proceeds 
produced by tax evasion) and vulnerability (because high levels of the un-
derground economy facilitate the introduction of dirty money in legitimate 
markets).  
 Most ML risk factors show significant correlation: areas with high lev-
els of organised crime, illicit markets and tax evasion are also those with 
highest cash-use. However, the principal component analysis (PCA) is able 
to distinguish the different dimensions of ML risk. In particular, it identi-
fies five principal components (PC), which are labelled and represented as 
follows: 
 
Figure 2. 
Principal components of ML risk across Italian provinces 
 
 
PC1 – Organised crime presence and 
infiltration 
PC2 – Underground and cash-intensive 
economy 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                                 
social security obligations. For details see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statis-
tics-explained/index.php/Building_the_System_of_National_Accounts_-
_non-observed_sector. 
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PC3 – Illicit markets PC4 – Opacity of business ownership 
 
PC5 – Money remittances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Riccardi, Milani and Came-
rini, 2017 
 
The five components – or better the scores for each component j and each 
province i – are then combined together in a single indicator using as 
weights the proportion of variance explained by each component in the 
PCA. In other words: 
ܯܮܴ݅ݏ݇ܫ݊݀݅ܿܽݐ݋ݎ௜ ൌ ෍ ൫ ௜ܵ௝ ൈ ݓ௝൯
௃
௝ୀଵ
 
Where the subscript i = 1 . . . I indicates the province (in this case I = 110); 
j = 1 . . . J the principal component (J = 5) and w = proportion of variance 
explained by each of the five components as emerged from the PCA (con-
stant across provinces). Sij is the relevant score extracted by the PCA for 
each province and for each component. 
 The final composite indicator of ML risk across Italian provinces is rep-
resented in the map below (Figure 3), while the first twelve provinces by 
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value of the ML risk indicator, i.e. the riskiest ones, are reported in Table 
1.  
 As it can be noted, the majority of most vulnerable provinces are located 
in the south and in islands, with Calabria and Sicily on top. The reasons 
are related to the high levels of mafia-type organised crime and of under-
ground economy. However, there are some exceptions: Imperia, which is 
located in Liguria at the border with France, ranks 6th due to the high cash-
intensive economy, the high tax evasion and the highest, among Italian ar-
eas, opacity of local businesses’ ownership structure. Prato, in Tuscany, 
ranks high due to the high underground economy and the anomalous vol-
ume of money remittances. The two activities are related to the presence 
of Chinese groups acting on the edge between the legitimate and the illegal 
economy (counterfeiting, labour and sexual exploitation and tax evasion), 
as also demonstrated by important investigations such as Qian Liu/Qian 
Ba operations (see Riccardi, Soriani, and Giampietri, 2016, pp. 133–134 
for a summary of these police operations).  
 
Figure 3 
 Composite indicator of ML risk across Italian provinces 
 
 Source: Riccardi, Milani and Camerini, 2017 
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Table 1. 
Top 12 Italian provinces by composite indicator of ML risk 
Province Macro-region ML risk indicator 
value 
Reggio Calabria South 100,0 
Vibo Valentia South 94,9 
Catanzaro South 85,4 
Crotone South 67,1 
Napoli South 66,3 
Imperia North-west 62,5 
Caserta South 62,0 
Agrigento Islands 59,9 
Palermo Islands 59,5 
Caltanissetta Islands 57,7 
Trapani Islands 52,3 
Prato Centre 51,1 
Source: Riccardi, Milani and Camerini, 2017 
 
It is important to note that the ML risk composite indicator is highly cor-
related with the ratio of STRs by bank units (Pearson’s r = 0,7), which can 
be seen as a first validation of the good-fit of our indicator. Moreover, the 
sensitivity analysis proves that, even after changing parameters of the anal-
ysis (e.g. weighting or normalisation criteria, PCA rotation, aggregation 
methods) results almost do not change (all alternative indicators show cor-
relations higher than 0,95 with our final one presented above).  
 The same methodology was employed to produce indicators of ML risk 
in the Netherlands at business sector level (Ferwerda and Kleemans, 2017) 
and in UK at police area level (Hopkins and Shelton, 2017) (See the rele-
vant IARM report chapters for details).  
 
 
Opacity of business ownership as a money laundering 
risk factor 
 
Apart from the development of the ML composite risk indicators, the 
added value of project IARM is the analysis of the opacity of business 
ownership in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. It was included as one of 
the ML risk factors in all the four models – and indicators; and as such was 
operationalised in proxy variables so as it could be measured. Despite the 
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wide political debate on the issue, empirical works on corporate structure 
opacity are few and weak, and limited to the analysis of case-studies (see 
for example de Willebois, Halter, Harrison, Park, and Sharman, 2011; 
Steinko, 2012; Riccardi and Savona, 2013). Project IARM represents prob-
ably the first attempt to carry out a systematic and large-scale exploration 
of how companies in Europe – at least in the three countries covered by the 
study – are controlled and owned. This last section of the chapter will focus 
on the findings of the analysis of business ownership opacity.  
 
a. The global debate on business ownership opacity 
 
In recent years, pumped by important journalistic investigations such as 
Panama Papers, Luxembourg leaks and Paradise Papers, an international 
consensus has emerged that the increased transparency of business owner-
ship information is of key importance for tackling money laundering, fi-
nancial crime and other serious and organised crimes. The FATF, in its 
Recommendation 10, stimulates financial institutions and obliged entities 
to:  
 
“Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to 
verify the identity of the beneficial owner, such that the financial insti-
tution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is. For legal 
persons and arrangements this should include financial institutions un-
derstanding the ownership and control structure of the customer” 
(FATF, 2012, p. 16). 
  
The issue has been supported by the G8, the G20 and was endorsed by the 
3rd, the 4th, and 5th AML Directive. The latter required obliged entities to 
identify the beneficial owner (BO hereinafter) of their customers, and EU 
member states to set up a central public register of beneficial owners ac-
cessible to a range of stakeholders upon certain conditions. 
 Since then, beneficial ownership identification has become a mantra of 
the global AML debate of policy-makers, academics, researchers and in-
ternational organisations. Opacity of corporate ownership represents now 
the first issue to be addressed – in the economic crime area – by govern-
ments and NGOs (see e.g. HM Treasury, 2015; US Department of State, 
2013; Transparency International UK, 2015). This has happened despite 
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the contradictory and often only anecdotal evidence about the use by crim-
inals of all sorts of complex corporate structures and of offshore jurisdic-
tions. 
 We have to admit, in fact, that the problem of corporate secrecy does 
not characterise all crime areas in the same manner. There is solid evidence 
that the ‘Chinese boxes’ schemes and opaque jurisdictions are used in 
grand corruption schemes (see e.g. the World Bank ‘Puppet Masters’ re-
port - de Willebois et al., 2011), and even more frequently in tax evasion, 
tax avoidance and profit misalignment mechanisms (see e.g. Cobham and 
Jansky, 2017; Zucman, 2013 for a review). However, the evidence of use 
of opaque corporations by ‘traditional’ organised crime is not as wide-
spread. 
 Transcrime (2013) and Riccardi, Soriani and Standridge (2015) show 
that Italian mafias, apart for some exceptions, prefer figureheads chosen 
within the family (possibly, daughters, sisters and wives) and limited com-
panies registered locally rather than professionals based in Panama or the 
Cayman Islands. The reason is simple: involving external people in the 
criminal ring – such as lawyers or accountants’ experts of international tax 
management – poses more risks than benefits, also because criminals are 
by nature averse of relying on third persons (Van Duyne, 2003).  
 Similarly, Steinko (2012) shows that most OC-related money launder-
ing in Spain heavily relies on traditional schemes rather than complex cor-
porate structures. It confirmed earlier findings by Van Duyne (2003) and 
the analysis by Kruisbergen et al. (2015) that stress that proximity is, above 
all, the most important driver of organised crime infiltration in the legiti-
mate economy in the Netherlands. This may imply a limited use of foreign 
jurisdictions and corporate vehicles to the preference of local small com-
panies and immovable assets: what van Duyne defined “own yard invest-
ment” (Van Duyne, 1996). 
 Even considering this, company secrecy raises significant concern; 
nonetheless it may work differently discerning the type of predicate of-
fences and the typologies of criminals. Are opaque jurisdictions more im-
portant for multinationals and Russian oligarchs than for ‘Ndrangheta fam-
ilies? Probably: anecdotal evidences on Panama or British Virgin Islands 
seems to endorse this assumption. However, the road is long and winding 
but research should pursue this path in the next future in order to really 
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contribute, with empirical evidence, to the political debate on business 
ownership opacity. 
 
b. Opacity of business ownership: how it can be operationalised? 
How it can be measured?  
 
The concept of corporate ownership opacity was analysed by the project 
IARM by looking at two dimensions: 
i) the complexity of businesses’ ownership structure as such; 
ii) the volume of ownership links with opaque jurisdictions. 
 
For the purpose of the analysis, we could access data on owners (i.e. name, 
surname, type of individual or entity, country of birth/incorporation, % 
shareholding held) from Bureau van Dijk’s ORBIS database.5 The database 
used covered more than 10 million companies, 14 million shareholders and 
15 million beneficial owners6 registered in Italy, the Netherlands and the 
                                                 
5  ORBIS is developed by Bureau van Dijk (BvD hereinafter), a multinational 
company headquartered in Belgium and specialised in business information, 
which collects company data from official business registers across the globe 
and, after appropriate standardisation, provides the data to users in a range of 
databases and services available online upon annual subscription. Because of 
the differences in company law and company reporting standards across dif-
ferent jurisdictions, BvD does not cover the universe of registered businesses 
worldwide and it is not fully clear how this coverage varies from one country 
to another. However, for certain jurisdictions – and among them Italy, the 
Netherlands and the UK, analysed in IARM – the degree of representativeness 
of ORBIS data is very high. The added value of BvD databases, and ORBIS in 
particular, is represented by the ownership data. Because it links together com-
pany data from different registers of different countries, ORBIS is able to map 
cross-border ownership networks, something that traditional and official busi-
ness registers and Chambers of Commerce do not provide: they usually stop at 
the border and cannot trace the ownership chain beyond the first layer of share-
holding, especially if the control network extends abroad. This makes ORBIS 
a unique dataset, and the only one helpful for an in-depth analysis as the one 
performed here.  
6  Beneficial owners in BvD definition are the natural person(s) who ultimately 
own or control an entity. They are identified by BvD reconstructing the own-
ership chain until finding natural persons holding above a certain shareholding 
percentage. For the purpose of this study it has been decided to set the mini-
mum threshold at 10% at the first level of company ownership chain and 10% 
at further levels. The adopted threshold is lower than EU Directive definition 
(25% threshold) but allows for a more comprehensive analysis. 
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UK, as illustrated in Table 2. Unfortunately, although ownership structure 
and names of shareholders and BOs are provided, information on their na-
tionality was not always available. While in Italy for almost half of the 
population it was possible to determine the country of birth (if natural per-
son) or of incorporation (if legal person) of the owner, in the Netherlands 
and in the UK it could be done only for a small sub-sample – even smaller 
when looking at BOs. One could argue that this lack of information could 
be the proof of the lack of effectiveness of the KYC (Know Your Cus-
tomer) activities: if due diligence were to be carried out properly, we would 
not have so many missing data. However, these are data taken from busi-
ness registers, which are not required to conduct any KYC. 
 
Table 2. 
Company ownership data analysed in project IARM 
 Italy Nether-
lands 
United 
Kingdom 
N. Companies analysed 3.700.000 2.700.000 3.700.000 
N. Shareholders 5.200.000 2.800.000 6.700.000 
% Shareholders with info on nation-
ality 
49,5% 12,7% 16,0% 
% Foreign shareholders (of those 
with available info on nationality) 
1,7% 7,8% 6,8% 
N. BOs 4.700.000 2.800.000 8.200.000 
% BOs with info on nationality 42,9% 0,9% 3,1% 
% Foreign BOs (of those with avail-
able info on nationality) 
1,3% 90,0% 37,9% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Savona and Riccardi, 2017 
 
This is a weakness of the study, especially because it is not possible to 
determine if the sample of owners with known nationality is properly rep-
resentative of the whole population. But what used in IARM is probably 
the best dataset of cross-border ownership nowadays available at global 
level.7  
                                                 
7  At least until promising projects such as EBOCS (www.ebocs.eu) will provide 
better data. EBOCS is a EU co-funded project which is currently developing a 
search engine able to crawl shareholders and directors’ data across borders 
through direct connections of official business registers of a number of juris-
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c. The complexity of business ownership 
 
The issue of unknown nationality does not constitute a problem for the 
analysis of the first sub-dimension of opacity, i.e. the complexity of busi-
ness ownership. This was measured through a proxy, developed on the ba-
sis of BvD data, called “beneficial owners’ (BO) distance”. It represents 
the number of ‘steps’ which separate a company from its BO(s)8: if BO 
distance equals 1, then the BO(s) has a direct ownership in the company; 
when it equals 2, it owns a given company through possessing a share in 
another intermediate company (i.e. a layer), etc. The higher the BO dis-
tance, the longer the control chain, the more complex the encompassing 
ownership structure of a given company, the higher the risk of money laun-
dering because of the opportunities to hide financial data.  
 For each of the 10 million companies for which data was available, the 
BO-distance for each of their BO(s) was calculated, then averaged for each 
company (because a single company could have multiple BOs). The BO- 
distance of each analysed geographic area or business sector was computed 
as the average of the BO-distances of the companies registered in that area 
or sector.  
 Table 3 reports the average BO distance in Italy, the Netherlands and 
UK. Of the three countries, Italian companies show, on average, the most 
direct control (and therefore the shortest BO distance). Italy has also a high 
number of individual enterprises, confirming the direct nature of business 
ownership. The higher values of the Netherlands and UK could be instead 
proxies for the higher number of multinational companies/holding schemes 
– set up either for tax optimisation or other reasons. 
 
                                                 
dictions. Until now EBOCS is covering 8 European countries – Italy, the Neth-
erlands, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, Ireland, Spain and the United Kingdom – 
but will be accessible only by law enforcement agencies for investigation pur-
poses. 
8  For the definition of BOs, see footnote 6 of this chapter. 
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Table 3. 
Average BO distance by country and region a 
Italy The Netherlands United Kingdom 
1,3 1,7 1,6 
Imperia                       1,5  Channel Islands          3,7 
Catanzaro                  1,5 Isle of Man                3,4 
Savona                       1,4 South Yorkshire        2,5 
Bolzano-Bozen          1,4 Greater Manchester   2,0 
Milano                       1,4 Norfolk,                     1,7 
a Analysis across regions was not conducted in the Netherlands because not mean-
ingful – see Ferwerda and Kleemans, 2017. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Milani and Riccardi, 2017 
 
Table 3 also shows the values by region in Italy and the UK. In Italy it 
is important to note that higher BO-distances are registered: (i) in regions 
at the border (Imperia, Savona and Bolzano-Bozen, respectively bordering 
France/Monaco and Austria); (ii) in Milan, where most inward FDI con-
verge; (iii) in Catanzaro, a relatively poor area in Calabria characterised by 
very high levels of mafia infiltration in the legitimate economy (especially 
in the wind-power sector, see Riccardi, Milani, and Campedelli, 2016). 
 In the UK, it is interesting to note that the highest BO distance is rec-
orded by Channel Islands, i.e. Guernsey, Jersey and Alderney, famous off-
shore tax havens close to Normandy but in fact territories under the British 
sovereignty. Starting from a company registered in these islands, on aver-
age it is necessary to open 3 further corporate boxes before finding the 
natural person ultimately owning the first one – i.e. its BO(s). Almost the 
same applies to Isle of Man (BO distance of 3,4), which frequently appears 
in Paradise Papers as a preferred place where oligarchs, multinationals or 
sport stars can set up legal persons behind which to conceal assets or funds 
in order to avoid (or evade) taxes.  
 The analysis at business sector level shows that NACE sections B (Min-
ing and quarrying – which includes also oil and gas extraction companies), 
D (Energy – which include electricity companies, wind power or gas com-
panies) and K (Finance – including banking and insurance groups and other 
financial institutions) record the highest BO distance (Figure 4). It is not 
surprising as these are sectors characterised by a high number of large com-
panies with a multinational structure and a holding company often regis-
tered in tax favourable countries. In the Netherlands, Mining and Finance 
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even reach the BO distance of 3,7 and 3,6: it means that, for example, for 
identifying the beneficial owner(s) of an average oil and gas company reg-
istered in Amsterdam it is necessary to open three further corporate boxes 
on top of it. Obviously, this does not mean that all of them have been es-
tablished in such a way in order to launder money, as other incentives (e.g. 
tax optimisation, profit shifting, and good business environment) matter, 
too. 
 It can be argued in fact that from a ML risk prevention perspective it is 
more important to identify those companies which are characterised by un-
necessary corporate complexity – e.g. small companies with low capitali-
sation but a very complex ownership structure. For this reason, we 
weighted the average BO-distance at sector level by the average company 
size (measured through the total assets value). After weighting, the NACE 
sectors with highest BO-distance are: S (Other services – including also 
security and fiduciary services) in Italy; R (Gambling, Art and Entertain-
ment) in the Netherlands and O (Health and Social work) in United King-
dom. But also sectors such as Bars, restaurant, hotels (NACE Section I) 
emerge in all the three countries and L (Real estate) in the United Kingdom 
(Milani and Riccardi, 2017, p. 159). 
 
d. Ownership links to opaque jurisdictions: conceptual frame-
work 
 
The second sub-dimension of corporate complexity analysed is the volume 
of links to opaque jurisdictions. It was operationalised through the number 
of shareholders and beneficial owners coming from risky countries: the 
more the links to opaque countries, the higher the risk that a company can 
be misused for ML purposes. 
The issue of course is to determine which jurisdiction can be de-
fined opaque and what makes them risky. The two easiest options would 
be (i) to take the countries included by international organisations such as 
FATF and European Union in AML blacklists; (ii) to consider what are 
usually labelled as off-shore financial centres.   
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Figure 4 
BO-distance at business sector level (NACE sections) 
Average between Italy, the Netherlands and United Kingdom.  
Not weighted by company size 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Milani and Riccardi, 2017 
 
 As for the first option, if we looked at the FATF we would end up with an 
awkward list of rogue countries (in the US-driven cosmogony) such as 
North Korea and Iran and other examples like Ethiopia, Bosnia Herze-
govina or Syria.9 Obviously nobody would not be satisfied by such lists, as 
it is hard to believe that drug lords or corrupt officers in Western Europe 
or South America wishing to launder money would incorporate holding 
companies in North Korea or Ethiopia. No doubt these are opaque juris-
dictions, but they are probably not the safest places where to deposit 
                                                 
9  Full list of FATF non-cooperative countries could be find here: 
www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#high-risk.  
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money, either legal or not. And if we used the brand new blacklist of “non-
cooperative tax jurisdictions” issued by the European Union in early De-
cember 2017,10 we would not find better solutions. In this list, there is no 
mention of notorious Caribbean territories such as BVI nor, on-shore cen-
tres such as Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg or the United Kingdom (which by 
the way is leaving EU)11. Then we can agree that official blacklists are 
more often expression of geo-political interests rather than real AML pre-
vention commitment (Van Duyne and Van Koningsveld, 2017, p. 141). 
 So, we do look at off-shore financial centers (OFC). As noted by vari-
ous authors, there is no one single and universal definition of offshore cen-
tre (Gara and De Franceschis, 2015, p. 5). In summary, off-shore jurisdic-
tions could be defined as locations which aim at attracting capital from 
non-residents (either individuals or companies) offering lower tax regimes 
and company confidentiality and anonymity (for a conceptual review see 
Van Duyne and Van Koningsveld, 2017). It must be noted that taxation 
regimes are so complex, country-specific and constantly changing that it is 
almost impossible to find a one-size-fits all definition, also because in 
some countries there is huge gap between statutory (or declared) and actual 
corporate taxes (Cobham and Jansky, 2017). 
 Therefore, for the purpose of the this analysis it was then decided to 
rely on what – at least in our opinion – represents nowadays the best indi-
cator of corporate opacity at country level: the Financial Secrecy Score 
(FSS) developed by the Tax Justice Network (Tax Justice Network, 
2015).12 This is an indicator, usually issued every two years, which evalu-
ates different dimensions of secrecy/opacity, for example: 
 the level of banking secrecy; 
 the access to BO information; 
 the transparency of corporate information; 
 the compliance with international standards (e.g. FATF Recommenda-
tions). 
                                                 
10  See here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5121_en.htm  
11  This 2-years exercise only covered extra EU countries. 
12  The Secrecy Score, of Financial Secrecy Score (FSS), is combined by Tax Jus-
tice Network with a measure of economic magnitude to produce the so-called 
Financial Secrecy Index (FSI). The difference between the FSS and FSI is that 
countries ranking on top of the first are very opaque, but often tiny, jurisdic-
tions such as Vanuatu; while the countries ranking on top of the FSI are more 
important international financial hubs such as Switzerland or Hong Kong. 
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The indicator has the advantage of including various facets which are all 
relevant to the AML discourse: not only compliance with FATF ‘soft-law’, 
but also the accessibility to company ownership and financial information 
and the cooperation with foreign authorities. These are issues which are 
important when talking either about tax evasion, grand corruption or seri-
ous and organised crime. In this sense, the FSS was preferred to other avail-
able measures because of its completeness and the methodological trans-
parency. The 2015 version of the FSS/FSI covers about 100 countries.13 
 
e. Ownership links to opaque jurisdictions: analysis 
 
Under the IARM framework, the FSS was used as follows: the share of 
each nationality among shareholders and BOs of companies registered in 
Italy, the Netherlands and UK (covered by BvD ORBIS database) was 
multiplied by the relevant FSS value. In other words:  
 
ܴܫܵܭܵܥܱܴ݆ܧ ൌ
ݔ݆݅
σ ݔ݆݅݅
ൈ ܨܵ ݅ܵ  
 
Where x = number of shareholders or BOs; i = nationality of shareholders 
or BOs; j = country or region or business sector of registration of compa-
nies; FSS = Secrecy Score 2015 issued by Tax Justice Network.  
 For example, if the shareholders of the companies registered in the sec-
tor I56 in Italy were 60% Italians and 40% Swiss, then the resulting opacity 
risk score of that sector would equal (60% x FSSItaly) + (40% x FSSSwitzer-
land)  
 Obviously, in order to do so, it was necessary to determine first the 
number of shareholders and BOs broken down by nationality in all the 
three countries. This was an interesting finding itself (although, as men-
tioned above, the result may be biased by the low percentage of owners 
with known nationality). Figure 5 below shows the ratio of foreign share-
holders and BOs in Italy, the Netherlands and UK: the latter two confirm 
                                                 
13  It is expected that in January 2018 the Tax Justice Network will issue a new 
version of the Financial Secrecy Index, with a wider coverage, an updated 
methodology and scores. 
272 
 
their role as preferred locations by foreign individuals or legal persons to 
set up firms – perhaps holding companies on their territories.  
 Among the top foreign nationalities of shareholders in Italy, Switzer-
land ranks first (11,4% of total foreign shareholders), while in both the 
Netherlands and UK the most common foreign shareholders are from the 
United States (respectively 20,7% and 24,3%) (see Milani and Riccardi, 
p.161, for full details). Moreover, Germany, Luxembourg, Switzerland and 
Cyprus are present in the top 10 of all the three countries. Interestingly, 
when looking at the beneficial owners, the most common foreign national-
ity is, in all the three cases, Spanish (respectively 21,7% in Italy, 28,7% in 
both the Netherlands and UK). A more in-depth study shows that Spanish 
shareholders are frequent in finance, energy but also in the gambling in-
dustry. We may hypothesize (especially for Italy) links of OC groups – in 
particular Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta – in Spain. But these findings would 
deserve further investigation and qualitative analysis.  
 
Figure 5. 
Ratio of foreign shareholders and BOs of companies registered 
in Italy, the Netherlands and the UK 
 
Source: Milani and Riccardi, 2017, p. 160 
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However, as said, foreign owner does not mean necessarily risky and 
opaque. And here the FSS is introduced and applied as described above. 
When multiplying the nationalities of shareholders and BOs by their rele-
vant Secrecy Score, and aggregating them, the country which emerges with 
the highest ownership connections with opaque jurisdictions is the UK, 
followed by the Netherlands and then – almost at a half of UK – Italy 
(Milani and Riccardi, 2017, p. 163). This is not surprising if we consider 
the role of Britain – and London in particular – in attracting foreign capital 
with doubtful origin, especially in some sectors (Hopkins and Shelton, 
2017). In the UK, the City of London is the more vulnerable to secrecy 
jurisdictions, while in Italy the province of Imperia ranks first, due to its 
proximity with France, Montecarlo and the high level of ‘Ndrangheta OC. 
 At the business sector level, again Mining, Energy and Finance are the 
sectors most attracting owners coming from opaque jurisdictions (Figure 
6). The same can be applied to BOs. But again this may only indicate the 
presence of big multinational firms using tax havens to try to minimise 
their tax burden – in the present discussion declared unethical but not nec-
essarily criminal behaviour from a strict legislative perspective.  
 If, again, we weight the risk score by the average company size (Figure 
7) what emerges as most related to owners from ‘risky’ countries are sec-
tors such as Bars and Restaurants (NACE section I), Wholesale and Retail 
trade (G) and the Entertainment and Gambling sectors (R): economic ac-
tivities which appear more frequently in money laundering and organised 
crime investigations.  
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Figure 6. 
Shareholders’ links with opaque jurisdictions  
(100 = max links).  
Average of Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.  
Not weighted by company size 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Milani and Riccardi, 2017, p. 164 
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Figure 7 
Shareholders’ links with opaque jurisdictions (100 = max exposure). 
Average of Italy, the Netherlands and the UK.  
Weighted by company size 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Milani and Riccardi, 2017, p. 165 
 
Looking at BOs, instead, another sector which prompts up if controlled by 
company size is the real estate, but only in the United Kingdom (Milani 
and Riccardi, 2017, p. 165). Here concerns have been already expressed by 
many authorities and NGOs, such as Transparency International or Global 
Witness (see e.g. (Transparency International UK, 2015). 
 Interestingly, the real estate industry does not seem to be owned by cor-
porates based in off-shore jurisdictions, neither in Italy nor in the Nether-
lands. This finding seems to confirm the results of previous research on the 
Dutch real estate market (Unger, Ferwerda, Nelen, and Ritzen, 2010; Van 
Duyne and Soudijn, 2009) which showed that only a minority of the local 
properties’ value is held through off-shore companies (see Van Duyne and 
Van Koningsveld, 2017, p. 168). In overall terms, not much for panicky 
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policy making, but in any case a significant value for AML and tax inves-
tigators. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we contributed to the debate on ML risk assessment by 
proposing a methodology, developed within the research project IARM, 
which eventually produced a composite indicator of ML risk at geographic 
area and business sector level. We tested it in Italy, the Netherlands and in 
the United Kingdom. We discussed what can be defined as ML risk and 
how it can be operationalised and measured; and we focused in particular 
on one ML risk factor: the opacity of business ownership. The latter was 
further explored to examine how complex are ownership structures of the 
companies registered in the three countries and to analyse to which extent 
owners of Italian, Dutch and British companies come from opaque juris-
dictions.  
 Our approach has some strengths and weaknesses which are discussed 
below, and which suggest some future directions of research.  
 
Strengths  
 
First, our methodology relies (mostly) on public data and it is designed so 
it can be replicated in other countries and contexts. In this way, it addresses 
one of the main gaps of existing national risk assessments (NRA) – the fact 
that they lack harmonisation and they basically cannot be compared nor 
easily reproduced. 
 With respect to previous studies and NRAs, our analysis stresses the 
quantitative approach, producing a composite indicator as a result of a 
transparent empirical analysis validated through sensitivity analysis. The 
methodology is clear and transparent, and can be easily criticised – while 
many previous studies do not disclose details about their methodology. 
 The composite indicator condenses in a synthetic score a complex issue 
such as money laundering risk, facilitating the assessment (required by 
law) by public authorities and private entities. And the higher level of dis-
aggregation – regional and sectorial – provides an added value with respect 
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to existing NRAs, which usually adopt only a national perspective or focus 
only on obliged sectors. 
 As regards the analysis of business ownership opacity, it must be 
stressed that this is one of the first large-scale and systematic empirical 
studies of how companies are owned and controlled in Europe – at least in 
Italy, the Netherlands and the UK. The access to the BvD database ORBIS 
allowed to trace the ownership chain of more than 10 million companies, 
and the nationality of several thousands of shareholders and beneficial 
owners. The analysis confirms the findings of some previous research, e.g. 
that the percentage of foreign owners is not that high, and those coming 
from off-shore countries and opaque jurisdictions is even smaller and con-
centrated in some sectors and areas (e.g. financial hubs such as London and 
Milan, on-shore tax havens, such as Channel Islands or the Isle of Man, or 
border areas, such as Imperia and Bolzano). Somehow, good news for 
AML, anti-corruption and tax authorities: corporate opacity is not every-
where, and the number of companies which really deserve further investi-
gation is reasonable.  
 It is interesting to note that the results changes radically if scores of 
complexity and opacity are weighted by the average company size. If not 
weighted, what emerge as most exposed to complex and opaque ownership 
schemes are those sectors – such as mining, finance or energy – character-
ised by numerous multinational companies. This points out more likely to 
tax avoidance and profit misalignment schemes rather than criminal be-
haviours in a ‘traditional’ fashion. But when weighted by company size, 
the sectors which register the highest risk scores are activities – such as 
bars, restaurants, hotels or the entertainment and gambling industry – 
which appear more frequently in organised crime investigations, despite 
the implementation of stricter controls in the three countries (like anti-ma-
fia laws in Italy or BIBOB in the Netherlands) has made it harder for crim-
inals to launder their money in these sectors (Van Duyne and Van der 
Vorm, 2016). Further research is needed. 
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Weaknesses 
 
Given the exploratory nature of this study, the results presented in this 
chapter should be in any case taken with caution. This approach has weak-
nesses, too. First of all, it is heavily reliant on data. Which is good on the 
one side, but weak on another. For example, the composite indicator does 
not take into account risk factors which are characterised by data scarcity 
such as, by definition, new and emerging phenomena: e.g. virtual curren-
cies or predicate offences characterised by high dark figures such as cor-
ruption, extortion, environmental crime (illegal logging, emission rights 
swindle, wildlife crime). 
 Second, although it contributes to risk assessment exercises, what we 
performed here is an evaluation of the likelihood of money laundering, ra-
ther than of the risk: the impact (or consequences, in the FATF taxonomy) 
are not taken into account. Future research cannot avoid facing the chal-
lenging, but necessary, task of measuring consequences, too.  
 And focusing on the business ownership opacity side, it must be 
stressed, as already noted, that the used data, especially in the Netherlands 
and the UK, are yet not very solid. The number of owners with known 
nationality is a very small percentage with respect to the whole population 
of firms; making conclusions on the basis of these figures could be hazard-
ous. But this is the best data available on corporate ownership – at least 
until official business registers and Chambers of Commerce will offer bet-
ter statistics usable for research purposes.  
 As in any empirical work, future research would therefore benefit from 
an improvement – in quantity and quality – of data. Just to mention three 
areas which are crucial when talking about ML risk: statistics on cash use 
(the Banca d’Italia is the only central bank, in Europe, possessing data on 
withdrawals and POS payments at the regional level! – see (Riccardi and 
Levi, 2018)); of data on tax crimes; and of data on corporate ownership, 
especially at cross-border level.  
 There is the need of further empirical studies on money laundering, in 
order not to leave the final word to presumed experts and qualitative as-
sessments, which are the ones which could be more easily influenced by 
(geo)political and commercial interests. There is the need to understand 
who and how owns European companies. The answer would not only help 
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AML officers, but also anti-corruption authorities, tax agencies and Euro-
pean policy makers for planning more effective and sustainable economic 
policies.  
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VAT fraud committed in the Slovak Republic 
in the context of the European Union 
 
Tomáš Strémy, Natália Hangáčová and Martin Kotovský1 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Economic crimes, especially tax crimes, have a significant impact on 
states’ budgets and consequently on the wealth of the citizens. Therefore, 
it is most important to set an effective system for the prevention of tax 
crimes, mainly within the European Union, but also beyond. In particular 
the Value Added Tax has historically been targeted by criminal entrepre-
neurs as well as ordinary citizens, who prefer to pay for their house repairs 
without requiring paperwork and without VAT (Pashev, 2007; 2008; Van 
Duyne, 1991; 1993; 1996; Aronowitz et al., 1996).  
 Its importance also comes to the fore when we look at the significance 
of VAT revenues in the EU context. In 2008, the income from value added 
taxes (VAT) constituted 21,4 % of the tax revenues of all European Union 
Member States according to the OECD Consumption Tax Trends, 2008. In 
many Member States the VAT collection constitutes on average 7,8 % of 
the GDP according to the Green Paper on the future of VAT, published by 
the European Commission.  
 While VAT evasion and abuse is a widespread daily practice, mainly 
small scale but accumulatively large, serious concern has been raised by 
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the professional organisation of VAT fraud (Pashev, 2008). It is remarka-
ble to observe that whilst having been researched by scholars for some 25 
years there has been only moderate commensurate official concern. Indeed, 
attention to tax crimes is not at the same level as other forms of profit ori-
ented crime, e.g. drugs or human trafficking. 
 As a matter of fact, the attention for financial crimes waxes and wanes. 
The Panama Papers scandal is a good example to represent the statistics, 
as the leaked documents contain information on almost 3.500 individuals, 
who are suspected of hiding money from their national authorities. The 
documents cover a time span of more than ten years. Europol looked 
closely at the Panama papers and compared data of the Panama papers pub-
lished by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists with the 
Europol’s database of persons and companies suspected of involvement in 
criminal offences and found around 3.500 probable matches. The data set 
comprises a varied group of potential offenders. A substantial part con-
cerned VAT-offenders: according to The Guardian (UK) “[. . .] 388 
matches were connected to VAT fraud operations [. . .].” 
 Of all the types of tax evasion in the European Union the Value Added 
Tax (VAT) fraud schemes are estimated to cause the most financial dam-
age. According to Stieranka et al., (2016) Bulgaria estimates its VAT 
frauds to have inflicted losses to the amount of about € 400 million yearly. 
Naturally Member States fight this form of tax crime. The best policies 
concerning fighting VAT frauds in the European Union can be observed in 
Luxembourg where the leakage is only 1 % loss of the theoretical VAT tax 
obligation. Therefore in this chapter the tax crimes in the Slovak Penal 
Code Act will be reviewed, particularly VAT Carousel frauds. The aim of 
this chapter is to explain in detail the nature and organisation of VAT 
frauds, identify all the types and variations of tax fraud committed and to 
explain them in the context of the Slovak and EU legislation. 
 
 
The nature and structure of organised VAT fraud 
 
The European Union VAT (EU VAT) is a value added tax on goods and 
services sold within the European Union (EU). EU VAT on selling or out-
put (known as “output VAT”) is charged by a business and paid by its 
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buyer. VAT paid by a business to other businesses on the supplies that it 
buys is known as EU VAT on input (known as “input VAT”). A business 
is generally able to recover input VAT by offsetting it against the output 
VAT for which the business is required to account to the government, or if 
there is an excess, by claiming a repayment from the government. The final 
consumer bears the burden of VAT paid: he cannot claim it back. The net 
effect of this is that each supplier in the chain remits tax on the value added, 
and ultimately the tax is paid by the end consumer, who cannot claim the 
paid VAT back. Hence, the enterprises have a tax collection function, a 
role with many temptations, as we will see.  
 Value added tax frauds may be committed by a variety of methods, 
ranging from simple to most sophisticated. The simplest and common ex-
ample is that of lowering output VAT by hiding turnover (no invoice, no 
VAT). A more complicated approach is to tamper with the paper work: by 
altering data on invoices and other documents concerning the sale of goods 
or services which result in lowering tax liability. Consequently less tax is 
paid. Another form consists of fictitiously increasing input VAT followed 
by claiming excess paid VAT from the tax authorities. For example, by 
including fictitious invoices into the accountancy or inflating input in-
voices. 
  Tax liability may also be lowered by tampering with the export of 
goods and services. Within the EU, VAT is a domestic tax, which implies 
that the export must be free of tax, also called ‘zero tariff’. Prior paid VAT 
is reclaimed by the exporting company (or settled with outstanding liabili-
ties). The vulnerability (or temptation) consists of exporting fictional 
goods or services to another EU Member State in order to claim fictitious 
VAT deductions.  
 A variation is that only the data on the export papers are fictitious, while 
the real goods are actually sold at the domestic (black) market: at a com-
petitive price while the VAT (if charged) is put in their own pocket. A 
frequent form of a VAT tax fraud is the so-called Missing Trader Intra 
Community Fraud. Europol defines this type of VAT fraud as one where 
the first company in a domestic trading chain charges the VAT to the cus-
tomer, but does not pay it to the tax authorities and ‘disappears’. This is 
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known as the “missing trader”.2 When such fraud takes place between 
Member States there is an Intra Community fraud. 
 The Missing Trader fraud is the organised theft of VAT from the treas-
ury, usually by an organised crime group.3 A number of basic conditions 
have to be fulfilled such as: the supplied goods have to be taxable; the 
transport of goods has to be completed at the country of the destination; 
the supply and purchase of goods have to be performed as part of an eco-
nomic activity and the buyer and the seller have to be registered as taxable 
persons. When these conditions are fulfilled, one can enter the ‘playing 
ground’. 
 The Missing Trader scheme can be illustrated by the following hypo-
thetical case.  
 
A Conduit company A, being the VAT payer in Member State A, is 
selling goods to the buyer, registered as VAT payer in another Member 
State, B. The exporting Conduit company is entitled to the deduction of 
the VAT paid earlier for the exported goods, by virtue of intra-Commu-
nity transactions. So the goods cross the border with a ‘zero tax’ tariff. 
The buyer in importing Member State B being the country of destina-
tion has the obligation to pay VAT to his tax administration. However, 
the VAT, which must be paid, is not paid immediately at the importa-
tion of the goods but at the time when the goods are sold and the tax 
return is submitted. The buyer in Member State B meanwhile sells the 
goods to another company B2 in his Member State B: VAT included. 
But company B does not pay the VAT he received and disappears. 
Therefore, this trader in the chain of transactions is called the Missing 
Trader. Company B2 consequently sells the goods to another Member 
State - Member State C, therefore company B2 is entitled to VAT return 
paid to the missing trader because of the ‘intra-Community’ transaction.  
 
The described scheme can be re-used: finally, the goods may be sold back 
to the original Member State A, whereupon the circle is closed. Many sub-
jects take part in this type of fraud and as a consequence the chain, also 
                                                 
2  MTIC (Missing trader intra community) Fraud 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/eco-
nomic-crime/mtic-missing-trader-intra-community-fraud   
3  Ibid 
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called ‘carousel fraud’, remains unclear. It may take months or even years 
to uncover these transactions. 
 This is not only large-scale tax fraud, but also organised crime targeting 
VAT proceeds. It has been observed that organised crime groups often in-
filtrate legitimate businesses in such a way that the manager of a company 
may not even be aware that his company forms a part of this chain of fraud-
ulent transactions. Indeed, this was a reason of the initiation of proceedings 
at the Court of Justice of the European Union in Optigen Ltd., Fulcrum 
Electronics Ltd., Bond House Systems Ltd. case from 12 January 20064. 
The case will be elaborated in the text below. .  
 In the region the first carousel frauds took place with small amounts of 
goods but those goods were of a high value. However, now the structure 
of fraud has changed. Sato (2014) in his article on carousel frauds with 
sugar, claims:  
 
“In recent years carousel frauds are more often committed in the Czech 
republic, but also in Poland, Hungary and in Slovakia concerning goods 
which are bigger and heavier, with which perpetrators trade in huge 
amounts and these goods are subject to quick usage and after they are 
consumed it is difficult to trace them (for example building materials, 
furnace iron, some types of  
groceries . . .).” 
 
As mentioned above, the trade can be ‘enriched’ by the fact that there are 
no actual goods crossing the internal border. The seller uses fraudulent in-
voices and transport papers to demonstrate that the goods were supplied to 
another Member State, whilst the goods remain in the country of origin of 
the goods. Because of this, the seller has a comparative advantage on the 
market, as he can sell the goods for a lowered price, which does not include 
VAT (or only partly). This scheme has been used in a ‘sugar’ case where 
according to Sato (2014) “in [. . .] Slovakia, this fraud resulted in hundreds 
of empty trucks traveling from the Slovak Republic to neighbouring coun-
tries where the VAT evasion is estimated to 25 million Euros per year.” 
The reason why perpetrators of carousel frauds chose the sugar is clear: 
sugar is a commodity which is quickly consumed in large amounts and it 
                                                 
4  See rulings No. C-354/03, C-355/03,C-484/03 Court of Justice of the European 
Union. 
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is difficult or impossible to trace and identify the cargo if the trucks are 
empty or forged transportation documents are used. 
 Carousel frauds may be committed by submission of invoices, referring 
to non-existing goods, to items of zero value such as offal, or goods which 
are quickly consumed. Vegetables or other perishables are not suitable to 
this type of fraud. In addition to sugar another commodity is alcohol. Al-
cohol has the additional advantage of being taxed with excise, which can 
be pocketed in the same operation (Van Duyne, 1993).5  
 
 
VAT frauds scenarios and modus operandi 
 
In this section, we shall explain the basic characteristics explained above 
by applying them in different theoretical scenarios. 
 Carousel frauds have been committed all over the European Union be-
cause of the cross-border requirement (See IMF working paper 2007). 
However, in order to make frauds more complicated to detect, usually more 
EU Member States are involved.  
 
Basically, company A sells goods to company B in another Member 
State and reclaims earlier paid VAT (“zero tariff”). B sells to company 
C in the same country and disappears. Now two scenarios available, 
either company C deducts input VAT it had paid to the company B after 
selling the goods to customers within the domestic market VAT in-
cluded. Or company C seller exports the goods to another Member State 
D or back to the Member State A, all also VAT exempted and company 
C is entitled to VAT deduction concerning this transaction. When the 
goods are again located in Member State A, the same carousel may take 
place, now using company X as a replacement missing trader B. The 
carousel fraud is then finished or may be continued in a circular manner 
but with other players.  
 
As remarked, the transactions may be fictitious, but usually business is 
conducted with increased or lowered VAT figures, depending on whether 
                                                 
5  Bleeding Central Europe through VAT scams 
 http://visegradrevue.eu/bleeding-central-europe-through-vat-scams/ 
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or not reclaiming VAT to the amount of goods that it is stated in the in-
voices. The aim is not to conduct business activity but to show that the 
goods are ‘really’ moving between Member States. That may require many 
firms: Carousel frauds are often associated with creation of new companies 
to cover the transactions for example by issuing documents such as in-
voices to make transactions more difficult to trace. 
 Abuses of VAT systems may be conducted concerning existing goods 
sold for reasonable prices. For example, businessman A has at his disposal 
goods which he acquired by illegal means (the goods come from previous 
criminal conduct, and this scheme may be used to launder money). Apart 
from profit from selling the goods, the business plan consists of an inten-
tion of obtaining a tax deduction from the State. Manipulation with in-
voices is one possible option, however, we would like to emphasise another 
scenario. A businessman registers a new company B headed by a straw 
man: a homeless person while the trade may be fictional. The dummy firm 
B sells the businessman A’s goods to company C with VAT included, i.e. 
company C actually pays the price, but company B, as a Missing Trader, 
disappears without paying VAT or alternatively submits a tax return claim 
but of a lesser amount. Finally, the illegitimate profit is handed over to 
businessman A. This case is qualified as Tax and Insurance Evasion ac-
cording to Section 276 of the Slovak Penal Code Act. 
 Another example concerns the selling of goods for a small loss (on pa-
per) such that other companies are not even aware of their involvement in 
a VAT fraud scheme. Let us illustrate this on an example.  
 
Company A has goods at its disposal, which it distributes using compa-
nies B, C, D and E. The goods circulate among these firms and will 
finally be sold to the end trader in another Member State, company F. 
The last company in the Member State of origin, E, exports the goods 
under ‘zero tariff’ to company F. Company A avoids attracting the at-
tention of the tax authorities by inserting company B as the Missing 
Trader which basically emits only invoices while not paying VAT. In 
more sophisticated fraud schemes part of the goods are stored in a stor-
age in case of tax inspection to look legitimate. Companies B, C, D and 
E sell the goods including VAT but the mutual payments are usually 
simulated. Company E fictionally exports goods to the company F and 
asks for excessive VAT deduction.  
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Another scenario is that the Missing Trader sells the goods further in the 
Member State B with VAT included, for regular, non-competitive prices 
to ‘acquire’ and keeps the whole amount of VAT.  
 There are more varieties of the MTIC fraud: one of the schemes is when 
the Broker (customer of the Missing trader) resells the goods to another 
Member State from where the goods may be resold to the Member State of 
the origin (Member State A): whether or not fictitious. The Broker then 
claims the VAT it has paid to the Missing Trader, because the Broker ex-
ports to a Member State VAT-exempted. Consequently, Member State B 
returned the earlier paid VAT to the Broker while firm B is missing. This 
carousel fraud is a repeated circular flow of invoices to make the fraud 
more complicated and less detectable.  
As stated in the Special report of the European Court of Auditors:  
 
“The fraud can be further complicated when the Missing trader sells the 
goods to buffer traders, some of whom could be honest, to make it more 
difficult for tax authorities to trace the fraudulent scheme. When the 
circular flow includes a third country, customs procedure 42 can also 
be used to hamper the traceability of transactions.” 
 
The Missing Trader Intra-Community fraud has two basic schemes: acqui-
sition fraud and carousel fraud. In the acquisition fraud the goods that are 
purchased from another Member State A without VAT being paid in that 
Member State, are sold in the domestic market of the buyer (Member State 
B) for domestic consumption. The buyer – the Missing Trader – fails to 
pay VAT and disappears, but sells the goods to its customers VAT in-
cluded. However, in the carousel fraud as a type of Missing Trader fraud 
the abuse of VAT system is based on fraudulently reclaiming VAT or de-
duction from tax authorities of Member States. The main difference be-
tween the acquisition fraud and the carousel fraud is that in the carousel 
fraud the goods are sold to number of companies within the domestic mar-
ket of the acquirer but finally are sold outside the domestic market, to an-
other Member State. This process may be repeated numerous times with 
the same goods creating the so-called carousel.   
 A numerical example may illustrate the functioning of a carousel 
scheme. Assuming that the VAT rate is 20 %, the following chart (no. 2) 
shows how the basic Carousel fraud works. In particular scheme the Con-
duit company sells the goods to the Missing trader for the amount of 
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€900.000. This sum does not include VAT because intra-Community sup-
ply of goods is exempt from VAT payment. Subsequently the Missing 
trader sells the goods further to the Buffer trader no. 1 for €1.080.000: 
€900.000 plus €180.000 VAT. The Missing trader is supposed to pay the 
€180 000 in VAT to its tax authority but does not do so and disappears. 
The Buffer trader no. 1 sells the goods to the Buffer trader no. 2 with a 
€20.000 (€1.100.000) profit and pays 20 per-cent of the profit to the tax 
authority as the value added tax in amount of €4.000. The Buffer trader no. 
1 may or may not be aware of the MTIC fraud taking place. As a conse-
quence, Buffer trader no. 2 sells the goods to the Broker making profit of 
€ 30.000 and pays taxes from this profit in amount of €6.000 (20 %). The 
fraudulent chain is completed when the Broker sells the goods back to the 
Conduit company in Member State A with profit of €20.000. The broker 
does not charge the VAT when the goods are sold to the Conduit company, 
because the intra-Community supplies are VAT exempt, but it claims back 
the VAT which the Broker paid to the Buffer trader no. 2 in value of 
€190.000. The above-mentioned transaction resulted in Member State’s B 
tax loss of €180.000, because Member State collected €10.000 from the 
Buffer traders no. 1 and no. 2, but refunded €190.000 to the Broker. 
€180.000 represent the profit gained by the carousel fraud, which will be 
divided among different parties taking part in the prescribed fraud. 
  
Figure 1: The basic carousel fraud scheme 
European Court of Auditors 
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The basic scheme of the Missing Trader rests on the fact that the company 
in Member State B sells the goods to another company (within the Member 
State) including VAT, however, the Company B acquired the goods from 
another Member State A under ‘zero tariff’ (intra-Community transaction 
The company in Member State B was supposed to pay VAT it disappears 
but as Missing Trader sold the goods including VAT which he put into his 
own pocket or into that of his principals or accomplices. According to the 
Europe review 2015, the Missing Traders can operate only few months be-
fore disappearing in order not to be detected by the authorities. But new 
companies are ready to take the MT place. 
 
Figure 2. 
Missing trader scheme - Acquisition fraud, source: Europol 
 
In order to prove the commitment of a tax fraud offence (in the Slovak 
Republic offence according to Section 277a of the Slovak Penal Code Act 
300/2005 Coll.) law enforcement agencies have to examine the whole 
chain of transactions and they have to prove that the company knew that it 
formed a part of fraudulent chain and that entitlement to VAT deduction 
was not legitimate. According to the case Optigen Ltd., Fulcrum Electron-
ics Ltd., Bond House Systems Ltd. from 12 January 2006, the Court of Jus-
tice of the European Union held that if companies adopt all reasonable 
measures in order to secure that their business transactions are not part of 
the fraudulent chain consisting of VAT frauds, these businesses have to 
have a right to trust the legality of the transactions without risking that the 
companies taking part in the chain will be jointly liable for tax payment, 
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which shall be paid by another tax payer. Each transaction has to be con-
sidered independently, even in the case that some transactions within the 
chain are fraudulent. In the judgement of the Court of Justice of the EU 
from 2006 in the joined cases C-354/03, C-355/03 and C-484/03 the Court 
ruled:  
 
“The right to deduct input value added tax of a taxable person who car-
ries out such transactions cannot be affected by the fact that in the chain 
of supply of which those transactions form part another prior or subse-
quent transaction is vitiated by value added tax fraud, without that tax-
able person knowing or having any means of knowing.” Otherwise, le-
gal certainty would be hampered.  
 
In the above-mentioned European jurisprudence, the CJEU has clearly 
shown that in the situation of a conflict between the economic interests of 
the EU and the legal certainty, it chooses the latter. This gives much needed 
protection to suspects who may have been unknowingly involved in a tax 
fraud scheme. It also creates a pathway for tax authorities, which respects 
fundamental rights of the suspects, but also does not obstruct investigation 
of tax fraud. 
 
 
Selected sections of the Penal Code Act of the Slovak 
Republic concerning VAT frauds 
 
In this section, we shall explain how VAT fraud takes place within the 
Slovak Republic We shall also examine various specific types of tax fraud 
and their definition within the Slovak legal system. 
 
a. General 
 
VAT frauds may fall within the definition of the following Sections of the 
Slovak Penal Code Act No. 300/2005 Coll.: 
§259 Distortion of Data in Financial and Commercial Records 
§276 Tax and Insurance Evasion 
§277a Tax Fraud 
§278 Failure to Pay Tax 
§278a Obstruction of Tax Administration 
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The main offences concerning VAT frauds are described in Section 276 
tax evasion and Section 277a tax fraud. Section 278a and Section 259 de-
fine offences which usually form a part of the preparation process to com-
mit criminal acts under sections 276 and 277a. According to the offence 
described under the Section 276 of the Slovak Penal Code Act 300/2005 
Coll. the tax payer is obliged to pay tax to the tax authority of the Slovak 
Republic, Section 278 refers to situations when the tax payer did not pay 
the tax due, however the value of unpaid tax has to exceed the amount of 
€ 2.660 to constitute the criminal offence.  
 According to Šamko (2015) in regard to the Section 277a the offender 
falsely pretends that he is entitled to a VAT deduction to which he is either 
not entitled or for which he over claims.  
 In an offence under § 276, the benefit rests in the fact that the decrease 
in the value of the perpetrator’s assets does not match the decrease that 
would be adequate to the tax the perpetrator is liable to pay. In the offence 
under § 277a the benefit represents the increment of the assets of the per-
petrator, while he asks tax authority to return VAT to which he is not enti-
tled. In both above-mentioned offences the fraud is committed against the 
Slovak Republic harming the public fund. Even if consequently the VAT 
fraud harms State’s citizens and indirectly the EU’s citizens too. In case 
that the harmed subject would be primarily another subject, not the Slovak 
Republic represented by the tax authority, then the respective fraudulent 
behaviour would fall within the definition of Fraud as described in § 221 
of the Slovak Penal Code Act. 
 
b. Tax and Insurance Evasion 
 
In terms of Tax and Insurance Evasion, this offence may be committed by 
failing to register as a taxpayer according to the § 4 of the Slovak VAT Act 
No. 222/2004 Coll. or by non-submitting the tax returns. The businessman 
may be registered as a VAT payer, however, may commit an offence, when 
he does not submit the tax return to the respective tax authority. The per-
petrator is hiding his business activities. For example, by charging VAT to 
end consumers that is not paid to the tax authorities. He may even submit 
the VAT return, however, he does not include all relevant documents of 
accountancy into the tax return which results in lowering his tax burden. 
In case the businessman does not pay the VAT which is due, the criminal 
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offence under Section 278 Failure to Pay Tax may be committed in case 
the VAT due exceeds the amount of € 2.660. 
 The case when the tax payer does submit the tax return, but does not 
include all transactions into the respective tax return was decided by the 
Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic in case no. 2 To 7/2010 in which 
the businessman did not include all transactions made into submitted tax 
return, however, charged the VAT (which he was supposed to pay to the 
Treasury) to his customers. As a consequence, the businessman obtained 
an unlawful advantage in VAT of €620.590, 62. 
 The Tax Evasion of VAT may be also committed by fictitiously lower-
ing the tax burden, by pretending increment of VAT which was paid for 
certain goods or services provided by another trader (supplier) who is also 
a VAT payer, so called input VAT. But in this case, the goods or services 
provided are only fictional and the supply of goods or services never took 
place. The perpetrator deducts this fictionally paid input VAT from VAT 
which is he supposed to pay at the output resulting in lowering his tax lia-
bility. The invoices used in this type of criminal behaviour are either fic-
tional, may be even issued by non-existent companies or in some cases 
invoices are bought from other companies which are doing real business, 
but they are also selling their invoices to other companies to ‘help’ them 
with documents about purchases to increase the VAT at the input stage. 
The case no. 5 To 4/2009 of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic 
refers to this type of criminal behaviour, where the businessman in the 
company’s tax return included also fictional invoices on purchase of iron 
plates issued by a fictional company and therefore evaded VAT in amount 
of €8.487, 64. 
 With respect to crimes connected to value added tax, it is important to 
differentiate between the behaviour resulting in lowering the VAT to be 
paid to the Treasury, the VAT is actually paid but in a lower amount and 
behaviour resulting in State returning VAT to the businessman. If the per-
petrator unlawfully lowers existing tax liability, this kind of behaviour falls 
within the Tax and Insurance Evasion offence. In the case where the busi-
nessman lowers his tax liability to the extent that (part of) unlawfully 
money is given back from the Treasury then this behaviour falls within the 
Section 277a of Tax Fraud. 
 In the respective section, the intra-Community fraud will be elaborated 
in a view of commitment of Tax and Insurance Evasion criminal offence, 
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i.e. which segment of behaviour in the intra-Community fraud falls within 
the scope of Tax and Insurance Evasion offence. This type of VAT tax 
fraud mostly concerns import of goods into the Slovak Republic from an-
other intra-Community state. In case of Intra-Community fraud, the respec-
tive behaviour of a businessman may be qualified as Tax and Insurance 
Evasion in the following course of action. The businessman is registered 
as a VAT payer importing goods to the Slovak Republic from other Mem-
ber States of the European Union. The import of goods, for example cars, 
was part of intra-Community transaction; therefore, the imported cars were 
exempted from VAT in EU Member States, but the Slovak businessman 
was supposed to pay VAT in the Slovak Republic pursuant to VAT rates 
applicable in the Slovak Republic. If the businessman fails to pay the VAT 
to the Slovak tax authority and consequently sold the goods further in the 
Slovak Republic including VAT, he ‘earned’ the VAT which was not paid 
to the Treasury. However, the businessman submitted the tax return, in 
which he did not include transactions concerning buying and selling of 
cars, which resulted in lowering company’s tax liability. The businessman 
did not ask the Slovak Republic tax authority for excessive tax deduction, 
he ‘only’ lowered his tax liability, therefore it was an offence committed 
under § 276 Tax and Insurance Evasion. Tax and Insurance Evasion can 
be also committed when the business is conducted with illegal goods. The 
goods are imported into the Slovak Republic illegally and consequently the 
goods are sold in domestic market without VAT being paid to the Treasury. 
 
c. Tax Fraud 
  
Because Tax Fraud is an offence with intent, it is important to look closely 
at the gravity of the particular offence described in Section 277a paragraph 
1 (minor offence), because if the gravity of a minor offence is of a lesser 
degree of seriousness in view of the mode of its commission, consequences 
and circumstances of commission, then the particular behaviour does not 
constitute a criminal offence. 
 The object of the offence of Tax Fraud is the protection of financial 
interests of the Slovak Republic against fraudulent behaviours gaining ad-
vantage through mis-declared VAT deduction. 
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 According to the definition of Tax Fraud as stated in Section 277a, in 
order for this offence to be completed it is sufficient that the offender un-
lawfully exercises entitlement to excessive VAT deduction in a tax return 
with the aim to earn an illegitimate benefit. Therefore, for accomplishment 
of Tax Fraud offence it is sufficient that the offender exercises a false en-
titlement to VAT deduction, while it is not necessary for VAT deduction 
to be actually granted to the offender by the respective tax authority. From 
the above-mentioned facts it is clear that the attempt of Tax Fraud accord-
ing to § 14 paragraph 1 of the Slovak Penal Code Act is not possible. Ac-
cording to Šamko (2015) if the tax authority actually pays the offender 
back then we can speak of a completed offence.  
 The tax return can have the difference between input VAT and output 
VAT: if the difference is positive the tax payer has an obligation to pay tax 
to the respective tax authority; if the difference is negative the tax payer is 
entitled to VAT deduction. Tax fraud is committed when the tax payer aims 
at an illicit negative difference between the output VAT and input VAT. 
 The offender may obtain an excessive VAT deduction by pretending 
fictitious purchases of goods. However, the State does not collect any VAT 
because the transaction has not taken place (there is no real seller or pur-
chase of goods). Consequently, the offender may obtain an excessive de-
duction. This is also known as fictitious increase of input VAT. 
 The right to deduct VAT is described under Section 51 of VAT Act No. 
222/2004 Coll. The respective Section states that the tax payer has a right 
to deduct VAT when supported by invoices showing entitlement to VAT 
deduction. Section 79 paragraph 1 of the Slovak VAT Act states that if the 
tax payer is entitled to excessive tax deduction and cannot deduct this ex-
cessive deduction from his tax obligation in the next taxation period, he is 
entitled to payment of the excessive deduction. The tax authority shall re-
turn to the tax payer his non-deducted excessive deduction within 30 days 
pursuant to Section 79 of 222/2004 VAT Act of the Slovak Republic. The 
difference between these two definitions (right to deduct and excessive de-
duction) is crucial in the classifications of criminal offences. Tax and In-
surance Evasion offence will occur when the businessman will illegiti-
mately deduct VAT without excessive deduction being granted to him. On 
the other hand the Tax Fraud offence will be committed if the offender will 
be illegitimately be granted or will ask for excessive deduction from the 
tax authority. 
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 In conclusion, enterprises are obliged to charge VAT to all their cus-
tomers and have the duty to pay the collected VAT to the tax authority. 
They have the right to lower their tax liability by an amount of VAT al-
ready paid for goods and services bought from suppliers i.e. input VAT: 
the so-called tax deduction. 
 Defrauding the VAT system looks as follows. The end consumer A 
buys goods e.g. computers from the registered firm B and A pays for the 
goods including VAT. The end consumer A and seller B are conducting 
business in one Member State and the end consumer A does not sell the 
goods further. Sold goods were for example of € 2.000 value, the end con-
sumer paid to seller B the value of the goods plus € 400 VAT if we presume 
a 20 % VAT rate. But seller B needed some components to construct the 
computers which were sold to the end consumer, therefore he bought these 
components from his suppliers for which seller B paid VAT. For the seller 
B the process is not finished by paying €400 to the Treasury as it was in 
case of end customer A. Let us presume that the seller B sold in this par-
ticular tax period only the computers for €2.000 (€400 VAT). In this sce-
nario seller B may deduct €400 VAT from all value added taxes he paid to 
his suppliers for goods and services which were used or needed to create a 
product he was selling e.g. computers and by this action lower his tax lia-
bility. If the seller B paid more on VAT to his suppliers than is the value 
of VAT he received from purchases made by customers, he is entitled to 
excessive deduction. These facts have to be supported by invoices and sub-
mitted in a tax return. 
 
Obstruction of Tax Administration and Distortion of Data in 
Financial and Commercial Records 
 
The offence described under Section 278a, Obstruction of Tax Administra-
tion, is an intentional criminal offence. In Section 278a paragraph 1 and 
paragraph 2 the offence is qualified as a minor offence. Therefore, it is 
important to look at the gravity of a particular offence because the principle 
of material corrective, enabling a conduct which would usually constitute 
a lesser offence to not be regarded as such, if the gravity of the offence is 
lower, enshrined in Section 10 paragraph 2 of the Slovak Penal Code Act 
may be invoked. The Section states that the act shall constitute a minor 
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offence if it is of a lesser seriousness in view of the mode of its commission 
and consequences, the circumstances of its commission, the degree of cau-
sation and the motivation of the offender. Moreover, punishability of this 
offence does not vanish even using effective regret under § 85 and § 86 of 
the Slovak Penal Code Act. The respective merits described under subpar-
agraphs a) b) c) and d) of § 278a paragraph 1 have one fact in common and 
so that the offender has to be previously punished for analogical act in ad-
ministration proceedings according to § 154 of the Slovak Tax Administra-
tion Act No. 563/2009 Coll. in previous 12 months. The period of 12 
months is counted backwards from the moment of committing the offence 
and the important event is when the decision of administrative authority 
concerning previous offence became valid. 
 Merits of the criminal behaviour stated under subparagraph a) describe 
situations when the offender in documents submitted to tax authorities in-
cludes false data, grossly distorted data or conceals mandatory data b) de-
scribe actions of changing, devaluating or destroying documents necessary 
for correct tax payment, under subparagraph c) the tax payer does not fulfil 
his announcement obligations imposed by law and under subparagraph d) 
the tax payer does not fulfil his obligations imposed by law in terms of tax 
control. All of the above mentioned merits of § 278a aim at the same pur-
pose and so to obstruct tax administration. Not all activities described in 
letters a) to d) will be considered as criminal offence of Obstruction of Tax 
Administration due to 12 month period condition mentioned above. The 
term tax administration is described in § 2 a) of the Act No. 563/2009 Coll. 
 In criminal behaviour described in § 278a under subparagraphs a) to d) 
the offender is intentionally trying to affect the tax administration process 
with the purpose to cover or to make it more difficult for the tax authorities 
to reveal that the particular businessman is a tax payer or what is the correct 
amount of VAT the tax payer is obligated to pay to the State’s Treasury. It 
is not necessary for tax administration to be disabled, the offender’s behav-
iour is aiming at the fact that tax authorities do not have the correct infor-
mation needed or they may achieve the correct data however with bigger 
efforts. 
 The object of the criminal offence described in § 278a is to protect tax 
administration and consequently to secure correct detection of tax payers 
and their tax liabilities. 
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 In terms of criminal act described in § 259 Distortion of Data in Finan-
cial and Commercial Records, the relevant paragraphs with regard to VAT 
frauds are § 259 paragraph 1 subparagraph c) and § 259 paragraph 2 sub-
paragraph b). Section 259 paragraph 1 subparagraph c) is dedicated to sub-
mitting false data or grossly distorted data or concealment of mandatory 
data used for controlling accounting records and Section 259 paragraph 2 
subparagraph b) concerns destruction, damage or rendering data unusable 
or failure to keep records referred to in paragraph 1. The main difference 
between the criminal offence of Obstruction of Tax Administration and 
Distortion of Data in Financial and Commercial Records rests in a fact that 
in terms of Distortion of Data in Financial and Commercial Records, there 
is no condition that the offender has to be previously punished for analog-
ical act in administration proceedings. In case a businessman was found 
guilty of the offence under § 278a (he had to be previously punished for 
analogical act according to § 154 of Act No. 563/2009 Coll. in administra-
tion proceedings and 12 month period had to be kept) and he would commit 
the same act again, in this case the businessman cannot be found guilty of 
the offence of Obstruction of Tax Administration because he did not fulfil 
the criterion of the previous administrative punishment. However, the busi-
nessman may be suspected of Distortion of Data in Financial and Commer-
cial Records, because this criminal offence does not have the condition of 
neither previous administration punishment nor previous criminal punish-
ment. The same analogy would apply in cases when the businessman 
would behave in a way to obstruct tax administration process by for exam-
ple destroying data or submitting false data and he was not punished in 
administrative proceedings in respective 12 month period, or when busi-
nessman was punished in administrative proceedings but in time period 
exceeding 12 months. The businessman could be suspected of Distortion 
of Data in Financial and Commercial Records offence. The description of 
the offence of Distortion of Data in Financial and Commercial Records is 
more universal because Obstruction of Tax Administration offence applies 
only to tax payers and behaviour concerning taxes. Moreover Distortion of 
Data in Financial and Commercial Records is not limited by previous crim-
inal or administrative punishment. 
 
 
  
303 
 
Conclusion 
 
The patterns of carousel frauds have been explained and described using 
respective examples concluding the complexity and sophistication of VAT 
fraud schemes as well as pointing out different modus operandi concerning 
VAT frauds within the European Union. The different patterns of VAT 
frauds as well as criminal offences which may be committed by the respec-
tive behaviours of perpetrators were elaborated in order to give the com-
plex view on the problems of tax frauds, mainly carousel frauds within the 
Community, reflecting the Slovak Penal Code Act. As it is clear from the 
facts stated in this chapter, the main goal of perpetrators of carousel frauds 
is to obtain profit, which perpetrators earn by exploiting loopholes in the 
European Union legislation (i.e. obtain a tax deduction from the State). 
Therefore more action from the European Union institutions is needed. The 
European Commission proposed solutions for the current situation, how-
ever it is complicated for Member States to agree on politics concerning 
VAT due to the fact that VAT forms one of the main states revenues. Since 
2010 (Green paper on the future of VAT) European Union bodies are try-
ing to create legal framework for single VAT system, however, the final 
solution was not found yet. 
It is obvious that carousel frauds are committed by large number of 
companies involved in the chain of transactions to prevent the authorities 
to uncover the fraudulent schemes. In case the chain would consist of only 
three companies, the carousel i.e. fraudulent transactions would be sus-
pected by the tax authorities of Members States quickly and would be eas-
ily detected. Therefore some Buffer Traders are added to the chain to make 
it more complicated to authorities to reveal the transactions. It was ob-
served that fraudulent companies infiltrate into legitimate businesses, ac-
cording to the case brought before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. Legitimate businesses are part of the chain as well, whereas they 
may have no knowledge of the fraudulent transactions taking place. On the 
other hand, in order for the legitimate businesses to be protected against 
fraudulent companies, the case Optigen Ltd., Fulcrum Electronics Ltd., 
Bond House Systems Ltd. case is fundamental. 
 The authors are of the opinion that more action is needed in the Com-
munity level in order to prevent VAT frauds from happening. The various 
modes of operation of VAT tax frauds described above show the complex-
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ity of the problem, however, the amount of wealth lost by this kind of crim-
inal activity also clearly shows that there is a lot that could be done regard-
ing the enforcement of current laws and regulations. The challenges of fi-
nancial crime of today are mostly international in nature and, therefore, the 
enforcement mechanisms of tax regulation have to be more international 
and cooperative as well.  
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Italian strategies against the infiltration of the 
criminal organisation in the economy 
 
Anna Maria Maugeri1 
 
 
  
 
Introduction 
 
According to the limited available data, the main illicit markets in the Eu-
ropean Union generate around 110 billion euros each year, approximately 
1% of the EU GDP (Transcrime report, 2015; European Commission, 
2016). These illicit proceeds are widely laundered in the legal economy of 
the European member states (Transcrime report, 2015).  
 Evidence of organised crime investments in the legal economy is found 
in almost all EU MS (Transcrime report, 2015; Lalam, 2004-2006, 382; 
Paoli, 2006, 284). There are different forms of involvement of criminals in 
legal companies: on the one hand legal businesses may be owned and di-
rectly managed by crime-entrepreneurs; on the other hand organised crim-
inals may create a partnership with legal business men. Legal and illegal 
capital may coexist in financing the illicit activities (Berlusconi, 2016: 429; 
Savona and Berlusconi, 2015). 
 The Italian Supreme Court has stressed the urgent necessity to curb the 
laundering of accumulated criminal incomes which may flow into the legal 
sectors of the economy. And this infiltration of criminality into the legiti-
mate economy can take place directly or indirectly, in the sense of entering 
into economic activities through individual companies, some of them al-
ready existing.2 
                                                 
1  The author is full Professor of criminal law, Department of law, University of 
Catania – Italy. 
2  Court of Appeal Palermo, decree 01/10/1996, Tre Noci s.r.l., (1997) Cass. pen. 
2257. 
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 Against this infiltration of illicit proceeds in the legal economy, accord-
ing to the Transcrime report “from illegal markets to legitimate businesses: 
the portfolio of organised crime in Europe” (2015), the number of seizures 
and confiscations in relation to serious and organised crime assets has been 
increasing throughout Europe, and especially in certain countries (such as 
Italy, Ireland). This trend has been reinforced with the implementation of 
the Confiscation directive (Directive 2014/42/EU) and with stronger inter-
national cooperation among national Asset Recovery Offices (ARO), in the 
framework of EU ARO Platform or the Camden Assets Recovery Inter-
agency Network (CARIN).  
 Notwithstanding these data about organised crime investments in the 
legal economy, most confiscated assets are movable goods (cash and vehi-
cles) while there is almost no confiscation of companies. As a result, a gap 
exists between where the illicit proceeds are assumed to be invested (in the 
legitimate sector) and what is actually recovered from companies (Trans-
crime report, 2015). 
 It is more common, indeed, to make confiscation orders against indi-
viduals, because it is often difficult to prove that a company was used for 
criminal conduct, as these companies are often used as fronts for illicit ac-
tivities (Laver, 2013) or, for example, due to the problems in tracing back 
the company to its beneficial owner. Moreover, prosecutors can also be 
reluctant to confiscate companies which are difficult to manage if they are 
still in operation (Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2014). 
 The Transcrime Report concluded that there is a need to increase the 
use of the confiscation of companies. EU policymakers could learn from 
Italy, where this approach has proven to be one of the most effective in-
struments in the fight against organised crime.  
 The scope of this chapter is not only to evaluate the conclusions noted 
above, but also to consider that the companies infiltrated by organised 
crime enjoy, at the very least, an unfair competitive advantage from the 
inflow of crime-money allowing criminals to obtain licit purchasing power 
(Masciandaro, 1994, p. 37; Zanchetti, 1997, p. 394). Therefore, targeting 
such companies serves the protection of the economic order and maintain-
ing equal conditions of investing in a fair market economy.  
 Moreover, in the UNICRI (United Nations Interregional Crime and Jus-
tice Research) report about organised crime and legal economy (the Italian 
case) 2016 (UNICRI, 2016), it is confirmed that “reinvesting illicit profits 
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back into the legal economy” is “a practice which consequently weakens 
both the economic fabric of society and state institutions [. . .] as actions 
by organised crime groups can shape political decisions in the economic 
sphere, particularly through corruption and blackmail”.  
 As the Transcrime report stresses, of particular importance is the capac-
ity of the Italian public authorities to target legitimate businesses: Italy is 
one of the few European countries seizing companies thanks to the power-
ful ‘arsenal’ of confiscation measures and to the wide experience of Italian 
law enforcement. At the same time, it is important to highlight that the 
Italian legislator has also introduced instruments alternative to seizure, e.g. 
judicial administration. 
 In the light of these considerations, a reflection is necessary at a Euro-
pean level on the strategies to face the infiltration of illegal proceeds in 
businesses and to achieve this aim, the analysis of various Italian tools can 
be very useful for legislators, national as well as the European.  
 The aim of this chapter is, firstly, to evaluate the different strategies 
adopted in the Italian system of law to tackle the infiltration of organised 
and economic crime in business and, secondly, to highlight the benefits 
and drawbacks of the different. In particular, the article focuses on the al-
ternative instruments to confiscation, e.g. judicial administration (tempo-
rary suspensions), in order to identify improvements in the fight against 
criminal infiltration, whilst better ensuring the survival of the firms. 
 
 
The importance of confiscation of companies in Italy 
 
The fight against organised crime infiltration in the Italian economy is im-
portant in order to ensure free and fair competition and to protect the legal 
economy, as considered above. It should also be acknowledged that, not 
only do mafia organisations seek contacts with businesses and the world 
of politics, but also that companies, on their own initiative, seek support 
and collusive agreements both with the mafia and with those who wield 
political power. This is in an attempt to gain commercial advantage, to have 
easier access to new markets and to obtain financial supplies. Moreover, 
companies do this to protect themselves from competition and to obtain 
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favours from public administrations whilst also eliminating or reducing 
various obstacles to their activity. 
 Furthermore, some studies confirm that in Italy the connection with the 
business world – in the form of control, conditioning or infiltration in pre-
existing companies, or in the form of direct management of new business 
activities – serves ‘mafiose’ criminal organisations. This is not only to pur-
sue enrichment in a strict sense but also to use the business as a tool to 
establish relationship networks, thereby reciprocating favours with protag-
onists from the world of politics, institutions and public administration. In 
this way, for the Mafia, the infiltration in companies or their management 
is a way to improve their ‘social capital’, i.e. the systemic network of rela-
tionships that the mafia organisations are using to developing with the var-
ious sectors of the so called ‘Legal society’, which historically is their 
strong point. For these reasons, an attack on the mafia-business means an 
attack on the heart of the mafia and thus an undermining of the foundations 
of their power and their territorial rooting (Sciarrone, 2012; Id., 2011; Vis-
conti, 2014, p. 263; Paoli, 2006, p. 263). In conclusion, the confiscation of 
companies is a tool to face, on the one hand, this Mafia business and, on 
the other hand, these collusive relationships among companies, criminal 
organisations and political power. 
 As of 28 February 2017, according to the database of the A.N.B.S.C. 
(Italian), the “National Agency for the Management and Destination of the 
Properties”, seized and confiscated goods from organised crime comprise: 
16.696 properties (buildings and land); 7.800 financial assets; 2.078 mov-
able assets; 7.588 registered movable goods and 2.492 corporate assets 
(Dossier statistico, 2017). 
 The analysis of the types of recovered assets across the available data-
bases in Italy shows that real estate is the macrotype with the highest num-
ber of confiscations and seizures. However, we should also note the signif-
icant weight of companies (between 5% and 15% across all the databases), 
which confirms that Italy is one of the few European countries seizing busi-
nesses (Transcrime report, 2015). 
 This phenomenon of sequestered and confiscated businesses is steadily 
growing. The “report on the consistency, destination and use of the frozen 
and confiscated goods” by the Italian House of Representatives of Febru-
ary 2016, takes into account the data for the previous five years (2011-
2015). The companies seized and confiscated totalled 912 in 2011, 1.054 
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in 2012; 1.549 in 2013; 1.874 in 2014 and 2.514 in 2015; the trend is grow-
ing.  
 The analysis of juridical forms has shown that, among the types of or-
ganised crime firms, Mafia organisations tend towards Companies and 
Partnerships. This would seem consistent with “the need for flexible forms 
of enterprises with limited personal liability and risk, allowing for greater 
possibilities to fragmentise capital and ownership” (UNICRI, 2016, 45). 
 Although southern Italy and capital provinces still collect most of the 
confiscated assets, the proportion of northern regions is growing. The up-
ward trend of ‘non-traditional’ geographic areas (north and centre) is con-
firmed by the data of the Ministry of Justice (SIPPI) (Transcrime report, 
2015, p. 272). There is, however, a notable variation in the types of confis-
cation. While real estate has a higher incidence in southern regions, com-
panies and movable assets occur most often in northern regions (Tran-
scrime report, 2015). 
 This evolution may be due, on the one hand, to the expansion of mafia 
investments in northern regions and on the other hand, to a wider adoption 
of confiscation measures in ‘non-traditional’ areas also because of confis-
cation measures against foreign criminal groups which are prevalent in 
central and northern regions (Transcrime report, 2015, p. 273).  
 The confiscation of assets in Italy, therefore, seems to reflect new trends 
of criminal investments, in both geographic terms (e.g. the expansion of 
mafia investments towards northern regions) and typological ones (e.g. 
more companies and movable assets) (Transcrime report, 2015, p. 273).  
 
 
The confiscation against a legal person in suprana-
tional legislation 
 
The awareness of the European legislator of the seriousness of the criminal 
investment in the business (Albert, Cutajar and Fargier, 2014) transpires 
from the European Parliament Resolution on organised crime (0459/2011, 
l. b), where the substantial social and economic costs of organised crime 
are highlighted. The Resolution pointed at evidence of the infiltration of 
organised crime in some member states in “political circles, the public sec-
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tor and legitimate economic activities; whereas it is conceivable that simi-
lar inroads have also been made, thereby strengthening the position of or-
ganised crime, in the rest of the European Union”. The Resolution n. 
0403/2016, “on the fight against corruption”, stresses that “organised crim-
inal groups have shown a tendency and a strong ability to diversify their 
activities, adapting to different geographical areas . . .” It pointed at the 
penetration into the legal economy and associated conduct which corrupts 
public officials”. The Resolution n. 0444/2013 “on organised crime, cor-
ruption and money laundering”, underlines that “organised crime is in-
creasingly resembling an economic global player” with an estimated cost 
to business of more than € 670 billion annually”.3 In order to face this crim-
inal infiltration in the economy various European legal instruments impose 
the introduction of forms of confiscation against the companies. 
 Art. 2 Directive n. 42/2014 on the freezing and confiscation of instru-
mentalities and proceeds of crime in the European Union provides for a 
broad concept of the object of the confiscation: ‘property’ means property 
of any description and legal documents or instruments evidencing title or 
interest in such property. Such a broad concept can also include actual busi-
nesses (Maugeri, 2015, p. 326). 
 Framework decision 212/2005 – on Confiscation of Crime-Related Pro-
ceeds, Instrumentalities and Property – imposed on Member States the 
adoption of the extended confiscation (art. 3; this rule has been replaced by 
art. 5 Directive n. 42/2014). The last paragraph of art. 3 establishes that 
each Member State may also consider adopting the necessary measures to 
enable it to confiscate property transferred to a legal person, in respect of 
which the person has a controlling influence or receives a significant part 
of the legal person’s income. With this rule the Framework decision per-
mits the confiscation of the company’s property. 
 The framework decision 2006/783/JHA, has established in the art. 12, 
§ 3, that “a confiscation order issued against a legal person shall be exe-
cuted even if the executing State does not recognize the principle of crim-
inal liability of legal persons”. It admits the mutual recognition of confis-
cation orders against a legal person. 
                                                 
3  See, however, the critical approach about the official dates of Van Duyne et 
al., 2014, p. 235; Van Duyne, 2000, p. 61. 
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 In the “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the mutual recognition of freezing and confiscation orders” 
(December 2016 – last version 1 December 2017), the legal person is also 
considered as the affected person. Moreover, the confiscation order is de-
fined in art. 2 as “a final penalty or measure [. . .] resulting in the final 
deprivation of property from a natural or legal person”. In addition, art. 26 
establishes that “a freezing order or a confiscation order issued against a 
legal person shall be executed even if the executing State does not recog-
nise the principle of criminal liability of legal persons”. 
 
a. The strategies in Italy 
 
In order to fight the infiltration of organised and economic crime in busi-
ness, the Italian system of law provides for four different approaches:  
1. various forms of confiscation of the illegal proceeds or directly of the 
business itself;  
2. measures designed to control or influence the management of the busi-
ness (judicial administration of the firm, i.e. temporary suspension of 
the management, ex art. 34 legislative decree 159/2011, so-called Anti-
mafia Code; judicial control of the business ex art. 34 bis l.d. 159/’11); 
3. administrative measures to limit the firms’ dealings with public admin-
istration (art. 83 ss. l.d. 159/’11);  
4. the administrative liability “ex crimine” of enterprises. 
 
While this article focuses mainly on the first two strategies, some consid-
eration of the other two is also of value. 
 The third, “disqualification”, is a preventive measure, applied by ad-
ministrative authorities: prohibition to conclude contracts, obtain authori-
sations and concessions and, in general, to have legal relations with public 
authorities, public bodies or companies that are supervised or otherwise 
controlled by the State or other public entities (art. 83 l.d. 159/’11).  
 It is possible to apply the disqualification, after the disqualifying dis-
closure/report (informativa interdittiva), of the existence of “any attempts 
at infiltration by the mafia, aimed at influencing the choices and directives 
of the concerned companies or firms” (art. 84, § 3 antimafia code). The 
disqualification paralyses all economic relations, in the broadest sense, be-
tween the subject and the Public Administration. This measure, which is 
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imposed with fewer safeguards, can have a significant impact on the firm, 
blocking all economic relations with public administration, on the basis of 
the mere suspicion of Mafia infiltration. It can be useful to prevent the in-
filtration of organised crime in the legal economy, but in a very problem-
atic way in terms of respect of the safeguard of the rule of law.  
 The same function is also served by art. 32 of Decree Law 90/2014 
which allows the Prefect, at the proposal of ANAC’s Chairman (National 
Agency against Corruption), to appoint new corporate management or to 
impose judicial administration on enterprises, either because they are in-
volved in criminal proceedings relating to, lato sensu, corruption or they 
are believed to be present in situations denoting unlawful conduct or crim-
inal events. This applies only to enterprises which have been awarded con-
tracts for public works, services or supplies. 
 The last of the four strategies, administrative liability “ex crimine” of 
legal entities, has been introduced by the legislative decree n. 231/2001, 
implementing the relevant international obligations.4 This form of liability 
has been introduced, primarily, to punish the fundamentally legal enter-
prise which commits a crime (economic crime). It is provided also for the 
crime of participation in a criminal association (art. 416 c.p.) or in a 
mafiose association (art. 416 bis c.p.). The confiscation of the proceeds (or 
its value) or of the instruments of crime is a sanction against the enterprise 
ex art. 19 of the leg. d. n. 231/2001; another interesting sanction is the de-
finitive disqualification from the exercise of the activity, if the enterprise 
or one of its organisational units is permanently used for the sole or pre-
vailing purpose of allowing or facilitating the commission of offenses (for 
example money laundering, forgery). This administrative liability “ex 
crimine” of legal entities is applied in a criminal proceeding and represent 
a useful tool against criminal infiltration in the economy. 
 
  
                                                 
4  For example, the Brussels Convention on the protection of the European Com-
munities’ financial interests 1995; the Convention on the fight against corrup-
tion involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member 
States of the European Union, signed in Brussels on 1997; and the OECD Con-
vention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 1999). 
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b. Confiscation as a strategy against criminal infiltration in the 
economy 
 
The traditional strategy applied by the Italian legislator to tackle the infil-
tration of (organised and economic) crime into the legal economy, and in 
particular into companies, is based, first of all, on different forms of con-
fiscation (especially extended confiscation), in order to forfeit the criminal 
proceeds laundered through a business, or to directly seize the business of 
the criminal organisation (see next section). Generally, in Italian judicial 
experience, confiscation has served as the main instrument, not only to de-
prive the mafia of illicitly acquired assets, but also to affect their capacity 
to influence businesses. 
 Art. 416 bis, § 7 criminal code (c.p.) provides for the conviction-based 
confiscation of the proceeds (fruits and reinvestment) and the instruments 
of mafiosa association; it is considered a security measure (Barazzetta, 
2012, 4310). 
 Art. 240 bis c.p. (criminal code)5 provided for seizure and confiscation 
in case of conviction or plea agreement for serious crimes, such as those 
regulated under article 416 bis of the criminal code, criminal mafia-type 
organisations, and connected crimes. This is a form of extended confisca-
tion used when assets have a value disproportionate to the declared income 
or economic activity of the convicted person6 and the owner is not able to 
give a clear explanation of their licit origin7 (Maugeri, 2016, p. 68). 
 A form of extended confiscation, albeit non-conviction based, is the 
preventive measures ex art. 24 legislative decree n. 159/2011 (anti-mafia 
code)8: confiscation of assets which a subject has at his disposal, being 
                                                 
5  Introduced by legislative decree n. 21/2018, before art. 12 sexies of Law De-
cree June 8th, 1992, n. 306 - converted by Law August 7th, 1992, n. 356. 
6  Supr. Court, 17/12/2003, Montella, (2004) Cass. pen. 1182; see McIntosh v 
Lord Advocate, n. 251, which affirm that Court could make the assumption of 
the illegal origin of the proceeds to confiscate only when there is a significant 
discrepancy beetween the accused property and expenditure and the accused’s 
known sources of income. L Campbell, Organised crime and the law (Hart 
Publishing, 2013) p. 189. 
7  Const. Court, 29/01/1996, n. 18, Basco, (1996) Cass. pen. 1385; Supr. Court, 
15/04/1996, Berti, ivi, 3649; Supr. Court, 17/12/2003 (19/01/2004), Montella, 
(2004) Cass. pen. 1182; Supr. Court, 13/05/2008, n. 21357, E., in www.deju-
regiuffrè.it. 
8  Before art. 2 ter law 575/’65, introduced with the law 646/1982. 
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disproportionate to declared income or economic activity, or when it re-
sults that they are derived from illicit activity or used for reinvestment, and, 
at any rate, are assets for which the defendant has not demonstrated a le-
gitimate origin.9  
 This confiscation is applied to specific categories of persons who have 
not been attributed a criminal responsibility through sentencing, but who 
are considered a danger to society because – according to art. 16 Anti-ma-
fia Code – they are suspected, based on objectively verifiable facts, of spe-
cific crimes10 or, on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as ha-
bitual offenders. Alternatively, on account of their behaviour and lifestyle 
and on the basis of factual evidence, they may be regarded as habitually 
living, even in part, on the proceeds of crime. For this reason such ablative 
measures are defined as ante or praeter probationem delicti (about confis-
cation without conviction, see Faraldo Cabana, 2017; Rui, 2015; Smith, 
Owen and Bodnar, 2015; Simser, 2009; Kennedy, 2006, 132). 
 Following the recent reforms it is possible to apply preventive confis-
cation without inflicting personal preventive measures that demand the 
demonstration of the “current social dangerousness” (not only in the past), 
and even when the owner died during the proceeding or has died in the five 
years before the beginning of the procedure (art. 18 Ant. Code). So it is 
truly an actio in rem. 
 A lower standard of proof is required (when compared to conviction-
based confiscations) regarding the evidence necessary for the application 
of preventive measures on both a personal and a patrimonial level. How-
ever, after the recent reform, preventive confiscation ex art. 24 anti-mafia 
code can be applied only when it transpires that the proceeds are derived 
from illicit activity or used for reinvestment, and no longer merely when 
there is reason to believe. This means, in the opinion of the doctrine, that 
the prosecutor has to prove the illicit origin of the proceeds on the basis of 
the criminal standard of the proof – at least by circumstantial evidence 
                                                 
9  Art. 2 ter, l. 575/1965, introduced by art. 14 l. 646/1982, and now art. 24 of the 
Anti-mafia Code. 
10  First of all the crime of participation in Mafia, Camorra or other criminal 
groups, or suspected of the crimes provided in art. 51, § 3 bis Criminal Proce-
dure Code (crimes connected to criminal organisations, kidnapping for profit, 
racketeering); or for those who committed preparatory acts to terrorism acts 
and so on.  
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(“serious, precise and concordant”, art. 192 of the Italian criminal proce-
dure code). Yet the Supreme Court does not demand this criminal standard 
of the proof as it accepts the use of assumptions.11 These preventive 
measures can also be applied after an acquittal in a criminal trial. 
 Moreover, art. 34 antimafia code (before art. 3 quinquies l. 575/’65) has 
introduced the confiscation of assets used in the exercise of an economic 
activity that, based on sufficient grounds, is considered objectively useful 
for the activity of persons who are considered for preventive measures or 
are defendant in ongoing criminal proceedings for crimes linked to organ-
ised crime. The confiscation is applied where there is motive to believe that 
these assets are the fruit of illicit activity or constitute the reinvestment of 
such assets, and the owner has not demonstrated a legitimate origin12. Re-
gardless of the fact that the property is at the disposal of the socium 
sceleris, the law does not require the existence of a fictitious interposition 
between the third party and the “proposed”, as occurs in the art. 24 
antimafia code (for the confiscation), as it does not require a “proposed”, 
but only requires sufficient evidence to believe that the exercise of certain 
economic activities (such as laundering) can still help the activities of the 
affiliated persons. This has eliminated one of the major obstacles to the 
identification of assets of illicit origin and the ensuing application of con-
fiscation, namely the difficulties linked to the demonstration of the actual 
relationship between the dummy and the person whose account the dummy 
holds. In the case of companies with a plurality of partners, considered for 
the application of preventive measures, it is not necessary to start as many 
processes as there are partners, rather it will suffice to simply bring a single 
case against the same company considered collectively. 
 
  
                                                 
11  Supr. Court, Unit. Sect., 26-6-2014, Spinelli, n. 4880. 
12  Art. 3 quinquies, 1. 1423/1956, introduced by art. 24 d.1. 306/1992, now art. 
34, § 7. 
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The mafia enterprise 
 
In the praxis, with some simplification, the distinction is possible among 
economic enterprises which are: 
1. ‘original’ mafia businesses, characterised by a strong individualization 
around the dominant figure of the founder, who runs it directly with 
mafiose method; 
2. enterprises owned by the ‘Mafioso’, who does not manage directly, but 
runs the business through a figurehead (dummy) with mafia methods;  
3. enterprises with ‘mafia participation’, where the holder is not a figure-
head but still represents his interests.  
 
The latter case is more complex because different situations are possible: 
(a) the company, originally legal, has become a tool in the hands of the 
mafia through extortion, exploitation or money laundering; (b) the com-
pany is managed with only some relation to organised crime, e.g. simply 
the depositing of moneys to launder, without alteration of the business cy-
cle. In the first case the company becomes a tool of the criminal organisa-
tion and it is close to the first two cases. 
 To respond to these situations in Italy, extended confiscation, art. 240 
bis c.p. (after conviction) and art. 24 antimafia code (without conviction), 
and also the confiscation ex art. 416 bis, § 7 criminal code (in the form of 
the confiscation of the instrument) are used to forfeit the enterprise that is 
considered an investment or a tool of a mafia association.  
 Normally these forms of confiscation can impact only on the illegal 
proceeds of a crime or on the instrument of that crime, but in order to coun-
ter the criminal infiltration into the economy, the Italian Supreme Court 
consider the firm itself as an instrument or proceed of the crime. 
 In particular, in order to simplify the confiscation of businesses, the 
Italian Supreme Court uses the category of ‘mafia enterprise’ to justify the 
confiscation of an entire company or of compendiums of all company 
shares in cases where proceeds of illegal origin have become fused with 
lawful assets.13 This category is applied whether the initial capital is of 
lawful origin and has been invested in an illegal activity (exercised with 
                                                 
13  Supr. Court, 30/01/2009, n. 17988, Ced. n. 244802; Supr. Court, 08/02/ 2007, 
n. 5640. 
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mafia method) or the unlawful initial capital has been invested in lawful 
activities.  
 When the illegal proceeds are merged with the company’s legal funds, 
it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between lawful and unlaw-
ful and this could result in the confiscation of the whole enterprise. Alt-
hough these forms of confiscation should affect only the illicit proceeds or 
the reinvestment of criminal assets, the Court forfeits, at least according to 
the interpretation of a certain case law, the entire contaminated activities, 
regardless of the illicit origin of the assets. 
 In the opinion of the Supreme Court, in a typically complex business 
enterprise, it was not possible to operate with a clear distinction between 
licit and unlawful goods, given the unique character of a company, which 
is the combined and synergistic result of capital, capital goods, labour force 
and other components, legally incorporated and united in the pursuit of the 
aim represented by the exercise of the company, as defined in civil law (art. 
2555 cc). The overall unit constitutes an autonomous economic and social 
reality, because the various factors interact with the same aim and comple-
ment each other; the contribution of licit components (regarding entrepre-
neurial capacity and initiative) cannot be discerned from that attributed to 
illicit resources, especially the subject’s companies have been supported 
by the mafia organisation, in a perverse circuit of common interests.14 
 Another way to forfeit an entire enterprise in the praxis of the jurispru-
dence is to consider the owner Mafioso and to apply the assumption that if 
the owner is ‘Mafioso’, the enterprise must be unlawful.  
 The problem here is that a similar assumption is used as a sort of ‘ex-
perience rule’, applicable without checking whether in the concrete case 
this rule is valid and is realised in practice, and without confirming the 
presence of an ‘original’ mafia business. Alternatively there is an enter-
prise owned by the “Mafioso” but managed by a straw man. Provided the 
assumptions are verified in the concrete case, these two hypotheses do not 
pose particular problems because the companies’ funds are of illicit origin 
and managed with mafia method. 
 More problematic is the case of the enterprise with ‘mafia participa-
tion’, where the holder is not a figurehead but still represents his interests. 
In this latter case, the court must clearly verify whether the company is 
                                                 
14  Supr. Court, 23/01/2014, n. 16311. 
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managed with mafia methods and when this mafia contamination started, 
or whether the company has merely had some kind of relationship with 
organised crime, without alteration of the business cycle. 
 The latter case, the enterprise with mafia participation, is one that de-
serves more attention and requires a limiting of the seizure and confiscation 
only within the bounds of the unlawful proceeds or their reinvestment, ra-
ther than an indiscriminate confiscation of the whole enterprise. This is of 
fundamental importance, in particular, when the company has had only a 
limited connection with organised crime. 
 Otherwise such a wide interpretation of the concept of ‘mafia enter-
prise’ transforms the confiscation of profits and reinvestment into a form 
of general confiscation of property. This would constitute a disproportion-
ate punishment in violation of the legality principle and of the constitu-
tional protection of private property, as well as of the principle of propor-
tionality (Maugeri, 2015, 337), because the law (art. 416 bis, § 7, art. 240 
bis c.p. and art. 24 L. D. 159/2011) allows only the confiscation of the 
crime proceeds and reinvestment. 
 The same problems arise when the jurisprudence considers a company 
‘totally illicit’ and ‘forfeitable’ because illegal proceeds have been invested 
such that they cannot be discerned.15 This is a consequence of the extension 
of application of preventive measures not only against people suspected of 
being Mafiosi but also against those suspected of any habitual criminal ac-
tivities, including corruption or tax evasion. 
 It is important to emphasise that the Directive n. 42/2014 in the recital 
n. 11 establishes, through the definition of the concept of ‘proceeds’, an 
important limit to the extension of these models of confiscation: “. . . pro-
ceeds can include any property . . . which has been intermingled with prop-
erty acquired from legitimate sources, up to the assessed value of the inter-
mingled proceeds”. This specification is a very important safeguard against 
the application of extended confiscation or a preventive measure to entire 
companies as it allows forfeiture of only those invested illegal proceeds. 
 In recitals 17 and 18 the Directive actually suggests the introduction of 
a clause to ensure compliance with the principle of proportionality in two 
cases. Firstly, “the relevant provisions could be applicable where [. . .] such 
                                                 
15  Supr. Court, 10/06/2013, n. 32032. 
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a measure is proportionate [. . .] to the value of the instrumentalities con-
cerned”. Secondly, “confiscation should not be ordered” in exceptional cir-
cumstances, where confiscation would represent an undue hardship for the 
affected person.16  
 These clauses ensure respect for the proportionality principle in cases 
where illegal profits have been reinvested and their removal would result 
in jeopardising the viability of a business (Lackner and Kühl, 2011). In 
Italy, though, these clauses, already present in other legal systems, have 
not been introduced with the law n. 202/2016 which has enforced the di-
rective; this represents a serious violation of the directive prescriptions and 
a lost opportunity to improve the safeguards in the Italian legal order.  
 Contrary to the praxis of the Italian jurisprudence which presumes the 
illicit origin of the business from the circumstantial evidence (or suspi-
cions) of the mafia participation of the owner, it is useful to remember, 
moreover, the correct approach of the Supreme Court in the “Cinà” case.17 
The Court considers, according with the principle of legality, that the 
“availability”, the proximity or the “will to be at disposal” of the owner 
with the mafia association is not enough circumstantial evidence to infer 
the illicit origin of the entire business and the corporate shares. The Su-
preme Court criticises the Court of Appeal on this issue. The latter inferred 
the proof of illicit (mafiosa) nature of the assets from the desire, manifested 
by C., “to enter into full agreement of intent with an important member of 
the Mafia, which is GS, in order to enter into economic and trade relations 
with other persons - member of the association . . . so being able to take 
the privileges that derive for the enterprise from such mafia relation”. This 
last conclusion has been overturned by the Supreme Court, affirming: 
“This is clearly tautological reasoning because it infers the nature of the 
assets from the will of the owner to enter into business relationships with 
Mafia leaders. It is absolutely not sufficient to justify the confiscation of 
the enterprise”.  
 In the Court’s opinion in order to confiscate the company, it is necessary 
to demonstrate, according to the standard of the proof of the preventive 
proceeding (a facilitated standard of proof in comparison with the criminal 
                                                 
16  Para.18 specifies that this exceptional circumstance should only be permitted 
‘in cases where it would put the person concerned in a situation in which it 
would be very difficult for him to survive.’ 
17  Supr. Court, 17/12/2013, n. 12493.  
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standard18), that the company is “the result of illegal activity” or that the 
company has actually taken advantage of the holder’s adhesion to mafia in 
carrying out its activities. More specifically, the demonstration is neces-
sary, at least at the level of circumstantial evidence: (a) that the original 
asset acquisition was made possible by the buyer’s unlawful activity 
though without demanding proof of a direct link, in the form of causal link, 
between the illegal activity and the obtaining of assets; (b) that the growth 
and the accumulation of wealth by the company was actually facilitated by 
the illegal activity of the holder “belonging to the Mafia”. In the latter case 
the Supreme Court requires that the holder, “at least, used his mafia quality 
to create favourable conditions, putting in place the activities appropriate 
to impose, illicitly, the enterprise in the market because only in this case, 
can it be said – according to the provision of the law – that the capital 
increase is “the result of illegal activities”.  
 The Court states correctly that the illicit origin of the company assets or 
the corporate shares cannot be inferred from the fact that the owner is sus-
pected (and is, therefore, considered a danger to society): “The preventive 
confiscation is not connected with the Mafioso status of the subject but 
[derives] from the activity exercised by him”.  
  The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that, “The existence of ade-
quate evidence of membership to a criminal association is not enough to 
believe that assets, although large and rapidly acquired, are of illegal 
origin. It is necessary, [. . .] indeed, to have evidence which suggests that 
the assets are the result of illegal activity or their reinvestment, due to the 
disproportion with the declared income or economic activity, or for other 
reasons”. 
 If the application of these forms of confiscation against enterprises does 
not respect the rule of law, the risk emerges that today the Court of Appeal 
of Palermo would try to confiscate the entire enterprise of individuals who 
wish to be at the disposal of the mafia. Tomorrow the jurisprudence can 
attempt to justify a company’s confiscation when the owner is a victim of 
extortion by a mafia organisation. The reason is that he is still economically 
supporting that organisation and is benefiting from a situation of calm to 
                                                 
18  See the previous paragraph. 
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work. Even these benefits, which are only a consequence of the mafia pro-
tection in relation to the victim of extortion, would already be sufficient to 
consider the company “mafiosa” and “confiscatable”.  
 
The problems of the confiscation of companies. 
 
The confiscation of a business is a very effective weapon in weakening 
mafia power and impeding their infiltration into the legal economy. Indeed, 
in the opinion of the prosecutors such financial onslaught is more feared 
than a prison sentence by Mafiosi and other criminals. 
 Nevertheless, even setting aside the problems of respect for the rule of 
law connected with the application of forms of extended confiscation 
(King-Walker, 2014; Hendry-King, 2017, 733) – the consequences of con-
fiscating a business are more complicated than those resulting from the 
seizure of properties: the risk to the very future of the company and to the 
jobs it provides, along with the negative social consequences attached to 
such job losses.  
 In order to address these issues in Italy, the legislator has introduced 
specific legislation to guarantee the management of the seized and confis-
cated businesses, to ensure that during the seizure the company can carry 
out its activities when the enterprise demands to be saved. Notwithstanding 
this, in Italy, data from the A.N.B.S.C. suggests that the majority of the 
forfeited companies are closed down and only a very small percentage will 
be sold, after the definitive confiscation, when they are survived during the 
seizure (Dossier statistico, 2017; Bivona, 2012, 321). 
 
 
Judicial administration (art. 34 leg. decree n. 159/2011) 
 
The judicial administration (before art. 3 quarter l. 575/’65, introduced by 
law decree n. 306/1992; now art. 34 lgs.d. n. 159/2011), applies to assets 
used in the running of an economic activity which, based on sufficient 
grounds, is considered objectively useful for the activity of persons who 
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are considered for preventive measures or are defendant in ongoing crimi-
nal proceedings for crimes linked to organised crime (Mangione, 2000, 
348; Licata, 2011, 1088)19. 
 The court orders the judicial administration of firms or assets which can 
be used, directly or indirectly, to carry out economic activities in two situ-
ations: 
  Firstly, if there are sufficient reasons to believe that these economic 
activities are directly or indirectly undertaken under the conditions of in-
timidation or submission provided for in Article 416-bis C.P. (mafiosa as-
sociation), and therefore these businesses are victims of Mafia (i.e. the firm 
is forced to pay the bribe); or secondly may, however, facilitate the activi-
ties of the suspect or defendant.20 
 This tool is an interesting alternative to confiscation because it better 
facilitates the continued running of the business. It consists only of the re-
moval of the company’s managers for a period of time (12 months – re-
newable until 24 months). The court charges a judge (delegated) and a ju-
dicial administrator who has to manage the business. The judicial admin-
istrator has to present statements about the economic activity and reports 
ex art. 36 l.d. 156/2011 to the public prosecutor. 
 The purpose of the measure is to interrupt the facilitating activities, the 
use of the economic activity to support the activities of suspects or defend-
ants. It aims also to prevent others by direct intervention on administration. 
This should not be confined to the mere management, but must also aim to 
remove the conditions that have caused the measure. This is a temporary 
measure, which can be concluded by the simple revocation of the measure, 
if the conditions of mafia infiltration have been removed. Likewise, there 
is the restoration of ordinary management alongside a “judicial control” 
for a maximum of three years, based on the obligation to communicate to 
the Questor and to the Tax Police a series of information on management 
acts; or, as mentioned earlier, the confiscation of properties when there is 
                                                 
19  See Trib. Milano, 27/01/2017 (2017) 4 ANPP 421; Supr. Court, 16/10/2013, 
n. 7449. 
20  Persons in respect of whom there is a preventive measure proposed or applied, 
or persons subject to criminal proceedings for any of the offenses provided for 
in articles 416-bis, 629 extortion – blackmail, 630 abduction, 644 usury, 648 
bis money laundering and 648 ter, use of money goods or utilities of unlawful 
origin, of the criminal code). 
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reason to believe that they are the result of illicit activities or that they con-
stitute re-use (Article 34, paragraph 7). 
 The object of the judicial administration (art. 34) is the entire business, 
not only the proceeds or the instruments of crime. It is an order in rem.  
 The owner must not be considered for preventive measures and, first of 
all, has not to be considered ‘dangerous’ because he/she is suspected of 
being involved in criminal activity, even if in the past. Otherwise, seizure 
and confiscation ex art. 20 – 24 leg. decree 159/2011 will be applied. The 
owner has to be ‘the third party’ in relation to the facilitated person and the 
business must genuinely be on his/her property and at his/her disposal. If 
the entrepreneur were merely a front or straw man of the facilitated person, 
his assets could be immediately subjected to the preventive seizure and 
preventive confiscation (art. 24 l.d. 159/2011), which may affect all the 
assets owned by the suspect or those which are, directly or indirectly 
(through straw man), at his disposal. 
 The activities both of parties subjected to preventive measure and of 
defendants must be facilitated. In the opinion of some authors these activ-
ities have to be criminal21 (Mangione, 2000, 15), but the jurisprudence has 
affirmed that the application of this measure does not demand that the fa-
cilitated activity is unlawful and that the economic activity, with facilitating 
nature, is being exercised in an unlawful manner. It is sufficient that: (1) 
the supported person is also only proposed for a preventive measure or 
prosecution for one of the offenses mentioned above, and (2) that such ac-
tivity, although exercised in a legitimate manner, offered an aiding contri-
bution to the persons referred to above.22 
 The aim is to expel the criminal organisation from the company’s busi-
ness, to reclaim the business, in particular when the company is only a vic-
tim of organised crime. The purpose is the ‘decontamination’ of fundamen-
tally healthy economic activities affected by mafia infiltration. This meas-
ure should alleviate any danger of infiltration of organised crime whilst 
also eliminating potential distorting effects for the free market.  
 The judicial administration intends to intervene in that ‘grey zone’ of 
relations between the mafia (or other serious forms of crime) and enter-
prise, where the ‘classical’ preventive measures are not easy to apply, and 
                                                 
21  See Supr. Court, 16/10/2013, n. 7449. 
22  Trib. Milano, 24/06/2016, n. 6, www.penalecontemporaneo.it/ 
326 
 
where these measures are aimed at tackling the phenomenon of contami-
nation of sound economic-entrepreneurial activities.  
 The more frequent use of judicial administration can be of great signif-
icance to the companies, in particular for more complex and big companies 
to remain outside criminal plots. Regarding this, the adoption of 
organisational-management models - as that imposed by the mentioned 
previously legislative decree 231/2001 - by the firms is considered worthy 
by the jurisprudence. 
 Judicial (compulsory) administration has been considered, in fact, in 
some judgements as a non-punitive deterrent to the infiltration by the mafia 
or organised crime. 
 In this regard, the TNT plc case is of great interest. The Dutch company, 
working in Lombardy, was placed under judicial administration by the 
Court of Milano due to the ‘Ndrangheta infiltration”. TNT used small co-
operatives connected with ‘Ndrangheta in order to run its business in Italy. 
After only five months, the Court overruled the measure because the mul-
tinational company adopted a trustworthy compliance measures in order 
both to cut the connections with organised crime, which had motivated the 
initial judicial intervention, and to introduce adequate preventive tools for 
averting the risk of future ‘relapses’23 (Visconti, 2012).  
For the ‘parent company’, TNT, it is not demonstrated that there was a 
clear self-interest in entertaining privileged relations with companies con-
trolled by the criminal organisation. The Court correctly demands the as-
certainment of an objective element, the nexus of instrumentality between 
a specific business and “mafiosi” interests, and a subjective element, the 
awareness by those who work for the enterprise of the "quality of the fa-
cilitated person and of his aims".  
 In the light of these stringent requirements, the measure has to work as 
a ‘bistoury’ (surgical knife) to operate selectively in the considered eco-
nomic activities. The Court observes, in fact, that the measure of temporary 
suspension cannot indiscriminately extend to “all the assets attributable di-
rectly or indirectly to a particular person”, but should concern only “those 
certain economic activities” that facilitate criminal interests. “A request for 
temporary suspension against a legal person cannot be accepted if it is 
founded only on the assumption that his legal representative has facilitated 
                                                 
23  Trib. Milano, April 2011. 
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the criminal group with other economic activities”. The law (art. 34), the 
Court highlights, demands that the “only objective requirement for the tem-
porary suspension is the effective and conscious facilitation of such per-
sons”. 
 Moreover, the Court of Milan has affirmed in a recent order that the 
judicial administration “is not repressive but preventive”. Its objective is 
not to punish the business person who is connected to criminal association, 
but to counter the mafia contamination24 (Capecchi, 2017). 
 The Court affirms that the proximity to criminal interests detected in 
the business, can be grounds for censorship “exclusively in terms of its 
negligent relationship”.  
 In this case, the proceeding was against F M SPA and its 100% con-
trolled N SPA, a semi-privatized public-sector entrepreneurial holding, no-
toriously responsible for planning, setting up and managing large-scale ex-
hibition events. This group of institutions had been made subject to art. 34 
of the Antimafia code, thanks to elements of criminal infiltration. In short, 
the Court considered the manager responsible for facilitating criminal in-
filtration into the business.  
 The originality of this order lies in the affirmation that judicial admin-
istration measures should be understood as “imposed also in favour of en-
trepreneurship and its transparency”. It presents new facets compared to 
previous case law and it limits itself to the appointment of a judicial ad-
ministrator to implement or introduce anti-mafia requirements. The Court 
imposes on the managers an instruction to: a) subject a series of important 
negotiations to countersignatures of the judicial administrator, and b) to 
give immediate impetus to the study and adoption of an adequate organi-
sation model.  
 In addition, the jurisprudence has recently specified that, in the case of 
illegal infiltration into a subsidiary company, through the creation of work-
ing relationships with persons involved in organised crime, the temporary 
                                                 
24  Trib. Milano, 24/06/2016, n. 6, cit.  
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suspension must be extended to the parent company. This extension is nec-
essary when the subsidiary company hasn’t real autonomy.25 
 
 
Evolution of the praxis 
 
In the past, due to the criminal strength of the Mafia, this judicial admin-
istration wasn’t applied. It was, indeed, more likely that the economic ac-
tivities would fall, directly or indirectly, under the control of the criminal 
organisation and the holder was often considered a member of the criminal 
organisation or an aider (external complicity). Regardless, he was consid-
ered a danger to society and consequently subjected to confiscation. 
 The situation has changed in recent years as it has become increasingly 
common for the judges to assess the requirements of Article 34 in regard, 
for example, to multinational and large banks in economic relations with 
the ‘Ndrangheta present in Lombardy. Moreover, there are large compa-
nies, holding either public or private wealth, with proven relationships with 
Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta that help secure lucrative contracts for public 
works in Sicily and Calabria; or consortiums of cooperatives, of national 
importance, in connection with the Roman mafia organisation, “Mafia cap-
itale” case (in which corruption has played a significant role). 
 In all these cases, as affirmed by Pignatone, the public prosecutor of 
Rome, the behaviour of one or more company managers, willing to enter 
into business relations with mafia associations – normally on the basis of 
a mutual benefit calculation – does not bring into question the origin and 
lawful formation of the company’s assets. Without prejudice to any crimi-
nal responsibility of the individuals, these are forms of mafia influence that 
do not justify seizure and confiscation, but that can be ‘cured’ (treated), for 
example, through the removal of directors and/or colluding executives, or 
by switching suppliers and subcontractors, and so on (Pignatone, 2015, 
262).  
 
 
                                                 
25  Trib. Milano, 28/09/2016, in www.dejure.giuffre.it 
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Advantages and disadvantages of judicial administra-
tion (temporary suspension) 
 
The judicial administration has the advantage, in terms of efficiency, of 
allowing the court to affect the whole business even if only some partners 
are involved in criminal activities.  
 In terms of respect of the safeguards of the rule of law, as well as from 
an economic point of view, judicial administration is not definitive and 
serves to ensure the continuity and productivity of the enterprise.  
 The more serious disadvantage is the risk of affecting the actual victim 
of the mafia or organised crime. This risk is increased with the reform, 
introduced by the recent law n. 61/2017, which does not demand the double 
verification, necessary in the former version of the law: first of all, of the 
apparent evidence that the company is a victim; and secondly, as a result 
of further investigations and on the basis of factual elements, of the fact 
that the enterprise victim supports the activities of the party subjected to 
preventive measure or the defendant. The demonstration of the fact that the 
firm is a victim is deemed sufficient.26 The law appears to admit that paying 
the bribe is a way to help the mafia, to give a contribution to the criminal 
association; it expresses the culture of suspicion.  
 This crosses, in particular, the line of acceptability when the measure is 
applied, in cases of aiding somebody under investigation as the judicial 
administration could impact upon the business of a third party, who is not 
defendant in a criminal trial, simply because it (the business) could facili-
tate the person under investigation, presumed innocent according to art. 27, 
§ 2 Constitution (Castaldo, 2016).  
 There are many doubts about the respect of the principle of guilt as the 
owner is not considered a danger (suspected) or guilty: he is a third party. 
Constitutional Court n. 487/1995 rejects the question of constitutionality 
by noting that the holders of those economic activities which aid the “mafia 
phenomenon, cannot be considered third parties with respect to the reali-
sation of those interests”, because the free management of their assets helps 
to strengthen the economic presence of organised crime in the area. There-
fore, the choice to carry out an activity with these connotations entails, by 
                                                 
26  Trib. Milano, 27/01/2017, cit.; Trib. Milano, 24/06/2016, n. 6, cit. 
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definition, the awareness of the consequences that may arise, thus allowing 
the exclusion of the subjective situation of ‘substantial guiltlessness’. In 
the opinion of the Constitutional Court, the owners of the business, sub-
jected to judicial administration, are in some way collaborators of the ma-
fia; there is ‘contiguity to mafia’.  
 For the Court of Milan, moreover, negligent facilitation is considered 
enough; the Court downgrades the ‘aware conduct of facilitation’, de-
manded by the Constitutional Court, to “negligent conduct”, a concept 
which, indeed, is not entirely clear.27 
 Moreover, an appeal against this measure is not provided for by the law; 
it is possible only against the confiscation, connected to this measure 
(when the court has reason to believe that the property has an illegal origin 
and the owner is not able to justify the origin), or against the renewal of 
the order. 
 
 
The judicial control of enterprise (new art. 34 bis) 
 
One fascinating new instrument is the judicial control of an enterprise (art. 
34 bis) provided by the law n. 61/2017 (reform of the Anti-Mafia code) 
and introduced by the legislator in order to tackle the criminal infiltration 
in the economy without adopting the more invasive tools, which remain 
available. 
 Where there is only occasional activity of supporting (‘facilitation’) the 
business of suspects (persons in respect of whom a preventive measure is 
proposed or applied) or a defendant, described in paragraph 1 of Article 34 
(analysed above) the court orders the judicial control of a company if there 
is a real danger of mafia infiltrations. It is applied for a period of not less 
than one year and not more than three years. 
 The content of the judicial control is less invasive than that of a tempo-
rary suspension because the Court doesn’t replace the management but ra-
ther, while allowing the owners of the company to run the activities, ap-
points a judicial commissioner with specific control tasks relating to the 
management of the business. He can impose stringent requirements or pre-
scriptions. This measure includes the obligation for those who own, use or 
                                                 
27  Trib. Milano, 28/09/2016, cit. 
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manage the goods and companies, to communicate to the judicial commis-
sioner and the tax police each economic act. Under the supervision of a 
delegated judge, the judicial commissioner has to report periodically on the 
outcomes of the monitored activity to the delegated judge and the public 
prosecutor. Managers must take any appropriate initiative aimed at specif-
ically preventing the risk of attempts of Mafia infiltration or influence. A 
procedure is provided for verifying the proper fulfilment of the obligations 
and, in the case of a violation of one or more of the requirements, the court 
may impose legal administration (art. 34 Antimafia code). 
 This measure is a monitoring tool for the firm which, after the failure 
to issue anti-mafia certification, wants to undergo verification of its path 
of emancipation from the risks arising from “criminal contiguity” and 
thereby to recover legality. 
 This judicial control might be seen as representing an expression of 
public leadership in the economy, but it is true that, if adopted intelligently, 
it could be a way out for those companies who want to try to fully comply 
with legality against the risk of being wholly absorbed into the chains of 
criminal organisations. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The fight against the infiltration by organised and economic crime in the 
legal economy is extremely important in order to protect the economy, the 
free competition and the par condicio of investors, preventing, above all, 
the infiltrated companies from enjoying an unfair competitive advantage 
(Sciarrone, 2011; UNICRI report, 2016). Attacking the mafia or criminal-
business is, moreover, fundamental in undermining the basis of their power 
and expansion, in part by dismantling their ‘social capital’, i.e. the systemic 
network of relationships, based on reciprocity of favours, with the world 
of politics, institutions and public administration. 
 In order to fight this polluting of the legal economy, the confiscation of 
companies is an important instrument, largely used in the Italian system of 
law through forms of extended and non-conviction based confiscation, as 
examined. In addition, the use of confiscation against companies is also 
encouraged in the supranational legislative instruments. 
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 The Transcrime report, quoted previously, emphasised that in order to 
improve the confiscation of enterprises there is the need to intervene at 
three levels.  
 First, the tracing/tracking of criminal assets should be improved by 
strengthening the financial investigation skills of European LEAs and 
FIUs. This can be achieved, for example, through courses and workshops, 
but there is also the need to equip Eurojust and Europol, with better access 
to registries and more effective IT tools. The report of the “Stati generali 
della lotta alla mafia”, emphasises this necessity to ease access to the reg-
istries of Eurojust and Europol (Report ‘Mafie e Europa’, 2018). 
 Secondly, the regulations should be enhanced, e.g. by widening the use 
of extended confiscation or third-party confiscation which in some coun-
tries (e.g. Italy) has greatly facilitated the confiscation of enterprises.  
 Finally, the management of confiscated companies should be improved 
in order to guarantee the continuity of the economic activity: in some Eu-
ropean countries, prosecutors may avoid the seizure of companies because 
they prove difficult to manage once confiscated. This calls for the effective 
development of management policies which, when possible, keep compa-
nies and jobs alive.  
 In relation to the proposal to improve the use of extended confiscation 
or third-party confiscation, however, it is important to stress that, accord-
ing to the principle of proportionality, the analysed instruments, and in par-
ticular confiscation, must be applied with almost surgical precision, in con-
sideration of the dramatic consequence that they can have. These measures 
can have an impact, first of all, on the owner involved in criminal activities 
(affecting his reputation, his economic freedom and his property rights) but 
also on third party innocents, such as the creditors and, above all, the work-
ers. Additionally, the economy and society in general may well be affected, 
while the risk to the long-term survival of businesses once they are sub-
jected to a confiscation application is clearly demonstrated in the Italian 
statistics regarding company closures following the imposition of such 
measures. 
 Another important aspect that should be highlighted is the need to im-
prove the safeguards of the rule of law in this legislation on extended con-
fiscation in order to guarantee first of all the respect of the principles of the 
rule of law (and the connected citizens’ freedoms) and to encourage the 
cooperation and mutual recognition in this sector. Mutual recognition must 
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be built on the harmonisation of confiscation laws but also, most im-
portantly, on mutual trust, which demands respect for the rule of law 
(Mitsilegas, 2006, 1277-1311). On 21 December 2016, a “Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mutual 
recognition of freezing and confiscation orders” (Proposal for a Regula-
tion, 2016) was presented (and amended in 2017), in order to impose the 
mutual recognition of all types of orders covered by Directive 2014/42/EU, 
as well as other types of orders issued without final conviction within the 
framework of criminal proceedings in criminal matters (in the first version 
the proposal demanded orders issued in “criminal proceedings”). This 
Regulation should not apply to freezing and confiscation orders issued 
within the framework of civil or administrative procedings (Maugeri, 2017, 
231). ‘Proceedings in criminal matters’ is an autonomous concept of Union 
law, where “the safeguards under the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of 
European Union] should apply. In particular, the essential safeguards of 
criminal proceedings set out in the Charter should apply to proceedings in 
criminal matters covered by this Regulation, which are not criminal pro-
ceedings” (recital n. 18).  
 In this context, the discovery of new types of intervention is gradually 
getting well-accepted following an approach entailing a ‘therapeutic’ man-
agement of enterprises that are temporarily afflicted by criminal viruses/el-
ements. The analysed judicial (compulsory) administration could be an in-
teresting alternative (art. 34 leg. decree n. 159/2011) to confiscation, as 
could the new instrument of judicial control of enterprise (art. 34 bis leg. 
decree n. 159/11). They are less invasive instruments that can sever a com-
pany’s ties with crime while, at the same time, maximising the chances of 
that business’s continued survival.  
 The mechanism of judicial administration (art. 34 leg. decree n. 159/11) 
provides an alternative to traditional ablating measures against enterprises, 
as a method of intervention against forms of mafia penetration within fun-
damentally sound and legal. It can be applied for purposes of combating 
illegality that has not yet reached a level of risk requiring the use of the 
seizure aimed at confiscation, but that nonetheless satisfies the appetites of 
organised crime. In the praxis, the adoption of an organisational, manage-
ment and control model (compliance program) by the company subjected 
to judicial administration, is particularly interesting and increases the value 
of this measure as a robust safeguard against the reiteration of unlawful 
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conduct that need to be reined in.  
 The new mechanism of Judicial control (art. 34 bis d.lgs. N. 159/2011) 
is inspired by an approach that enhances a company’s prospects through 
an intervention from outside the enterprise aimed at facilitating its rein-
statement into economic legality, inspired in turn by flexible decision-mak-
ing models that honour the principle of proportionality and impose the least 
possible invasion. The judicial intervention pursuant to art. 34, does not 
give rise to the ‘freezing’ of the entire governance, but it guarantees the 
continuity of the management. 
 In a wider European perspective, the proposal of these alternative in-
struments to confiscation should be considered as a tool to combat the tra-
ditional mafias, which are increasingly ‘looking outside’ their physical 
borders. Also, in general, they tackle the infiltration of organised and eco-
nomic crime in the legal economy. This proposal is inspired, on the one 
hand, by the principle of proportionality, with a view to ensuring balance 
between sanctioning response against the weight of the individual action. 
On the other hand, there is the need to ensure that the entire sanctioning 
system is rational and flexible, in that it provides a range of measures with 
appropriate degrees of severity. Ultimately, these instruments are designed 
to strike the fine balance between the need to repress illegality and the need 
to safeguard the ‘social value’ of the enterprise. 
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